Dharmendra Kumar Deuby Alias Dharmendra Kumar Deubey Alias Dharmendra Dubey Vs Nitu Devi

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IN THE HIGH COURT OF JHARKHAND AT RANCHI F.A. No. 30 of 2024

Dharmendra Kumar Dubey, S/o Tapeshwar Dubey, aged about 37 years, Resident of: Village-Tilra, P.O & P.S: Ichak, District:-Hazaribagh, State: Jharkhand presently residing at Village Mandai Kala, P.O: Reformatory School Kolghatti, P.S: Lohsinghna, Dist: Hazaribagh, State-Jharkhand

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… … Respondent/Appellant

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Versus Nitu Devi, aged about 33 years, W/o: Dharmendra Dubey, D/O: Bhim Sen Pandey, resident of: Village Raham, P.O. & P.S.-Tandwa, District:Chatra, State: Jharkhand presently residing at Bank colony, Near Junior St. Stephen’s School, P.O. & P.S: Bara Bazar (Sadar), Dist: Hazaribagh, State-Jharkhand

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… … Petitioner/Respondent

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CORAM: HON’BLE MR. JUSTICE SUJIT NARAYAN PRASAD HON’BLE MR. JUSTICE RAJESH KUMAR

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------For the Appellant : Mr. Ravi Prakash Mishra, Advocate For the Respondent : None ----------------------------

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07/Dated: 02.07.2025

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Per Sujit Narayan Prasad, J.

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1. The instant appeal under Section 19(1) of the Family Courts Act, 1984 is directed against the order/judgment dated 13.12.2023 (decree signed on18.12.2023) passed by the learned Addl. Principal Judge, Addl. Family Court, Hazaribagh in Original Suit No. 15 of 2020, whereby and whereunder, the petition filed by the petitioner/respondent-wife under Section 13(1)(i-a)(i-b) of the Hindu Marriage Act, 1955 seeking a decree of divorce on the ground of cruelty and desertion, has been allowed.

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2. The brief facts of the case leading to filing of the divorce petition by the respondent-wife, needs to be referred herein as under:

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The case in brief as per petition filed by the petitioner wife (respondent herein) before the learned Family Judge is that her marriage

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with the respondent husband(appellant herein) was solemnized on 28.06.2009 at Narsingh Asthan Temple, Khapriyawan, Hazaribag according to Hindu Customs and Rights and after the marriage, the petitioner and respondent started living together at village Tilra, P.S. Ichak, Distt. Hazaribag.

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It is further case that at the time of marriage, her father had fulfilled all the demands of the respondent and his family members and the petitioner was kept with dignity in her Sasural for few days but soon thereafter, the respondent and his family members started subjecting cruelty and harassing the petitioner for the demand of Rs. 2 lakhs, fridge, cooler and washing machine. After 2½ months of the marriage, the respondent and his family members started asserting that the petitioner's father, being an employee of CCL was having sufficient means to fulfill above noted demands as the cash and article demanded were for the betterment of the respondent, who himself was unemployed at that moment. The petitioner in clear words replied to the respondent and his family members that her father would not be able to fulfill such demands as he had the responsibility and liability for the marriage of his other daughters as also the responsibility of the education of his son.

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Thereafter, the respondent husband and his family members started physical and mental cruelty upon the petitioner/wife and in that course on 01.10.2009, petitioner's mother-in-law had put a hot iron utensil on her waist inflicting burn injury over her waist.

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The petitioner further averred that once her sister-in-law (Nanad) and her nanad's husband (Nandosi) took her to Ranchi, where in connivance

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with a doctor, she was given some medicine resulting in her unconsciousness.

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It has further been stated that on 30.10.2009, her husband and in-laws again gave burn injury on her body with a hot iron rod and when she gave information of such atrocities to her father, he approached Ichak Police, which summoned the respondent husband and his family members and warned them of legal action if such cruel behavior continued with the petitioner. However, in spite of such rebuke by the police, there was no change in the behavior of the respondent husband and his family members and instead of keeping the petitioner in her matrimonial house with dignity, they even stopped providing her proper food and hence, the petitioner found herself helpless in her matrimonial house and informed her parents about the atrocities suffered by her. On such information, her father came to her matrimonial house but the respondent and his family members refused to send her back to her parent's house and as such the petitioner's father had to approach Deputy S.P. Hazaribag, who intervened and on said intervention, the petitioner was permitted to accompany her father and return to her parent's house on 24.12.2009 with direction to her to return after two weeks.

