Dismissed

Rajesh Rawani v. Arti Devi Alias Parwati

Jharkhand HC2 Dec 2025FA/26/2020

Case brief

AI extract

What is this about?

Husband appealed against dismissal of his divorce suit on grounds of cruelty and desertion. The Division Bench found no perversity in the Family Court judgment, holding the wife left under compulsion amid dowry-related allegations and remained willing to cohabit. Appeal dismissed.

What the court decided

AI extract

Rajesh Rawani Vs Arti Devi Alias Parwati — Dowry and Cruelty | Jharkhand HC (2025)

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IN THE HIGH COURT OF JHARKHAND AT RANCHI

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F.A. No. 26 of 2020

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Rajesh Rawani, aged about 30 years, son of Mahipal Rawani, resident of Fularitand, P.O. Kharkhari, P.S. Madhuban, District Dhanbad.

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… … Appellant/Plaintiff

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Versus

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Arti Devi @ Parwati, wife of Rajesh Rawani, daughter of Anil Rawani, resident of Village Mahuwar, P.O. Baidmara, P.S. Baidmara, District Bokaro.

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… … Respondent/Defendant

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CORAM: HON’BLE MR. JUSTICE SUJIT NARAYAN PRASAD HON’BLE MR. JUSTICE ARUN KUMAR RAI

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------For the Appellant : Mr. Rama Kant Tiwary, Advocate For the Respondent : Mr. Subhneet Jha, Advocate ----------------------------

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CAV/Reserved on 24.11.2025 Pronounced on: 02.12.2025 Per Sujit Narayan Prasad, J.

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The instant appeal under Section 19(1) of the Family Courts Act, 1984 is directed against the order/judgment dated 18.11.2019 and decree signed on 30.11.2019 passed by the learned Principal Judge, Family Court, Dhanbad in Original Suit No. 681 of 2016, whereby and whereunder, the learned court has dismissed the suit filed under Section 13(1)(i-a) of the Hindu Marriage Act, 1955 with litigation cost of Rs.5,000/-.

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The brief facts of the case as per the original matrimonial suit needs to be referred herein as under:

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This suit had been filed by the appellant/plaintiff for a decree of dissolution of marriage mainly on the ground of cruelty against the defendant/respondent Aarti Devi @ Parwati, under Section 13(1)(i-a) of Hindu Marriage Act. The marriage of the appellant/plaintiff was solemnized with respondent/defendant as per Hindu Rites and Customs on 30.06.2013 at Bokaro. After the marriage, the appellant/plaintiff and defendant/respondent lived together as husband and wife at Fularitand, Dhanbad and out of their wedlock they have been blessed with a son namely, Aayush @ Roshan on 21.06.2014. It is alleged by plaintiff in his

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plaint that defendant/respondent left the matrimonial house since long back after the marriage and subjected to cruelty by quarreling, not cooking food, putting pressure to leave his parents and did not perform physical relationship and on protest the defendant/respondent left the house of plaintiff on 22.09.2015.

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Thereafter, the appellant/plaintiff filed a case u/s 9 of Hindu Marriage Act for restitution of conjugal life which was withdrawn by the appellant/plaintiff and, thereafter, the appellant/plaintiff filed the suit being Original Suit No. 681 of 2016 had been filed for dissolution of marriage, which had been dismissed against which the present appeal has been filed.

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It is evident from the factual aspect as referred hereinabove which led to filing of the present appeal that, as per the Original Matrimonial Suit, the marriage of the appellant/plaintiff was solemnized with respondent/defendant as per Hindu Rites and Customs on 30.06.2013 at Bokaro.

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After the marriage, the appellant/plaintiff and defendant/respondent lived together as husband and wife at Fularitand, Dhanbad and out of their wedlock they have been blessed with a son namely, Aayush @ Roshan on 21.06.2014.

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It is alleged by plaintiff in his plaint that defendant/respondent left the matrimonial house since long back after the marriage and subjected to cruelty by quarreling, not cooking food, putting pressure to leave his parents and did not perform physical relationship and on protest the defendant/respondent left the house of plaintiff on 22.09.2015.

