Vikash Chandra Singh Vs the State of Jharkhand through Its Chief Secretary

2025:JHHC:28280-DB

IN THE HIGH COURT OF JHARKHAND AT RANCHI

L.P.A No.184 of 2024

Vikash Chandra Singh, aged about 54 years, Son of Late Madan Mohan Prasad Singh, resident of Gopi Lane, Power Ganj, P.O.Lohardaga, P.S.- Lohardaga, District- Lohardaga, Jharkhand

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… Appellant / Petitioner

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Versus

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1. The State of Jharkhand though its Chief Secretary, Government of Jharkhand having its office at Project Building, Dhurwa, P.O.Dhurwa, P.S.- Jagarnathpur, District- Ranchi.

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2. Department of Industries, Mines and Geology, Government of Jharkhand, Ranchi, having its office at Nepal House, Doranda, P.O.-Doranda, P.S.- Doranda, District- Ranchi.

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3. District Mining Officer, Gumla, P.O.-Gumla, P.S.- Gumla, DistrictGumla. … Respondents / Respondents

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CORAM:HON’BLE MR. JUSTICE SUJIT NARAYAN PRASAD HON’BLE MR. JUSTICE ARUN KUMAR RAI

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------- For the Petitioner :Mr. Shresth Gautam, Advocate For the Respondents : Mr. Md. Sahabuddin, S.C.-VII : Mr. Zaid Imam, AC to SC-VII ---------

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Order No.06/Dated 11^th September, 2025

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Per Sujit Narayan Prasad, J:

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I.A. No. 6482 of 2024

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1. The instant interlocutory application has been preferred under Section 5 of the Limitation Act for condoning the delay of 121 days in preferring the instant appeal.

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2. Considering the reason assigned in the interlocutory application and taking into consideration the purport of Section 5 of the Limitation

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Act the delay of 121 days in preferring the instant appeal is hereby condoned.

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3. Accordingly, the Interlocutory Application being I.A. No. 6482 of 2024 stands allowed and disposed of.

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L.P.A. No. 184 of 2024

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4. The appeal under Clause 10 of Letters Patent Appeal has been directed against the order/judgment dated 30.10.2023 passed in W.P.(C) No. 338 of 2018, by which the demand notice dated 12.11.2017 issued by District Mining Officer, Gumla, has been refused to be interfered with.

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Factual Matrix

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5. The brief facts of the case, as per pleadings made in the writ petition, reads as under:

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6. The Petitioner was granted a mining lease for mining the mineral Bauxite, over a land situated in Mouza Narma, Thana No. 38, Thana Bishunpur, admeasuring an area of 51.88 acres (21.00 hectares) in the District of Gumla.

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7. The said Mining Lease was originally granted in favour of the Petitioner on 26.03.1990, as on date in terms of Section 8A (6) of the Mines & Mineral (Development & Regulation) Act, 1957 [MMDR Act"), a Supplementary Lease Deed has been executed in favour of the Petitioner by the State of Jharkhand on 29.03.2017 and the period of Mining Lease has been extended up to 25.03.2040.

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8. The Petitioner has duly obtained all requisite governmental clearances and has filed its statutory returns under the MMDR Act and the rules made thereunder, which has been duly accepted by all the authorities concerned such as the Indian Bureau of Mines and regulatory authorities of the State Government.

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9. It is stated that in the meanwhile, the Hon'ble Supreme Court of India after considering the report of Central Empowered Committee and the report of Justice M.B. Shah Commission, delivered a judgment in the case titled Common Cause Vs. Union of India & Others, W.P. (C) No. 114 of 2014 on 02.08.2017 wherein the said Judgment the Hon’ble Apex Court has held that mining operations being carried out without an EC or Forest Clearance, would amount to 'mining without lawful authority' and, therefore, the lessee would be liable to pay penalty in terms of Section 21(5) of the MMDR Act. In its conclusion, at Para 225, it was further held that the amounts determined as due from all the mining lease holders should be deposited by them on or before 31.12.2017.

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10. It is the case of the petitioner that the State of Jharkhand without appreciating the said judgment of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in its correct perspective, especially with respect to the purported cut-off date of 31.12.2017 for making payments, started to make a roving enquiry to collect data in hot haste.

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11. Thereafter, the District Mining Officer, Gumla, vide its letter no. 1701/M dated 12.11.2017 ("Impugned Demand Notice") has raised a

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provisional demand of Rs. 4,76,95,948/- purportedly in terms of the

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aforesaid judgment i.e. Common Cause (supra).

