MD Zahiruddin Vs the State of Jharkhand through the Chief Secretary

is delay of 356 days in preferring the present appeal and, as such, the application for condonation of delay as also the instant appeal may be dismissed.

¶29

We have heard the learned counsel for the parties and gone through the pleadings made in the instant interlocutory application to assess as to whether the reason so assigned in the application for condonation of delay is to be considered to be sufficient cause for condoning the delay of 356 days.

¶30

We are conscious with the fact that the delay is to be condoned in exercise of power conferred under section 5 of the Limitation Act depending upon the sufficient cause if shown by the party seeking condonation of delay.

¶31

It also requires to refer herein that what is the meaning of ‘sufficient cause’. The consideration of meaning of ‘sufficient cause’ has been made in Basawaraj & Anr. Vrs. Spl. Land Acquisition Officer, [(2013) 14 SCC 81] , wherein, it has been held by the Hon’ble Apex Court at paragraphs 9 to 15 hereunder: -

¶32

“9. Sufficient cause is the cause for which the defendant could not be blamed for his absence. The meaning of the word “sufficient” is “adequate” or “enough”, inasmuch as may be necessary to answer the purpose intended. Therefore, the word “sufficient” embraces no more than that which provides a platitude, which when the act done suffices to accomplish the purpose intended in the facts and circumstances existing in a case, duly examined from the viewpoint of a reasonable standard of a cautious man. In this context, “sufficient cause” means that the party should not have acted in a negligent manner or there was a want of bona fide on its part in view of the facts and circumstances of a case or it cannot be alleged that the party has “not acted diligently” or “remained inactive”.

¶33

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However, the facts and circumstances of each case must afford sufficient ground to enable the court concerned to exercise discretion for the reason that whenever the court exercises discretion, it has to be exercised judiciously. The applicant must satisfy the court that he was prevented by any “sufficient cause” from prosecuting his case, and unless a satisfactory explanation is furnished, the court should not allow the application for condonation of delay. The court has to examine whether the mistake is bona fide or was merely a device to cover an ulterior purpose. (See Manindra Land and Building Corpn. Ltd. v. Bhutnath Banerjee [AIR 1964 SC 1336] , Mata Din v. A. Narayanan [(1969) 2 SCC 770 : AIR 1970 SC 1953] , Parimal v. Veena [(2011) 3 SCC 545 : (2011) 2 SCC (Civ) 1 : AIR 2011 SC 1150] and Maniben Devraj Shah v. Municipal Corpn. of Brihan Mumbai [(2012) 5 SCC 157 : (2012) 3 SCC (Civ) 24 : AIR 2012 SC 1629] .

¶36

10. In Arjun Singh v. Mohindra Kumar [AIR 1964 SC 993] this Court explained the difference between a “good cause” and a “sufficient cause” and observed that every “sufficient cause” is a good cause and vice versa. However, if any difference exists it can only be that the requirement of good cause is complied with on a lesser degree of proof than that of “sufficient cause”.

¶37

11. The expression “sufficient cause” should be given a liberal interpretation to ensure that substantial justice is done, but only so long as negligence, inaction or lack of bona fides cannot be imputed to the party concerned, whether or not sufficient cause has been furnished, can be decided on the facts of a particular case and no straitjacket formula is possible. (Vide Madanlal v. Shyamlal [(2002) 1 SCC 535 : AIR 2002 SC 100] and Ram Nath Sao v. Gobardhan Sao [(2002) 3 SCC 195 : AIR 2002 SC 1201] .

¶38

12. It is a settled legal proposition that law of limitation may harshly affect a particular party but it has to be applied with all its rigour when the statute so prescribes. The court has no power to extend the period of limitation on equitable grounds. “A result flowing from a statutory provision is never an evil. A court has no power to ignore that provision to relieve what it considers a distress resulting from its operation.” The statutory provision may cause hardship or inconvenience to a particular party but the court has no choice but to enforce it giving full effect to the same. The legal maxim dura lex sed lex which means “the law is hard but it is the law”, stands attracted in such a situation. It has consistently

¶39

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been held that, “inconvenience is not” a decisive factor to be considered while interpreting a statute.

¶42

13. The statute of limitation is founded on public policy, its aim being to secure peace in the community, to suppress fraud and perjury, to quicken diligence and to prevent oppression. It seeks to bury all acts of the past which have not been agitated unexplainably and have from lapse of time become stale. According to Halsbury's Laws of England, Vol. 28, p. 266:

¶43

“605. Policy of the Limitation Acts.—The courts have expressed at least three differing reasons supporting the existence of statutes of limitations namely, (1) that long dormant claims have more of cruelty than justice in them, (2) that a defendant might have lost the evidence to disprove a stale claim, and (3) that persons with good causes of actions should pursue them with reasonable diligence.” An unlimited limitation would lead to a sense of insecurity and uncertainty, and therefore, limitation prevents disturbance or deprivation of what may have been acquired in equity and justice by long enjoyment or what may have been lost by a party's own inaction, negligence or laches. (See Popat and Kotecha Property v. SBI Staff Assn. [(2005) 7 SCC 510] , Rajender Singh v. Santa Singh [(1973) 2 SCC 705 : AIR 1973 SC 2537] and Pundlik Jalam Patil v. Jalgaon Medium Project [(2008) 17 SCC 448 : (2009) 5 SCC (Civ) 907] .)

