Naresh Sao Vs Central Coalfields Ltd. through Its… — Writ and Judicial Review

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IN THE HIGH COURT OF JHARKHAND AT RANCHI L.P.A No. 356 of 2025

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Naresh Sao, aged about 69 years, son of late Chander Sao, R/o villageBodam, PO: Bodam, PS:Barkagaon, DistrictHazaribag (Jharkhand). ….Petitioner/Appellant Versus

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Central Coalfields Ltd. a subsidiary of Coal India Limited, through its Chairman-cum-Managing Director, having its office at Darbhanga House, Ranchi, PO: GPO, PS: Kotwali, District: Ranchi, Jharkhand

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Director (Personnel), Central Coalfields Ltd., Darbhanga House, Ranchi, having its office at Darbhanga House Ranchi, PO: GPO, PS: Kotwali, District-Ranchi,Jharkhand.

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General Manager, Barka Sayal Area, Central Coalfields Ltd., having its office at Urimari, PO & PS Urimari, District Hazaribagh, Jharkhand.

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Deputy Commissioner, Hazaribagh, having its office at Hazaribagh, PO: GPO, Hazaribagh, PS: Sadar, District: Hazaribagh.

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… Respondents/Respondents

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CORAM: HON’BLE MR. JUSTICE SUJIT NARAYAN PRASAD HON’BLE MR. JUSTICE ARUN KUMAR RAI

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For the Appellant(s) :Mr. Krishna Prajapati, Advocate For the CCL : Mr. A.K.Das, Advocate;

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Mr. Sankalp Goswami, Advocate

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Order No.03/Dated:08.12.2025

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Prayer

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The present appeal has been filed under Clause-10 of the Letters Patent against the order dated 30.01.2025 passed by the learned Single Judge of this Court in W.P.(C) No. 1058 of 2024, whereby and whereunder, the learned Single Judge has been pleased to dismiss the writ petitionsolely on the ground that after lapse of 43 years from the date of payment of compensation, the writ petitioner by claiming title over the land in question has questioned the decision so taken by the Central Coalfields Limited in making payment of compensation in

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favour of the other persons way back in the year 1975 and also in theyear 1983 when the land in question was acquired.

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Factual Matrix

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The brief facts of the case as per the pleadings made in the plaint as well as in the writ petition need to refer herein which reads as under:

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(I) The original raiyat of the said land had failed to pay the rent for which a certificate proceeding being Certificate Case No.1143 of 1932-33 was initiated against him. Subsequently, the decree was prepared in the said case and the said land was purchased by ancestors of the Writ petitioner through auction sale and, thereafter, they came in possession of the land in question and became owner of the suit property. Due to dispute between the ancestors of the petitioner and the original raiyat over the suit property the ancestors of the petitioner filed Title Suit No. 178 of 1944 which was dismissed vide judgment dated 24.7.1946.

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(II) Being aggrieved by the order dated 24.7.1946 the ancestors of the petitioner had filed Title Appeal No.58 of 1946 which was decided in favour of the ancestors of the petitioner vide order dated 11.02.1947, against which no proceeding was initiated by either of the parties.

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(III) vide Notification No. S.O. 51(E) dated 24th January, 1975 issued by the Ministry of Energy (Department of Coal), Government of India, New Delhi, the land described in the Schedule appended to the said notification including part of the

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said land of the petitioner were acquired under the provisions of Coal Bearing Areas (Acquisition and Development) Act, 1957.

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(IV) Thereafter, vide virtue of notification dated 07.12.1983 the Government of India decided to acquire the land under the provisions of Coal Bearing Areas (Acquisition & Development) Act, 1957 which included the suit property of the petitioner.

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(V) It is stated that petitioner filed representation before the appropriate authorities for payment of compensation and employment, but no order has been passed till date. However, through RTI the petitioner came to know that the land in question has been decreed in favour of the ancestors of the petitioner and the said land belongs to the petitioner.

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(VI) It is further stated that neither any compensation nor employment has been given to the petitioner in lieu of the acquisition of the land-in-question which is illegal and arbitrary.

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(VII) Aggrieved thereof, the petitioner approached the writ Court by filing writ petition being WP (C) No. 1058 of 2024, in which respondents-CCL was called for, who appeared and filed counter affidavit stating inter alia that plots claimed by petitioner as submitted by him in Annexure-5 of the writ petition, does not entirely match with the plots acquired by Central Coalfields Limited under Khata No. 8, and many plots which are being claimed by the petitioner do not fall under the acquisition proceedings of the Central Coalfields Ltd. It has further been submitted by the respondents that compensation

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has already been paid by them against 36.95 acres of land under khata no. 8 and moreover, in lieu of acquisition of the land made vide notification no. S.O. 51 (E) dated 24.1.1975 the employment has already been given in the year 1982, on the basis the authentic report submitted by the Circle Officer, Barkagaon.

