Jharkhand Krantikari Mazdoor Union Thr Its General Secretary D C Gosain Alias Dinesh Chandra Gohain Vs Bokaro Power Supply Company Pvt. Ltd. through Its Chief Executive Officer

IN THE HIGH COURT OF JHARKHAND AT RANCHI

(Letters Patent Appellate Jurisdiction)

L.P.A No. 98 of 2023

Jharkhand Krantikari Mazdoor Union at Qr. No. 1587, Street 38, Sector IXD, Bokaro Steel City, PO & PS-Harla, District-Bokaro through its General Secretary D.C. Gosain @ Dinesh Chandra Gohain, aged about-64 years, s/o late K.D. Gohain, r/o Qrt. No.-1587 Street 38, Sector-IXD Bokaro Steel City, PO & PS-Harla, District-Bokaro (Jharkhand)-827009 … Appellant Versus

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Bokaro Power Supply Company Pvt. Ltd. (A Joint Venture of SAIL & D.V.C), having its registered office at Ispat Bhawan Lodhi Road, New Delhi-110003 and having one of its units at Hall no.-No.-M-01, Old Admn. Building, Ispat Bhawan, Bokaro Steel City, District-Bokaro (Jharkhand) through its Chief Executive Officer at Bokaro Steel City, PO & PS-Bokaro Steel City, DistrictBokaro (Jharkhand) 827001 ... Respondent

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CORAM: HON’BLE THE ACTING CHIEF JUSTICE HON’BLE MRS. JUSTICE ANUBHA RAWAT CHOUDHARY

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For the Appellant	: Mr. Vijoy Pratap Singh, Sr. Advocate Mr. Ramakant Tiwari, Advocate
	Ms. Vandana Kumari Sinha, Advocate
For the Respondent	: Mr. Indrajit Sinha, Advocate Mr. Arpan Mishra, Advocate
	Mr. Ajay Kumar Sah, Advocate

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3^rd January 2024

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Per, Shree Chandrashekhar, A.C.J.

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I.A No. 11572 of 2023

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This interlocutory application has been filed for condoning the delay of 27 days in preferring the present Letters Patent Appeal.

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After hearing the learned counsel for the appellant and considering the facts and circumstances of this case and also after going through the cause shown in this interlocutory application seeking condonation of delay, we find sufficient grounds to condone the delay of 27 days and, accordingly, I.A No. 11572 of 2023 is allowed.

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L.P.A No. 98 of 2023

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The Jharkhand Krantikari Mazdoor Union (in, short Mazdoor Union) seeks to challenge the writ Court’s decision which reversed the award dated 22^nd February 2017 made in Reference No. 41 of 2012; the reference was answered in favor of the workmen.

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L.P.A No.98 of 2023

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On account of a dispute relating to grant of additional welfare amenities to the contract workers through their contractors in the form of attendance allowance @ Rs.1000/- per month i.e Rs.38.46/- per day not being paid to the contract workers under the Bokaro Power Supply Company Private Limited (in short, Power Supply Company), the appropriate Government made a reference in the following terms:

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“Whether the action of the management of Bokaro Power Supply Co, (P) Ltd., Bokaro in not allowing the payment of Additional Welfare Amenities @ Rs.1000/- per month to the Contract workers engaged through contractors w.e.f 1.10.2009 at par with the contract workers working in the premises of Bokaro Steel Plant – SAIL is legal and justified? What relief the workmen are entitled to?”

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Before the Central Government Industrial Tribunal No.1 at Dhanbad (in short, Industrial Tribunal), the Power Supply Company took a stand that the reference was vague and indefinite, inasmuch as, the contract workers were not identified. However, the main objection was that the Power Supply Company being a separate entity the contract workers under it cannot claim the benefits given to the contract workers under the Steel Authority of India Limited (in short, SAIL). It further appears that the Power Supply Company conceded before the Industrial Tribunal that the Board of Management acceded to the demand for payment of Rs.1000/- per month i.e Rs.38.46/- per day on account of additional welfare amenities; but with effect from 1^st October 2011.

