Ajay Kumar Vs the State of Jharkhand

Jharkhand Police Housing Corporation Limited, through its Chairmancum-Managing Director, Line Tank Road, Near Lee lac Hotel, P.O. and P.S. Kotwali, District- Ranchi.

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The Superintending Engineer, Jharkhand Police Housing Corporation Limited, Line Tank Road, Near Lee Lac Hotel, P.O. and P.S. Kotwali, District- Ranchi.

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The Manager (Personnel), Jharkhand Police Housing Corporation Limited, Line Tank Road, near Lee Lac Hotel, P.O. and P.S. Kotwali, District- Ranchi. … … Respondents

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CORAM: HON’BLE MR. JUSTICE SUJIT NARAYAN PRASAD HON’BLE MR. JUSTICE RAJESH KUMAR

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------For the Appellant : Mr. Harsh Preet Singh, Advocate For the Resp.-JHPCL : Mr. Indranil Bhaduri, Advocate For the State : Mr. Arun Kumar Dubey, AC to GP-III

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C.A.V on 01.07.2025 Pronounced on 10/07/2025

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Per Sujit Narayan Prasad, J.

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The instant appeal under Clause 10 of the Letters Patent appeal is directed against the order dated 21.09.2023 passed in W.P(S) No.4449 of 2023 whereby and whereunder the writ petition has been dismissed by the learned Single Judge in which the impugned order of termination dated 17.07.2015 contained in Memo No.772 issued under the signature of Manager (Personnel), Jharkhand Police Housing Corporation Limited has been challenged by the writ petitioner.

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The brief facts of the case as per the pleadings made in the writ petition needs to refer herein which reads as under:

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(i) It is pleaded that the petitioner being qualified Diploma Engineer applied for the post of Junior Engineer (Civil) pursuant to an open advertisement floated by the respondent Jharkhand Police Housing Corporation Limited in the year 2009.

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(ii) Pursuant thereof, the petitioner was appointed following due process of law vide letter No. 951 dt 30.07.2010 and his joining was accepted and one standard format agreement was signed containing the terms of appointment.

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(iii) It is pleaded that from clause-6 of the terms of appointment, it would be evident that their services were to be governed by same service conduct rule by which, State Govt. employees are regulated. Further, the petitioner has also been declared public servant with stipulation that all conduct rules and regulation governing the Govt. Employees shall be applicable to the petitioner. This by itself sufficiently proves that services of the petitioner carry all tapings of regular employees and thereby happens regular in nature with only contractual/ad hoc in nomenclature.

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(iv) Further Clauses 8, 9, 10 and 11 of the agreement also goes long way in establishing that for all practical purposes he is regular and permanent employee. Hence no action contrary to the rules/regulations governing the field of misconduct etc. can be taken in summary manner without affording ample opportunity of defence by framing charge etc. with supply of memo of evidence in accordance with Civil Services (C.C.A.) Rules, 1930 with up-to-date amendments, till date.

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(v) It is further pleaded that pursuant to aforesaid constitutionally valid appointment and joining thereof, the petitioner was also sent for training and after completion of training of 15 days, the petitioner was assigned to execute the works of Palamau Division.

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(vi) It is pleaded that thereafter vide office Letter Contained in Memo No. 411/Ranchi dated 25.08.2010 issued under the signature of the Manager, Personnel, the petitioner was deputed to Garhwa District.

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(vii) It is pleaded that during the course of his service, the petitioner was transferred to different divisions and districts at various times thus further signifying that his service had all the bearings of a permanent employee only the nomenclature of the service was ad-hoc in nature.

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(viii) It is further case of the petitioner that the services of the petitioner and others were being found satisfactory; his salary was revised at various times.

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(ix) It is pleaded that the petitioner has always discharged his duties to the satisfaction of all concern; there was no communication of any complaint or deficiency in his work. On the contrary, whatever measurement books that he has prepared and submitted through the proper channel, i.e. after verification etc. by the Assistant Engineer, the same has been passed by the Executive Engineer and the payments were released in favor of the contractor/agency leading to timely completion of concerned schemes.

