Allowed

Kantu Kumar Thakur v. Central Mine Planning and Design Institute Ltd. through Its Chairman Cum Managing Director

Jharkhand HC15 Jul 2025LPA/541/2024

Case brief

AI extract

What is this about?

The Division Bench allowed an appeal against a Single Judge's dismissal of a writ petition seeking compassionate appointment. The Court quashed the rejection order, holding that once a Medical Board assesses age ambiguously (35-40 years), authorities must take the lower limit (35 years) per Lilwa Bhuiyan precedent, rather than the midpoint (37.5 years) which the respondent utilized to deny the cla

What did the court decide?

The appeal allowed; impugned order dated 10.06.2022 quashed; respondent directed to consider appellant's case; writ petition allowed.

Kantu Kumar Thakur Vs Central Mine… — Pension and Retirement Benefits | Jharkhand HC (2025)

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IN THE HIGH COURT OF JHARKHAND AT RANCHI L.P.A. No. 541 of 2024

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Kantu Kumar Thakur, aged about 28 years, son of Late Shiv Narayan Thakur, resident of Village – Benti, P.O. – Behera, P.S. – Piparwar, District

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– Chatra. ... Appellant/Writ Petitioner

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Versus

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Central Mine Planning & Design Institute Ltd. Through its Chairmancum-Managing Director, having its office at Gondwana Place, Kanke Road, P.O. & P.S. – Kanke, District – Ranchi.

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The Director (P & A1), Central Mine Planning & Design Institute Ltd. Having its office at Gondwana Place, Kanke Road, P.O. & P.S. – Kanke, District – Ranchi.

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The General Manager (P &A1), Central Mine Planning & Design Institute Ltd. having its office at Gondwana Place, Kanke Road, P.O. & P.S. – Kanke, District – Ranchi.

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... Respondents/Respondents

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CORAM : HON’BLE MR. JUSTICE SUJIT NARAYAN PRASAD HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE RAJESH KUMAR

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------

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For the Appellant : Mr. Abhijeet Kumar Singh, Advocate : Mr. Kumar Harsh, Advocate : Ms. Khushboo Kumari, Advocate : Ms. Tejaswa Mohanta, Advocate For the Respondents : Mr. Amit Kumar Das, Advocate : Mr. Vineet Sinha, Advocate ------

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Order No. 06 CAV on 24^th June, 2025 Pronounced on 15^th July, 2025

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Per Sujit Narayan Prasad, J.:

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1. The instant appeal is under Clause 10 of the Letters Patent against the order dated 26.06.2024 passed by the learned Single Judge of this Court in writ petition being W.P.(S) No. 3378 of 2023, whereby and whereunder the learned Single Judge while dismissing the writ petition has declined to interfere with the decision taken by the respondent-CCL by which the claim of compassionate appointment of petitioner/appellant has been rejected on the ground that the appellant has crossed the maximum age of 35 years on the basis of the assessment made by the Medical Board.

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Factual Matrix

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2. The brief facts of the case as per the pleading made in the petition and in the memo of appeal needs to be refer herein which reads as under:

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The petitioner has claimed appointment on compassionate ground after demise of his father, who was working as CAT-II Drill Helper under respondent CCL. His father died in harness on 25.03.2020.

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The petitioner being legal heir and son of the deceased employee had applied for appointment on compassionate ground under the provision of National Coal Wage Agreement on 12.11.2020.

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After due consideration, the respondents have rejected the claim of the petitioner vide order dated 10.06.2022 on the ground that the

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petitioner has crossed the age of appointment required for compassionate appointment.

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3. The appellant thereafter filed a writ petition being W.P.(S) No. 3378 of 2023, which was being rejected by the learned Single Judge of this Court, against which the instant appeal is filed.

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4. It is evident from the factual aspect that the appellant being dependent of the deceased employee had made an application for consideration of the appointment on compassionate ground.

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5. The respondent authorities, while entertaining the said application, has submitted the appellant to Medical Board for assessment of his age in order to assess as to whether the appellant was within the age of 35 years or more than 35 years.

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6. The Medical Boad has assessed the age of the petitioner to be in between the age of 35 to 40 years, hence coming to the mid-point in between the age of 35 to 40 years, i.e., 37.5 years age of the appellant has been assessed.

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7. Vide order dated 10.06.2022, the respondent, on consideration of the aforesaid assessment of the age of the appellant by the Medical Board, has rejected the claim of the writ petitioner/appellant on the ground that the appellant has crossed the age of 35 years on the date of filing application for compassionate appointment.

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8. The appellant-writ petitioner has challenged the said order by filing writ petition being W.P.(S) No. 3378 of 2023.

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9. The respondent CCL has appeared and contested the case and while filing the counter-affidavit, the ground has been taken that there is no error in the assessment made by the Medical Board and further if the age of the petitioner will be taken into consideration i.e. 31.12.1982 which has been mentioned in the Aadhar card as available in the paper book at Page No. 79, the age of the appellant will be more than the age of 35 years.