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It has been stated that since 24.12.2009 the petitioner had been staying in her parent's house and no one from her in-laws’ house has ever taken any stock or news of the petitioner and her parents. It is stated that her father had once received fracture injury in his leg and had to remain admitted in the hospital from 24.01.2010 to 26.06.2010 but in spite of the knowledge of such severe injury, neither the respondent nor his any other

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family member ever came to see petitioner's father and this act and conduct of the respondent shows that he had complete coldness and indifference towards the petitioner and her family members and had no intention to continue marital life with the petitioner.

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It has further been stated that when the petitioner became fed-up with the conduct and attitude of the respondent and his family members, she filed a complaint case no. 295/2010 in the court of Chief Judicial Magistrate, Chatra for summoning the respondent and his family members for facing trial under Sections 498A, 323 I.P.C and section 3/4 of Dowry Prohibition Act. During the pendency of the trial of the aforementioned criminal case, the petitioner and the respondent resolved to get their marriage dissolved through a decree of divorce by mutual consent and accordingly, they jointly filed MTS No.191 of 2017 but the respondent later on backed out from his stand and as a result, the suit was dismissed by the Court.

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After the trial in the complaint case no. 295/2010, the Court of CJM, Chatra found the respondent and his parents guilty for committing offences of dowry harassment and accordingly, convicted them. Since 24.12.2009 there has been no communication between the petitioner and respondent and as such, the respondent has completely deserted the petitioner.

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Thereafter, petitioner/wife has filed suit being Original Suit No. 15 of 2020 for the dissolution of her marriage with the respondent husband through a decree of divorce on the ground of cruelty and desertion under Section 13 (1), (i-a) and (i-b) of Hindu Marriage Act, 1955.

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3. The notice has been issued to the respondent/husband (appellant herein) and he has appeared on notice and thereafter, the Court initiated reconciliation proceeding to make endeavour to bring about a reconciliation between the parties and also referred their dispute to Mediation Centre, Hazaribag for exploring the possibility of amicable settlement but the reconciliation and the mediation had failed.

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4. Thereafter, the respondent-husband (appellant herein) has filed written statement taking the preliminary plea that the suit is not maintainable in its present form and is devoid of any cause of action. It has been stated by the respondent husband (appellant herein) that the petitioner-wife has not come to seek relief with clean hands as she has purposely concealed the fact that without taking divorce from the respondent, she has solemnized her second marriage with Mithilesh Dubey.

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5. The respondent-husband further averred that the petitioner-wife has filed this suit in order to save her skin from the case lodged by respondent alleging bigamy. The respondent averred that when he came to know about the solemnization of second marriage by the petitioner with Mithilesh Dubey resident of village Barabagi within P.S. Rajpur, Distt. Chatra in Nagar Mandir on 03.07.2017, he filed a complaint case no. 391/2017 for the prosecution of the petitioner for the offence u/s 394 I.P.C as well as other sections under Indian Penal Code and the court of CJM, Chatra forwarded that complaint case under the provision of under Section 156 (3) Cr.P.C to the local Police Station for registration and investigation and when the petitioner came to know about the registration of F.I.R against her, she filed this case for divorce to save her skin from

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prosecution in a criminal case. The respondent has asserted that the decree in this proceeding cannot be granted to the petitioner-wife as she is taking advantage of her own wrong for the purpose of such a relief and has also come to take relief after unnecessarily and improper delay.

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6. In para-wise reply to the averment made by the petitioner-wife in her plaint, the respondent though admitted his marriage with the petitioner has denied the petitioner's assertion regarding the demand of dowry made by the respondent.

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7. It has been stated by the respondent that his marriage with the petitioner was an ideal marriage without giving and taking of any dowry and therefore, there was no question of any demand of dowry after the marriage. The respondent has specifically denied the petitioner's assertion that she was subjected to physical and mental cruelty for demand of dowry and was ousted from her matrimonial house.

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8. It has also been stated by the respondent-husband that since the petitioner-wife used to live in CCL Quarter before her marriage because of her father being posted in CCL, she was quite averse to living in the village environment and therefore, started putting pressure upon the respondent-husband to settle somewhere in town and when the respondent-husband did not agree to settle in town leaving his parents in the village, the petitioner's-wife behavior towards the respondent-husband (appellant herein) and his family member changed and she often used filthy and abusing language with the respondent-husband and his family members.