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12. Bing aggrieved the Petitioner furnished its representation against the Impugned Demand Notice vide its letter dated 08.01.2018, wherein, inter alia it was highlighted that the judgment of the Hon'ble Supreme Court rendered in the Common Cause case, was not applicable in the instant case, the purported provisional demand was vague and was without any lawful basis, arbitrary and not as per the mandate of the Hon'ble Supreme Court Judgment. Therefore, it was requested that the Respondents may withdraw the impugned demand notice dated 12.11.2017 issued provisionally against the Petitioner.

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13. When the grievances of the petitioner have not been addressed then a writ petition being W.P.(C) 33 of 2018 was preferred by the petitioner against the said impugned demand notice dated 12.11.2017.

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14. The learned writ Court after taking into consideration that writ petition remained pending for more than five years account of inaction on the part of the petitioner as also mere filing of writ petition is not sufficient and the High Court may refuse to invoke its extraordinary powers if there is inaction, negligence or omission on the part of the petitioner, has refused to interfere with the impugned demand notice dated 12.11.2017.

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15. The aforesaid order/judgment of the learned writ Court has been assailed herein.

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Submission of the learned counsel for the appellant/petitioner

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16. Learned counsel appearing for the appellant has submitted that the judgment impugned passed by learned Single Judge is nullity in the eyes of law, since, the day when the aforesaid judgment was passed by learned Single Judge, the writ petitioner, namely, Madan Mohan Prasad Singh was no more. However, son of the writ petitioner, namely, Vikash Chandra Singh who has filed this instant appeal along with the Interlocutory Application being I.A. No. 6483 of 2024wherein leave was sought for to file this appeal for the reason that by way of the impugned demand which is the subject matter of the appeal, the liability thereof has been shifted upon the present appellant, namely, Vikash Chandra Singh who happens to be son of Late Madan Mohan Prasad Singh who was the petitioner in original writ petition W.P.(C) No. 338 of 2018.

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17. It has been submitted that the said interlocutory application being I.A. No. 6483 of 2024 was allowed by the Co-ordinate Bench videorder dated 08.05.2025 and accordingly the son of the petitioner, namely, Vikash Chandra Singh has got the status of appellant as to challenge the order dated 30.10.2023 passed in W.P.(C) No. 338 of 2018, impugned in the present appeal, therefore, the instant appeal may be heard on merit.

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18. Learned counsel for the appellant has submitted that the order passed by the learned Single Judge is not sustainable in the eyes of law, on the non-compliance of the principle of natural justice and further the

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in the writ petition the ground has also been taken about the lack of jurisdiction of the District Mining Officer, which has been pleaded specifically at paragraph no. 44 at running page no. 83 of the writ petition which is annexure-1 of the present appeal.

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19. The further ground has been agitated that the learned Single Judge even though has not given any finding on the issue of violation of the principle of natural justice, since, straightway the demand notice has been raised by the DMO.The learned Single Judge has not gone into the merit for the reason that the writ petition has been filed in the year, 2018, but no endeavour has been taken for its early hearing.

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20. Learned counsel for the appellant has further submitted that, based upon the aforesaid reason, as to why the case has not been mentioned for early hearing and thus, the learned Single Judge failedto exercise the discretionary powers conferred under Article 226 of the Constitution of India.

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21. Learned counsel for the appellant has further submitted that the, the Co-ordinate Bench of this Court has decided the issue of jurisdiction of the authority concerned i.e. DMO in the batch of writ petition being W.P.(C) No. 3399 of 2019 vide order dated 04.03.2025 holding therein that the District Mining Officer was having no jurisdiction to exercise such power and demand by way of notice by invoking Section 21(5) of the MMDR Act, 1957.

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22. It has also been contended that the aforesaid finding has been agreed by the State Government and thus, the State Government has to

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come out with the notification in exercise of power conferred under

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Section 26(2) of the MMDR Act, 1957.

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23. The submission, therefore, has been made that the jurisdiction has been conferred by virtue of the notification dated 06.05.2025to the District Mining Officer of the respective districts hence, the demand may be quashed by taking into consideration the issue of jurisdiction as also the violation of principle of natural justice which had not been given in favour of the deceased father of the appellant i.e writ petitioner.

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24. The learned counsel has further placed his reliance upon the order passed by this Court in W.P.(C) No. 4950 of 2023 havingidentical situation, whereinthe order passed by the District Mining Officer, prior to issuance of notification dated 06.05.2025, has been quashed and the matter was remitted while directing the District Mining Officer to pass the order afresh.

