Smt Kumud Kumari Vs Smt Bageshwari Devi

2025:JHHC:10385

IN THE HIGH COURT OF JHARKHAND AT RANCHI

F.A. No. 117 of 2024

Smt. Kumud Kumari, aged about 41 years, W/o Sri Praveen Kumar Thakur, R/o Ratan Niwas, Indra Nagar, Itki Road, Bazara, P.O.- Hehal, P.S. Pandra, O.P. Sukhdeonagar, District- Ranchi, Jharkhand, Bharat; At present residing at Devakinandan Gali, VillSimalia, Circle- Ratu, Thana No. 139, P.S. Ratu, District: Ranchi, Jharkhand, Bharat, AADHAR No. 839248023493; Mobile No. 9113751389.

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… … Plaintiff/Appellant

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Versus

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Smt. Bageshwari Devi, aged about 68 years, W/o Sri Dinesh Pathak, Permanently R/o Village- Rukhai, P.O.- 7, P.S.- Chandi, District- Nawada, State-Bihar, Bharat; At present R/o Quarter No. E/233/II, Sector-2, Dhurwa, P.O.- Dhurva, P.S.- Dhurva, Ranchi834004, Jharkhand, Bharat; AADHAR No. 905148356161

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… … Defendant/Respondent

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CORAM :HON'BLE MRS. JUSTICE ANUBHA RAWAT CHOUDHARY --For the Appellant : Mr. Pranay Kumar Sinha, Advocate For the Respondent : Mr. Anil Kumar Singh, Advocate ---

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09 /03.04.2025

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1. Heard the learned counsel appearing on behalf of the parties.

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2. This appeal has been filed against the judgement dated 24.02.2024 (decree signed on 01.03.2024) passed by the learned Civil Judge (Senior Division)-I, Ranchi in Original Suit No. 663 of 2023.

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3. The appellant was the plaintiff in the suit. The grievance of the plaintiff-appellant is that the learned trial court dismissed the suit inspite of the fact that there was compromise between the parties, joint compromise petition was filed, written statement was filed under Order XII Rule 6 of CPC, the matter was settled in mediation also and the mediation was declared successful by the learned trial court also and it was observed that no issue need to be framed and then the learned trial court dismissed the suit by entering into the merits of the case. A prayer has been made that the suit be decreed in terms of compromise and arguments have also been advanced that since the

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claim of the plaintiff was that of adverse possession, so it is a declaration of pre-existing right of adverse possession which had matured prior to filing of the suit and therefore the decree would not require registration under the Registration Act, 1908 in view of section 17 (2) (vi) of the Registration Act, 1908.

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Arguments of the appellant.

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4. The learned counsel for the appellant has submitted that the impugned judgment passed by the learned trial court is ex-facie not in accordance with the provision of the C.P.C. He has submitted that once the compromise petition is filed, then the court has no other option but to decree the suit in terms of compromise. He has also submitted that the compromise between the parties is well established inasmuch as no contesting written statement was filed; the written statement was filed under Order XII Rule 6 of CPC; in the same terms the joint compromise petition was filed on the same date; then the matter was sent for mediation and after mediation was successful the matter came back to the court; the court specifically recorded that no issues were required to be framed; still asked the plaintiff to adduce evidence and ultimately the case was decided on the aforesaid issues which was mentioned for the first time in the final judgment.

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5. The learned counsel has relied upon the judgment passed by the Hon’ble Supreme Court (1991) 3 SCC 338 [K. Venkata Seshiah Vs. Kanduru Ramasubbamma (Dead) By LRS] and has referred paragraph 8 of the judgment to submit that once the court was satisfied that there was a compromise it was for the court to record the same and no option lay before the court to act otherwise.

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6. The learned counsel has further submitted that there was no occasion for the court to enter into the legality and validity of the claim of the plaintiff with regard to adverse possession once the claim of adverse possession stood admitted by the defendant by way of joint compromise, by way of written statement and also during mediation when the mediation was also successful in terms of the compromise.