¶44

14. In P. Ramachandra Rao v. State of Karnataka [(2002) 4 SCC 578 : 2002 SCC (Cri) 830 : AIR 2002 SC 1856] this Court held that judicially engrafting principles of limitation amounts to legislating and would fly in the face of law laid down by the Constitution Bench in Abdul Rehman Antulay v. R.S. Nayak [(1992) 1 SCC 225 : 1992 SCC (Cri) 93 : AIR 1992 SC 1701] .

¶45

15. The law on the issue can be summarised to the effect that where a case has been presented in the court beyond limitation, the applicant has to explain the court as to what was the “sufficient cause” which means an adequate and enough reason which prevented him to approach the court within limitation. In case a party is found to be negligent, or for want of bona fide on his part in the facts and circumstances of the case, or found to have not acted diligently or remained inactive, there cannot be a justified ground to condone the delay. No court could be justified in condoning such an inordinate delay by imposing any condition whatsoever. The application is to be decided only within the parameters laid down by this Court in regard to the

¶46

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condonation of delay. In case there was no sufficient cause to prevent a litigant to approach the court on time condoning the delay without any justification, putting any condition whatsoever, amounts to passing an order in violation of the statutory provisions and it tantamounts to showing utter disregard to the legislature.”

¶49

6. Thus, it is evident that the sufficient cause means that the party should

¶50

not have acted in a negligent manner or there was a want of bona fide on its part in view of the facts and circumstances of a case or it cannot be alleged that the party has “not acted deliberately” or “remained inactive”. However, the facts and circumstances of each case must afford sufficient ground to enable the Court concerned to exercise discretion for the reason that whenever the Court exercises discretion, it has to be exercised judiciously. The applicant must satisfy the Court that he was prevented by any “sufficient cause” from prosecuting his case, and unless a satisfactory explanation is furnished, the Court should not allow the application for condonation of delay. The Court has to examine whether the mistake is bona fide or was merely a device to cover the ulterior purpose as has been held in Manindra Land and Building Corporation Ltd. Vrs. Bhootnath Banerjee & Ors., AIR 1964 SC 1336, Lala Matadin Vrs. A. Narayanan, (1969) 2 SCC 770, Parimal Vrs. Veena @ Bharti, (2011) 3 SCC 545 and Maniben Devraj Shah Vrs. Municipal Corporation of Brihan Mumbai, (2012) 5 SCC 157.

¶51

It has further been held in the aforesaid judgments that the expression ‘sufficient cause’ should be given a liberal interpretation to ensure that substantial justice is done, but only so long as negligence, inaction or lack of bona fides cannot be imputed to the party concerned, whether or not sufficient cause has been furnished, can be decided on the facts of a

¶52

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particular case and no straitjacket formula is possible, reference in this regard may be made to the judgment rendered by the Hon’ble Apex Court in Ram Nath Sao @ Ram Nath Sahu & Ors. Vrs. Gobardhan Sao & Ors., (2002) 3 SC 195 , wherein, at paragraph-12, it has been held as hereunder:-

¶55

“12. Thus it becomes plain that the expression “sufficient cause” within the meaning of Section 5 of the Act or Order 22 Rule 9 of the Code or any other similar provision should receive a liberal construction so as to advance substantial justice when no negligence or inaction or want of bona fides is imputable to a party. In a particular case whether explanation furnished would constitute “sufficient cause” or not will be dependent upon facts of each case. There cannot be a straitjacket formula for accepting or rejecting explanation furnished for the delay caused in taking steps. But one thing is clear that the courts should not proceed with the tendency of finding fault with the cause shown and reject the petition by a slipshod order in overjubilation of disposal drive. Acceptance of explanation furnished should be the rule and refusal, an exception, more so when no negligence or inaction or want of bona fides can be imputed to the defaulting party. On the other hand, while considering the matter the courts should not lose sight of the fact that by not taking steps within the time prescribed a valuable right has accrued to the other party which should not be lightly defeated by condoning delay in a routine-like manner. However, by taking a pedantic and hypertechnical view of the matter the explanation furnished should not be rejected when stakes are high and/or arguable points of facts and law are involved in the case, causing enormous loss and irreparable injury to the party against whom the lis terminates, either by default or inaction and defeating valuable right of such a party to have the decision on merit. While considering the matter, courts have to strike a balance between resultant effect of the order it is going to pass upon the parties either way.”

¶56

Further, the Hon’ble Apex Court in Ramlal, Motilal and Chhotelal

¶57

Vrs. Rewa Coalfields Ltd., (1962) 2 SCR 762 , has held that merely because sufficient cause has been made out in the facts of the given case,

¶58

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there is no right to the appellant to have delay condoned. At paragraph12, it has been held as hereunder:

¶61

“12. It is, however, necessary to emphasise that even after sufficient cause has been shown a party is not entitled to the condonation of delay in question as a matter of right. The proof of a sufficient cause is a condition precedent for the exercise of the discretionary jurisdiction vested in the court by Section 5. If sufficient cause is not proved nothing further has to be done; the application for condoning delay has to be dismissed on that ground alone. If sufficient cause is shown then the court has to enquire whether in its discretion it should condone the delay. This aspect of the matter naturally introduces the consideration of all relevant facts and it is at this stage that diligence of the party or its bona fides may fall for consideration; but the scope of the enquiry while exercising the discretionary power after sufficient cause is shown would naturally be limited only to such facts as the court may regard as relevant. It cannot justify an enquiry as to why the party was sitting idle during all the time available to it. In this connection we may point out that considerations of bona fides or due diligence are always material and relevant when the court is dealing with applications made under Section 14 of the Limitation Act. In dealing with such applications the court is called upon to consider the effect of the combined provisions of Sections 5 and 14. Therefore, in our opinion, considerations which have been expressly made material and relevant by the provisions of Section 14 cannot to the same extent and in the same manner be invoked in dealing with applications which fall to be decided only under Section 5 without reference to Section 14. In the present case there is no difficulty in holding that the discretion should be exercised in favour of the appellant because apart from the general criticism made against the appellant's lack of diligence during the period of limitation no other fact had been adduced against it. Indeed, as we have already pointed out, the learned Judicial Commissioner rejected the appellant's application for condonation of delay only on the ground that it was appellant's duty to file the appeal as soon as possible within the period prescribed, and that, in our opinion, is not a valid ground.”