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10. The appellant/writ petitioner has taken the ground by relying upon the judgment rendered in the case of Lilwa Bhuiyan V. CCL, 2021 SCC OnLine Jhar 1301, has submitted that as per the aforesaid judgment in case of age assessment by the medical board, lower age limit has to be taken into consideration.

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11. The learned writ Court, on consideration of the fact that the age of the appellant has been assessed by the Medical Board to be 37.5 years, the mid-point in between the age of 35 to 40 years and applying the order passed by the Hon’ble Apex Court in the case of Rajasthan Pradesh Vaidya Samiti, Sardarshahar & Anr. V. Union of India & Ors. (2010) 12 SCC 609 has dismissed the writ petition, which is the subject matter of the present appeal.

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Arguments advanced by the learned counsel appearing for the appellant:

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12. The learned counsel appearing for the appellant-writ petitioner has taken the following grounds in assailing the impugned order passed

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by the learned Single Judge as also the order passed by the respondent CCL rejecting the claim of the appellant:

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(i) The Medical Board has assessed the age of 35 to 40 years, and respondent authority by taking the mid-point in between 35 to 40 years i.e. 37.5 years has rejected the claim of the writ petitioner and while rejecting the claim based upon the aforesaid assessment of the Medical Board, the order passed by this Court in the case of Lilwa Bhuiyan V. CCL (supra) has not been taken into consideration wherein this Court has decided that the mid-point which is to be taken on the basis of the assessment of the age by the Medical Board cannot be allowed to be taken, since the writ petitioner has not got the status of an employee and, therefore, the decision of the respondent CCL as contained in letter dated 07.07.1992 is not applicable in the facts and circumstances of the instant case.

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(ii) It has been submitted that once the issue of age assessment by the medical board has been decided in the order/judgment passed by this Court in L.P.A. NO. 687 of 2019 Lilwa Bhuiyan V. CCL (supra) , wherein it has been observed by the Division Bench of this Court that the lower age limit has to be taken into consideration, the respondent CCL ought not to have assessed the age by taking the mid-point of the age, but ignoring the said judgment passed by this Court, hence the order passed by the authorities is not sustainable in the eye of law, but the aforesaid

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aspect of the matter has also not been considered by the learned Single Judge, rather by holding therein that the writ petitioner since have been found to be more than of the age of 35 years and as such, there is no need to interfere with the decision taken by the authorities in rejecting the claim for appointment on compassionate ground.

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(iii) The learned counsel has also taken the ground that since the appointment is to be made on the National Coal Wage Agreement, which is a beneficial piece of legislation and as such, the same is liberally to be construed in favour of the dependent of the deceased employee, but contrary to the said principle, the approach has been taken by negating the claim that too when the issue has been settled by this Court not to come to the mid-point of the age assessed by the Medical Board.

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13. The learned counsel, based upon the aforesaid grounds, has submitted that the order passed by learned Single Judge therefore suffers from an error and the same is not sustainable in the eye of law, hence is fit to be quashed and set aside.

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Arguments advanced by the learned counsel appearing for respondent-CCL:

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14. Per contra, Mr. Amit Kumar Das, learned counsel appearing for the respondent CCL, while defending the impugned judgment, has taken

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the following ground:

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(i) The order passed by the learned Single Judge suffers from no error, reason being that the assessment which has been made by the Medical Board is in consonance with the age available on record with the Aadhar document, wherein the date of birth of the appellant if taken into consideration, it will come to more than of the age of 35 years. It has been contended that the maximum age of appointment in the CCL is 35 years hence rightly the claim of writ petitioner/appellant has been rejected.

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(ii) The learned Single Judge has considered the aforesaid aspect of the matter and therefore the impugned order of rejection of claim for appointment on compassionate ground has rightly not been interfered with.

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(iii) The submission has been made that so far as the judgment rendered by this Court in the case of Lilwa Bhuiyan V. CCL (supra) is concerned, the same has been considered by the learned Single Judge and on its consideration, the fact as available in the present case, the same has been found to be applicable since, in the case of Lilwa Bhuiyan V. CCL (supra) also the judgment has been passed by this Court that the assessment of age by the Medical Board has been considered to be correct,

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based upon the document available on record.

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(iv) It has been submitted that herein also the assessment of the age of the writ petitioner made by the Medical Board in between the age of 35 to 40 years and accordingly , the mid-point has been taken as 37.5 years, which is in corroboration with the age of the writ petitioner as referred in Page 53 or Page 79 of the memo of the instant appeal.Hence, it is incorrect on the part of the appellant to take the ground that the judgment rendered in the case of Lilwa Bhuiyan V. CCL (supra) has not rightly been considered rather on its consideration, the claim of the appellant-writ petitioner has been rejected.

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(v) The learned counsel has also relied upon the judgment rendered by this Court in the case of Ganesh Kumar V. M/s Central Coalfields Limited & Ors., LPA No. 311 of

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2021.

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15. The learned counsel, based upon the aforesaid grounds, has submitted that the judgment passed by the learned Single Judge, suffers from no error.

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Analysis

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16. We have heard the learned counsel for the parties and gone through the finding recorded by the learned Single Judge in the impugned judgment as also the factual aspect available on record along with the

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document available therein.