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Thereafter, the appellant/plaintiff filed a case u/s 9 of Hindu Marriage Act for restitution of conjugal life which was withdrawn by the appellant/plaintiff and, thereafter, the appellant/plaintiff filed the suit being Original Suit No. 681 of 2016 for dissolution of marriage, which had been dismissed against which the present appeal has been filed.

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It is evident from the factual aspect that the appellant/plaintiff had a motion by filing a petition under Section 13(1)(i-a) of the Hindu Marriage Act, 1955 for decree of divorce.

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The learned Family Judge has called upon the respondent-wife. The wife has filed written statement and altogether six issues have been framed by the learned Family Court which are as follows:

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(i) Whether the suit of the petitioner/plaintiff is maintainable in the eye of law ?

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(ii) Whether the opposite party/defendant left the house of the petitioner on 22.09.2015 and petitioner/plaintiff filed under Section 9 of Hindu Marriage Act 1955 against the opposite party?

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(iii) Whether any cruelty made by the opposite party/defendant against the petitioner/plaintiff and opposite party/defendant is living separately for more than two years from the petitioner/plaintiff?

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(iv) Whether any other cases are running between the parties or not ?

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(v) Is the petitioner/plaintiff entitled for decree of divorce from the opposite party/defendant?

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(vi) Whether the petitioner is entitled for any other relief/reliefs?

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The evidences have been made on behalf of both the parties. Thereafter, the judgment has been passed dismissing the suit by holding that the appellant/plaintiff has not been able to prove his case to the extent of preponderance of probabilities, as such, the suit is not maintainable and the appellant/plaintiff is not entitled to get a decree of divorce, which is the subject matter of the present appeal.

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Submission of the learned counsel for the appellant/plaintiff:

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It has been contended on behalf of the appellant/plaintiff that the factual aspect which was available before the learned court supported by the evidences adduced on behalf of the appellant/plaintiff has not properly

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been considered and as such, the judgment impugned is perverse, hence, not sustainable in the eyes of law.

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It has been submitted by the learned counsel for the appellant/plaintiff that after the marriage, the respondent/defendant started misbehaving with the appellant/plaintiff and his family members and refused to do household work as also to cohabit with the appellant/plaintiff. It is also submitted that the respondent/defendant used to pressurize the appellant/plaintiff for living separately from his family members, failing which, the respondent/defendant left the house on 22.09.2015.

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It has been submitted that the issue of cruelty has not been taken into consideration in right perspective even though the fact about the same as also the fact of living separately has well been established.

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Learned counsel for the appellant/plaintiff, based upon the aforesaid grounds, has submitted that the judgment impugned suffers from perversity, as such, not sustainable in the eyes of law.

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Submission of the learned counsel for the respondent/defendant:

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Per contra , Mr. Subhneet Jha, learned counsel for the respondent-wife, while defending the impugned judgment, has submitted that there is no error in the impugned judgement. The learned Family Judge has considered the issue of cruelty and having come to the conclusion that no evidence has been adduced to establish cruelty, has dismissed the petition.

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So far as the issue of cruelty is concerned, the learned counsel for the respondent-wife has submitted that there is no such act of cruelty on behalf of the respondent/defendant rather it is the appellant/plaintiff who subjected the respondent/defendant to cruelty and torture as the demand of dowry was there and the appellant/defendant used to assault the respondent/defendant.

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It has also been submitted that due to such act, a panchayati was also held. It has also been submitted that the appellant/plaintiff on several occasions, ousted the respondent/defendant from matrimonial home and the respondent/defendant had also filed C.P. Case No. 491/2016 u/s 498(A) of IPC against the appellant/plaintiff and his family members and

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maintenance case has also been filed being Original Maintenance Case No. 176/2016 against the appellant/plaintiff for maintaining herself and her minor son.

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Learned counsel, based upon the aforesaid ground, has submitted that if on that pretext, the factum of cruelty has not been found to be established, based upon which the decree of divorce has been refused to be granted, the impugned judgment cannot be said to suffer from an error, as such, the present appeal is fit to be dismissed.