¶62

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¶64

Thus, it is evident that while considering the delay condonation application, the Court of Law is required to consider the sufficient cause for condonation of delay as also the approach of the litigant as to whether it is bona fide or not as because after expiry of the period of limitation, a right is accrued in favour of the other side and as such, it is necessary to look into the bona fide motive of the litigant and at the same time, due to inaction and laches on its part.

¶65

This Court adverting to the ground taken in the instant interlocutory application as also come to the consideration as to whether the ground shown for condoning the delay of 356 days can be said to be sufficient cause or not.

¶66

Expression ‘sufficient cause’ has been dealt with which means that the party should not have acted in a negligent manner or there was a want of bona fide on its part in view of the facts and circumstances of a case or it cannot be alleged that the party has “not acted deliberately” or “remained inactive”.

¶67

The cause for condoning the delay has been shown in the application for condonation of delay, particularly, paragraph nos.5, 6 and 7 of the instant interlocutory application.

¶68

It is pleaded that there were two original writ petitioners, namely, Md. Abu Bakar and Md. Zahiruddin who were old aged person and suffering from so many old age ailments and due to the said reason, the present Letters Patent Appeal could not be filed in time.

¶69

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¶71

It has further been averred that after death of the original writ petitioner no.1, namely, Md. Abu Bakar, who died on 18.08.2023 leaving behind his sons/legal heirs, who have decided to file the present Letters Patent Appeal after death of his father and, as such, the delay is occurred which is not deliberately rather beyond the control of the legal heirs of the original petitioner no.1.

¶72

As per the law laid down for condoning the delay that the issue of limitation is to be taken liberally and not to be taken in hyper technically manner, this Court is of the view that what has been stated in paragraph nos.5, 6 and 7, therefore, cannot be said to be not having sufficient reason being filing the appeal after delay of 356 days.

¶73

This Court, considering the reason assigned in paragraph nos. 5 6, and 7 of the instant interlocutory application, is of the view that the same is sufficient cause for the purpose of condoning the delay of 356 days in filing the appeal.

¶74

Accordingly, I.A. No. 6885 of 2025 is allowed.

¶75

Consequently, the delay of 356 days in filing the present appeal is hereby condoned.

¶76

I.A. No.1684 of 2025

¶77

The present interlocutory application has been filed for substitution of the legal heirs of the original writ petitioner no.1, namely, Md. Abu Bakar who died on 18.08.2023 leaving behind his sons/legal heirs, who have been arrayed as appellant nos.2 to 5 in the present Letters Patent Appeal being L.P.A No.298 of 2025.

¶78

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¶80

The learned counsel for the respondent-State has raised no objection to the same.

¶81

Accordingly, the application for substitution being I.A No.1684 of 2025 is hereby allowed.

¶82

Since, the substituted applicants/appellants have already been arrayed as the appellant nos.2 to 5 in the present Letters Patent Appeal being L.P.A No.298 of 2025 and, as such, there is no need to make necessary correction in the array of the appellant.

¶83

L.P.A No.298 of 2025

¶84

With the consent of both the parties, the matter is being heard on merit.

¶85

The instant appeal under Clause 10 of the Letters Patent is directed against the order dated 17.07.2023 passed in W.P(C) No.6576 of 2018 by which the learned Single Judge has declined to entertain the writ petition on the ground of delay and laches and dismissed the said writ petition whereby and wherein the original writ petitioners, who are the successor in interest of the original Raiyat, have challenged the order dated 30.09.2015 passed by the District Land Acquisition Officer, Ranchi who has declined either to pay compensation or to release the land in favour of the original writ petitioners.

¶86

Factual Matrix

¶87

The brief facts of the case as per the pleadings made in the writ petition needs to refer herein which reads as under:

¶88

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(i) It is pleaded that the lands appertaining to Plot Nos. 1463,1464 and 1470 under Khata No: 11 in Mouza-Hinoo measuring a total area of 3.15 acres was recorded in the name of Sk. Akbar Ali, son of Sk. Khuda Bux in the Revisional survey Records of right.

¶91

(ii) It is pleaded that Sk. Akbar Ali died leaving behind his legal heirs including the petitioners.

¶92

(iii) It is pleaded that the petitioners are the legal heirs of Sk. Akbar Ali. Upon death of Sk. Akbar Ali, the petitioners inherited right, title and interest over the lands-in-question.

¶93

(iv) It is pleaded that by Memo No: 2584 dated 09.04.1943, several pieces of lands including the plots-in-question were acquired for the purpose of construction of Aerodrome, Ranchi.

¶94

(v) It is pleaded that although the construction of Ranchi Aerodrome was completed, the but lands appertaining to Plot Nos. 1463 and 1464 under Khata No.11 remained unutilized, rather the same fell beyond the boundary-wall of the Ranchi Aerodrome.