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7. The learned counsel has further submitted that the impugned judgment be set aside and the suit be decreed in terms of the compromise.

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8. He has further submitted that in case the suit is decreed in terms of compromise, there would be no occasion to get the compromise decree registered under the provisions of Registration Act. He has submitted that once the claim of adverse possession stood admitted by the defendant then the claim stood crystalized prior to filing of the suit and the suit was essentially a declaratory suit and therefore, by virtue of the decree no title is conferred or created in favour of the plaintiff. The learned counsel has relied upon the judgment passed by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case reported in (2020) 10 SCC 264 Mohammade Yusuf and others Vs. Raj Kumar and others and he submits that in the said judgment the earlier judgment of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of (2019) 8 SCC 729 Ravinder Kaur Grewal and others vs. Manjit Kaur and others has also been considered by which the Hon’ble Supreme Court held that the plea of adverse possession can also be used as a sword and it is not only available as a shield. The learned counsel has submitted that in such circumstances there would be no requirement to get the compromise decree registered in the registry office.

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9. The learned counsel has further submitted that it is only in case where the compromise decree is used as a device to avoid payment of stamp duty the decree would still be registered. He has submitted that in the present case although there has been transaction of money with regard to the suit property but the possession was claimed by way of adverse possession and therefore the right stood crystalized in favour of the plaintiff and such right stood acknowledged and admitted by the defendant in the uncontested written statement and also by way of joint compromise.

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10. The learned counsel for the appellant has referred to paragraph 11 of the judgment passed by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of Mukesh Vs. The State of Madhya Pradesh and Another passed in

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Civil Appeal No. 14808 of 2024 decided on 20^th December, 2024 to submit that the Hon’ble Supreme Court has held that there can be no doubt that in the Civil Suit filed by the appellant of the said case he had categorically stated that he was the owner of the subject land and was in long and continuous possession by doing cultivation for several years and when the respondent No. 2 sought to disturb the possession of the appellant by selling the subject land to third parties, taking advantage of his name standing in the revenue records, the appellant prayed for declaration and permanent injunction. The learned counsel submits that the Hon’ble Supreme Court has taken note of the judgment passed in the case of Ravinder Kaur Grewal (Supra) and observed that continuous and uninterrupted adverse possession would confer right, title and interest and the same can be used as a sword and in the said case admittedly the suit was filed seeking a declaration asserting his pre-existing right, title and interest and for permanent injunction. The Hon’ble Supreme Court was of the view that the appellant did not obtain any new right, but he asserted his pre-existing right, title and interest over the subject land.

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11. The learned counsel for the appellant submits that in the present case also the entire plaint stood admitted and therefore, the right of the appellant regarding the adverse possession stood admitted and consequently, the suit be decreed in terms of compromise and there would be no requirement to get the compromise decree registered as the compromise decree would not amount to creation of any new right in favour of the plaintiff. He has again relied upon Section 17 (2)(vi) of the Registration Act, 1908 and has submitted that it may also be decided as to whether compromise decree, if any, would require registration or not.

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Arguments of the respondent.

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12. The learned counsel appearing on behalf of the respondent has submitted that he has taken instructions from his client and it is not in dispute that the joint compromise petition was filed and the defendant

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did not contest the suit by filing a formal written statement. He has fully supported the submissions advanced on behalf of the appellant. Points for determination.

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13. Considering the submissions and the materials on record, two points for determination arise for consideration by this court: -

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a. Whether the suit is to be decreed in terms of the compromise between the parties?

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b. Whether the compromise decree, if any, would amount to appellant obtaining a new right or would amount to declaration of his pre-existing right, title and interest over the suit property through adverse possession so that such compromise decree may not require registration?

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14. The plaintiff/appellant has filed the suit seeking declaration of right, title and interest of the plaintiff over the suit property on adjudication. The suit property was described in schedule-I of the plaint.