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17. This Court, on consideration of the argument advanced on behalf of the parties and after going through the finding recorded by the learned Single Judge in the impugned order needs to consider the applicability of the judgment passed in the case of Lilwa Bhuiyan V. CCL (supra) and Ganesh Kumar V. M/s Central Coalfields Limited & Ors., , but for consideration of the said judgments, the factual aspects of both the judgments needs to be refer herein.

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18. The reference of the facts of the case of Lilwa Bhuiyan V. CCL (supra) is being quoted herein which reads as under:

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2. ----- The brief facts of the case which need to be enumerated herein, read as under:—

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The mother of the writ petitioner, namely, Laxmi Devi, was appointed to the post of Ex-Wagon Loader on 18.12.1989, who died in harness on 19.12.2013. The petitioner, being the legal heir, approached the respondent authorities for consideration of his case for appointment on compassionate ground under the provision of Clause 9.3.0 of National Coal Wage Agreement (hereinafter to be referred to as NCWA). His case for compassionate appointment was forwarded for consideration. The writ petitioner had annexed copy of Driving License, Aadhar Card, nomination form and L.T.C. form with his application. His case was referred to the Medical Board for assessment of the correct age. The Medical Board assessed the age of the writ petitioner to be 371/2 years on the date of assessment and taking into consideration the aforesaid age and keeping the fact into consideration that maximum age for appointment is 35 years, his case was rejected vide order dated 16.06.2015, aggrieved thereof the writ petitioner has approached to this Court by filing writ petition being W.P.(S) No. 2424 of 2019.

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5. Learned Single Judge, after taking into consideration the stand of

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the respondent C.C.L., has found no merit in the writ petition and accordingly the writ petition has been dismissed which is the subject matter of the instant intra- court appeal.

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19. Following findings has been recorded in the said case by the Division

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Bench of this Court which is being quoted as under:

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18. We have considered the L.T.C. Form vis-a-vis PS-3 and PS-4 Forms which contain details about the family members wherefrom we have found that in the L.T.C. Form-A the age of the writ petitioner has been shown to be 15 years but it is very surprising that the said L.T.C. Form is having no signature of the respondent authorities and the same is without any date and as such, the age of the writ petitioner finds mentioned therein as 15 years, but on what date, is not being clarified from the said document and, therefore, according to us, the said document cannot be said to be a proof of age of the writ petitioner.

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19. We have also perused the PS-3 Form which contains particulars of family members wherein the age of the writ petitioner has been shown to be 18 years and the said document is dated 28.05.1998.

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20. It is further evident from the L.T.C. Form-A that the said application does not contain any column for signature of the employer rather it is the form to be furnished by way of selfdeclaration of the concerned employee but the PS-3 Form i.e., particulars of family, contains the column for signature of the employer. Likewise, PS-4 Form i.e., the nomination form, also contains column for signature of the employer and as such, in comparison in between the L.T.C. Form-A and PS-3 and PS-4 Forms, so far as its authenticity is concerned, in absence of any signature of the employer the same cannot prevail upon the details furnished either in PS-3 or PS-4 Forms and, therefore, the authority, instead of putting reliance upon L.T.C. Form-A so far as the age of the writ petitioner is concerned, ought to have considered solely the details furnished including the age of the writ petitioner on PS-3 or PS-4 Forms.

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21. Therefore, reliance having been placed by the respondent CCL on the L.T.C. Form-A cannot be said to be justified one since the age

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of 15 years mentioned therein cannot be said to be conclusive age in absence of any date mentioned in L.T.C. Form-A as to on what date and year the writ petitioner was of the age of 15 years.

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22. So far as PS-3 Form is concerned, the age of the writ petitioner has been mentioned as 18 years as on 28.05.1998 and, therefore, the said document i.e., PS-3 Form, containing the particulars of family members, can be said to be a valid document to assess the age of the writ petitioner. Since herein the respondent CCL is placing reliance upon these documents i.e., L.T.C. Form-A, PS-3 and PS-4 Forms but reliance has been placed by the respondent CCL in L.T.C. Form where the age of the writ petitioner has been shown to be 15 years while in PS-3 and PS-4 Forms the age of the writ petitioner has been shown to be 18 years which led the respondent CCL to come to the conclusion about discrepancy in the age necessitating for constituting a Medical Board but as we have already said hereinabove that the age having mentioned in L.T.C. Form-A without any date and year, cannot be relied and, therefore, the age mentioned in PS-3 and PS-4 where the age of the writ petitioner has been mentioned as 18 years on 28.05.1998 can only be said to be valid document for assessment of age of the writ petitioner and as such, there was no requirement to constitute a Medical Board.

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23. The respondent CCL has not considered this aspect of the matter even though an agreement has been entered into by way of National Coal Wage Agreement which is a beneficial piece of agreement as per provision of Section 18(1) of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 to make out provision for providing appointment in case of death of bread earner by way of social security measures, meaning thereby, the NCWA which is having a statutory fervor as because the agreement has been entered in view of Section 18(1) of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 which confers statutory force to the agreement and as such, the same ought to have been considered by the respondent CCL taking into consideration the object and intent of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947.