¶95

(vi) It is pleaded that in exercise of the powers conferred by Rule75/A (i) of the Defence of India Rules read with Notification No.1336-OR/42 dated 25.04.1942 of the Government of India, the then Deputy Commissioner, Ranchi-cum-Collector requisitioned the lands described in the schedule including the lands appertaining to Plot No: 1463 and 1464.

¶96

(vii) It is pleaded that after completion of the Ranchi Aerodrome, the Deputy Commissioner, Ranchi prepared a list of such lands which were declared surplus. The list of such lands includes the lands appertaining to Plot Nos. 1463 and 1464 belonging to Sk.

¶97

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Akbar Ali, the ancestor of the petitioners. The petitioners could obtain a plain copy of such list of the lands from the Office of the Deputy Commissioner, Ranchi.

¶100

(viii) It is pleaded that by letter No. 191 dated 29.04.1995, the Home (Spl.) Department of the then Government of Bihar issued a Guideline for verification of the concerned papers relating to the lands requisitioned for the purpose of Aerodrome in the district of Ranchi.

¶101

(ix) It is pleaded that by letter No: 314 dated 29.11.1995, the respondent No.4 deputed Amin of land Acquisition Section, Ranchi to submit a Status report of the aforesaid lands -inquestion.

¶102

(x) It is pleaded that one Anamika Sahkari Griha Nirman Samiti preferred a writ application for quashing the letter No.3080 dated 29.01.1996 whereby and whereunder the Station Commander prohibited the said Samiti/Society from commencing any construction work. The said writ application was registered as C.W.J.C. No: 1024 of 1996 (R). While dismissing the said writ application vide order dated 12.02.1999, this Hon'ble Court was pleased to direct the respondents not to interfere with the petitioner and other similarly situated persons who were having right, title and possession over the lands except by obtaining an order of Court of competent jurisdiction.

¶103

(xi) It is pleaded that although such status report was submitted by the concerned Amin in respect of the plots of the petitioners, but

¶104

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neither any step was taken nor anything was communicated to the petitioners.

¶107

(xii) It is pleaded that thereafter, by letter No. 46 dated 19.01.2009, the Special Secretary, Revenue & Lands Reforms Department of the Government of Jharkhand directed the respondent No.3 to submit a report after enquiry in respect of the objections raised by the petitioners. Even copy of the said letter was forwarded to the petitioners.

¶108

(xiii) It is pleaded that on 16.06.2009, both the petitioners jointly made a representation before the Governor, Jharkhand with copies to the respondents concerned with a request to release their lands or to pay compensation in lieu thereof. The copies of such representation were served in the office of the concerned respondents on 22.06.2009.

¶109

(xiv) It is pleaded that on 29.09.2011, the petitioners submitted a joint representation before the Land Reforms Deputy Collector, Ranchi requesting him either to pay price at the present market rate or to release their lands.

¶110

(xv) It is pleaded that the lands appertaining to Plot Nos. 1463 and 1464 appertaining to Khata No: 11 were shown surplus after completion of the Ranchi Aerodrome, still the lands of those plots remain unused for decades and so far Plot No: 1470 is concerned, it neither find place in the List of Plots under requisition nor it has been used as such, and therefore, instead of repeated requests and after having respective reports from the concerned Amin and instead of specific direction issued from the

¶111

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office of the respondent No.2, no step has yet been taken by the respondent No.3 and his subordinates and hence the petitioners had been left with no option other than to invoke the extraordinary writ jurisdiction of this Hon'ble Court for redressal of their grievance in WP. (C) No: 410 of 2013.

¶114

(xvi) It is pleaded that by an order dated 21.10.2013, this Hon'ble Court was pleased to dispose of W.P. (C) No: 410 of 2013 directing the respondent No:3 to pass order in accordance with law on the representation forwarded to him within three months from the date of receipt of the order and communicate the same to the petitioners.

¶115

(xvii) It is pleaded that on 20.11.2013, the petitioner made a representation before the respondent No:3 along with copy of the order passed by this Hon'ble Court in W.P. (C) NO: 410 of 2013.

¶116

(xviii)It is pleaded that by letter issued under Memo No:306 dated 05.04.2014, the respondent No:4 asked the petitioners to appear before him for hearing.

¶117

(xix) It is pleaded that accordingly, on 16.07.2014, both the petitioners appeared before the District Land Acquisition Officer, Ranchi.

¶118

(xx) It is pleaded that subsequently, by letter No:97 dated 4.02.2015, the District Land Acquisition Officer, Ranchi requested the Director, Indian Airport Authority, Birsa Munda Airport, Ranchi to submit a report with regard to the land appertaining to Plot No: 1463, 1464and 1470 under Khata No:11 measuring an area of 3.15 acres.

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(xxi) It is pleaded that by letter NC: 188 (11) - dated 27.02.2015, the District Land Acquisition Officer, Ranchi issued a reminder to the Director, Indian Airport Authority Birsa Munda Airport, Ranchi.

¶122

(xxii) It is pleaded that ultimately, the petitioner had to prefer Cont. Case (C) No:822 of 2016 in which on 25.01.2017, the respondent No:4 filed a Show Cause enclosing therewith the order dated 30.09.2015.

¶123

(xxiii)It is pleaded that by an order dated 28.04.2017, Cont. Case (C) No: 822 of 2016 was dropped with a liberty to the petitioner to challenge the impugned order dated 30.09.2015.