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(VIII) Learned writ court after hearing both the parties and perused the documents on record, dismissed the petition filed by the writ petitioner vide order dated 30.01.2025 on the ground that after lapse of about 43 years from the date of payment of compensation and grant of employment, the petitioner has claimed the compensation and employment for the land which was said to be decreed in favour of his ancestors in Title Appeal No. 58 of 1946 vide order dated 11.2.1947.

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Being aggrievedby order dated 30.01.2025 passed by the learned single judge in WP (C) No. 1058 of 2024, the present appeal has been filed.

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Arguments advanced on behalf of the petitioner/appellant:

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(i)The learned counsel for the appellant has submitted that the ancestors of the writ petitioner has filed Title Suit No. 178 of 1944 claiming the title over the land-in-question which was dismissed vide judgment dated 24.7.1946 and being aggrieved by the said judgment the ancestors of the petitioner preferred Title Appeal No. 58 of 1946 which was allowed vide judgment and decree dated 11.2.1947 and

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24.2.1947 respectively setting aside the judgment and decree passed in Title Suit No. 178 of 1944.

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(ii) The appellant on the strength of the judgment passed in Title Appeal No. 58 of 1946 has questioned the decision so taken by the Central Coalfields Ltd. in awarding compensation as also employment to other persons.

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(iii Mr. Krishna Prajapati, the learned counsel appearing for the appellant/writ petitioner has taken the ground that the learned writ court without appreciating other factual aspects and the documents issued by the Circle Officer showing the title over the land-inquestion in favour of the appellant/ writ petitioner, has merely gone through the issue of delay and non-production of the judgment passed in Title Appeal No. 58 of 1946 before the authority concerned. The learned counsel for the appellant, therefore, has submitted that if the writ petitioner having the grievance regarding conduct of the respondent-CCL and for justifying the same, the grounds have been taken supported by the documents then it was bounden duty of the writ court to consider all aspects of the matter but having not done so the learned single judge has erred in passing the judgment and, as such, the same is not sustainable in the eye of law.

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Arguments advanced on behalf of the CCL:

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(i) Per contra, Mr.Amit Kumar Das, the learned counsel appearing for the Central Coalfields Ltd. has submitted by defending the judgment passed by the learned single judge that the land initially was acquired sometime in the year 1975 and

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subsequently in the year 1983 under the provisions of Coal Bearing Areas (Acquisition and Development) Act, 1957.

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(ii) The compensation has been awarded in favour of the beneficiaries as per reference available at that time in the records of rights as also as per the rehabilitation scheme the appointment was provided in favour of the beneficiaries who have been displaced due to acquisition of the land.

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(iii) It has been contended that ancestors of the writ petitioner have not raised any question either in the year 1975 or in the year 1983 and even within the reasonable period no grievance has been raised questioning the decision so taken by the Central Coalfields Limited.

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(iv) It has been contended that even accepting the judgment passed in Title Appeal No. 58 of 1946 in favour of the ancestors of the petitioner, it was incumbent upon the petitioner/appellant to produce that judgment before the concerned authority at its inception in order to make an objection regarding the determination of the claim which has been made in favour of the khatiyaniraiyat but it cannot be allowed to be entertained after lapse of about 49-50 years from the date of first acquisition that is sometime in the year 1975.

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(v) It has further been submitted that the writ petitioner has not impleaded the beneficiariesor their descendent as a party to the writ proceeding.

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(vi) Further contention has been raised that the beneficiaries in whose favour the employment was provided and compensation was paid have already been superannuated from service (on instruction).

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(vii) The Central Coalfields Limited, the respondent has further taken a ground that purposely the beneficiaries, in whose favour the amount of compensation has been paid and employment has been provided, has not been impleaded as the party in the writ proceeding. In addition, thereto the ground has been taken that even the writ petitioner has not approached the tribunal as provided under section 14 of the Coal Bearing Areas (Acquisition and Development) Act, 1957.

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(viii) The learned counsel, based upon the aforesaid grounds, has submitted that if based upon the aforesaid factual aspect, the learned single judge has refused to pass positive direction in favour of the appellant/writ petitioner then it cannot be said to suffer from an error.

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Analysis:

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Heard the learned counsel appearing for the parties and gone through the findings recorded by the learned single judge in the impugned judgment.

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The learned Single Judge primarily has considered the issue of delay of 49-50 years. It needs to refer herein that although the learned Single Judge has referred lapse of 43 years, perhaps, the period has been calculated from the date of acquisition which has happened in

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the year 1983 but herein as per the admitted facts the first transaction in lieu of acquisition of land was done in the year 1975, hence,almost after lapse of 49 years the writ petition has been filed.

