21. The answer to the apparently simple—and perhaps misleading— question as to ‘who is normal?’ runs inevitably into philosophical thickets of the concept of mental normalcy and as involved therein, of the ‘mind’ itself. These concepts of ‘mind’, ‘mental phenomena’, etc. are more known than understood and the theories of ‘mind’ and ‘mentation’ do not indicate any internal consistency, let alone validity, of their basic ideas. Theories of ‘mind’ with cognate ideas of ‘perception’ and ‘consciousness’ encompass a wide range of thoughts, more ontological than epistemological. Theories of mental phenomena are diverse and include the dualist concept—shared by Descartes and Sigmund Freud—of the separateness of the existence of the physical or the material world as distinguished from the non-material mental world with its existence only spatially and not temporally. There is, again, the theory which stresses the neurological basis of the ‘mental phenomenon’ by asserting the functional correlation of the neuronal arrangements of the brain with mental phenomena. The ‘behaviourist’ tradition, on the other hand, interprets all reference to mind as ‘constructs’ out of behaviour. ‘Functionalism’, however, seems to assert that mind is the logical or functional state of physical systems. But all theories seem to recognise, in varying degrees, that the psychometric control over the mind operates at a level not yet fully taught to science. When a person is oppressed by intense and seemingly insoluble moral dilemmas, or when grief of loss of dear ones etch away all the bright colours of life, or where a broken marriage brings with it the loss of emotional security, what standards of normalcy of behaviour could be formulated and applied? The arcane infallibility of science has not fully pervaded the study of the non-material dimensions of ‘being’.