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(x) It is alleged that cutting across the aforesaid position, the Manager (Personnel) with oblique motive in order to get rid of the petitioner so as to facilitate the fresh appointment of the person of his choice or to that of seniors, suddenly issued the Letter No. 590 dated 03.06.2015, wherein while making non est and motivated attributions with respect to Agreement No. 11 F2/2010-11 pertaining to excess payment of Rs 3,71,770/(Rupees Three Lacs Seventy One thousand and Seven Hundred and Seventy Only) to the concerned contractor, an empty notice has been issued as to why not an action against him be taken .

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(xi) In the aforesaid context, the petitioner asserts that he has not committed any wrong in preparation of bills of any schemes, rather he has prepared and submitted the bills with all promptitude and after taking due care through proper channel and no prior show cause notice has ever been given to the petitioner and he submitted his reply to the aforesaid letter vide letter on 18.06.2015.

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(xii) Consequently, the petitioner was served Letter No. 771 dated 17.07.2015 in which false allegations were made against him regarding payment of excess amount of Rs 3,71,770/- (Rupees Three Lacs Seventy-One thousand and Seven Hundred and Seventy Only) and he was asked as to why not 1/3rd of Rs 3,71,770/- i.e Rs 1,23,993/- (Rupees One lac twenty-three thousand Nine Hundred and twenty-three) be recovered from him.

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(xiii) On account of Letter No. 771 dated 17.07.2015 the petitioner without any fault of his was threatened with summary removal if he did not deposit (Rupees One Lakh twenty-three thousand Nine Hundred and twenty-three) in favor of Jharkhand Police Housing Corporation.

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(xiv) It is the case of the writ petitioner that Respondent Authorities without following due process of law issued a stigmatic and predicative impugned order of Termination vide Memo No-772 dated 17.07.2015 under the signature of Respondent No.5 unilaterally declaring the petitioner as guilty for alleged excess payment of Rs 3,71,770/- (Rupees Three Lacs Seventy One thousand and Seven Hundred and Seventy Only) and terminated him from his service.

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(xv) Further on assurance of reinstatement as well as under tremendous pressure, the petitioner deposited Rs 42,000/(Rupees Forty Two Thousand) on 28.08.2015 and Rs 81,923/(Rupees Eighty One Thousand Nine Hundred and Twenty Three Only) on 12.10.2015 for which he was issued money receipts dated 07.09.2015 and 12.10.2015 by the Accounts Officer, Jharkhand Police Housing Corporation Limited respectively, but of no avail.

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(xvi) Thereafter, the writ-petitioner has time and again approached the Respondent Authorities to reverse the Termination Notice dated 17.07.2015 by way of hand-to-hand representation dated 05.01.2016, 10.01.2018, 06.02.2020 and 07.03.2022 but has received no correspondence from the Respondent Authorities.

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Being aggrieved with aforesaid, the writ petitioner after being punished by inflicting termination from the service has challenged the said termination order by filing a writ petition being W.P.(S) No.4449 of 2023, on the ground that termination is Imputative and Stigmatic on the face of it and further in continuation Letter No. 771 dated 17.07.2017 which is based on non est allegations, for which no opportunity of hearing has been granted to the petitioner. Hence same is violative of principle of Natural Justice.

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The learned Single Judge on two grounds, i.e., firstly, prior to termination of the service of the writ petitioner the authority has issued a show-cause notice and secondly, the writ petition has been preferred after delay of 8 years, has dismissed the aforesaid writ petition.

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Being aggrieved, the instant appeal has been preferred by the writ petitioner(appellant herein).

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Submission on behalf of the appellant-writ petitioner:

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In support of his contention, Mr. Harsh Preet Singh, the learned counsel appearing for the appellant-writ petitioner has taken the following grounds in assailing the impugned order:

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(i) The learned Single Judge has not appreciated the fact that the order of termination being stigmatic in nature, hence, regular departmental proceeding ought to have been initiated.