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15. It was the specific case of the plaintiff that the defendant through the registered sale deed No. 9078 dated 20.07.1984 purchased the suit property from its erstwhile owner and got his name mutated in the Rent Roll of the State vide Mutation case No. 203 (R) 27 of 199091 vide order dated 02.07.1990 of the then Circle Officer, Kanke and since then she paid rent to the State. Thus, defendant was the owner of the suit land with peaceful possession thereon since 20.07.1984.

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16. The further case of the plaintiff is that in the year 2005 the defendant was in need of money and had publicly announced for the sale of the suit land in which many intending purchasers including the plaintiff contacted the defendant wherein the plaintiff proved herself as the highest bidder and negotiated the sale of the suit land which was finalized with the plaintiff in the year 2005. On 10.05.2005, the plaintiff paid the entire agreed consideration amount i.e. Rs.1,51,000/to the defendant and upon payment of the entire consideration amount, the defendant assured the plaintiff that she would execute proper

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conveyance in favour of the plaintiff within a fortnight transferring the suit land in her favour. Despite, this the defendant did not execute the sale deed on one pretext or the other.

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17. It was further case of the plaintiff that when the defendant did not turn to execute any sale deed in favour of the plaintiff, seeing no way out, the plaintiff forcefully entered into the suit land against the will and permission of the defendant, that is, hostile to the true-owner on 23.06.2005 and took forceful possession of the suit land on that day i.e. on 23.06.2005 and since then the plaintiff started to enjoy the suit land as owner thereof openly known to the world at large and hostile to the true owner and continued to enjoy the same peacefully.

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18. It was the case of the plaintiff that since 23.06.2005 the plaintiff has been hitherto peacefully as its absolute owner hostile to the trueowner has been enjoying the property and has also constructed boundary wall and house. It was further case of the plaintiff that the claim of adverse possession of the plaintiff on the suit land satisfied basic ingredients i.e. Nec Vi, Nec Clam, Nec Pre Cario during the entire period of 12 years commencing from 23.06.2005 and culminating on 23.06.2017 i.e. up to completing the period of the title of the plaintiff by prescription to which the defendant has acquiesced by not taking any legal action for more than 12 years.

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19. The case of the plaintiff was that at the time of receipt of the entire consideration amount for the suit land, the defendant had handed over the original of the registered sale deed dated 20.07.1984 to the plaintiff by which the defendant had purchased the suit land. Additionally, the defendant had also given to the plaintiff an acknowledgement of receipt of full consideration money dated 10.05.2005 with respect to the suit land and the defendant had further delivered to the plaintiff the original of the correction slip showing mutation of the defendant pertaining to the suit land as well as the then available Government Rent Receipt of the suit land issued in favour of the defendant. Save and except these documents, the plaintiff has no other document as the same were in custody of the defendant only.

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20. It was further case of the plaintiff that the plaintiff has only defacto possession over the suit land and therefore, the demand thereof in the Register-2 of the State of Jharkhand was allowed to be run in the name of the defendant and de-facto possession thereon has been with the plaintiff for last more than 12 years. It was asserted that the plaintiff has absolute title on the suit land with unfettered interest, unimpeachable right and peaceful possession. The reference was also made to the judgment passed by the Hon’ble Supreme Court reported in 2019 (9) SCC 488 [Krishnamurthy S Setlur (D) by LRS vs. O.V. Narasimha Setty (D) by LRS] that a civil suit seeking declaration of title on the basis of law of adverse possession can very well be instituted.

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21. It has also been asserted in paragraph 16 of the plaint that on 10.07.2023 upon visit of the defendant to the plaintiff, it was for the first time that the defendant orally claimed the suit land exclusively as her own based on the fact that she has not yet executed any sale deed to that effect in favour of the plaintiff and consequently, the cause of action for this Suit stemmed forth on 10.07.2023 when the defendant made false claim on the suit land. As per plaint, the value of the suit land is not less than Rs.40,00,000/-.