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9. The respondent-husband (appellant herein) also specifically denied the petitioner's-wife assertion that she was given burn injury while residing in her Sasural. It has also been asserted by the respondent-husband that since the petitioner-wife did not want to live in her Sasural specially in village environment, she voluntarily with her sweet will left her matrimonial house and settled in her parent's house.On several occasions, he took effort to persuade the petitioner-wife to return to her matrimonial house but she always refuted the offer and finally in the year 2017 solemnized second marriage with Mithilesh Dubey and was also blessed with children from her second marriage.

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10. The learned Family Judge, in view of the above pleadings, has framed altogether five issues, which are as follows:

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(i) Whether the suit as framed is maintainable in the present form?

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(ii) Whether the petitioner has valid cause of action for filing this suit?

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(iii) Whether the petitioner Nitu Devi was treated cruelty by her husband Dharmendra Dubey, whose conduct was of such a nature creating reasonable apprehension in the petitioner's mind that it would be harmful and injurious for her to live with the respondenthusband Dharmendra Dubey entitling her to relief of a decree of divorce on the ground of cruelty u/s 13 (1) (i-a) of the Hindu Marriage Act, 1955?

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(iv) Whether the petitioner Nitu Devi has been willing to fulfill her part of marital duty but has been deserted by her husband Dharmendra Dubey for the continuous period of two years and more immediately preceding the presentation of this petition for divorce

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on the ground of desertion u/s 13 (1) (ib) of the Hindu Marriage Act, 1955?

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(v) Whether the petitioner is entitled for any other relief/reliefs?

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11. The evidences have been led on behalf of both the parties. Thereafter, the judgment has been passed by learned family court allowing the suit by holding that petitioner-wife (respondent herein) has got valid cause of action for filing the suit and the suit is maintainable for the relief as prayed for by the petitioner -wife. Further, it has been held that the petitioner-wife is entitled to get a decree of divorce on the ground of cruelty and desertion, which is the subject matter of the present appeal.

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Submission of the learned counsel for the Respondent/appellant:

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12. It has been contended on behalf of the learned counsel for the respondent/appellant that the factual aspect which was available before the learned Family Judge supported by the evidences, has not properly been considered and as such, the judgment impugned is perverse, hence, not sustainable in the eyes of law.

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13. It has been submitted that the issue of cruelty and desertion has not been taken into consideration in right perspective as the learned Family Court has failed to appreciate that the respondent/appellant has produced credible evidence which are sufficient to establish that the respondentwife herself left the house of appellant without any valid reason as such ground of desertion was not available to her, therefore she was not entitled for grant of decree of divorce.

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14. Further, it has been submitted that the findings recorded by the learned Trial Court while answering issue no. iii (cruelty) and iv (desertion) are perverse and based on mere presumption, therefore, the same will not stand in the eye of law.

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15. It has lastly been submitted that the learned Trial Court has failed to appreciate the oral evidence produced on behalf of respondent / appellant and, thus, came to wrong conclusion

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16. Learned counsel for the respondent/appellant based upon the aforesaid ground, has submitted that the judgment impugned suffers from an error as such, not sustainable in the eyes of law.

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Analysis:

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17. This Court has heard the learned counsel for the appellant and gone through the finding recorded by the learned Family Judge in the impugned judgment.

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18. The case has been heard at length. The admitted fact herein is that the suit for divorce has been filed by the respondent-wife on the ground of cruelty and desertion, i.e., by filing an application under Section 13(1)(i-a)(i-b) of the Hindu Marriage Act, 1955 and accordingly, issues have been framed primarily the issue nos.3 and 4 pertains to cruelty and desertion.

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19. The evidence has been led on behalf of both the parties, i.e., the petitionerwife and the respondent-husband. On behalf of the petitioner-wife witnesses were examined and the Nitu Devi (the petitioner herself) has been examined as P.W.1, and father of the petitioner wife namely Bhim

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Sen Pandey has been examined as PW-2 and further more one witness ( namely Ashok Upadhyaya has been examined as P.W.3.