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(ii) The show-cause notice although has been issued but there is no consideration as would be evident from the face of the order of termination.

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(iii) Even though the writ petitioner has not committed any financial embezzlement but without arriving at any concrete conclusion the contract has been rescinded by the authority concerned.

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(iv) The learned Single Judge has also taken a ground that the writ petition was filed after delay of 8 years and, as such, taking the ground of delay and laches has dismissed the writ petition without going into the merits of the case in right perspective.

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(v) For that the order/judgment impugned is perverse both in law and fact.

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(vi) For that the impugned order of summarily dismissal since does not answers any points of law and/or constitutional violations raised in the writ petition, the same is not sustainable as per the judgments of the Hon'ble Apex Court.

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(vii) For that the learned Single Judge has failed to take into consideration that in the instant case show-cause and order by which dismissal has been done was issued on the same date, i.e, on 17.07.2015, thus, principle of natural justice was violated.

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(viii) For that by way of impugned judgment the learned Single Judge has failed to consider that delay is a species of waiver and the present case since involves constant breach of fundamental right of life on account of arbitrary snatching of livelihood, the so-called delay in filing the writ petition as argued by the respondent was liable to be ignored having no legal bearing in given facts of the case.

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(ix) For that the learned Single Judge has failed to appreciate that in the instant case there is continuing cause of action on account of

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livelihood loss caused to the petitioner and thereby no involvement of creation of third party right.

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(x) For that the learned Single Judge has failed to appreciate there are large scale vacancies in the respondent concerned, i.e., Jharkhand Police Housing Corporation Limited even now.

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(xi) For that the learned Single Judge ought to have considered that in the instant case the petitioner was illegally removed and the illegality thereof could not have been allowed to be perpetuated.

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(xii) For that the impugned judgment is otherwise inequitable, erroneous amounts granting premium for the fault committed by the respondents and punishment for no fault committed by the petitioner.

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(xiii) For that the learned Single Judge has further failed to consider that due to order of dismissal being stigmatic in nature the petitioner has failed to find any gainful employment thus violating his fundamental right of life as enshrined in the constitution.

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(xiv) For that since the case of the petitioner is otherwise squarely covered by the judgment of Sumit Roy rendered in WP(S) No-3803 of 2017 and which should have made operative suo motu by the respondents under the doctrine of equity the question of delay does not arise as per the law.

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(xv) For that the learned Single Judge has failed to appreciate that there cannot be any waiver or delay in case of violation of fundamental rights of life and livelihood.

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Learned counsel appearing for the writ petitioner-appellant based

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upon the aforesaid ground, initially, has contested the case by showing the

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error in the impugned order and has submitted that the impugned judgment needs interference.

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Submission on behalf of the Respondent-Authority:

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Mr. Indranil Bhaduri, the learned counsel appearing for the respondent-authority to defend the impugned order has raised the following grounds:

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(i) The learned counsel for the respondent has submitted that there is no error in the judgment passed by the learned Single Judge as it has rightly been held by the learned Single Judge that the principle of natural justice has been followed by the authority concerned by issuing show-cause notice and the writ petition has been filed after delay of about 8 years.

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(ii) The learned Single Judge in the impugned order has rightly observed that the service of the writ petitioner was purely on contractual basis for one year and the same may be cancelled at any point of time after issuance of show-cause notice which was duly issued twice by the authority concerned.

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(iii) The nature of engagement of the writ petitioner is contractual in nature depending upon certain terms and conditions, one of the conditions is that the engagement is to be dispensed with forthwith in case of any moral turpitude or commission of any financial irregularity.

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(iv) The nature of allegation against the writ petitioner is serious which relates to the financial irregularity of making payment in favour of the contractor more than their entitlement, hence, a show-cause notice was issued and after consideration of the reply

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furnished by the writ petitioner the decision was taken to rescind the contract and in consequence thereof the services of the writ petitioner was dispensed with vide order dated 17.07.2015.