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Submission of the learned counsel for the state :

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25. Mr. Md. Sahabuddin, learned State Counsel has not disputed all these aspects of the matter rather he has fairly submitted aftergoing through the order passed by this Court in W.P.(C)No. 4950 of 2023 and by the Co-ordinate Bench of this Court in order dated 04.03.2025 in W.P.(C) No. 3399 of 2019, copy of which has been supplied by the learned counsel for the petitioner to the learned State Counsel and submittedthat the appropriate order may be passed for the purpose of passing order afresh in the light of the conferment of

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power by virtue of notification dated 06.05.2025 in favour of the District Mining Officer as conferred under Section 26(2) of the MMDR Act, 1957

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Analysis

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26. We have heard the learned counsel for the parties.

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27. The factual aspect which is not in dispute in the present case is that a writ petition was preferred by one Madan Mohan Prasad Singh, who died during pendency of the writ petition and the saidthe writ petition was listed on board on 30.10.2023, but it could not be brought to the notice of the Court about the death of the writ petitioner, namely, Madan Mohan Prasad Singh, the deceased-father of the present appellant, namely, Vikash Chandra Singh.

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28. The writ petition was disposed of by the learned Single Judge on 30.10.2023 on the ground that the writ petition although was filed in the year 2018, but no endeavour was taken for its early hearing and hence, considering the conduct of the deceased-father of the present appellant being not vigilant in pursuing the case.

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29. The present appellant, son of the writ petitioner, namely, Vikas Chandra Singh came to know about the fact that as per the reference made in the lease deed, as the legal heir i.e. son of the original lease holder, namely, Madan Mohan Prasad Singh thereafter he rushed to this Court by filing the present appeal along with the interlocutory application being I.A. No. 6483 of 2024, seeking leave of this Court to represent the erstwhile writ petitioner.

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30. The Co-ordinate Bench of this Court, on the consideration of the averment made in the Interlocutory Application being I.A. No. 6483 of 2024, has allowed the same vide order dated 08.05.2025 and accordingly leave was granted to the applicant/appellant to file an appeal challenging the judgment of the learned Single Judge passed on 30.10.2023. For the ready reference, the orderdated 08.05.2025 is being referred hereinwhich readsas under: -

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“I.A. No. 6483 of 2024 is allowed and leave is granted to the applicant to file the Appeal challenging the judgment of the learned Single Judge.

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Notice in the application for condonation of delay (I.A. No.

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6482 of 2024) to the respondents.

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Mr. Zaid Iman, learned AC to SCVII, accepts notice for the

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respondent.”

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31. This Court, is of the view that since the leave has been granted to the applicant/appellant to file an appeal challenging the judgment/order of learned Single Judge,therefore the applicant to the interlocutory application being I.A. No. 6483 of 2024 has got the locus along with the status to challenge the order dated 30.10.2023passed by the learned Single Judge in the said writ petition.

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32. Herein the question which has been raised by the appellant that if the case is pending for consideration on its meritbefore the Court and if it is not being taken up, then the writ petition ought not to have been dismissed on the ground of lack of vigilance on behalf of the petitioner.

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33. Since the two vital issues have been raised herein i.e., first, violation of principle of natural justice and the second, lack of the jurisdiction of the District Mining Officer.

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34. This Court cannot dispute the aforesaid ground that if there is delay in disposal of the litigation pending before the Court of law, the same cannot be dismissed on the aforesaid ground without entering into the merit of the issues as delay cannot be attributed to the litigant concern.

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35. So far, the issue of no endevaour for filing an interlocutory application for early hearing is concerned that can also not be disputed, but because merely anapplication for early hearing has not been filed, it cannot say to be fatal for adjudication of the issuesupon which right to be heard on merit be taken away.

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36. This Court is of the view that there might be lack ofcare but herein the original writ petitioner was no more on the day when the order was passed by the learned Single Judge.

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37. Further, taking no endeavour for filing of an application for an early hearing by the litigant concern or his counsel cannot be attributed to them rather it is the duty of the Court to decidethe issue on its merit when the matter has been preferred before the Court of law by the writ petitioner.

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38. The matter has been different, if the litigation has been filed after lapse of reasonable delay,then certainly so far as the exercise of the discretionary powers is concerned in case of lapse of reasonable

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delay, the principle of delay and lachescan be a ground for refusal of exercise of the discretionary powers conferred under Article 226 of the Constitution of India.

