The State of Jharkhand Vs Srinivas Rao

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2025:JHHC:19138-DB

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IN THE HIGH COURT OF JHARKHAND AT RANCHI

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I.A. No. 4488 of 2025

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In/And

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L.P.A No. 206 of 2025

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The State of Jharkhand

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The Director General of Police, Jharkhand, having his office at Police Headquarter, P.O. Dhurwa, P.S. Jagarnathpur, District Ranchi.

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The Police Inspector General (Human Rights), having his office at Police Headquarter, P.O. Dhurwa, P.S. Jagarnathpur, District Ranchi.

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The Deputy Inspector General of Police, Jharkhand Armed Police (JAP), having his office at Raja-Rani Kothi, P.Ο. & P.S. Doranda, District Ranchi.

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The Senior Superintendent of Police, East Singhbhum, Jamshedpur, P.O. & P.S. Sakshi Thana, District East Singhbhum.

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The Superintendent of Police, Hazaribagh, P.O. Hazaribagh, P.S. Sadar, District Hazaribagh.

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The Superintendent of Police, Chatra, P.O. Chatra, P.S. Sadar, District Chatra.

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The Superintendent of Police, Chaibasa, P.O. & P.S. Chaibasa, District West Singhbhum.

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The Superintendent of Police, Koderma, P.O. & P.S. Koderma, District Koderma.

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The Superintendent of Police, Saraikella-Kharsawan, P.O. & P.S. Saraikella-Kharsawan, District Saraikella-Kharsawan.

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The Superintendent of Police, Gumla, Ρ.Ο. & P.S. Gumla, District Gumla.

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The Superintendent of Police, Lohardaga, P.O. Lohardaga, P.S. Town Thana Lohardaga, District Lohardaga.

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The Commandant of IRB-1, P.O. Davalbardi, P.S. Narayanpur, District Jamtara.

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The Commandant of JAP-9, P.O. & P.S. Jilwabarri, District Sahibganj.

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The Commandant of JAP-2, P.O. & P.S. Tatisilway, District Ranchi.

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The Commandant of JAP-4, P.O. Sector 12/A, P.S. Sector 12 Thana, District Bokaro.

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…… Appellants/Respondents

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Versus

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Srinivas Rao, Son of Sri C. Rao, resident of At Sakshi Thana Campus, 48/A/3, P.O. & P.S. Sakshi, District East Singhbhum, PIN831001, Jharkhand.

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Lotla Satyam, Son of Sri L. Seetha Rao, Resident of House no.1077, Kumharpara, P.O. & P.S. Sonari, District East Singhbhum, PIN831011, Jharkhand.

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Praveen Kumar, Son of Late Sri Matuk Dhari Singh, Resident of Gram-Saram, P.O. & P.S. Ichak, District Hazaribagh, PIN-825402, Jharkhand.

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Sunil Kumar, Son of Sri Moti Ram, Resident of 84, T.R. Type, Kundli Road, P.O. & P.S. Kadma, Jamshedpur, District East Singhbhum, PIN-831005, Jharkhand.

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Md. Shahid, Son of Sri Ali Jan, resident of House no.50, Road no.1, K.G.N. Colony, Old Purulia Road, Zakhirnagar, P.O. & P.S. Azad Nagar, Jamshedpur, District East Singhbhum, PIN-832110, Jharkhand.

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Jitendra Singh, Son of Sri Baldev Singh, Resident of Gram Deo Nagar, Gandhi Marg, House no.14, P.O. Sakshi, P.S. Sitaramdera, District East Singhbhum, PIN- 831001, Jharkhand.

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Sarfaraz Ahmad, Son of Sri Gulzar Ahmad, Resident of B.H. Area, Road no.2, Ρ.Ο. & P.S. Kadma, District East Singhbhum, PIN-831005, Jharkhand.

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Lakhwinder Singh, Son of Sri Baldev Singh, Resident of 4/29, Golmuri Hindu Basti, P.O. & P.S. Golmuri, District East Singhbhum, PIN-831003, Jharkhand.

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Hemant Kumar Sahu, Son of Sri Ishwar Lal Sahu, Gram Sonari, Gudri Bazar, P.O. & P.S. Sonari, District East Singhbhum, PIN-831011, Jharkhand.

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Tarun Kumar Pandey, Son of Sri Balsudha Pandey, Resident of Village Haripur, P.O. Nishchalganj, P.S. Parawalpur, District Nalanda, PIN-801301, Bihar.

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Lalu Kumar Sharma, Son of Sri Adalati Sharma, Resident of House no.58 D, Kadma, Near Bhatia Basti Shivpath, P.O. & P.S. Kadma, District East Singhbhum, PIN-831005, Jharkhand.

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Rakesh Kumar Pandey, Son of Sri Shivejee Pandey, Resident of Gram- Barka Rajpur, P.O. Barka Rajpur, P.S. Simri, District Buxer, PIN 802113, Bihar.