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22. The suit was admitted on 31.07.2023 and the notice was issued to the sole defendant directing to put up the case on 30.08.2023. On the very first date i.e. on 30.08.2023, a joint compromise petition was said to have been filed and on that day itself, the written statement under Order XII Rule 6 of the Code of Civil Procedure has been filed stating as under: -

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“1. That, by the benevolent interference of well-wishers of both the parties to this suit, the dispute has wholly been settled outside the Court lawfully.

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2. That, the Defendant does, hereby, admit and accept the entire claim of the Plaintiff in Toto.

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3. That, the Defendant has no objection, if the Suit is decreed in favour of the Plaintiff granting her all the reliefs sought for in the Plaint.”

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23. The order-sheet further reveals that on the very same day, that is on 30.08.2023, the matter was sent for mediation and the order dated 03.10.2023 reveals that the meditation was successful.

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24. The copy of the aforesaid joint compromise petition dated 30.08.2023 has been placed along with the Memo of appeal and same statements have been made in the joint compromise petition as was stated in the aforesaid written statement filed under Order XII Rule 6 of the Code of Civil Procedure.

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25. However, the learned court did not decree the suit in terms of compromise in-spite of the fact that the written statement was filed only under Order XII Rule 6 and a joint compromise petition was also filed. The case was sent for mediation where the joint compromise was confirmed and the confirmation of joint compromise was also recorded in the order sheet, still the court did not decree the suit in terms of compromise.

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26. It is important to note that the order dated 10.10.2023 of the learned trial court reveals that the learned court was of the view that the mediation has been successful and therefor, there is no point to frame any issue. The learned court although did not frame any issue, but vide order dated 22.11.2023 directed the plaintiff to adduce evidence. Pursuant to the direction of the learned trial court the plaintiff examined herself as a sole witness and exhibited the following documents: -

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Exhibit-1:- Acknowledgment receipt of money.

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Exhibit-2:- Original Registered Sale deed No. 9078, dated 20.07.1984.

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Exhibit 3, 3(a) and 3(b):- Original Rent Receipt.

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Exhibit-4:- Original Correction Slip Showing Mutation Case No. 203 R 27 of 1990-91.

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27. The defendant has also adduced one evidence i.e. herself and defendant during her cross examination had exhibited Acknowledgment of Receipt of Money and her signature as ExhibitA.

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28. In-spite of the aforesaid order dated 10.10.2023 of the learned trial court recording that the mediation has been successful and therefore, there was no point to frame any issue, Surprisingly, the impugned judgement records that following issued were framed for consideration: -

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1) Whether the suit as framed maintainable?

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2) Has the plaintiff valid cause of action for the suit?

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3) Is the suit barred by law of limitation, principal of waiver, estoppel and acquiescence?

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4) Whether the plaintiff has got valid rights, title and interest over the suit land?

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5) To what any other relief or reliefs the plaintiff is entitled to?

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29. The learned trial court considered the main issue as issue no. (4) whether the plaintiff has got valid right, title and interest over the suit land and considered the basic ingredients for declaration of adverse possession and observed that the plaintiff in paragraph 6 of the plaint has stated that on 23.06.2005 the property came in possession of the plaintiff and observed that at present there has been compromise between the parties and both the parties have given evidence on the basis of compromise and the defendant has accepted all the averments made by the plaintiff. The learned court thereafter referred to section 101 of the Evidence Act and was of the view that the plaintiff has to establish the case on his own. The learned court thereafter observed that even if on 23.06.2005 is taken as a date on which the plaintiff came in possession of the property and was in possession of the property since then and that the owner did not object to such possession but the plaintiff has not produced any evidence to that effect and the learned court was of the view that merely because the defendant has agreed to the statement of the plaintiff through compromise, the same does not establish the case of the plaintiff that she was in possession of the suit property since 23.06.2005. The learned court also observed that the possession must be continuous and uninterrupted and the plaintiff did not adduce any evidence that