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(v) The ground has been taken that the writ petitioner has approached this Court after lapse of 8 years and by the time when he has approached, the period of agreement/contract has already lost its force and, hence, the said ground has also been taken as one of the grounds, in addition to consideration on merit.

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The learned counsel based upon the aforesaid ground has submitted that the learned Single Judge after taking into consideration the aforesaid aspect of the matter has passed the impugned judgment and, thus, the same cannot be said to suffer from an error and, as such, the impugned judgment needs no interference.

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Analysis:

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We have heard the learned counsel appearing for the parties and gone through the findings recorded by the learned Single Judge as also the order passed by the adjudicatory authority concerned dated 17.07.2015.

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The admitted fact herein is that the writ petitioner while discharging his duty as Junior Engineer on contractual basis with the Jharkhand Police Housing Corporation Limited has made payment in favour of the contractor without completion of work and, as such, the allegation of irregularity has been levelled against him on commission of disbursement of excess amount of Rs.3,71,770/- in favour of the contractor.

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It is also admitted fact that the writ petitioner was engaged on contractual basis depending upon certain terms and conditions and one of

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the conditions is that in case of any moral turpitude or financial irregularity the service is to be dispensed forthwith.

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Pursuant thereto, a show-cause notice was issued to the writ petitioner to explain as to why the payment of excess amount of Rs,3,71,770/- in favour of the contractor without completion of work has been made by making an entry in the measurement book and if such reply finally will not be found to be satisfactory, then the legal, disciplinary and administrative action will be taken.

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The writ petitioner has replied denying the allegation of commission of any financial irregularity, but the authority having considered the same has come to the conclusion to rescind the contract and in consequence thereof the writ petitioner was terminated from service vide order dated 17.07.2015.

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The said order was challenged by filing writ petition being W.P(S) No.4449 of 2023 by taking the ground that the order being stigmatic and, as such, regular departmental proceeding ought to have been initiated but even no show-cause notice has been issued and order of termination has been passed.

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On the other hand, the learned counsel appearing for the respondent-authority has taken the plea that the show-cause notice was issued on consideration of the reply and engagement of the writ petitioner was cancelled depending upon the terms and conditions as stipulated in the offer of appointment wherein it was provided that in case of any irregularity found to be there the services will be dismissed forthwith.

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The learned Single Judge on consideration of the rival submissions has dismissed the writ petition on two grounds, i.e., firstly the

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show-cause notice has been issued and secondly, that the writ petition has been preferred after delay of 8 years.

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The said dismissal order is the subject matter of the present appeal.

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The learned counsel appearing for the writ petitioner in order to make out a case has taken the ground that since the order of termination is stigmatic and, as such, even in a case of contractual engagement the departmental proceeding is to be initiated for at least a show-cause notice ought to have been issued.

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So far as the issue of initiation of departmental proceeding is concerned, this Court is of the view that the said argument is having no basis, reason being that the nature of appointment was purely on contract basis, then as per the settled position of law a contractual engagement is to depend upon the terms and conditions as stipulated in the offer of appointment and there cannot be any deviation therefrom. Since, the parties of the contract after going through the terms and contract has entered into the contract therefore, cannot be any deviation anywhere and no addition or alteration can be made in the said contract.

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The Hon’ble Apex Court in the case of Rakesh Kumar Verma HDFC Bank Ltd. 2025 INSC 473 has categorically observed that like any other contract, even in an employment contract, a concluded contract pre supposes the existence of at least two parties with mutual rights and obligations and once a concluded contract comes into existence, it is axiomatic that such rights and obligations of the parties are governed by the terms and conditions thereof.

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It is further settled position of law that if any terms and conditions have been agreed upon by the parties the same cannot be relaxed by the High Court sitting under Article 226 of the Constitution of India otherwise it will amount to re-write the terms and conditions of contract as has been held in the case of Union Territory of Pondicherry and Ors Vs. P.V. Suresh and Ors., reported in (1994) 2 SCC 70 wherein at paragraph 11 it has been held that the Court has no jurisdiction to alter the terms or rewrite the contract between the parties, for ready reference paragraph 11 is being referred as under:—

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“11. In the circumstances of this case, …………………….. Otherwise, the Court has no jurisdiction to alter the terms or rewrite the contract between the parties.”