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The Industrial Tribunal has made a consideration of the materials

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on record in the following terms:

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“15. On perusal of voluminous document it is noticed that document of BPSCL is printed in SAIL/Bokaro Steel Plant for example Ext.W-15, it is the pay slip of BPSCL employee which is marked during the cross examination of as MW-1. The Ext W-15 is the pay slip of BPSCL employee but it is under logo of BSL and print head of SAIL/Bokaro Steel Plant. Hence now it is also proved that employee of BPSCL contract workers are discriminated among the contract workers working in the premises of SAIL-Bokaro Steel Plant and the contract workers working in the premises of BPSCL through various contractors. Both are in one premises, it is also proved through agreement that the BPSCL is the very important part of BSL, without BPSCL the BSL Plant will be paralyzed. Now it is strange that BPSCL contract worker is discriminated.

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Considering the facts and circumstances of this case, I hold that the action of the management of Bokaro Power Supply Co, (P) Ltd., Bokaro in not allowing the payment of Additional Welfare Amenities @ 1000/- per month to the Contract workers engaged through contractors w.e.f 01/01/2009 at par with the contract workers working in the premises of Bokaro Steel Plant-SAIL is not justified. Therefore the management is directed to pay AWA to the all Contract workers as per list provided by the Union which is given in the bottom of the award w.e.f Oct 2009, and the formality of entire payment

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L.P.A No.98 of 2023

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be completed within 3 months from the date of publication of the award as otherwise the management has to pay interest @ 6% P.M soon after the completion of the stipulated period of 3 months is over.”

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However, the writ Court allowed W.P.(L) No. 6187 of 2017

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observing as under:

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“7. Having heard learned counsel for the parties and from perusal of record, it appears that M/s. Bokaro Power Supply Company (P) Limited is a entity created by the joint venture of Damodar Valley Corporation and Steel Authority of India Limited. All the three companies are public sector undertaking companies. Still the benefits given to a organization cannot be equated with other organization as in the present case there are three organizations, i.e., Damodar Valley Corporation, Steel Authority of India Limited and the petitioner-organization itself. Every organization has its own financial constraint and financial implication. Considering the above, the board of directors have taken a resolution and benefit has been granted to one or another organization. In the present case, the benefit has been granted to the contract labourers w.e.f. 01.10.2011 by the Board of Directors and shifting the date of implementation giving reference to the resolution of the Steel Authority of India Limited is not permissible rather not warranted. This Court finds that the Industrial Tribunal has travelled beyond its jurisdiction accordingly, the Award dated 22.02.2017 passed in Reference No.41 of 2012 by the Presiding Officer, Central Government Industrial Tribunal No.1, Dhanbad is, hereby, set aside.

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In the result, the writ petition stands allowed.

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In view of the disposal of the present writ petition, the pending interlocutory applications stand disposed of.”

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Assailing the writ Court’s decision to interfere with the award dated 22^nd February 2017, Mr. Vijoy Pratap Singh, the learned senior counsel for the appellant submits that the findings of fact recorded by the inferior Tribunal/Court are not open to challenge in a proceeding for certiorari. The learned senior counsel would submit that by merely recording that the Power Supply Company is a different entity the writ Court could not have exercised its powers under Articles 226/227 of the Constitution of India to set aside the award dated 22^nd February 2017. On the other hand, Mr. Indrajit Sinha, the learned counsel for the Power Supply Company submits that the contract workers of the Mazdoor Union have no vested legal right to seek parity with the contract workers under the SAIL. It is submitted that the Power Supply Company is entitled to frame the service conditions of the contract workers and, having regard to the financial implications, if the demand of the Mazdoor Union is acceded to with effect from 1^st October 2009 that would put huge financial burden on the Power Supply Company.