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24. It is settled position of law that benevolent provisions should be construed taking into consideration the dominant purpose of the statute, intention of the legislature and underlying policy as laid down by Hon'ble Apex Court in National Textile Workers' Union etc.

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v. P.R. Ramakrishnan reported in (1983) 1 SCC 228 : AIR 1983 SC 75 and in Madan Singh Shekhawat v. Union of India reported in (1999) 6 SCC 459 wherein it has been held that it would be the duty of the Court to interpret the provision, especially a beneficial provision, liberally so as to give it a wider meaning rather than a restrictive meaning which would negate the very object of the Rule.

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25. It is admitted by the respondent CCL that the Medical Board is constituted in case of discrepancy in the age. We are not disagreeing with the said policy decision but the question is that while constituting a Medical Board, there must be conscious decision by the competent authority in the backdrop of the factual aspect but we repeatedly asked the learned counsel appearing for the respondent CCL to place on record any decision of the competent authority to constitute a Medical Board to assess as to what led the competent authority of the respondent CCL to constitute the Medical Board but surprisingly no such decision has been produced, however, a noting sheet has been produced by way of affidavit dated 09.02.2021 wherein a hand written script has been placed on record under the signature of the General Manager (P & IR) referring therein that due to discrepancy in the age of the writ petitioner having been mentioned in L.T.C. Form, PS- 3 and PS-4, a decision was taken to constitute a Medical Board but anything contained in the noting sheet cannot be said to be a decision of the authority, rather a decision will be said to be a decision in the eyes of law if the same has been taken by the competent authority after deliberating upon the issues and communicating to all concerned for its execution/implementation and, therefore, we are left with no option but to hold that the decision of the respondent CCL asking the writ petitioner to go for the medical examination is in absence of any decision of the competent authority.

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26. We have already referred hereinabove about the validity of the L.T.C. Form-A and further we have come to a conclusion that PS-3 and PS-4 Forms refer the age of the writ petitioner as 18 years as on 28.05.1998, the same being a piece of evidence to substantiate the age of the writ petitioner available on record and which is sole piece of evidence, there was no requirement to constitute a Medical Board for assessment of the age of the writ petitioner as because the

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reason for constituting a Medical Board as has been admitted by the learned counsel appearing for the respondent CCL that the same is required to be assessed in case of nonavailability of any document pertaining to age of the employee but herein official documents are available by way of PS-3 and PS-4 Forms containing the age of the writ petitioner as 18 years on 28.05.1998.

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27. Even accepting the contention of the respondent CCL that there was requirement to constitute a Medical Board and admittedly the Medical Board has assessed the age of the writ petitioner in between 35 to 40 years and respondent authorities have considered the writ petitioner to be the age of 371/2 years taking the midpoint of five years but the question is why the midpoint and not 35 years.

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28. We have already referred hereinabove about the principle to be followed in a case of beneficial legislation which is to be interpreted liberally so as to give it a wider meaning than a restrictive meaning which would indicate the very object of the Rule and admittedly the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 is a beneficial legislation and as such, the provisions contained therein may be construed taking the dominant purpose of the statute, intention of the legislature and underlying policy.

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29. We have also referred hereinabove that the NCWA is by way of providing social security measures by entering into an agreement with the Union under the provision of Section 18(1) of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 and the same having the statutory fervor, the object underlying therein is to be considered. The foremost object of the said agreement is to act by way of providing social security measures to the employees and its dependant for which various provisions have been made to provide appointment in case of death of the bread earner as under Clause 9.3.0 and 9.5.0 of the said agreement and, therefore, when the underlying object of the said agreement is to provide social security measures to the employees and their dependants, the same is to be treated by the respondent authorities in a way so that the object and intent of the agreement be achieved.

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30. The respondent CCL, however, failed to produce any decision of the authority, in case of consideration of appointment on

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compassionate ground, to take the midpoint of the age assessed by the Medical Board as has been done in the instant case, rather the document dated 07.07.1992 has been produced to assess the age of an employee by taking the midpoint of the age as has been assessed by the Medical Board but since it is not a case of an employee rather the case of a candidate who is seeking appointment on compassionate ground and, therefore, the said circular will not be applicable in the case of the writ petitioner and in that view of the mutter, when the respondent authorities have asked the writ petitioner to go for the medical examination wherein the age of the writ petitioner has been assessed in between 35 to 40 years and taking the midpoint the age of the writ petitioner has been assessed as 371/2 years of age, cannot be said to be an action to achieve the object and intent of the NCWA to provide social security measures to the dependant of the deceased employee, rather the approach of the respondent authorities ought to have been to consider the age of the writ petitioner by taking its lower point so that the object and intent of NCWA be achieved.

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31. It requires to refer herein about the order passed by the Coordinate Division Bench of this Court in L.P.A. No. 117 of 2010 dated 01.12.2010 which has been brought on record wherein also the issue fell for consideration about judging the age of appellant on medical opinion and therein it has been observed that if the petitioner's claim that her age is 43 years and the respondents considered that as per the medical evidence her age is 45 years then there always possibility of errors of two years (plus)/ (minus) and in that view of the matter the claim of the petitioner's mother could not have been denied on compassionate ground.