¶124

(xxiv) It is pleaded that by the impugned Order dated 30.09.2015, the respondent No:4 observed that the lands in-question was acquired for the purpose of construction of Runway of the Airport and the respondent No: 4 contacted the Director, Indian Airport Authority, Ranchi who intimated that the said land has been transferred in the name of the Airport Authority of India and Compensation has been paid. On the basis of such instructions, the respondent no. 4 purported to have observed that the compensation amount might have been paid to the ancestors of the petitioners and their claims have been rejected.

¶125

(xxv) It is pleaded that that no payment of compensation has been made either to the ancestors of the petitioners or to them as alleged in the impugned Order.

¶126

Being aggrieved, the petitioners have approached before this Court by filing W.P(C) No.6576 of 2018.

¶127

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¶129

It is evident from the factual aspect that the land in question has been claimed by the writ petitioners, who are the grand sons of the original title holder by making the ground that the land in question although has been acquired in 1943-44, but no compensation has been paid in favour of the predecessors in interest of the original writ petitioners.

¶130

The claim was agitated before the District Land Acquisition Officer, Ranchi who vide order dated 30.09.2015 has rejected to extend the amount of compensation in favour of the predecessors in interest of the writ petitioners.

¶131

The said order dated 30.09.2015 has been assailed by filing a writ petition being W.P(C) No.6576 of 2018 before the learned Single Judge.

¶132

The learned Single Judge has considered the legality and propriety of the said decision and came to a conclusion that that the land having said to be acquired sometime in the year 1943-44, however, the claim has been raised sometime in the year 2015, i.e., after delay of more than 70 years.

¶133

The learned Single Judge has, therefore, gone into the principle of applicability of the delay and laches and accordingly vide order dated 17.07.2023 dismissed the said writ petition, which is the subject matter of the present appeal.

¶134

It needs to mention here that the original writ petitioner no. 1 had died on 18.08.2023 i.e. after passing of the order by the learned Single Judge leaving behind his sons/legal heirs, who have been arrayed as appellant nos.2 to 5 in the present Letters Patent Appeal being L.P.A No.298 of 2025

¶135

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¶137

Submission on behalf of the appellant-writ petitioners:

¶138

Mr. Sanjay Kumar Pandey, the learned counsel appearing for the petitioners/appellants has taken the following grounds:

¶139

(i)That the learned Single Judge has not appreciated the very basic factor that the land although has been acquired by the State to be handed over in favour of the Civil Aviation Authority for the purpose of construction of Airport at Ranchi.

¶140

(ii) It has been contended that the compensation amount has not been paid, rather the District Land Acquisition Officer, Ranchi has come out with the reasoning in the impugned order that no record has been found available and that led the District Land Acquisition Officer, Ranchi to reject such claim. (iii) It has been contended that keeping the record is the exclusive domain and bounded duty of the State and its authority and if the same is not available, the same cannot be taken as a ground to negate the claim for compensation.

¶141

The learned counsel based upon the aforesaid ground has submitted that the learned Single Judge ought to have taken into consideration the aforesaid aspect of the matter, but instead of considering the same, the learned Single Judge has gone into the applicability of the principle of delay and laches and, hence, the impugned order suffers from error.

¶142

Submission on behalf of the Respondent-State:

¶143

Per contra, the learned counsel appearing for the respondentState to defend the impugned order has raised the following grounds:

¶144

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¶146

(i) It has been contended that keeping the record is the exclusive domain of the State and its functionary but it is also equally applicable that the claim cannot be allowed to be agitated after a long period of 70 years as the case herein is and that is the reason the principle of delay and laches has been carved out by considering the fact about the availability of the documents vis a vis the approach of the litigants in approaching the Court of Law.

¶147

(ii) It has been contended that the learned Single Judge has, therefore, taken the aforesaid ground and claim of the writ petitioners has been rejected on the principle of delay and laches that too, without any explanation.

¶148

The learned counsel based upon the aforesaid grounds has submitted that the order passed by the learned Single Judge needs no interference and the present appeal is fit to be dismissed.

¶149

Analysis:

¶150

We have heard the learned counsel appearing for the parties and gone through the findings recorded by the learned Single Judge in the impugned judgment as also the relevant facts as available in the pleadings.

¶151

The learned Single Judge has dismissed the writ petition on the ground of applicability of the principle of delay and laches, since, the claim has been agitated by making an application before the District Land Acquisition Officer, Ranchi sometime in the year 2014 pertaining to the acquisition of the land of the year 1943-44.

¶152

The question of applicability of principle of delay and laches since is the reason for dismissing the writ petition and, as such, this Court is to consider whether in the facts and circumstances of the present case,

¶153

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the principle of delay and laches will be applicable which has been made applicable by the learned Single Judge can it be said to be justified?

¶156

The position of law is well settled that so far as the exercising of the jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution of India is concerned, there is no issue of applicability of limitation, however, the delay and laches is to be applied for the reason that since the writ jurisdiction is the Court of equity and, as such, the litigant concerned being aggrieved be expected to approach the Court within a reasonable period.

¶157

The further reason is that if the litigant is not conscious with his right and after long period suddenly approaching the Court for redressal of his grievance such benefit of extraordinary jurisdiction conferred to the High Court is not to be made available to such litigant.

¶158

Further, there is no dispute of the proposition of law that the writ court being the court of equity is to entertain the writ petition, if the writ court is being approached within a reasonable period of time.