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The question of delay and laches are fundamental for entertaining the writ petition since as per the settled position of law the writ court being court of equity is to exercise the power conferred under Article 226 of the Constitution of India, which is available to the litigant concerned, to approach the court of law within a reasonable period of time. It is not available to the litigant concerned to come to the court of equity i.e. the writ court after awaking from the slumber and filing the petition after lapse of about five decades as the facts of the present case is.

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The law is well-settled that the applicability of delay and laches is to be taken care of by the writ court, reference with regard to the same is rendered by the Hon’ble Apex Court in the case of New Delhi Municipal Council Vs. Pan Singh & Ors. [(2007) 9 SCC 278] in particular paragraph 17, which is quoted as herein under:

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“17. Although, there is no period of limitation provided for filing a writ petition under Article 226 of the Constitution of India, ordinarily, writ petition should be filed within a reasonable time. (See Lipton India Ltd. v. Union of India).”

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10.In State of M.P. & Ors Vs. Nandlal Jaiswal & Ors . reported in AIR 1987 SC 251 , the Hon’ble Apex Court has observed that the power of the High Court to issue an appropriate writ under Article 226 of the Constitution is discretionary and if there is inordinate delay on the part of the petitioner in filing the writ petition and such delay is not satisfactorily explained, the High Court may decline tointerfere and

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grant relief in exercise of its writ jurisdiction. Emphasis was laid down on the principle of delay and laches stating that the High Court does not ordinarily permit a belated resort to the extraordinary remedy under the writ jurisdiction because it is likely to cause confusion and inconvenience in bringing the justice.

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11.The Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of " Eastern Coalfields Ltd.

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Vs. Dugal Kumar" reported in (2008) 14 SCC 295 has held as under:

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24. As to delay and laches on the part of the writ petitioner, there is substance in the argument of learned counsel for the appellant Company. It is well settled that under Article 226 of the Constitution, the power of a High Court to issue an appropriate writ, order or direction is discretionary. One of the grounds to refuse relief by a writ court is that the petitioner is guilty of delay and laches. It is imperative, where the petitioner invokes extraordinary remedy under Article 226 of the Constitution, that he should come to the court at the earliest reasonably possible opportunity. Inordinate delay in making the motion for a writ is indeed an adequate ground for refusing to exercise discretion in favour of the applicant.

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12.In this context, further reference is made to the judgment rendered by

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Hon’ble Apex Court in Baljeet Singh (Dead) through Lrs. And Others Vs. State ofU.P. and Others reported in 2019 SCC OnLine SC 1004 [S.L.P. (C) Nos. 30404-30442/2017] wherein the land losers had approached the Court of law after inordinate delay seeking enhanced compensation which the Hon’ble Apex Court has refused to condone. In the aforesaid case, in para- 7, the Hon’ble Apex Court has held which reads as hereunder -

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“7. The matter requires examination from another aspect, viz., laches and delay. It is a very recognised principle of jurisprudence that a right not exercised for a long time is nonexistent. Even when there is no limitation period prescribed by any statute relating to certain proceedings, in such cases, courts have coined the doctrine of laches and delay as well as doctrine of acquiescence and non-suited the

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litigants who approached the court belatedly without any justifiable explanation for bringing the action after unreasonable delay. In those cases, where the period of limitation is prescribed within which the action is to be brought before the court, if the action is not brought within that prescribed period, the aggrieved party loses remedy and cannot enforce his legal right after the period of limitation is over, however, subject to the prayer for condonation of delay and if there is a justifiable explanation for bringing the action after the prescribed period of limitation is over and sufficient cause is shown, the court may condone the delay. Therefore, in a case where the period of limitation is prescribed and the action is not brought within the period of limitation and subsequently proceedings are initiated after the period of limitation along with the prayer for condonation of delay, in that case, the applicant has to make out a sufficient cause and justify the cause for delay with a proper explanation. It is not that in each and every case despite the sufficient cause is not shown and the delay is not properly explained, the court may condone the delay. To make out a case for condonation of delay, the applicant has to make out a sufficient cause/reason which prevented him in initiating the proceedings within the period of limitation. Otherwise, he will be accused of gross negligence. If the aggrieved party does not initiate the proceedings within the period of limitation without any sufficient cause, he can be denied the relief on the ground of unexplained laches and delay and on the presumption that such person has waived his right or acquiesced with the order. These principles are based on the principles relatable to sound public policy that if a person does not exercise his right for a long time then such right is non-existent.”

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13.The learned single judge has taken a view that no direction can be passed in favour of the writ petitioner in such a delayed cause of action as has been raised on behalf of the appellant, that too, without any explanation. The same according to our considered view cannot be said to suffer from an error.

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14.The learned single judge has also given his view in order to consider the ground agitated on behalf of the appellant regarding the judgment passed in Title Appeal No. 58 of 1946. It has been opined by the learned single judge that even accepting the judgment passed in Title Appeal No. 58 of 1946 was in favour of the appellant then why the same had not been produced before the concerned authorities at the time of acquisition of the land.

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