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20. On the other hand, the respondent-husband has also produced and examined altogether four witnesses including himself. For ready reference, the name of the said witnesses are being referred as under:

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(i) O.P.W.1, Digeshwar Pandey.

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(ii) O.P.W.2, Kanti Devi.

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(iii) O.P.W.3, Manoj Kumar Pandey.

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(iv) O.P.W.4, Dharmendra Kumar Dubey.

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21. The respondent-husband(appellant herein) has also proved and exhibited the following documents:-

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(i) Certified copy of order dated 20.09.2013 passed in Maintenance Case No.16-12 by the court of Principal Judge Family Court, Chatra (Ext.A).

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(ii) Certified copy of F.I.R. of Rajpur P.S. Case No.33 of 2018 (Ext.B).

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22. The learned Family Judge has gone into the interpretation of the word “cruelty” and “desertion” and assessing the same from the evidences led on behalf of the parties as also the submission made in the pleadings, i.e., in petition and written statement of respondent-husband, has found that the element of cruelty and desertion could have been established on behalf of the petitioner wife(respondent herein).

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23. The learned counsel for the appellant/petitioner has argued that the evidence of cruelty and desertion has not properly been considered and as such, the impugned judgment suffers from perversity, hence, not sustainable in the eyes of law.

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24. This Court, while appreciating the argument advanced on behalf of the appellant on the issue of perversity, needs to refer herein the interpretation of the word “perverse” as has been interpreted by the Hon'ble Apex Court which means that there is no evidence or erroneous consideration of the evidence. The Hon'ble Apex Court in Arulvelu and Anr. vs. State [Represented by the Public Prosecutor] and Anr., (2009) 10 SCC 206 while elaborately discussing the word perverse has held that it is, no doubt, true that if a finding of fact is arrived at by ignoring or excluding relevant material or by taking into consideration irrelevant material or if the finding so outrageously defies logic as to suffer from the vice of irrationality incurring the blame of being perverse, then, the finding is rendered infirm in law. Relevant paragraphs, i.e., paras-24, 25, 26 and 27 of the said judgment reads as under:

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“24. The expression “perverse” has been dealt with in a number of cases. In Gaya Din v. Hanuman Prasad [(2001) 1 SCC 501] this Court observed that the expression “perverse” means that the findings of the subordinate authority are not supported by the evidence brought on record or they are against the law or suffer from the vice of procedural irregularity.

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25. In Parry's (Calcutta) Employees' Union v. Parry & Co. Ltd. [AIR 1966 Cal 31] the Court observed that “perverse finding” means a finding which is not only against the weight of evidence but is altogether against the evidence itself. In Triveni Rubber & Plastics v. CCE [1994 Supp (3) SCC 665 : AIR 1994 SC 1341] the Court observed that this is not a case where it can be said that the findings of the authorities are based on no evidence or that they are so

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perverse that no reasonable person would have arrived at those findings.

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26. In M.S. Narayanagouda v. Girijamma [AIR 1977 Kant 58] the Court observed that any order made in conscious violation of pleading and law is a perverse order. In Moffett v. Gough [(1878) 1 LR 1r 331] the Court observed that a “perverse verdict” may probably be defined as one that is not only against the weight of evidence but is altogether against the evidence. In Godfrey v. Godfrey [106 NW 814] the Court defined “perverse” as turned the wrong way, not right; distorted from the right; turned away or deviating from what is right, proper, correct, etc.

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27. The expression “perverse” has been defined by various dictionaries in the following manner:

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1. Oxford Advanced Learner's Dictionary of Current English, 6th Edn.

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“Perverse.—Showing deliberate determination to behave in a way that most people think is wrong, unacceptable or unreasonable.”

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2. Longman Dictionary of Contemporary English, International Edn.

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Perverse.—Deliberately departing from what is normal and reasonable.

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3. The New Oxford Dictionary of English, 1998 Edn.

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Perverse.—Law (of a verdict) against the weight of evidence or the direction of the judge on a point of law.

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4. The New Lexicon Webster's Dictionary of the English Language (Deluxe Encyclopedic Edn.)

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Perverse.—Purposely deviating from accepted or expected behavior or opinion; wicked or wayward; stubborn; cross or petulant.

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5. Stroud's Judicial Dictionary of Words & Phrases, 4th Edn.

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“Perverse.—A perverse verdict may probably be defined as one that is not only against the weight of evidence but is altogether against the evidence.””