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Further, the Hon'ble Apex Court in the judgment rendered

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in Vice-Chairman and Managing Director, A.P. Sidc Ltd. v. R. Varaprasad [(2003) 11 SCC 572] at paragraph 12 has held as under:

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When the employees have opted for VRS on their own without any compulsion knowing fully well about the Scheme, guidelines and circulars governing the same, it is not open to them to make any claim contrary to the terms accepted. It is a matter of contract between the Corporation and the employees. It is not for the courts to rewrite the terms of the contract , which were clear to the contracting parties, as indicated in the guidelines and circulars governing them under which Voluntary Retirement Schemes floated.”

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Further, it needs to refer herein that so far as the nature of engagement on contractual basis is concerned, the Civil Services (C.C.A.) Rules, 1930 which is applicable to the employee working under the regular establishment, will not be applicable.

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Since, the Civil Services (C.C.A.) Rules, 1930 is applicable under the regular establishment and not for the contractual engagement,

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rather for contractual engagement the terms and conditions of the offer of appointment is to be made applicable.

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However, the terms and conditions are there to forthwith dispense with the service of the contractual engagement in case of any moral turpitude or financial irregularity, but if the nature of termination is punitive or stigmatic, then the principle of natural justice is to be followed.

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It is relevant to refer herein that in a case of stigmatic order no departmental proceeding as provided to be initiated for the employee working under the regular establishment is to be issued against the engagement on contract, rather in order to follow the principle of natural justice the show-cause notice is required to be issued.

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We are now proceeding to examine as to whether a show-cause notice has been issued against the writ petitioner before passing the order of termination and if yes, then no case will be said to be made out by the writ petitioner by taking the plea of the order being stigmatic.

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Further, the required consideration is to be made herein that even accepting that no show-cause notice has been issued said to be conflicting before termination of the service of the writ petitioner can any relief be given to the writ petitioner if he approached the Court of law after lapse of 8 years, i.e., after expiry of contract which was initially for one year, however, deemed to be extended upto the date of termination.

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It is evident from the communication dated 03.06.2015 addressed to the writ petitioner, also in addition thereto the same has also been served to the Executive Engineer and the Assistant Engineer concerned, wherein the reference of the financial irregularity has been shown as per which the money has been shown to be paid in favour of the

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contractor without any actual work, however, the entry has been made in the measurement book due to which a sum of Rs.3,71,770/- has been paid unauthorizedly in favour of the contractor. The petitioner was asked to reply within 15 days, failing which, the legal, disciplinary and administrative action will be taken.

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The writ petitioner has replied thereto on 18.06.2015 in which there is no specific denial with respect to the payment made in favour of the contractor said to be made without any work, rather it has been stated therein that the money has been paid but it is the accountability of the contractor for completion of work.

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It has also been stated that if any irregularity was done in the completion of work, then the money could have been forfeited from the Earnest Money and Security Money deposited with the authority.

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It is evident from the said reply that the writ petitioner instead of denying the said allegation has virtually accepted the same. 34. The respondent-authority thereafter has come out with the order dated 17.07.2015 as contained in Memo No 772 by the order of the Managing Director of the Jharkhand Police Housing Corporation Limited by which the engagement of the writ petitioner has been terminated.

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Admittedly herein for redressal of his grievances the writ petitioner had preferred the writ petition being W.P(S) No.4449 of 2023 in the year 2023, i.e., after lapse of about 8 years.

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There is no dispute of the proposition of law that the writ court being the court of equity is to entertain the writ petition, if the writ court is being approached within a reasonable period of time.