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she was in continuous and uninterrupted possession since 23.06.2005 and merely on account of the admission by the defendant it could not be said that the plaintiff was in possession of the property since 23.06.2005. The plaintiff had also stated that the plaintiff had constructed a house over the property but no document in support of that including the tax receipt submitted to municipality or the electricity bill etc. was filed. The learned court also considered that the plaintiff had not produced any evidence that the defendant was the owner of the property and was also of the view that merely because the defendant had agreed, the same was not sufficient, and observed that neither the plaintiff nor the defendant could prove their ownership with regard to the suit property. The learned trial court after considering the documents and evidences produced on behalf of the parties decided the issue No. 4 against the plaintiff and so far as other issues were concerned, since no opposition was made from the side of the defendant, other issues were decided in favour of the plaintiff. The learned court also recorded that the suit was dismissed on contest.

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30. This Court finds that the specific case of the plaintiff before the trial court as per the plaint was that the plaintiff forcefully entered into the suit land although the title of the suit property was still with the defendant and the entry of the plaintiff was against the will and permission of the defendant i.e. hostile to the true owner on 23.06.2005 and took forceful possession of the suit land on that day i.e. on 23.06.2005 and since then the plaintiff has been enjoying in the suit land as owner thereof openly known to the world at large and hostile to the true owner and further in paragraph 9 the plaintiff calculated the period of adverse possession from 23.06.2005 itself which expired on 23.06.2017 and the suit was filed in the year 2023 when on 10.07.2023 the defendant asserted his title on the ground that the sale deed was not yet executed.

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31. Thus, the learned trial court instead of decreeing the suit in terms of compromise read with the written statement filed on similar lines as that of the compromise admitting the claim of the plaintiff,

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proceeded to decide the case on merits and while doing so the learned trial court referred to section 101 of the Evidence Act and has observed that it is for the plaintiff to satisfy the court with regard to the basic ingredients of adverse possession and found that the basic ingredients of adverse possession were not proved and also recorded that the plaintiff failed to prove the title of the defendant .

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32. In the judgement passed by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in K. Venkata Seshiah v. Kanduru Ramasubbamma, (1991) 3 SCC 338 , it has been held that once the court was satisfied that there was a compromise it was for the court to record the same and no option lay before the court to act otherwise and further being satisfied that the compromise petition is genuine and lawful passed appropriate order. the portion of paragraph 8 relevant for the purposes of this case and Paragraph 9 are quoted as under: -

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“8. …………………………………….. On the other hand, we find that a similar question arose before the Orissa High Court in the case of Bhaja Govinda Maikap v. Janaki Dei where the power of the court under Order XXIII, Rule 3 of the Code of Civil Procedure in the face of an objection of one of the parties to the compromise was considered. Relying upon several authorities of different High Courts and one of the Privy Council referred to in the decision, the High Court held that once the court was satisfied that there was a compromise it was for the court to record the same and no option lay before the court to act otherwise.

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9. We are in accord with the principle indicated in the said decision and are of the view that as the compromise petition is genuine and lawful the same has to be acted upon. We direct that the compromise petition shall be accepted and in terms thereof the suit shall be disposed of and the terms of the compromise shall form part of the order to be drawn up in this Court for disposing of the special leave petition.”

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33. This Court is of the considered view that once there was compromise; joint compromise petition was filed which was coupled with written statement filed under Order XII Rule 6 of C.P.C. in the same terms as that of compromise admitting the claim of the plaintiff; the mediation in terms of joint compromise was also successful and success of the mediation was recorded in the order passed by the

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learned trial court; when there was a specific order that in view of compromise no issues are required to be framed, and all this was done upon full satisfaction of the court regarding genuineness of compromise, the court had no option but to decree the suit in terms of compromise and the scope of enquiry could have been only to the extent as to whether the compromise was genuine and Bonafide. The law is well settled in the aforesaid judgement that once the court was satisfied that there was a compromise, it was for the court to record the same and no option lay before the court to act otherwise. Once it is found that the compromise petition is genuine and lawful the same has to be acted upon.