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25. Further the ground for divorce in form of cruelty and desertion has been pleaded before the learned family judge, therefore it wound be apt to discuss herein the scope of cruelty and desertion herein.

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26. In the context of the aforesaid factual aspect only seminal issue has to be decide herein that “Whether the plaintiff is entitled to get divorce dissolving the marriage of the petitioner/appellant with OP/wife U/s 13(1) (i-a) and (i-b) of the Hindu Marriage Act, 1955?

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27. The “cruelty” has been interpreted by the Hon’ble Apex Court in the case of Dr. N.G. Dastane vs. Mrs. S. Dastana, (1975) 2 SCC 326 wherein it has been laid down that the Court has to enquire, as to whether, the conduct charge as cruelty, is of such a character, as to cause in the mind of the petitioner, a reasonable apprehension that, it will be harmful or injurious for him to live with the respondent.

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28. This Court deems it fit and proper to take into consideration the meaning of ‘cruelty’ as has been held by the Hon’ble Apex Court in Shobha Rani v. Madhukar Reddi, (1988)1 SCC 105 wherein the wife alleged that the husband and his parents demanded dowry. The Hon’ble Apex Court emphasized that “cruelty” can have no fixed definition.

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29. According to the Hon’ble Apex Court, “cruelty” is the “conduct in relation to or in respect of matrimonial conduct in respect of matrimonial obligations”. It is the conduct which adversely affects the spouse. Such cruelty can be either “mental” or “physical”, intentional or unintentional. For example, unintentionally waking your spouse up in the middle of the night may be mental cruelty; intention is not an essential element of cruelty but it may be present. Physical cruelty is less ambiguous and more “a question of fact and degree.”

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30. The Hon’ble Apex Court has further observed therein that while dealing with such complaints of cruelty it is important for the court to not search

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for a standard in life, since cruelty in one case may not be cruelty in another case. What must be considered include the kind of life the parties are used to, “their economic and social conditions”, and the “culture and human values to which they attach importance.”

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31. The nature of allegations need not only be illegal conduct such as asking for dowry. Making allegations against the spouse in the written statement filed before the court in judicial proceedings may also be held to constitute cruelty.

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32. In V. Bhagat vs. D. Bhagat (Mrs.), (1994)1 SCC 337 , the wife alleged in her written statement that her husband was suffering from “mental problems and paranoid disorder”. The wife’s lawyer also levelled allegations of “lunacy” and “insanity” against the husband and his family while he was conducting a cross-examination. The Hon’ble Apex Court held these allegations against the husband to constitute “cruelty”.

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33. In Vijaykumar Ramchandra Bhate v. Neela Vijay Kumar Bhate, (2003)6 SCC 334 the Hon’ble Apex Court has observed by taking into consideration the allegations levelled by the husband in his written statement that his wife was “unchaste” and had indecent familiarity with a person outside wedlock and that his wife was having an extramarital affair. These allegations, given the context of an educated Indian woman, were held to constitute “cruelty” itself.

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34. The Hon’ble Apex Court in Joydeep Majumdar v. Bharti Jaiswal Majumdar, (2021) 3 SCC 742 , has been pleased to observe that while judging whether the conduct is cruel or not, what has to be seen is whether that conduct, which is sustained over a period of time, renders the life of

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the spouse so miserable as to make it unreasonable to make one live with the other. The conduct may take the form of abusive or humiliating treatment, causing mental pain and anguish, torturing the spouse, etc. The conduct complained of must be “grave” and “weighty” and trivial irritations and normal wear and tear of marriage would not constitute mental cruelty as a ground for divorce.

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35. The Hon’ble Apex Court in the case of Vidhya Viswanathan v. Kartik Balakrishnan , (2014) 15 SCC 21 has specifically held that cruelty is to be determined on whole facts of the case and the matrimonial relations between the spouses and the word ‘cruelty’ has not been defined and it has been used in relation to human conduct or human behaviour. It is the conduct in relation to or in respect of matrimonial duties and obligations. It is a course of conduct and one which is adversely affecting the other.

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36. Further, at this juncture the definition of “desertion” is required to be referred herein as defined under explanation part of Section 13 which means the desertion of the petitioner by the other party to the marriage without reasonable cause and without the consent or against the wish of such party, and includes the willful neglect of the petitioner by the other party to the marriage.