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Dildar Singh, Son of Sri Pramjeet Singh, Resident of Gram Tulia Dungri, P.O. & P.S. Golmuri, District East Singhbhum, PIN- 831003, Jharkhand.

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Amit Kumar Singh, Son of Sri Ashok Singh, Resident of Gram East Plant Basti, Burmamines, P.O. & P.S. Burmamines, District East Singhbhum, PIN-831007, Jharkhand.

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Bir Kumar Singh, Son of Sri Prahlad Singh, Resident of Quarter no.2-051, Street- S, Sector 2D, P.O. Sector- 2, P.S. City Police Station, District Bokaro Steel City, PIN-827001, Jharkhand.

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Sonu Oraon, Son of Sri Shankar Oraon, Resident of Gram-Barman Diha, P.O. Ningni, P.S. Lohardaga, District Lohardaga, PIN- 835302, Jharkhand.

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Rajiv Ranjan, Son of Sri Raghunandan Rajak, Resident of 1/B, Ambedkar Nagar, P.O. Sector-2, P.S. City Police Station, District Bokaro Steel City, PIN-827001, Jharkhand.

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…. Respondents/Petitioners

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CORAM: HON’BLE THE CHIEF JUSTICE HON’BLE MR. JUSTICE RAJESH SHANKAR

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--------For the Appellants: Mr. Kumar Rahul Kamlesh, A.C. to S.C.-IV

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Reserved on: 08.07.2025 Pronounced on: 15 .07.2025

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Per M.S. Ramachandra Rao, C.J.

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1. This application is filed by the applicants under Section 5 of the Limitation Act, 1963 to condone the delay of 410 days in filing the Letters Patent Appeal challenging the judgment dt. 05.01.2024 passed in W.P.(S) No. 6836 of 2018 of the learned Single Judge.

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2. In the application filed seeking condonation of delay, it is contended that prior to that date, on 27.12.2023 the then Inspector General (Human Rights) was transferred and posted as Inspector General, South Chotanagpur Division, Ranchi, but no regular posting was made on the post of the Inspector General (Human Rights) and the I.G. (Headquarters) was given additional charge of the post of I.G. (Human Rights) through Government order dt. 09.01.2024.

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3. It is then contended that there were two general elections in 2024 i.e. in the mid of the year and at the end of the year, and because of these elections, apart from the regular responsibilities, the said officer was busy in making transfers/postings of police personnel on priority basis. It is

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contended that the judgment of the learned Single Judge in W.P.(S) No. 6836 of 2018 could not be placed before the said authority on time.

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4. It is stated that the post of Inspector General (Human Rights) was filled up by regular officer in January, 2025 and thereafter, a proposal was mooted for taking an appropriate decision. It is stated that after going through various departmental channels, on 25.02.2025 the file was sent to the office of Advocate General, Jharkhand for obtaining necessary opinion; on 28.02.2025, the Advocate General opined that Letters Patent Appeal should be preferred through the Standing Counsel-IV; the departmental file was returned from the office of the Advocate General on 03.03.2025; and then it was sent to the conducting counsel where also some time was consumed in formulating grounds and drafting memo of Appeal. It is stated that ultimately the Appeal was drafted and the Letters Patent Appeal was filed on 21.03.2025 and therefore, 410 days delay occurred in this process.

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5. It is stated that the delay in filing the Letters Patent Appeal is due to inadvertence and the time consumed after January, 2025 was due to procedural technicalities and was not deliberate and therefore, the said period of delay is required to be condoned.

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6. We may point out that though the judgment of the learned Single Judge was pronounced on 05.01.2024, a perusal of the certified copy of the impugned judgment filed with the accompanying Letters Patent Appeal indicates that application for issuance of certified copy thereof was made on 21.03.2025 i.e. more than a year from the date of pronouncement of the judgment in the Writ petition. No explanation is

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offered why application for certified copy of the judgment was not made immediately after the judgment was pronounced.

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7. Admittedly, the limitation period for filing a Letters Patent Appeal challenging the judgment of the learned Single Judge is only 30 days from the date of pronouncement of the judgment.

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8. Therefore, the Letters Patent Appeal ought to have been filed within 30 days from 05.01.2024 when the judgment was pronounced.

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9. Merely because at that point of time there was no regular officer posted in the post of Inspector General (Human Rights), the respondents cannot state that the steps could not be taken to file the Letters Patent Appeal within the above said period because the I.G. (Headquarters) who had given additional charge of post of Inspector General (Human Rights) ought to have processed and taken steps to file the Letters Patent Appeal within a reasonable time.

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10. The fact that there were two general elections in mid 2024 and end of 2024 cannot also be an excuse for not doing anything in the matter of taking steps to file the Letters Patent Appeal and it is clearly a case of abject negligence on the part of the applicants.