¶159

It is also equally settled that in the proceeding under Article 226 of the Constitution of India the principle of limitation is not applicable but the delay and laches is applicable so that the court of equity may not be approached after inordinate delay. Reference in this regard be made to the judgment rendered by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in P.S. Sadasivaswamy v. State of T.N.(1975) 1 SCC 152 wherein at para 2, their Lordship have held as under:

¶160

“2. The main grievance of the appellant is that the second respondent who was junior to him as Assistant Engineer was promoted as Divisional Engineer in 1957 by relaxing the relevant rules regarding the length of service necessary for promotion as Divisional Engineer and that his claim for a similar relaxation was not considered at that time. The learned Judge of the Madras High Court who heard the writ

¶161

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petition was of the view that the relaxation of the rules in favour of the second respondent without considering the appellant's case was arbitrary. In view of the statement on behalf of the Government that such relaxation was given only in the case of overseas scholars, which statement was not controverted, it is not possible to agree with the view of the learned Judge. Be that as it may, if the appellant was aggrieved by it he should have approached the court even in the year 1957, after the two representations made by him had failed to produce any result. One cannot sleep over the matter and come to the court questioning that relaxation in the year 1971. There is the further fact that even after Respondents 3 and 4 were promoted as Divisional Engineers over the head of the appellant he did not come to the court questioning it. There was a third opportunity for him to have come to the court when Respondents 2 to 4 were again promoted as Superintending Engineers over the head of the appellant. After fourteen long years because of the tempting prospect of the Chief Engineership he has come to the court. In effect he wants to unscramble a scrambled egg. It is very difficult for the Government to consider whether any relaxation of the rules should have been made in favour of the appellant in the year 1957. The conditions that were prevalent in 1957, cannot be reproduced now. In any case as the Government had decided as a matter of policy, as they were entitled to do, not to relax the rules in favour of any except overseas scholars it will be wholly pointless to direct them to consider the appellant's case as if nothing had happened after 1957. Not only Respondent 2 but also Respondents 3 and 4 who were the appellant's juniors became Divisional Engineers in 1957, apparently on the ground that their merits deserved their promotion over the head of the appellant. He did not question it. Nor did he question the promotion of his juniors as Superintending Engineers over his head. He could have come to the court on every one of these three occasions. A person aggrieved by an order of promoting a junior over his head should approach the court at least within six months or at the most a year of such promotion. It is not that there is any period of limitation for the courts to exercise their powers under Article 226 nor is it that there can never be a case where the courts cannot interfere in a matter after the passage of a certain length of time. But it would be a sound and wise exercise of discretion for the courts to refuse to exercise their extraordinary powers under Article 226 in the case of persons who do not approach it expeditiously for relief and who stand by and allow things to happen and then approach the court to put forward stale claims and try to unsettle settled matters. The petitioner's petition

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should, therefore, have been dismissed in limine. Entertaining such petitions is a waste of time of the court. It clogs the work of the court and impedes the work of the court in considering legitimate grievances as also its normal work. We consider that the High Court was right in dismissing the appellant's petition as well as the appeal.”

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In State of M.P. &Ors Vs. Nandlal Jaiswal & Ors reported in

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(1986) 4 SCC 566 , the Hon'ble Apex Court has observed that the power of the High Court to issue an appropriate writ under Article 226 of the Constitution is discretionary and if there is inordinate delay on the part of the petitioner in filing the writ petitioner and such delay is not satisfactorily explained, the High Court may decline to interfere and grant relief in exercise of its writ jurisdiction. Emphasis was laid down on the principle of delay and laches stating that the High Court does not ordinarily permit a belated resort to the extraordinary remedy under the writ jurisdiction because it is likely to cause confusion and inconvenience in bringing the justice. For ready reference the relevant paragraph of the aforesaid judgment is being quoted as under:

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24. Now, it is well settled that the power of the High Court to issue an appropriate writ under Article 226 of the Constitution is discretionary and the High Court in the exercise of its discretion does not ordinarily assist the tardy and the indolent or the acquiescent and the lethargic. If there is inordinate delay on the part of the petitioner in filing a writ petition and such delay is not satisfactorily explained, the High Court may decline to intervene and grant relief in the exercise of its writ jurisdiction. The evolution of this rule of laches or delay is premised upon a number of factors. The High Court does not ordinarily permit a belated resort to the extraordinary remedy under the writ jurisdiction because it is likely to cause confusion and public inconvenience and bring in its train new injustices. The rights of third parties may intervene and if the writ jurisdiction is exercised on a writ petition filed after unreasonable delay, it may have the effect of inflicting not only hardship and inconvenience but also injustice on third parties. When the writ jurisdiction of the High Court is invoked, unexplained delay coupled with the creation of third party rights in the meanwhile is an

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important factor which always weighs with the High Court in deciding whether or not to exercise such jurisdiction. We do not think it necessary to burden this judgment with reference to various decisions of this Court where it has been emphasised time and again that where there is inordinate and unexplained delay and third party rights are created in the intervening period, the High Court would decline to interfere, even if the State action complained of is unconstitutional or illegal. We may only mention in the passing two decisions of this Court one in Ramana Dayaram Shetty v. International Airport Authority of India [(1979) 3 SCC 489 : AIR 1979 SC 1628 : (1979) 3 SCR Page 9 1014] and the other in Ashok Kumar Mishra v. Collector [(1980) 1 SCC 180 : AIR 1980 SC 112 : (1980) 1 SCR 491] . We may point out that in R.D. Shetty case, even though the State action was held to be unconstitutional as being violative of Article 14 of the Constitution, this Court refused to grant relief to the petitioner on the ground that the writ petition had been filed by the petitioner more than five months after the acceptance of the tender of the fourth respondent and during that period, the fourth respondent had incurred considerable expenditure, aggregating to about Rs 1.25 lakhs, in making arrangements for putting up the restaurant and the snack bar. Of course, this rule of laches or delay is not a rigid rule which can be cast in a strait jacket formula, for there may be cases where despite delay and creation of third party rights the High Court may still in the exercise of its discretion interfere and grant relief to the petitioner. But, such cases where the demand of justice is so compelling that the High Court would be inclined to interfere in spite of delay or creation of third party rights would by their very nature be few and far between. Ultimately it would be a matter within the discretion of the court; ex hypothesis every discretion must be exercised fairly and justly so as to promote justice and not to defeat it.