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Analysis:

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This Court has heard the learned counsel for the parties and gone through the finding recorded by the learned Family Judge in the impugned judgment.

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It is evident from record that the said suit of dissolution of marriage was filed under Section 13(1)(i-a) of the Hindu Marriage Act, 1955 however, while framing the issues the learned Family Court has framed the issue of separation also along with the primary issue of cruelty.

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The evidence has been led on behalf of both the parties before the Family Court. For better appreciation, the evidences led on behalf of the appellant/plaintiff are being referred as under:

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(i) P.W.-1 Mahipal Rawani is father of appellant/plaintiff and P.W.-2 Mohan Rawani who is the neighbour of the appellant/plaintiff. It has been stated by both the witnesses during their evidence that the marriage of appellant/plaintiff Rajesh Rawani was solemnized with respondent/defendant Arti Devi @ Parwati Devi on 30.06.2013 according to Hindu Rites and Customs and after the marriage they were blessed with a son namely, Roshan Rawani on 21.06.2014 out of their wedlock, but, after few days of the marriage defendant Arti Devi @ Parwati Devi started quarreling with appellant/plaintiff and his family members by saying that appellant/plaintiff is not according to her liking and her parents solemnized her marriage without her consent, so, appellant/defendant always deserted to appellant/plaintiff and lastly on 22.09.2015 respondent/defendant

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left her matrimonial home without the consent of appellant/plaintiff and his family members along with her belongings and threatened the appellant/plaintiff for not taking her back failing which she will implicate in false case of dowry. The respondent/defendant is residing at her Maike since more than 3½ years. The respondent/defendant threatened the appellant/plaintiff and his family members if any one put pressure upon her for leading conjugal life with the appellant/plaintiff she will commit suicide.

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(ii) P.W.-3 Rajesh Rawani is the appellant/plaintiff himself who has stated in his evidence that his marriage was solemnized with respondent/defendant Arti Devi @ Parwati Devi on 30.06.2013 according to Hindu Rites and customs. After the marriage, respondent/defendant started her conjugal life with him resulting which they were blessed with a son namely Roshan Rawani.

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He has further stated during his evidence that his wife/defendant never lived with him peacefully and she used to quarrel with him and by saying that she is not liking him and her marriage was solemnized with him by her parents without her liking. Resulting which the respondent/defendant used to fled away from her matrimonial home without consent of the appellant/plaintiff and his family members. P.W.-3 Rajesh Rawani further stated during his evidence that the respondent/defendant used to quarrel with him and his family members and never cooking food and never doing household work, rather, threatened him for committing suicide. He has also stated that the respondent/defendant always deserted him by saying that he is black in colour, so, she will never lead conjugal life with him. Lastly, on 20.09.2015, respondent/defendant went from her matrimonial home along with her belongings by saying that she will never return back and threatened for sending jail in dowry case. The appellant/plaintiff has admitted that respondent/defendant has filed maintenance case before the Family Court, Bokaro and also filed C.P. Case No. 491/2016 against him and his family members on

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ground of torturing respondent against demand of dowry. He has also stated that he filed T.M.S No. 746/2015 for restitution of conjugal life under the provision of Section 9 of Hindu Marriage Act which was withdrawn by him on the threatening of respondent/defendant. He has further stated during his evidence that he filed the original suit for dissolution of marriage due to torture and cruel behaviour of the respondent/defendant.

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The evidences led on behalf of the respondent/defendant is being referred as under:

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(i) D.W.-1 Anil Rawani, (father of defendant), D.W.-2 Ghanshyam Rawani (maternal uncle of defendant), D.W.-3 Shiv Kumar Rawani (maternal uncle of plaintiff) and D.W.-4 R.W.-1 Aarti Devi @ Parwati Devi (defendant/respondent herself) have categorically stated during their evidence that the marriage of respondent/defendant Arti Devi @ Parwati was solemnized on 30.06.2013 with appellant/plaintiff according to Hindu Rites and Customs with consent of both the parties. After the marriage respondent/defendant went to her matrimonial home on 01.07.2013 and started her conjugal life with her husband/plaintiff but after few days of the marriage the plaintiff and his family members started saying to the respondent/defendant regarding her black colour and bringing less dowry and appellant/plaintiff started demand of one Alto Car and golden chain, then the father of respondent/defendant shown his inability to fulfill the same and in the meantime respondent/defendant gave birth to a son in Choudhary Nursing Home, Katras on 21.06.2014 by operation.