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11. There is no excuse for starting the decision making process to file the Letters Patent Appeal in January, 2025 one year after the judgment of the learned Single Judge was pronounced and giving untenable excuses for the delay in filing the Letters Patent Appeal.

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12. This conduct has been deprecated by the Supreme Court in several cases.

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13. In Postmaster General and others Vs. Living Media India Limited and another¹ , the Supreme Court held:

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“25. We have already extracted the reasons as mentioned in the “better affidavit” sworn by Mr. Aparajeet Pattanayak, SSRM, Air Mail Sorting Division, New Delhi. It is relevant to note that in the said affidavit, the Department has itself mentioned and is aware of the date of the judgment of the Division Bench of the High Court in Office of the Chief Postmaster v. Living Media India Ltd. as 11-92009. Even according to the deponent, their counsel had applied for the certified copy of the said judgment only on 8-1-2010 and the same was received by the Department on the very same day. There is no explanation for not applying for the certified copy of the impugned judgment on 11-9-2009 or at least within a reasonable time. The fact remains that the certified copy was applied for only on 8-1-2010 i.e. after a period of nearly four months.

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26. In spite of affording another opportunity to file better affidavit by placing adequate material, neither the Department nor the person-in-charge has filed any explanation for not applying the certified copy within the prescribed period. The other dates mentioned in the affidavit which we have already extracted, clearly show that there was delay at every stage and except mentioning the

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dates of receipt of the file and the decision taken, there is no explanation as to why such delay had occasioned. Though it was stated by the Department that the delay was due to unavoidable circumstances and genuine difficulties, the fact remains that from day one the Department or the person/persons concerned have not evinced diligence in prosecuting the matter to this Court by taking appropriate steps.

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27. It is not in dispute that the person(s) concerned were well aware or conversant with the issues involved including the prescribed period of limitation for taking up the matter by way of filing a special leave petition in this Court. They cannot claim that they have a separate period of limitation when the Department was

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1 (2012) 3 SCC 563

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possessed with competent persons familiar with court proceedings. In the absence of plausible and acceptable explanation, we are posing a question why the delay is to be condoned mechanically merely because the Government or a wing of the Government is a party before us.

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28. Though we are conscious of the fact that in a matter of condonation of delay when there was no gross negligence or deliberate inaction or lack of bona fides, a liberal concession has to be adopted to advance substantial justice, we are of the view that in the facts and circumstances, the Department cannot take advantage of various earlier decisions. The claim on account of impersonal machinery and inherited bureaucratic methodology of making several notes cannot be accepted in view of the modern technologies being used and available. The law of limitation undoubtedly binds everybody, including the Government.”

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(Emphasis supplied)

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14. These observations equally apply to the instant case where the applicants have acted in a similar manner as in the said case.

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15. The said judgment has been followed by the Supreme Court in several cases such as Commissioner of Customs Chennai vs. M/s Volex Interconnect (India) Pvt. Ltd.² , Pr. Commissioner Central Excise Delhi-1 vs. Design Dialogues India Pvt. Ltd.³ , Union of India vs. Central Tibetan Schools Administration & Others⁴ , Union of India & Others vs. Vishnu Aroma Pouching Private Limited and another⁵ , and State of Uttar Pradesh & Others vs. Sabha Narain & others⁶ .

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16. In Union of India & Anr. Vs. Jahangir Byramji Jeejeebhoy (D) through his LR⁷ , the Supreme Court held that it could not look into the

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2 (2022) 3 SCC 159

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3 (2022) 2 SCC 327

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4 (2021) 11 SCC 557

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5 (2022) 9 SCC 263

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6 (2022) 9 SCC 266

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7 2024 INSC 262: 2024 SCC OnLine SC 489

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merits of the matter as long as it is not convinced that sufficient cause has been made out for condonation of long and inordinate delay; that it hardly matters whether a litigant is a private party or a State or Union of India when it comes to condoning gross delay of more than 12 years; length of delay is a relevant matter which the Court must take into consideration while considering whether the delay should be condoned or not; from the tenor of the approach of the appellants, it appears that they want to fix their own period of limitation for instituting the proceedings for which law has prescribed a period of limitation; once it is held that a party has lost his right to have the matter considered on merits because of his long inaction, it cannot be presumed to be non-deliberate delay and in such circumstances, he cannot be heard to plead that the substantial justice deserves to be preferred as against the technical considerations. It was reiterated while considering plea for condonation of delay, Court must not start with the merits of the main case and the Court owes a duty to first ascertain the bona fides of the explanation offered by the party seeking condonation. It declared that delay should not be excused as a matter of generosity.

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17. This was also reiterated in State of Madhya Pradesh Vs. Ramkumar Choudhary⁸ .

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18. In the facts and circumstances of the case, we are satisfied that the applicants have been negligent in taking steps to file the Letters Patent Appeal and they have not shown sufficient cause for condoning the said period of delay.

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