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32. It has been brought to the notice of this Court by the learned counsel for the appellant that in pursuance to the order passed in L.P.A. No. 117 of 2010 [Md. Rahim v. Project Officer, Kuju Colliery], the appellant namely Md. Rahim has already been provided with the appointment which fact has not been disputed by the learned counsel appearing for the respondent CCL

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33. Further, learned counsel for the appellant has relied upon the judgment passed by the learned Single Judge of this Court in the case of Jagdish v. Central Coalfields Limited in W.P.(S) No. 3339 of 2016

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wherein also the dispute about the age has been set at rest by the opinion of the Medical Board after assessment of the age of the writ petitioner in that writ petition which has been questioned by the writ petitioner on the ground that when the age of the writ petitioner is available in other records what is the necessity to go for the Medical Board and in that view of the matter the writ petition was allowed with a direction to appoint the writ petitioner of the said writ petition on compassionate ground.

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34. We are taking note of this order even though the same has been passed by the learned Single Judge only due to the reason that the respondent CCL, in pursuance to the said order, has acted upon by providing appointment to the writ petitioner of the said case without assailing the same before the higher forum and, therefore, according to us, the approach of the respondent CCL, being the machinery of the State, cannot be of pick and choose policy i.e., to assail one order and accept another order on almost same set of facts.

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35. We, on the basis of the discussion made hereinabove, have gone across the order passed by the learned Single Judge and found therefrom that the learned Single Judge has simply gone across the contention of the respondent CCL wherein the respondent CCL has contended about the age of writ petitioner to be 371/2 years which has been considered to be more than the maximum age of 35 years and, therefore, writ petition has been dismissed but we, on the basis of the discussion made hereinabove, are of the view that the learned Single Judge has failed to appreciate the fact in entirety as per the discussion made hereinabove and reached to a wrong conclusion by approving the decision of the respondent CCL which according to us, cannot be said to be sustainable in the eyes of law.

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36. In view thereof, we find patent illegality in the impugned order. Accordingly, the same is quashed and set aside. In the result, the instant L.P.A. is allowed and the writ petition being W.P.(S) No. 2424 of 2019 is also allowed.

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20. Likewise, the factual aspect involved in the case of Ganesh Kumar V.

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M/s Central Coalfields Limited & Ors. (supra)., also required to be

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referred herein which is being quoted hereunder:

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The instant intra-court appeal preferred under Clause-10 of Letters Patent is directed against the order/judgment dated 26.11.2020 passed by the learned Single Judge of this Court in W.P.(S) No.7727 of 2017, whereby and whereunder, the writ Court has refused to interfere with the decision of the Administrative Authority as contained in letter no.1487 dated 08.06.2017, by which, the case of the writ petitioner for appointment on compassionate ground has been rejected.

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2. The brief facts of the case, as per the pleading made in the writ petition, required to be enumerated, are as hereunder:-

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It is the case of the writ petitioner that his father was appointed on 01.12.1975 with the respondent CCL and he was working in Bhurkunda Colliery. In the service excerpt issued in favour of the writ petitioner’s father, the age of the writ petitioner was wrongly mentioned as 11 years as on 01.04.1987. The writ petitioner has produced the various documents showing his date of birth as 26.07.1985. The father of the writ petitioner died in harness on 19.02.2015. The writ petitioner has made an application for his employment under the provision of Para 9.3.0 of the National Coal Wage Agreement (N.C.W.A.).

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The respondent-CCL in view of the discrepancy in the age of the writ petitioner appearing in the service excerpt of the father of the writ petitioner and his age appearing on the document furnished by him, he was asked to appear before the Medical Board for assessment of his age. The Medical Board has assessed the age of the writ petitioner as 37 ½ years on the date of his application and as such, the claim of the writ petitioner for appointment on compassionate ground was rejected considering the maximum age of the writ petitioner for appointment, as per the N.C.W.A. to be 35 years vide decision, as contained in letter dated 08.06.2017.

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The writ petitioner, being aggrieved with the decision of the Administrative Authority, has filed writ petition being W.P.(S) No.7727 of 2017 taking the plea therein that the writ petitioner has produced the Birth Certificate and School Leaving Certificate etc. to

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show that his age was below 35 years which has not been considered by the respondent-CCL in the right perspective. The other issues have also been agitated that in view of the provision of N.C.W.A., the case of the writ petitioner is fit to be considered in right direction and the writ petitioner was entitled for appointment on compassionate ground.

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The respondent-CCL has taken the plea that the case of the writ petitioner has rightly been rejected by the competent authority on the ground that the father of the writ petitioner, namely, Late Brij Lal was designated as Store Keeper at Bhurkunda Colliery and he died in harness on 19.02.2015. After the death of the employee, the mother of the writ petitioner, namely, Smt. Ramsakhi Devi submitted a representation on 26.03.2016 for appointment of the writ petitioner on compassionate ground.

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It has been submitted that as per the provision of N.C.W.A., the maximum age limit of dependent for compassionate appointment is not required to be more than 35 years. However, the age of the writ petitioner was more than 35 years on the date of submission of application for compassionate appointment, therefore, such claim has been rejected.