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They have also stated during their evidence that on 24.07.2014, appellant/plaintiff ousted her from matrimonial home after assaulting her for which a Panchyati was held in Fularitand Panchyat Sachiwalay on 12.09.2014 in presence of local Mukhiya in which appellant/plaintiff after giving assurance for not doing aforesaid act, the respondent/defendant again went to her Sasural, but, appellant/plaintiff repeatedly assaulted and subjected to cruelty

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to respondent/defendant and lastly, an agreement for keeping defendant peacefully with him was executed by plaintiff, but, after residing for fifteen days at her matrimonial home the appellant/plaintiff again assaulted the respondent/defendant and put her signature forcibly on blank paper. This matter was reported by defendant to Bokaro Mahila Police on 22.07.2015 and with intervention of Mahila P.S Bokaro, she again went to her matrimonial home on 08.08.2015, but on 22.09.2015 plaintiff and his father after assaulting her brought her to Mahila P.S Bokaro and, thereafter, appellant/plaintiff and his father fled away leaving the respondent/defendant and lastly, on 01.11.2015 respondent/defendant along with officer-in-charge of Mahila P.S Bokaro went to matrimonial home and the appellant/plaintiff and his family members did not permit to enter in the house. The respondent/defendant filed C.P. Case No. 491/2016 regarding her torture in connection with demand of dowry against the appellant/plaintiff and his family members and a maintenance case u/s 125 Cr.P.C. They have also stated that appellant/plaintiff has filed a case for restitution of conjugal life before the Family Court, Dhanbad when respondent/defendant ready to join and lead her conjugal life with appellant/plaintiff then appellant/plaintiff withdraw the said case for which Rs. 5,000/- cost was imposed upon the appellant/plaintiff. Lastly, D.W.-4 Arti Devi @ Parwati clearly stated that she is still ready to lead conjugal life with her husband/plaintiff.

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The learned Family Judge has gone into the interpretation of the word “cruelty” and assessing the same from the evidences led on behalf of the parties as also the submission made in the pleading, i.e., plaint and written statement, has found that the element of cruelty could not have been established.

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The learned counsel for the appellant/plaintiff has argued that the evidence of cruelty has not properly been considered and as such, the

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judgment suffers from perversity, hence, not sustainable in the eyes of law.

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While on the other hand, argument has been advanced on behalf of the respondent/defendant that the judgment is well considered one and merely by committing fraud, the suit for divorce has been filed.

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This Court while appreciating the argument advanced on behalf of the parties on the issue of perversity needs to refer herein the interpretation of the word “perverse” as has been interpreted by the Hon'ble Apex Court which means that there is no evidence or erroneous consideration of the evidence. The Hon'ble Apex Court in Arulvelu and Anr. vs. State [Represented by the Public Prosecutor] and Anr., (2009) 10 SCC 206 while elaborately discussing the word perverse has held that it is, no doubt, true that if a finding of fact is arrived at by ignoring or excluding relevant material or by taking into consideration irrelevant material or if the finding so outrageously defies logic as to suffer from the vice of irrationality incurring the blame of being perverse, then, the finding is rendered infirm in law. Relevant paragraphs, i.e., paras-24, 25, 26 and 27 of the said judgment reads as under:

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“24. The expression “perverse” has been dealt with in a number of cases. In Gaya Din v. Hanuman Prasad [(2001) 1 SCC 501] this Court observed that the expression “perverse” means that the findings of the subordinate authority are not supported by the evidence brought on record or they are against the law or suffer from the vice of procedural irregularity.