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It is also equally settled that in the proceeding under Article 226 of the Constitution of India the principle of limitation is not applicable but the delay and laches is applicable so that the court of equity may not be approached after inordinate delay. Reference in this regard be made to the judgment rendered by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in P.S. Sadasivaswamy v. State of T.N. (1975) 1 SCC 152 wherein at para 2, their

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Lordship have held as under:

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“2. The main grievance of the appellant is that the second respondent who was junior to him as Assistant Engineer was promoted as Divisional Engineer in 1957 by relaxing the relevant rules regarding the length of service necessary for promotion as Divisional Engineer and that his claim for a similar relaxation was not considered at that time. The learned Judge of the Madras High Court who heard the writ petition was of the view that the relaxation of the rules in favour of the second respondent without considering the appellant's case was arbitrary. In view of the statement on behalf of the Government that such relaxation was given only in the case of overseas scholars, which statement was not controverted, it is not possible to agree with the view of the learned Judge. Be that as it may, if the appellant was aggrieved by it he should have approached the court even in the year 1957, after the two representations made by him had failed to produce any result. One cannot sleep over the matter and come to the court questioning that relaxation in the year 1971. There is the further fact that even after Respondents 3 and 4 were promoted as Divisional Engineers over the head of the appellant he did not come to the court questioning it. There was a third opportunity for him to have come to the court when Respondents 2 to 4 were again promoted as Superintending Engineers over the head of the appellant. After fourteen long years because of the tempting prospect of the Chief Engineership he has come to the court. In effect he wants to unscramble a scrambled egg. It is very difficult for the Government to consider whether any relaxation of the rules should have been made in favour of the appellant in the year 1957. The conditions that were prevalent in 1957, cannot be reproduced now. In any case as the Government had decided as a matter of policy, as they were entitled to do, not to relax the rules in favour of any except overseas scholars it will be

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wholly pointless to direct them to consider the appellant's case as if nothing had happened after 1957. Not only Respondent 2 but also Respondents 3 and 4 who were the appellant's juniors became Divisional Engineers in 1957, apparently on the ground that their merits deserved their promotion over the head of the appellant. He did not question it. Nor did he question the promotion of his juniors as Superintending Engineers over his head. He could have come to the court on every one of these three occasions. A person aggrieved by an order of promoting a junior over his head should approach the court at least within six months or at the most a year of such promotion. It is not that there is any period of limitation for the courts to exercise their powers under Article 226 nor is it that there can never be a case where the courts cannot interfere in a matter after the passage of a certain length of time. But it would be a sound and wise exercise of discretion for the courts to refuse to exercise their extraordinary powers under Article 226 in the case of persons who do not approach it expeditiously for relief and who stand by and allow things to happen and then approach the court to put forward stale claims and try to unsettle settled matters. The petitioner's petition should, therefore, have been dismissed in limine. Entertaining such petitions is a waste of time of the court. It clogs the work of the court and impedes the work of the court in considering legitimate grievances as also its normal work. We consider that the High Court was right in dismissing the appellant's petition as well as the appeal.”

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Further, the Hon’ble Supreme Court in New Delhi Municipal

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Council v. Pan Singh (2007) 9 SCC 278 by referring to the judgment rendered in Lipton India Ltd. v. Union of India (1994) 6 SCC 524 has observed that although, there is no period of limitation provided for filing a writ petition under Article 226 of the Constitution of India, ordinarily, writ petition should be filed within a reasonable time.

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Further, we have considered the issue of issuance of show-cause notice as since it has been referred in the judgment passed by the learned Single Judge that twice show-cause notice has been issued.

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This Court, in order to examine the aforesaid fact has found that the show-cause notice has been issued to the writ petitioner with respect to making payment in favour of the contractor and failing in reply to the same, the legal, disciplinary and administrative action will be taken. The reply of the writ petitioner is in admission and instead of its denial the statement has been given therein in defence that even the excess money has been paid but the said money will be recovered from the Earnest Money and Security Money deposited by the contractor.

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Now, the question is that when there is no specific denial of the conduct by the writ petitioner himself as per the reply dated 18.06.2015 (as available in the paper-book at page-53 thereof), then where is the question to issue a show-cause notice prior to termination.