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It has further been stated that the Medical Board has assessed the age of the writ petitioner to be in between 35 to 40 years as on 12.04.2017 and as such, the respondent-CCL, by taking into consideration the decision contained in circular dated 07.07.1992, the mid-point of the age of the writ petitioner has finally been assessed, as per which, the writ petitioner has been found to be more than 35 years, therefore, the case of the writ petitioner has rightly been rejected.

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The learned Single Judge, after considering the rival submissions advanced on behalf of the parties, has refused to interfere with the decision of the Administrative Authority, against which, the present intra-court appeal has been preferred.

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21. The finding recorded therein also needs to be refer herein which

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reads as under:

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9. This Court, on consideration of the submission made on behalf of

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the learned counsel for the appellant to the effect about nonapplicability of the circular dated 07.07.1992, is of the view that the said circular in the facts of the given case will not be applicable, as has been held by us in LPA No.687 of 2019 dated 10.02.2021. But, this Court is required to consider that even if, the said circular is not applicable in the facts of the given case, can the writ petitioner be held entitled for appointment on compassionate ground, on the basis of the declaration furnished by his father at the time of availing the benefit of LTC.

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It is the further admitted fact that the said averment has not been disputed by the writ petitioner, since, no rejoinder to the counter affidavit has been filed. The aforesaid aspect of the matter automatically compelled us to come to the conclusion that whatever has been stated with respect to details of furnishing the age of the writ petitioner by his deceased father, as has been stated in the counter affidavit as under para 20 and 21 has been admitted. It is evident from the aforesaid stand taken by the respondent-CCL that admittedly as on the date of application dated 26.03.2016, the age of the writ petitioner was more than 35 years.

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20. This Court has also considered the case from different angel in order to see about the assessment of the age by taking the mid-point of the age in between 35 to 40 years i.e., 37 ½ years and has found the age which has been disclosed by the father of the writ petitioner as per the statement made in the counter affidavit as under para 20 and 21, as quoted and referred hereinabove, derives the conclusion about the correctness of the assessment of the age of the writ petitioner by taking the mid-point of the range of the age i.e., 37 ½ years.

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11. This Court, therefore, is of the view that since, it is the selfdisclosure of the father of the writ petitioner about the age of the writ petitioner and after taking into consideration the aforesaid age on the date of application, admittedly, the writ petitioner has crossed the minimum age of 35 years, therefore, the writ petitioner cannot be held entitled for appointment on compassionate ground.

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12. This Court, however, requires to refer herein the issue of the

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statement made in the counter affidavit as under para 20 and 21 has not been referred in the impugned order, since, it is available in the counter affidavit, therefore, the same has been taken into consideration by this Court in order to arrive at the conclusion about the outcome of the writ petition and basis upon which, we are of the view that the outcome of the writ petition, since, is showing no interference with the decision of the Administrative Authority, by which, the appointment on compassionate ground has not been provided, which cannot be said to suffer from an error.

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22. It is evident from the judgment rendered in the case of Lilwa Bhuiyan V. CCL (supra) and consider that this Court has given a specific finding not to assess the age by coming to the mid-point of the age assessed by the Medical Board, such finding has been given on the basis of the fact that the Coal India Limited has come out with the document dated 07.07.1992 wherein it has been decided that on assessment of age by the Medical Board, the mid-point is to be taken into consideration but this court after going through the document dated 07.07.1992 has come out with a conclusive finding that the said decision is only applicable to the in-service employees and not to the candidate who is to enter into service, the relevant paragraph of the said judgment on the cost of repetition is quoted herein which reads as under:

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“30. The respondent CCL, however, failed to produce any decision of the authority, in case of consideration of appointment on compassionate ground, to take the midpoint of the age assessed by the Medical Board as has been done in the instant case, rather the document dated 07.07.1992 has been produced to assess the age of an employee by taking the midpoint of the age as has been assessed by the Medical Board but since it is not a case of an employee rather the

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case of a candidate who is seeking appointment on compassionate ground and, therefore, the said circular will not be applicable in the case of the writ petitioner and in that view of the mutter, when the respondent authorities have asked the writ petitioner to go for the medical examination wherein the age of the writ petitioner has been assessed in between 35 to 40 years and taking the midpoint the age of the writ petitioner has been assessed as 371/2 years of age, cannot be said to be an action to achieve the object and intent of the NCWA to provide social security measures to the dependant of the deceased employee, rather the approach of the respondent authorities ought to have been to consider the age of the writ petitioner by taking its lower point so that the object and intent of NCWA be achieved.

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23. Further this Court had given finding in the said case that the reliance placed by the respondent CCL in L.T.C. Form where the age of the writ petitioner has been shown to be 15 years but the age having mentioned in L.T.C. Form-A without any date and year, cannot be relied and, therefore, the age mentioned in PS-3 and PS-4 where the age of the writ petitioner has been mentioned as 18 years on 28.05.1998 can only be said to be valid document for assessment of age of the writ petitioner.