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25. In Parry's (Calcutta) Employees' Union v. Parry & Co. Ltd. [AIR 1966 Cal 31] the Court observed that “perverse finding” means a finding which is not only against the weight of evidence but is altogether against the evidence itself. In Triveni Rubber & Plastics v. CCE [1994 Supp (3) SCC 665 : AIR 1994 SC 1341] the Court observed that this is not a case where it can be said that the findings of the authorities are based on no evidence or that they are so perverse that no reasonable person would have arrived at those findings.

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26. In M.S. Narayanagouda v. Girijamma [AIR 1977 Kant 58] the Court observed that any order made in conscious violation of pleading and law is a perverse order. In Moffett v. Gough [(1878) 1 LR 1r 331] the Court observed that a “perverse verdict” may probably be defined as one that is not only against the weight of evidence but is altogether against the evidence. In Godfrey v. Godfrey [106 NW 814] the Court defined “perverse” as turned the wrong way, not right; distorted from the right; turned away or deviating from what is right, proper, correct, etc.

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27. The expression “perverse” has been defined by various dictionaries in the following manner:

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1. Oxford Advanced Learner's Dictionary of Current English, 6th Edn.

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“Perverse.—Showing deliberate determination to behave in a way that most people think is wrong, unacceptable or unreasonable.”

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2. Longman Dictionary of Contemporary English, International Edn.

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Perverse.—Deliberately departing from what is normal and reasonable.

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3. The New Oxford Dictionary of English, 1998 Edn.

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Perverse.—Law (of a verdict) against the weight of evidence or the direction of the judge on a point of law.

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4. The New Lexicon Webster's Dictionary of the English Language (Deluxe Encyclopedic Edn.)

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Perverse.—Purposely deviating from accepted or expected behavior or opinion; wicked or wayward; stubborn; cross or petulant.

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5. Stroud's Judicial Dictionary of Words & Phrases, 4th Edn.

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“Perverse.—A perverse verdict may probably be defined as one that is not only against the weight of evidence but is altogether against the evidence.””

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The ground for divorce has been taken of cruelty. The “cruelty” has been interpreted by the Hon’ble Apex Court in the case of Dr. N.G. Dastane vs. Mrs. S. Dastana, (1975) 2 SCC 326 wherein it has been laid down that the Court has to enquire, as to whether, the conduct charge as cruelty, is of such a character, as to cause in the mind of the petitioner, a reasonable apprehension that, it will be harmful or injurious for him to live with the respondent.

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This Court deems it fit and proper to take into consideration the meaning of ‘cruelty’ as has been held by the Hon’ble Apex Court in Shobha Rani v. Madhukar Reddi, (1988)1 SCC 105 wherein the wife alleged that the husband and his parents demanded dowry. The Hon’ble Apex Court emphasized that “cruelty” can have no fixed definition.

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According to the Hon’ble Apex Court, “cruelty” is the “conduct in relation to or in respect of matrimonial conduct in respect of matrimonial obligations”. It is the conduct which adversely affects the spouse. Such cruelty can be either “mental” or “physical”, intentional or unintentional. For example, unintentionally waking your spouse up in the middle of the night may be mental cruelty; intention is not an essential element of

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cruelty but it may be present. Physical cruelty is less ambiguous and more “a question of fact and degree.”

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The Hon’ble Apex Court has further observed therein that while dealing with such complaints of cruelty it is important for the court to not search for a standard in life, since cruelty in one case may not be cruelty in another case. What must be considered include the kind of life the parties are used to, “their economic and social conditions”, and the “culture and human values to which they attach importance.”

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The nature of allegations need not only be illegal conduct such as asking for dowry. Making allegations against the spouse in the written statement filed before the court in judicial proceedings may also be held to constitute cruelty.

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In V. Bhagat vs. D. Bhagat (Mrs.), (1994)1 SCC 337 , the wife alleged in her written statement that her husband was suffering from “mental problems and paranoid disorder”. The wife’s lawyer also levelled allegations of “lunacy” and “insanity” against the husband and his family while he was conducting a cross-examination. The Hon‟ble Apex Court held these allegations against the husband to constitute “cruelty”.