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The writ Court held that the Industrial Tribunal travelled beyond its jurisdiction and, therefore, the award dated 22^nd February 2017 became vulnerable and was liable to be set aside. However, the reference made to the

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L.P.A No.98 of 2023

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Industrial Tribunal clearly indicates that the reference was to find out whether the action of the Management of the Power Supply Company in not granting benefits of additional welfare amenities with effect from 1^st October 2009 was legal and justified. The Industrial Tribunal dealt with this issue and recorded a finding thereon. Moreover, this does not even seem to be the case pleaded before the writ Court by the Power Supply Company that the Industrial Tribunal has exceeded its jurisdiction.

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On a glance at the award dated 22^nd February 2017, we find that the Industrial Tribunal has recorded good reasons for answering the reference in favor of the Mazdoor Union. However, the writ Court has not even dealt with the findings recorded by the Industrial Tribunal and decided to interfere with the award on non-existent grounds. The writ Court’s decision to interfere with the award made by the Industrial Tribunal is mainly based on the consideration that the Power Supply Company is a different entity and the benefits given to the contract workers of another organization cannot be enforced and given to the contract workers under the Power Supply Company. These findings of the writ Court as recorded in paragraph no. 7 are not based on any material laid before the writ Court. The Industrial Tribunal has noted in paragraph nos. 15 and 16 of the award dated 22^nd February 2017 that Ext.W-15 is the pay slip of Power Supply Company employee under the logo of the SAIL and the same has been printed under the head of SAIL/Bokaro Steel Plant. The Industrial Tribunal further observed that both the establishments are in the same premises and it is also proved that the Power Supply Company is a very important part of the Bokaro Steel Plant. The Industrial Tribunal has held that the Power Supply Company contract workers are discriminated among the contract workers working in the premises of SAIL/Bokaro Steel Plant through various contractors. However, there is no consideration by the writ Court regarding the findings recorded by the Industrial Tribunal in paragraph nos. 15 and 16 of the award dated 22^nd February 2017.

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For the sake of fullness, we may add that the Management of Power Supply Company itself took a decision to extend the benefit of additional welfare amenities with effect from 1^st October 2011 and while so it must be held that the Management has accepted the claim of parity raised by

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L.P.A No.98 of 2023

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the Mazdoor Union on behalf of the contract workers under the SAIL. In fact, except raising the pela of being a separate entity, the Power Supply Company did not put forth any reason why the benefit of additional welfare amenities to the contract workers under the Mazdoor Union should not be given from 1^st October 2009. Simply put, the plea of discrimination urged on behalf of the contract workers under the Mazdoor Union has been rightly accepted by the Industrial Tribunal and no interference was required with the award dated 22^nd February 2017.

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The powers of judicial review exercised by the writ Court are very limited and only under exceptional circumstances where on a mere glance at the award it can be said that the award is perverse, the writ Court shall interfere with the award made by the inferior Tribunal/Court. This is well settled a law that on mere showing of some error in law or of facts the writ Court shall not issue certiorari . This is also too well settled that sufficiency or insufficiency of the material laid before the inferior Tribunal/Court is not an issue which can be agitated in a proceeding for certiorari. On this issue, the law is very clear that wherever it is found that there was some material on the basis of which a decision has been rendered the writ Court shall stay its hands away and would not interfere in the matter. 13. In “Syed Yakoob v. K.S. Radhakrishnan” AIR 1964 SC 477 the Hon’ble Supreme Court held as under:

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The question about the limits of the jurisdiction of High Courts in issuing a writ of certiorari under Article 226 has been frequently considered by this Court and the true legal position in that behalf is no longer in doubt. A writ of certiorari can be issued for correcting errors of jurisdiction committed by inferior courts or tribunals : these are cases where orders are passed by inferior courts or tribunals without jurisdiction, or is in excess of it, or as a result of failure to exercise jurisdiction. A writ can similarly be issued where in exercise of jurisdiction conferred on it, the Court or Tribunal acts illegally or properly, as for instance, it decides a question without giving an opportunity, be heard to the party affected by the order, or where the procedure adopted in dealing with the dispute is opposed to principles of natural justice. There is, however, no doubt that the jurisdiction to issue a writ of certiorari is a supervisory jurisdiction and the Court exercising it is not entitled to act as an appellate Court. This limitation necessarily means that findings of fact reached by the inferior Court or Tribunal as result of the appreciation of evidence cannot be reopened or questioned in writ proceedings. An error of law which is apparent on the face of the record can be corrected by a writ, but not an error of fact, however grave it may appear to be. In regard to a finding of fact recorded by the Tribunal, a writ of certiorari can be issued if it is shown that in recording the said finding, the Tribunal had erroneously refused to admit admissible and material evidence, or had erroneously admitted inadmissible evidence which has influenced the impugned finding. Similarly, if a finding of fact is based on no evidence, that would be regarded as an error

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L.P.A No.98 of 2023

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of law which can be corrected by a writ of certiorari. In dealing with this category of cases, however, we must always bear in mind that a finding of fact recorded by the Tribunal cannot be challenged in proceedings for a writ of certiorari on the ground that the relevant and material evidence adduced before the Tribunal was insufficient or inadequate to sustain the impugned finding. The adequacy or sufficiency of evidence led on a point and the inference of fact to be drawn from the said finding are within the exclusive jurisdiction of the Tribunal, and the said points cannot be agitated before a writ Court. It is within these limits that the jurisdiction conferred on the High Courts under Article 226 to issue a writ of certiorari can be legitimately exercised (vide Hari Vishnu Kamath v. Syed Ahmad Ishaque Nagandra Nath Bora v. Commissioner of Hills Division and Appeals Assam and Kaushalya Devi v. Bachittar Singh.

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The law on the subject under consideration has been elucidated by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in “Madurantakam Coop. Sugar Mills Ltd. v. S. Viswanathan” (2005) 3 SCC 193 wherein the Hon’ble Supreme Court observed as under:

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“12. Normally, the Labour Court or the Industrial Tribunal, as the case may be, is the final court of facts in these types of disputes, but if a finding of fact is perverse or if the same is not based on legal evidence the High Court exercising a power either under Article 226 or under Article 227 of the Constitution can go into the question of fact decided by the Labour Court or the Tribunal. But before going into such an exercise it is necessary that the writ court must record reasons why it intends reconsidering a finding of fact. In the absence of any such defect in the order of the Labour Court the writ court will not enter into the realm of factual disputes and finding given thereon. A consideration of the impugned order of the learned Single Judge shows that nowhere has he come to the conclusion that the finding of the Labour Court was either perverse or based on no evidence or based on evidence which is not legally acceptable. Learned Single Judge proceeded as if he was sitting in a court of appeal on facts and item after item of evidence recorded in the domestic enquiry as well as before the Labour Court was reconsidered and findings given by the Labour Court were reversed. We find no justification for such an approach by the learned Single Judge which only amounts to substitution of his subjective satisfaction in the place of such satisfaction of the Labour Court.”

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In our opinion, the writ Court transgressed the limits of judicial review of the award made by the inferior Tribunal and for that reason the writ Court’s order dated 29^th November 2022 is set aside. As a consequence of this order, the award dated 22^nd February 2017 is restored. 16. L.P.A No. 98 of 2023 is allowed in the aforesaid terms.

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(Shree Chandrashekhar, A.C.J.)

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(Anubha Rawat Choudhary, J.)

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Jharkhand High Court, Ranchi Dated: 3^rd January 2024 Amit N.A.F.R

Jharkhand Krantikari Mazdoor Union Thr Its General Secretary D C Gosain Alias Dinesh Chandra Gohain v. Bokaro Power Supply Company Pvt. Ltd. through Its Chief Executive Officer

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Jharkhand Krantikari Mazdoor Union Thr Its General Secretary D C Gosain Alias Dinesh Chandra Gohain v. Bokaro Power Supply Company Pvt. Ltd. through Its Chief Executive Officer

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