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Once commission of irregularity has been admitted, there is no question of issuance of show-cause notice, since, issuance of show-cause notice is to follow the principle of natural justice and there is no straight jacket formula that in each and every case the issuance of show-cause notice is to be followed for the purpose of following the principle of natural justice.

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The issuance of show-cause notice is required to be there in order to follow the principle of natural justice if there is a chance in change of the outcome. But if there is no chance in change of the outcome, then for the purpose of formalities there is no need to provide opportunity of hearing, reference in this regard may be made to judgment rendered by Hon’ble Apex Court in the case of Escorts Farms Ltd. Vrs. Commissioner, Kumaon Division, Nainital, U.P. and Ors ., reported in

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(2004) 4 SCC 281 wherein Hon’ble the Apex Court has held at paragraph-

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64 which is being quoted herein below:-

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64.------------ Rules of natural justice are to be followed for doing substantial justice and not for completing a mere ritual of hearing without possibility of any change in the decision of the case on merits. In view of the legal position explained by us above, we therefore, refrain from remanding these cases in exercise of our discretionary powers under Article 136 of the Constitution of India”

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Further, in the case of Dharampal Satyapal Ltd Vrs. Deputy Commissioner of Central Excise, Gauhati and Ors ., reported in (2015) 8 SCC 519 the Hon’ble Apex Court has categorically held that there may be situations wherein for some reason perhaps because the evidence against the individual is thought to be utterly compelling- it is felt that a fair hearing “would make no difference”- meaning that a hearing would not change the ultimate conclusion reached by the decision-maker”. For ready reference the relevant paragraph of the aforesaid judgment is being quoted as under:

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“39. We are not concerned with these aspects in the present case as the issue relates to giving of notice before taking action. While emphasizing that the principles of natural justice cannot be applied in straight jacket formula, the aforesaid instances are given. We have highlighted the jurisprudential basis of adhering to the principles of natural justice which are grounded on the doctrine of procedural fairness, accuracy of outcome leading to general social goals, etc. Nevertheless, there may be situations wherein for some reason perhaps because the evidence against the individual is thought to be utterly compelling- it is felt that a fair hearing “would make no difference”- meaning that a hearing would not change the ultimate conclusion reached by the decision-maker”.

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Exactly, the case of the writ petitioner is same herein, since, he has not denied the allegation, rather has stated in the reply that the same could have been recovered from the contractor from the Earnest Money and the Security Money. The show-cause notice dated 03.06.2015 which

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has been given to the writ petitioner is to ask his explanation regarding the excess payment made to the tune of Rs.3,71,770/- to the contractor which has been admitted by the writ petitioner. The said show-cause notice has been referred by the learned Single Judge in the impugned judgment. However, once the writ petitioner has admitted the fact of making excess payment of Rs.3,71,770/- in favour of the contractor, then there is no need to issue show-cause notice prior to terminating the engagement of the writ petitioner.

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The respondent-authority has terminated the service of the writ petitioner based upon the condition available in the offer of appointment. 47. Further, the ground as has been taken by the learned Single Judge in the impugned judgment is that the writ petition has been filed after lapse of about 8 years. The question is that even if the writ petition would have been allowed, then what relief could have been given to the writ petitioner due to the lapse of the period of contract long back.

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Since, the contract is only for the period of one year although the same has been extended year by year up-till the date of order of termination. If the writ petitioner would have come to this Court immediately after the order of termination, then it could have been understood but even if a positive direction would have been passed by the learned Single Judge no purpose would have been served, since, in the meanwhile, the fresh engagement could have been made for the purpose of carrying out the public utility service.

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This Court, in view of the aforesaid discussion and adverting to the findings recorded by the learned Single Judge, is of the view that no error has been found to be there in the impugned judgment dated

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21.09.2023 passed by the learned Single Judge in W.P(S) No.4449 of 2023

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and, accordingly, the instant appeal is liable to be dismissed.

¶166