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37. Rayden on Divorce which is a standard work on the subject at p. 128 (6th Edn.) has summarised the case-law on the subject in these terms:

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“Desertion is the separation of one spouse from the other, with an intention on the part of the deserting spouse of bringing cohabitation permanently to an end without reasonable cause and without the consent of the other spouse; but the physical act of departure by one spouse does not necessarily make that spouse the deserting party.”

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The legal position has been admirably summarised in paras-453

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and 454 at pp. 241 to 243 of Halsbury's Laws of England (3rd Edn.), Vol. 12, in the following words:

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“In its essence desertion means the intentional permanent forsaking and abandonment of one spouse by the other without that other's consent, and without reasonable cause. It is a total repudiation of the obligations of marriage. In view of the large variety of circumstances and of modes of life involved, the Court has discouraged attempts at defining desertion, there being no general principle applicable to all cases.

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Desertion is not the withdrawal from a place but from a state of things, for what the law seeks to enforce is the recognition and discharge of the common obligations of the married state; the state of things may usually be termed, for short, ‘the home’. There can be desertion without previous cohabitation by the parties, or without the marriage having been consummated. The person who actually withdraws from cohabitation is not necessarily the deserting party. The fact that a husband makes an allowance to a wife whom he has abandoned is no answer to a charge of desertion.

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38. The offence of desertion is a course of conduct which exists independently of its duration, but as a ground for divorce it must exist for a period of at least two years immediately preceding the presentation of the petition or, where the offence appears as a cross-charge, of the answer. Desertion as a ground of divorce differs from the statutory grounds of adultery and cruelty in that the offence founding the cause of action of desertion is not complete, but is inchoate, until the suit is constituted. Desertion is a continuing offence.

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39. It is, thus, evident from the aforesaid reference of meaning of desertion that the quality of permanence is one of the essential elements which differentiates desertion from wilful separation. If a spouse abandons the other spouse in a state of temporary passion, for example, anger or disgust, without intending permanently to cease cohabitation, it will not amount to desertion. For the offence of desertion, so far as the deserting spouse is concerned, two essential conditions must be there, namely, (1) the factum of separation, and ( 2 ) the intention to bring cohabitation permanently to an end.

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40. Similarly, two elements are essential so far as the deserted spouse is concerned: ( 1 ) the absence of consent, and ( 2 ) absence of conduct giving reasonable cause to the spouse leaving the matrimonial home to form the necessary intention aforesaid. In such a situation, the party who is filing for divorce will have the burden of proving those elements.

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41. Recently also, the Hon'ble Apex Court in Debananda Tamuli vs. Kakumoni Kataky, (2022) 5 SCC 459 has considered the definition of ‘desertion’ on the basis of the judgment rendered by the Hon'ble Apex Court in Lachman Utamchand Kirpalani v. Meena, AIR 1964 SC 40 which has been consistently followed in several decisions of this Court. The law consistently laid down by this Court is that desertion means the intentional abandonment of one spouse by the other without the consent of the other and without a reasonable cause. The deserted spouse must prove that there is a factum of separation and there is an intention on the part of deserting spouse to bring the cohabitation to a permanent end. In other words, there should be animus deserendi on the part of the deserting

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spouse. There must be an absence of consent on the part of the deserted spouse and the conduct of the deserted spouse should not give a reasonable cause to the deserting spouse to leave the matrimonial home. The view taken by the Hon'ble Apex Court has been incorporated in the Explanation added to sub-section (1) of Section 13 by Act 68 of 1976. The said Explanation reads thus:

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“ 13. Divorce .—(1) …

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Explanation.—In this sub-section, the expression “desertion” means the desertion of the petitioner by the other party to the marriage without reasonable cause and without the consent or against the wish of such party, and includes the wilful neglect of the petitioner by the other party to the marriage, and its grammatical variations and cognate expressions shall be construed accordingly.”

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42. This Court, on the premise of the interpretation of the word “cruelty” and “desertion” has considered the evidences of the witnesses as has been incorporated by the learned Court in the impugned judgment.

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43. In this case, the admitted fact is that there is separation of long period of fourteen years. The petitioner-wife alleged mental and physical cruelty at the hands of respondent husband (appellant herein) and family members as the reason of separation and the coldness and indifference on the part of the respondent husband to continue marital relationship as the reason of continuance of separation.