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34. This Court further finds that even when the court proceeded to decide the case on the basis of written statement filed under Order XII Rule 6 of C.P.C. based on admission of the statements made in the plaint there was no scope for the court to dispute the admitted facts which stood prima-facie proved by the documents exhibited which included the registered sale deed and mutation documents showing title of the defendant with respect to the suit property and also the money receipt showing payment of entire consideration amount by the plaintiff to the defendant. The fact that the plaintiff was in possession of the suit property was also admitted and it was also admitted that on 10.07.2023 the defendant claimed to be the owner of the suit property as sale deed was not yet executed as stated in paragraph 16 of the plaint.

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35. This Court is of the considered view that once it was proved that the defendant was the owner of the property by virtue of a registered sale deed dated 20.07.1984 and the defendant had also got his name mutated in revenue records, the title of the defendant with respect to the suit property stood proved and there was no occasion for the learned trial court to seek the complete chain of title as to how the defendant acquired the suit property. Further, once the uninterrupted and continuous possession of the plaintiff was admitted by the defendant and the defendant had no objection with regards to suit

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being decreed in terms of the relief prayed for at every stage of the proceedings before the learned trial court, there was no occasion for the learned trial court to enter into determination of point as to whether the ingredients of adverse possession were proved or not particularly when it was already observed that no issues need be framed as the mediation between the parties was also successful. This Court also finds that at any point of time and even in the impugned judgement the learned trial court recorded that the compromise was otherwise not acceptable on account of any fraud or lack of Bonafide of the parties or the parties had entered into such an arrangement to avoid payment of stamp duty for registration etc. Even before this Court, no such material has come to the notice of this Court to come to any findings of fraud or lack of bonafide of the parties or to come to a conclusion that the parties had entered into such an arrangement to avoid payment of stamp duty for registration etc.

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36. In view of the aforesaid findings, the impugned judgement and decree dismissing the suit is hereby set-aside and it is declared that the plaintiff has right, title and interest over the suit property and the suit is decreed in terms of the compromise as mentioned in the written statement admitting and accepting the entire claim of the plaintiff in toto and also expressing that the defendant has no objection if the suit is decreed in favour of the plaintiff granting the plaintiff all the reliefs sought for in the plaint. This Court also finds that the statements made in the written statement filed under Order XII Rule 6 of C.P.C. and the statements made in joint compromise petition filed before the learned trial court (a copy of the certified copy of the joint compromise petitioner has been filed as Annexure-3 to this memo of appeal) are identical wherein to has been stated as under:

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“1. That, by the benevolent interference of well-wishers of both the parties to this suit, the dispute has wholly been settled outside the Court lawfully.

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2. That, the Defendant does, hereby, admit and accept the entire claim of the Plaintiff in Toto.

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3. That, the Defendant has no objection, if the Suit is decreed in favour of the Plaintiff granting her all the reliefs sought for in the Plaint.”

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37. Accordingly, the suit is decreed in terms of the aforesaid averments made in the joint compromise petition and also in the written statement filed under Order XII Rule 6 of C.P.C. and from today the right, title and interest of the plaintiff is declared as prayed for in the plaint. The point of determination no. (a) is accordingly decided in favour of the appellant.

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38. On the face of the plaint, the plaintiff has averred that in-spite of payment of the entire consideration amount when the defendant did not execute the sale deed the plaintiff forcibly entered into the suit premises in-spite of knowing full well that the title of the suit property was still with the defendant and continued to be in possession and asserted in the plaint that three ingredients for claiming adverse possession were satisfied namely Nec Vi, Nec Clam, Nec Pre Cario but further ingredient of Animus possidendi has not been pleaded. The suit was filed when the defendant on 10.07.2023 claimed the suit property and refused to execute the sale deed in favour of the plaintiff. In the judgment passed by the Hon’ble Supreme Court reported in (2019) 8 SCC 729 the Hon’ble Supreme Court has considered the status of a trespasser in paragraph 56 and 60 and while considering the status the Hon’ble Supreme Court has also considered the basic ingredients for claiming the adverse possession i.e. nec adequate in continuity, nec clam adequate in publicity, and nec precario adverse to a competitor in denial of title and his knowledge. It should be visible, notorious and peaceful and it should be coupled with Animus possidendi under hostile colour of title. It has been held that trespasser’s long possession is not synonymous with adverse possession. Paragraph 56 and 60 of the aforesaid judgment are quoted as under:-