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In Vijaykumar Ramchandra Bhate v. Neela Vijay Kumar Bhate, (2003)6 SCC 334 the Hon’ble Apex Court has observed by taking into consideration the allegations levelled by the husband in his written statement that his wife was “unchaste” and had indecent familiarity with a person outside wedlock and that his wife was having an extramarital affair. These allegations, given the context of an educated Indian woman, were held to constitute “cruelty” itself.

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The Hon‟ble Apex Court in Joydeep Majumdar v. Bharti Jaiswal Majumdar, (2021) 3 SCC 742 , has been pleased to observe that while judging whether the conduct is cruel or not, what has to be seen is whether that conduct, which is sustained over a period of time, renders the life of the spouse so miserable as to make it unreasonable to make one live with the other. The conduct may take the form of abusive or humiliating treatment, causing mental pain and anguish, torturing the spouse, etc. The conduct complained of must be “grave” and “weighty” and trivial

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irritations and normal wear and tear of marriage would not constitute mental cruelty as a ground for divorce.

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It is, thus, evident that while judging whether the conduct is cruel or not, what has to be seen is whether that conduct, which is sustained over a period of time, renders the life of the spouse so miserable as to make it unreasonable to make one live with the other. The conduct may take the form of abusive or humiliating treatment, causing mental pain and anguish, torturing the spouse, etc.

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Since herein along with issue of cruelty the learned Court has appreciated the issue of living separately of the respondent wife from her husband/appellant has been framed as such it would be apt herein to discuss the concept of desertion as stipulated under section 13(i-b) of Hindu Marriage Act 1955.

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It needs to refer herein that the word ‘desertion’ has been given in Explanation to Section 13 (1) wherein it has been stated that “the expression desertion means the desertion of the petitioner by the other party to the marriage without reasonable cause and without the consent or against the wish of such party, and includes the willful neglect of the petitioner by the other party to the marriage, and its grammatical variations and cognate expressions shall be construed accordingly.”

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It is pertinent to note that the word ‘desertion’, as has been defined in Explanation part of Section 13 of the Act, 1955, means the desertion of the petitioner by the other party to the marriage without reasonable cause and without the consent or against the wishes of such party, and includes the willful neglect of the petitioner by the other party to the marriage, and its grammatical variations and cognate expressions shall be construed accordingly.

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Rayden on Divorce, which is a standard work on the subject at p. 128 (6th Edn.), has summarised the case-law on the subject in these terms:

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“Desertion is the separation of one spouse from the other, with an intention on the part of the deserting spouse of bringing cohabitation permanently to an end without reasonable cause and without the consent of the other spouse; but the physical act of departure by one spouse does not necessarily make that spouse the deserting party.”

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The legal position has been admirably summarised in paras-453 and 454 at pp. 241 to 243 of Halsbury's Laws of England (3rd Edn.), Vol. 12, in the following words:

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“In its essence desertion means the intentional permanent forsaking and abandonment of one spouse by the other without that other's consent, and without reasonable cause. It is a total repudiation of the obligations of marriage. In view of the large variety of circumstances and of modes of life involved, the Court has discouraged attempts at defining desertion, there being no general principle applicable to all cases.”

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Desertion is not the withdrawal from a place but from a state of things, for what the law seeks to enforce is the recognition and discharge of the common obligations of the married state; the state of things may usually be termed, for short, ‘the home’. There can be desertion without previous cohabitation by the parties, or without the marriage having been consummated. The person who actually withdraws from cohabitation is not necessarily the deserting party.

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The offence of desertion is a course of conduct which exists independently of its duration, but as a ground for divorce it must exist for a period of at least two years immediately preceding the presentation of the petition or, where the offence appears as a cross-charge, of the answer.

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Desertion as a ground of divorce differs from the statutory grounds of adultery and cruelty in that the offence founding the cause of action of desertion is not complete, but is inchoate, until the suit is constituted, desertion is a continuing offence.

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It is, thus, evident from the aforesaid reference of meaning of desertion that the quality of permanence is one of the essential elements which differentiate desertion from wilful separation. If a spouse abandons the other spouse in a state of temporary passion, for example, anger or disgust, without intending permanently to cease cohabitation, it will not amount to desertion. For the offence of desertion, so far as the deserting spouse is concerned, two essential conditions must be there, namely, (1) the factum of separation, and ( 2 ) the intention to bring cohabitation permanently to an end.