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44. On the other hand, the respondent-husband has alleged that his wife left her matrimonial house voluntarily of her own accord as she was not ready to live in the village and that therefore, she being guilty of her own wrong cannot be allowed to take advantage of her own wrong to seek the relief of decree of divorce.

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45. In the instant case, there is allegation of the petitioner-wife that her husband and his parents harassed her with dowry demand and even they inflicted burn injury upon her body twice when the demand could not be fulfilled and therefore, she was forced to leave her matrimonial house by creating circumstances which were very dangerous for her life.

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46. There is oral assertion of the respondent husband that he on several occasions took efforts to restore his marital life with the petitioner wife but on complete scrutiny of the pleadings as well as the evidence adduced on behalf of the parties, this court finds that the respondent husband has neither mentioned the date of such attempt to restore marital life nor has given the details of the manner in which he took efforts to bring about reconciliation. There is no pleading to the effect that when and how the respondent took efforts to restore his marital life with the petitioner wife.

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47. There is no material on the record to show that the parties were having any connection or communication with each other except fighting litigation against each other during this long period of separation. The respondent husband (appellant herein) has not been able to place material on record that he ever tried to establish any connection with his respondent/wife expressing his desire to continue marital relationship nor did he ever tried to provide any financial assistance to her.

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48. The respondent-husband in his written statement has taken the plea that his wife left the matrimonial house of her own accord and has been staying in her parent's house without the consent of the respondent. Upon the perusal of the impugned judgment (Ext. 1), it appears that there is mention of one divorce case filed by the respondent-husband Dharmendra

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Dubey against his wife Nitu Devi (petitioner) in the year 2010. Evidence has been laid on behalf of Dharmendra Dubey in the Complaint Case no. 295/2010 that before the filing of complaint case alleging dowry harassment by Nitu Devi, he had himself filed a divorce case no. 112/2010 for seeking the relief of dissolution of marriage through a decree of divorce. However, it appears that the respondent-husband in his written statement filed in this case has intentionally concealed this fact. Apart from it, filing of the divorce case in the year 2010 by the respondenthusband disproves his claim of his being willing to continue marital relationship with the petitioner Nitu Devi. It also disproves his claim of his taking efforts to restore his marital life with petitioner Nitu Devi.

¶169

49. The respondent husband (appellant herein) has contested this case on the ground that the petitioner wife has solemnized her second marriage with one Mithilesh Dubey and just to save her skin from the persecution, she has filed the divorce case after such inordinate delay.

¶170

50. The desertion has also been taken as a ground but the desertion has been defined and interpreted by the Hon’ble Apex Court that the desertion will be said to be desertion if either of the party, on his/her own wish, has left the matrimonial house. But, no such evidence has been produced by the appellant to prove the element of desertion showing that the respondentwife has left her matrimonial house on her own wish rather it appears from the record that the unpleasant circumstances have been created by the appellant and his family due to which in compulsion respondent wife left her matrimonial house.

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51. It is apparent from the impugned judgment that the learned Family Judge, has taken into consideration all the evidences led by both the parties and after threadbare analysis of the same, has found the ground for dissolution of marriage is available in favour of the respondent/wife and therefore, has allowed the suit.

¶175

52. This Court, based upon the aforesaid discussion, is of the view that the appellant has failed to establish the element of perversity in the impugned judgment as per the discussion made hereinabove, as such, the instant appeal deserves to be dismissed.

¶176

53. This Court, on the basis of discussions made hereinabove, is of the view that the judgment passed on 13.12.2023 and decree signed on 18.12.2023 by the learned Addl. Principal Judge, Addl. Family Court, Hazaribagh in Original Suit No. 15 of 2020, whereby and whereunder, the petition filed by the petitioner/respondent-wife under Section 13(1)(i-a)(i-b) of the Hindu Marriage Act, 1955 seeking a decree of divorce on the ground of cruelty and desertion, has been allowed, requires no interference by this Court.

¶177

54. Accordingly, the instant appeal fails and is dismissed.

¶178

55. Pending interlocutory application(s), if any, also stands disposed of.

¶179

(Sujit Narayan Prasad, J.)

¶180

(Rajesh Kumar, J.)

¶181

Rohit /A.F.R.

¶182

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