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Further, the Hon’ble Supreme Court in New Delhi Municipal Council v. Pan Singh (2007) 9 SCC 278 by referring to the judgment rendered in Lipton India Ltd. v. Union of India (1994) 6 SCC 524 has observed that although, there is no period of limitation provided for filing a writ petition under Article 226 of the Constitution of India, ordinarily, writ petition should be filed within a reasonable time.

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Thus, it is evident from the aforesaid settled proposition of law that the doctrine of delay and laches should not be lightly brushed aside. A writ court is required to weigh the explanation offered and the acceptability of the same. The Court should bear in mind that it is exercising an extraordinary and equitable jurisdiction.

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Further, this Court is conscious with the fact that being a constitutional Court, it has a duty to protect the rights of the citizens but simultaneously it is to keep itself alive to the primary principle that when an aggrieved person, without adequate reason, approaches the Court at his own leisure or pleasure, the Court would be under legal obligation to scrutinize whether the lis at a belated stage should be entertained or not. Be it noted, delay comes in the way of equity.

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In certain circumstances delay and laches may not be fatal but, in most circumstances, inordinate delay would only invite disaster for the litigant who knocks at the doors of the Court. Delay reflects inactivity and inaction on the part of a litigant - a litigant who has forgotten the basic norms, namely, "procrastination is the greatest thief of time" and second, law does not permit one to sleep and rise like a phoenix. Delay does bring in hazard and causes injury to the lis.

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The law is well-settled that if no claim has been raised fairly within the reasonable period, then such litigation is not to be reopened on the principle of applicability of delay and latches. However, it is equally settled that all the delay and laches will not fatal to entertain the writ petition, if the delay caused in preferring the writ petition has sufficiently been explained, then certainly the writ petition is to be entertained.

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In the backdrop of the aforesaid settled position of law this Court is now adverting to the factual aspect of the case. The land in question has been said to be acquired under the Land Acquisition Act, 1894 sometime in the year 1943-44. The original land owners have not raised any litigation by filing any application before the concerned authority.

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This Court has posed a pin pointed question to the learned counsel appearing for the appellants whether there is any averment in the pleadings regarding the reference of issuance of notice under section 4 of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894.

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The learned counsel appearing for the appellants has submitted that no such instruction is available with him and that is the reason no such statement has been made even before the writ Court or even in the present memo of appeal.

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The question therefore is that when the litigant himself is not knowing that as to whether notification under section 4 of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894 has been issued or not, how can they claim amount of compensation that too, being claimed by the successor in interest after delay of about more than 70 years of the acquisition as per the pleadings.

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The acquisition is only to be made on the basis of the statutory provision and at that time only one provision was available, i.e., the Land Acquisition Act, 1894 which provides the provision from the stage of issuance of notice under section 4, the objection under section 5, its consideration under section 6 and thereafter the declaration under section 11 and then award under section 17 of the said provision.

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This Court, in absence of any document either notice under section 4 or objection under section 5 or even an award under section 17

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of the Act and in absence of any statement to that effect in the pleading, is of the view that if in such premise the principle of delay and laches has been held applicable by the learned Single Judge the same cannot be said to suffer from an error.

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The substituted writ petitioners/appellants since have agitated the claim before the District Land Acquisition Officer, Ranchi and, as such, it was the bounded duty of the applicant therein to bring all the facts in the notice of the District Land Acquisition Officer.

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The argument which has been advanced on behalf of the learned counsel for the appellants/writ petitioners that the document is to be kept in the custody of the authority.

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There is no denial of the said fact, but it is also not possible to keep all the documents of the period of more than 70-80 years and if the writ petitioners or the predecessor in interest has not approached to the Court within a reasonable period, then it is not available for such litigant to put claim upon the State functionary and, therefore, the principle of delay and laches, in such circumstances, is having bearing.

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59. The Hon’ble Apex Court on the issue of disbursement of amount of compensation has rendered judgment wherein the compensation was sought for after lapse of 21 years and in those circumstances, the Hon’ble Apex Court has dismissed the application on the ground that after 21 years no direction can be passed for making payment of the amount of compensation, reference in this regard may be made to the judgment rendered by the Hon’ble Apex Court in the case of Baljeet Singh (Dead) through Lrs. and Others Vs. State of U.P. and Others [(2019) 15 SCC

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33] wherein at paragraph at para-7, the Hon'ble Apex Court has held which

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reads hereunder as:

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"7. The matter requires examination from another aspect, viz., laches and delay. It is a very recognised principle of jurisprudence that a right not exercised for a long time is nonexistent. Even when there is no limitation period prescribed by any statute relating to certain proceedings, in such cases, courts have coined the doctrine of laches and delay as well as doctrine of acquiescence and non-suited the litigants who approached the court belatedly without any justifiable explanation for bringing the action after unreasonable delay. In those cases, where the period of limitation is prescribed within which the action is to be brought before the court, if the action is not brought within that prescribed period, the aggrieved party loses remedy and cannot enforce his legal right after the period of limitation is over, however, subject to the prayer for condonation of delay and if there is a justifiable explanation for bringing the action after the prescribed period of limitation is over and sufficient cause is shown, the court may condone the delay. Therefore, in a case where the period of limitation is prescribed and the action is not brought within the period of limitation and subsequently proceedings are initiated after the period of limitation along with the prayer for condonation of delay, in that case, the applicant has to make out a sufficient cause and justify the cause for delay with a proper explanation. It is not that in each and every case despite the sufficient cause is not shown and the delay is not properly explained, the court may condone the delay. To make out a case for condonation of delay, the applicant has to make out a sufficient cause/reason which prevented him in initiating the proceedings within the period of limitation. Otherwise, he will be accused of gross negligence. If the aggrieved party does not initiate the proceedings within the period of limitation without any sufficient cause, he can be denied the relief on the ground of unexplained laches and delay and on the presumption that such person has waived his right or acquiesced with the order. These principles are based on the principles relatable to sound public policy that if a person does not exercise his right for a long time then such right is non-existent."

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It is evident from the judgment rendered by Hon'ble Apex Court

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in the case of Baljeet Singh (supra) which was a case for seeking a

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direction for compensation in lieu of acquisition of land and the Hon'ble Apex Court has declined to condone the delay of 21 years.

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This Court, after having discussed the factual as well as the legal issues and after going through the judgment passed by the learned Single Judge has found that the learned Single Judge has given its finding on the basis of the applicability of the principle of delay and laches in view of the fact that the land, as per the admitted case of the appellants/writ petitioners was acquired sometime in the year 1943-44.

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The learned Single Judge has given the finding of applicability of the principle of delay and laches by putting reliance upon the judgment of the Hon’ble Apex Court which have been recorded in the findings of the learned Single Judge at paragraph no.6, 7 8 and 9, for ready reference the same are being quoted hereunder as:

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6. The Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of “Eastern Coalfields Ltd. Vs.

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Dugal Kumar” reported in (2008) 14 SCC 295 has held as under:

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24. As to delay and laches on the part of the writ petitioner, there is substance in the argument of learned counsel for the appellant Company. It is well settled that under Article 226 of the Constitution, the power of a High Court to issue an appropriate writ, order or direction is discretionary. One of the grounds to refuse relief by a writ court is that the petitioner is guilty of delay and laches. It is imperative, where the petitioner invokes extraordinary remedy under Article 226 of the Constitution, that he should come to the court at the earliest reasonably possible opportunity. Inordinate delay in making the motion for a writ is indeed an adequate ground for refusing to exercise discretion in favour of the applicant.

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7 . In the case of “Karnataka Power Corpn. Ltd. Vs. K. Thangappan”

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reported in (2006) 4 SCC 322, the Hon’ble Supreme Court held as under:

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6. Delay or laches is one of the factors which is to be borne in mind by the High Court when they exercise their discretionary powers under Article 226 of the Constitution. In an appropriate case the High Court may refuse to invoke its extraordinary powers if there is such negligence or omission on the part of the applicant to assert his right as taken in conjunction with the lapse of time and other circumstances, causes prejudice to the opposite party. Even where fundamental right is involved the matter is still within the discretion of the Court as pointed out in Durga Prashad v. Chief Controller of Imports and Exports

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[(1969) 1 SCC 185]. Of course, the discretion has to be exercised judicially and reasonably.

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8. The Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of “City and Industrial Development Corpn. Vs. Dosu Aardeshir Bhiwandiwala & Ors.”, reported in (2009) 1 SCC 168, held as under:

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26. It is well settled and needs no restatement at our hands that under Article 226 of the Constitution, the jurisdiction of a High Court to issue appropriate writs particularly a writ of mandamus is highly discretionary. The relief cannot be claimed as of right. One of the grounds for refusing relief is that the person approaching the High Court is guilty of unexplained delay and the laches. Inordinate delay in moving the court for a writ is an adequate ground for refusing a writ. The principle is that the courts exercising public law jurisdiction do not encourage agitation of stale claims and exhuming matters where the rights of third parties may have accrued in the interregnum.

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9. In the case of “Syed Maqbool Ali Vs. State of U.P & Another” reported in (2011) 15 SCC 383, the Hon’ble Supreme Court held as under:

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12. The High Courts should also be cautious in entertaining writ petitions filed decades after the dispossession, seeking directions for acquisition and payment of compensation. It is not uncommon for villagers to offer/donate some part of their lands voluntarily for a public purpose which would benefit them or the community as for example, construction of an access road to the village or their property, or construction of a village tank or a bund to prevent flooding/erosion. When they offer their land for such public purpose, the land would be of little or negligible value. But decades later, when land values increase, either on account of passage of time or on account of developments or improvements carried out by the State, the landholders come up with belated claims alleging that their lands were taken without acquisition and without their consent. When such claims are made after several decades, the State would be at a disadvantage to contest the claim, as it may not have the records to show in what circumstances the lands were given/donated and whether the land was given voluntarily. Therefore, belated writ petitions, without proper explanation for the delay, are liable to be dismissed. Be that as it may.”

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This Court, after considering the judgment rendered by Hon'ble

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Apex Court in the case of Baljeet Singh (supra) as also considering the fact that the learned Single Judge has also given the finding of applicability of the principle of delay and laches the claim for compensation has been filed after lapse of 70 years, which is admittedly after inordinate delay, that too without explanation, is of the view that the order passed by the learned Single Judge requires no interference.

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