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Similarly, two elements are essential so far as the deserted spouse is concerned: ( 1 ) the absence of consent, and ( 2 ) absence of conduct giving reasonable cause to the spouse leaving the matrimonial home to from the necessary intention aforesaid.

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The Hon'ble Apex Court in Debananda Tamuli vs. Kakumoni Kataky, (2022) 5 SCC 459 has considered the definition of ‘desertion’ on the basis of the judgment rendered by the Hon'ble Apex Court in Lachman Utamchand Kirpalani v. Meena , AIR 1964 SC 40 which has been consistently followed in several decisions of the Hon’ble Court.

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The law consistently has been laid down by the Court that desertion means the intentional abandonment of one spouse by the other without the consent of the other and without a reasonable cause. The deserted spouse must prove that there is a factum of separation and there is an intention on the part of deserting spouse to bring the cohabitation to a permanent end. In other words, there should be animus deserendi on the part of the deserting spouse. There must be an absence of consent on the part of the deserted spouse and the conduct of the deserted spouse should not give a reasonable cause to the deserting spouse to leave the matrimonial home.

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Now this Court is going to the factual aspect of the instant case and it is evident therefrom that the main ground of cruelty has been taken of not taking care and always misbehaving with the appellant/plaintiff and the in-laws as the respondent/defendant was ready to co-operate with the appellant/plaintiff.

¶127

It is evident from the impugned judgment that the learned court has taken into consideration the fact that prior to filing of the suit, one case was filed by the appellant/plaintiff being T.M.S. No. 746 of 2015 for restitution of conjugal right but the same was withdrawn.

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It is evident from the record that the learned family court has also considered the fact that the respondent/defendant had earlier filed one C.P. Case No. 491/2016 u/s 498(A) of IPC against the appellant/plaintiff and his family members for demand of dowry as the respondent/defendant was being tortured by demanding dowry and on non-fulfillment of the same,

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she was being assaulted. It has also been taken note in the impugned judgment that the respondent/defendant had also filed one maintenance case being Original Maintenance Case No. 176/2016 against the appellant/plaintiff for maintaining herself and his minor son.

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It has come in the impugned judgment as well as from record that the plaintiff and his father Mahipal Rawani after assaulting to defendant brought her to Mahila P.S. Bokaro and, thereafter, they fled away, so, the defendant not left the house of plaintiff voluntarily, but under compulsion. It is also evident that the defendant is living separately from plaintiff not voluntarily but under compelled circumstances which clearly shows it was practically impossible for the defendant to lead conjugal life with the plaintiff in a such changed circumstances.

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It is significant to mention here that the plaintiff and his family members ousted to defendant from her matrimonial home after subjecting to cruelty and torture to defendant in connection with demand of dowry and the defendant is living at her matrimonial home along with her minor son. The cruelty flows from plaintiff to defendant under the facts and circumstances of this case even though the defendant is ready to lead her conjugal life with her husband/plaintiff as she had specifically stated that D.W.-4 Arti Devi @ Parwati clearly stated that she is still ready to lead conjugal life with her husband/plaintiff.

¶134

The learned Family Court has categorically stated in the impugned judgment that the plaintiff/appellant has not been able to discharge the burden of proving cruelty and desertion against the defendant/husband even with extent to preponderance of probabilities while the defendant has discharged her burden of proving the reasonable excuse her separate living from plaintiff, as such, these issues are decided against the plaintiff and in favour of defendant.

¶135

Thus, on the basis of discussion made hereinabove it is evident that learned Family Court has appreciated meticulously each and every evidence available on record as such it is the considered view of this Court that there is complete absence of element of perversity in the impugned judgment.

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The learned Family Judge, on consideration of the issues, has not found the ground of cruelty for dissolution of marriage and therefore, dismissed the suit.

¶139

This Court, based upon the aforesaid discussion, is of the view that the appellant/petitioner has failed to establish the element of perversity in the impugned judgment as per the discussion made hereinabove, as such, the instant appeal deserves to be dismissed.

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