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24. In the said case, this Court on the basis of the availability of document, has criticized the assessment made by the Medical Board and accepting the same, the mid-point of the age, has been assessed for the purpose of consideration of appointment on compassionate ground and in that view of the matter, we have come out with the conclusion that the mid-point for the purpose of ascertaining the age, based upon the age assessment made by the Medical Board cannot be said to be proper approach and for coming to such conclusion, we

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have taken into consideration the document wherein also the age of the petitioner of the said case has been found to be less than 35 years.

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25. According to the factual aspect of the present case, herein the respondent contrary to the judgment passed by this Court again, since the respondent authorities are found some confusion in the age of the writ petitioner, decided to send the appellant to the Medical Board for his age assessment. The age was assessed by the medical board in between the age of 35 to 40 years. Therefore, by taking the mid-point, the age of the writ petitioner has been considered to be 37.5 years and further on date of filing application for compassionate appointment i.e. on 12.11.2020 it has been taken as 36 years 01 month and 7 days.

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26. The respondent, based upon the said assessment, has rejected the claim as would be evident from the bare reading of the impugned order dated 10.06.2022. For ready reference, the same is being referred herein which reads as under:

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“HEAD OF P& A DIVISION, CMPDI HO

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Cmpdi

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No.CMPDI/HQ/SE/9.4.0/NCWA-X/K,Thakur/22/e419078/f.-

100875

Date: 10.06.2022

To, Regd.

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Post

Sri Kantu Kumar Thakur,

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S/o- Late Shivnarayan Thakur, Ex- Rigman, CMPDI, RI-III, Ranchi.

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At.- Benti,

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P.O- Bahera, P.S.- Piparwar

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Distt.- Chatra (Jharkhand)- 825321

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Dear Sir,

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This has reference to your application dated 12.11.2020 for compassionate employment under provision 9.3.0 of NCWA-X consequent upon death of your father late Shivnarayan Thakur, Ex- Rigman, CMPDI, RI- III, Ranchi on 25.03.2020, Since, the date of application for compassionate employment was treated as 12.11.2020.

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There was a huge age difference of 10 years or so between the age you had mentioned in your application (DOB. As 31.12.1994) and the age declared by Late Shivnarayan Thakur during his service life time, which is indicated below-

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Sl. No.	Name of the document	Age/DOB of Sri Kantu Thakur as on date	Age of candidate on the date of application dt.
			12.11.2020
1	Inclusion of FamilyDepdt Form dt. 16.02.1993.	08yrs	35yrs 08 months 26 days
			35 yrs. 10 months 22
2.	Service Excerpts From dt. 20.06.1995	10 1/5yrs.	days
			37 yrs. 10 months 14
3.	Aadhaar Card No. 686979631026	31.12.1982	days

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School Certificate issued by Prathmic Vidyalaya, 4. Veti, Tandwa. 31.12.1983 36 yrs 10 months 14 days

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Accordingly, the was referred for age Accordingly, the matter determination in the Medical Board on CCL.

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The "Age Assessment Board of CCL" has assessed your age range between 35-40 (Thirty five to forty) years as on 05.04.2022. As per guidelines of CIL, mid point of age range is to be taken if there is no mention of age in different record. As such, taking this into consideration, your age as on 05.04.2022 i.e medical board report will be 37½ yrs. (Middle point). Hence you will be aged 36 years 01 month 07 days (i.e. above 35 years) as on the date of application dtd. 12.11.2020.

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As per provision of NCWA for compassionate employment the male dependent shold: not be more 35 (Thirty five) years of age on the date of complete application.

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In view of above, your claim for compassionate employment can not be Accepted as you the over 35 (Thirty Five) years (36 yrs. 01 month 07 days) of age on the date of application (12.11.2020) as per recommendation of Medical Board of CCL dated 05.04.2022. hence your claim is hereby rejected.

Yours Faithfully

General Manager

Copy to:-

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The Regional Director, CMPDI, RI-III, Ranchi. For kind information please.”

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27. The ground has been taken in the impugned order passed by the authority that since, as per the Medical Board, the age of the appellant-writ petitioner has been assessed in between 35 to 40 years and by taking the mid-point, it is to be 37.5 years, which is more than the age of 35 years, the maximum age for consideration of the appointment under the respondent, hence the claim of the appellant was rejected.

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28. The said rejection, cannot be said to be in consonance with the judgment passed by this Court in the case of Lilwa Bhuiyan V. CCL (supra) , wherein the specific consideration has been given that there is no decision in assessing the age by taking the mid-point of the age assessed by the Medical Board.

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29. It is settled position of law that benevolent provisions should be construed taking into consideration the dominant purpose of the statute, intention of the legislature and underlying policy, reference in this regard may be taken from the judgment rendered by the Hon’ble Apex Court in the case of Edukanti Kistamma (Dead) through LRs & Ors. Vrs. S. Venkatareddy (dead) through LRs. & Ors (2010) 1 SCC 756. For ready reference the relevant paragraph is being quoted as under:

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"26. ....... Interpretation of a beneficial legislation with a narrow pedantic approach is not justified. In case there is any doubt, the

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court should interpret a beneficial legislation in favour of the beneficiaries and not otherwise as it would be against the legislative intent. For the purpose of interpretation of a statute, the Act is to be read in its entirety. The purport and object of the Act must be given its full effect by applying the principles of purposive construction. The court must be strong against any construction which tends to reduce a statute's utility. The provisions of the statute must be construed so as to make it effective and operative and to further the ends of justice and not to frustrate the same. The court has the duty to construe the statute to promote the object of the statute and serve the purpose for which it has been enacted and should not efface its very purpose......"