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“56. There is the acquisition of title in favour of the plaintiff though it is negative conferral of right on extinguishment of

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the right of an owner of the property. The right ripened by prescription by his adverse possession is absolute and on dispossession, he can sue based on “title” as envisaged in the opening part under Article 65 of the Act. Under Article 65, the suit can be filed based on the title for recovery of possession within 12 years of the start of adverse possession, if any, set up by the defendant. Otherwise right to recover possession based on the title is absolute irrespective of limitation in the absence of adverse possession by the defendant for 12 years. The possession as trespasser is not adverse nor long possession is synonymous with adverse possession.

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60. The adverse possession requires all the three classic requirements to co-exist at the same time, namely, nec vi i.e. adequate in continuity, nec clam i.e. adequate in publicity and nec precario i.e. adverse to a competitor, in denial of title and his knowledge. Visible, notorious and peaceful so that if the owner does not take care to know notorious facts, knowledge is attributed to him on the basis that but for due diligence he would have known it. Adverse possession cannot be decreed on a title which is not pleaded. Animus possidendi under hostile colour of title is required. Trespasser's long possession is not synonymous with adverse possession. Trespasser's possession is construed to be on behalf of the owner, the casual user does not constitute adverse possession. The owner can take possession from a trespasser at any point in time. Possessor looks after the property, protects it and in case of agricultural property by and large the concept is that actual tiller should own the land who works by dint of his hard labour and makes the land cultivable. The legislature in various States confers rights based on possession.”

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39. This Court is of the considered view that once there was a joint compromise there is no occasion for this Court to enter into the point as to whether the plaintiff had perfected his title by way of adverse possession and therefore no further discussion is required on the point of adverse possession.

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40. This Court also finds that in view of the joint compromise and also the written statement filed under Order XII Rule 6 of C.P.C. coupled with successful mediation there was no occasion for the court to enter into the merits of the claim of the plaintiff and the claim of the

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plaintiff crystalized after admission of the claim of the plaintiff by the defendant and not by way of declaration of the right of the plaintiff by the court through adjudication. The statement made in the plaint disclosing the cause of action to file the suit on 10.07.2023 when the defendant disputed the claim of the plaintiff also stood admitted as the entire claim of the plaintiff stood admitted in the joint compromise and also in the written statement filed under Order XII Rule 6 of C.P.C.

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41. In totality of the aforesaid facts and circumstances, this Court is of the considered view that the right of the plaintiff over the suit property is created through the decree passed by this Court and it does not amount to declaration of a pre-existing right of adverse possession by this Court. In fact, there was a dispute between the parties which ended up in compromise and passing of decree by this Court without adjudication creating title over the suit property in favour of the plaintiff and extinguishing the right, title and interest of the defendant over the suit property and thus the right, title and interest has been created in favour of the plaintiff over the suit property through the decree passed by this Court.

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42. The point of determination no. (b) is accordingly decided by holding that the compromise decree in the instant case creates a new right in favour of the plaintiff-appellant and does not amount to declaration of his pre-existing right, title and interest over the suit property through adverse possession and accordingly the compromise decree would require registration.

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43. This appeal is allowed in the aforesaid terms.

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44. Office to draw decree in the light of paragraph 36 and 37 of this judgement.

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45. Pending I.A., if any, is closed.

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46. Let a copy of this order be communicated to the concerned court through “Fax/e-mail”.

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(Anubha Rawat Choudhary, J.)

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Rakesh/-/A.F.R