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39. This Court also needs to refer herein that Article 226 of the Constitution of India equipped with not only having the discretionary powers, rather, it has got extraordinary jurisdictionto secure the ends of justice in the case of infringement of right for which the Court has to look into the issue to adjudicate the same,based upon the ground available by passing its decision either way so that the matter be decided on merit.

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40. This Court on the aforesaid premise is of the view that the order passed by the learned Single Judge needs to be interfered withand accordingly, quashed and set aside.

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41. This Court has been apprised with the order passed by the Coordinate Bench of this Court in W.P.(C) No.3399 of 2019 and analogous cases dated 04.03.2025which has been appendedwith the Interlocutory Application being I.A. No. 4540 of 2025.

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42. We have gone through the said order/judgment and found that the Co-ordinate Bench has observed that in the absence of a delegation of power by the State Government to the District Mining Officer under Section 21(5) of the Act, the District Mining Officer has no jurisdiction to exercise such a power and demand from the petitioners, by invoking Section 21(5) of the MMDR Act, 1957.

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43. The aforesaid judgment has been accepted by the State Government and in compliance thereto the notification dated 06.05.2025 has been issued in exercise of the power conferred under Section 26(2) of the MMDR Act, 1957 by conferring power upon the different authorities’right from the hierarchy of the Director/Additional Director/Deputy Director and the District Mining Officer/Assisting Mining Officer.

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44. The import of the said notification is being referred in the order dated 18.08.2025 passedby this Court in W.P(C) No. 4950 of 2023and the also the copy of the said order has been suppliedto the learned State Counsel.

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45. We have gone through the said order and found that in consequence of the conferment of power to the District Mining Officer in exercise of power conferred under Section 26(2) of the MMDR Act, 1957, the order raising the demand has been quashed and set aside with the concession as agreed by the learned counsel for the parties as it is evident from the relevant paragraphs of the said order, which are being referred herein:

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“3. Under Section 26(2) of the said Act, the State Government is enabled by notification in the official gazette to delegate any power exercisable by it under the statute in relation to matters and subject to certain conditions, if any, as may be specified in the notification to its officer or authority subordinate to the State Government as may be specified in the notification.

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6. In this view of the matter, these writ petitions are allowed and the impugned demand notices issued by the respective District Mining Officers to the petitioners under Section 21 (5) of the Act are all set aside. Liberty is however granted to the respondents for

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demanding and collecting the same through the designated authority under the Statute.

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7. Amounts deposited by the petitioners with the respondents during the pendency of the writ petitions shall be refunded to the petitioners within eight weeks from the date of receipt of copy of this order.

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8. The above sums will be refunded by the State Government with the interest rate 7% per annum from the date of making of such deposit till the date of actual refund to the petitioners.

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9. All other points raised by the petitioners in the writ petitions are left open”

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46. Learned counsel for the appellant has also submitted that in view of

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the conferment of power upon District Mining Officer in exercise of power conferred under Section 26(2) of the MMDR Act, 1957 as such, the District Mining Officer, now having been jurisdiction, may be directed to decide the issue afresh.

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47. Learned State counselis having no objection rather he has submitted that matter may be relegated before the District Mining Officer for taking decision a fresh.

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48. This Court after taking into consideration of the aforesaid submissions/concession of the parties is of the view that the matter needs to be considered by the District Mining Officerin light of the power being conferred to him byvirtue notification dated 06.05.2025.

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49. The District Mining Officer is further directed to seek explanation from the petitioner referring therein theirregularity said to becommittedand the same will be sentto the petitioner within period of two weeks from the date of receipt copy of this order.

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50. The appellant is to respond to the said show cause within the further period of two weeks.

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51. The District Mining Officer of the concerned district will decide the issue with within the further period of four weeks, in accordance with law.

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52. It needs to refer herein that if the appellant will not submitthe explanation within the period as referred in the show cause i.e. within the period of two weeks, then the District Mining Officer of the concerned districts will proceed accordance to law.

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53. With the aforesaid direction and observation, the instant appeal is hereby disposed of.

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54. Pending I.A(s), if any, stands disposed of.

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(Sujit Narayan Prasad, J.)

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(Arun Kumar Rai, J.)

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Dated: 11^th September,2025 Suman-Simran/ A.F.R.

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Vikash Chandra Singh v. the State of Jharkhand through Its Chief Secretary

Case brief

What is this about?

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Vikash Chandra Singh v. the State of Jharkhand through Its Chief Secretary

Case brief

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