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30. Likewise, the Hon’ble Apex Court in the case of Madan Singh

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Shekhawat v. Union of India , (1999) 6 SCC 459 has observed which reads as under:

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15. It is the duty of the court to interpret a provision, especially a beneficial provision, liberally so as to give it a wider meaning rather than a restrictive meaning which would negate the very object of the rule.

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31. Herein, in the instant case, the age of the appellant has been assessed to 37.5 years and when the said decision has been challenged by filing writ petition in this regard, the plea was taken based upon crossing of the age of 35 years.

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32. The learned Single Judge has accepted the said stand of the respondent-CCL and has refused to interfere with the order of rejection and, in addition, has gone into the fact by putting reliance upon the document as mentioned in Page 53 which also suggests that the age of the appellant is more than the age of 35 years.

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33. The learned counsel for the respondent CCL has defended the

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impugned judgment passed by learned Single Judge on the ground by putting reliance upon Page 79 that contains the Aadhar document, wherein from the date of birth, the appellant has been found to be more than 35 years and to buttress his arguments, reliance has been placed on the judgment rendered in the case of Ganesh Kumar V. M/s Central Coalfields Limited & Ors. (supra).

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34. But we have referred hereinabove by dealing with the factual aspect and the finding recorded by this Court in the case of Lilwa Bhuiyan V. CCL (supra) to the effect that the assessment by which by taking the mid-point as the age has been assessed by the Medical Board, is not proper to be accepted, rather, the minimum of age, herein 35 years, is to be taken into consideration.

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35. This Court, in order to fortify the same, has considered the document as available in PS-3 and PS-4 for the purpose of consideration that even if the said document as available in the service record suggest that the age of the dependent of the said case is less than 35 years.

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36. Admittedly, herein the age as referred in Page 53 is without any specific date of birth rather the age has been referred in terms of years which has been sought to be considered to establish the fact that the age of the appellant-writ petitioner is more than the age of 35 years.

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37. The question herein arises that when the document already available and consciously the respondent-CCL has taken a decision to refer the

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issue of assessment of age of the appellant to the Medical Board and the Medical Board has assessed the age in between the age of 35 to 40 years and thereafter the mid-point, i.e., 37.5 years has been assessed, then will it be proper for the respondent CCL to go on the document as available in Page 53, which has quoted and referred hereinabove.

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38. The answer of this Court is in Negative, reason being that once the respondent authorities have gone into the issue of assessment of age by subjecting the appellant to the Medical Board, then the respondent CCL cannot be allowed to again take the aid of the document already available as available in Page 53.

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39. If the reliance was already there on the document as mentioned in Page 53 of the paper book, then the respondent ought not to have subjected the appellant to the Medical Board.

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40. The respondent CCL once subjected the appellant to the Medical Board, then it is the bounden duty of the respondent to go by the assessment made by the Medical Board and there is no denial of the fact that once the Medical Board assess the age of one or the other, the same requires no corroboration with the document as is being sought to be done herein by the respondent CCL.

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41. This Court, therefore, is of the view that once the Medical Board is taken recourse for the purpose of assessment of the age, then it is not available for the respondent to go into the other document available.

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42. Since, this Court has already come up with the finding in the case of Lilwa Bhuiyan V. CCL (supra) by deprecating the stand of the respondent CCL to take the mid-point of the age as has been assessed by the Medical Board, herein 37.5 years, since the age of the appellant has been assessed to be in between the age of 35 to 40 years. Hence the action of the respondent CCL cannot be said to be just and proper, rather, the respondent CCL based upon the finding recorded by this Court in the case of Lilwa Bhuiyan V. CCL (supra) on the issue of taking mid-point, based upon the decision dated 10.06.2022 ought to consider the age of the appellant to 35 years.

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43. This Court after having discussed the aforesaid factual as well as legal aspect and adverting to the judgment passed by the learned Single Judge, has found that the learned Single Judge has not considered the important aspect of the matter regarding the decision already taken by the Division Bench of this Court that the consideration of midpoint of the age cannot be said to be just and proper.

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44. The learned Single Judge has not appreciated the fact that once the Medical Board has been constituted, then it was not available for the respondent CCL to go to the age as referred in the document as said to be available in the service profile of the appellant.

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45. This Court, therefore based upon the aforesaid finding, is of the view that the order passed by the learned Single Judge suffers from an error, hence the same requires interference.

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46. In the result, the instant appeal needs to be allowed, accordingly, the instant appeal being L.P.A. No. 541 of 2024 is allowed.

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47. The order passed by the learned Single Judge is hereby quashed and set aside.

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48. The respondent authority is directed to consider the case of the appellant-writ petitioner.

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49. Accordingly, the writ petition also stands allowed.

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