Dismissed

Jharkhand State Electricity Board (Now Jharkhand Urja Vikas Nigam Ltd) through Its Chairman v. Bina Devi

Jharkhand HC13 Jun 2024LPA/406/2023

Case brief

AI extract

What is this about?

Letters Patent Appeal by the electricity board challenging quashing of a 50% pension deduction under Rule 43(b). The court found the explanation for the 422-day delay—movement of files between departments—insufficient and dismissed the delay-condonation application and consequently the appeal.

What the court decided

AI extract

Jharkhand State Electricity Board (Now… — Pension and Retirement Benefits | Jharkhand HC (2024)

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IN THE HIGH COURT OF JHARKHAND AT RANCHI

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L.P.A. No.406 of 2023

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1. Jharkhand State Electricity Board (Now Jharkhand Urja Vikas Nigam Ltd.) through its Chairman, Engineers Building, H.E.C. Township, P.O. & P.S.-Dhurwa, District-Ranchi

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2. The Secretary, Jharkhand State Electricity Board (Now Jharkhand Urja Vikas Nigam Ltd.), Engineers Building, H.E.C. Township, P.O. & P.S.-Dhurwa, District-Ranchi

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3. The Director Personnel, Jharkhand State Electricity Board, (Now Jharkhand Urja Vikas Nigam Ltd.), Engineers Building, H.E.C. Township, P.O. & P.S.-Dhurwa, District-Ranchi

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4. The General Manager-cum-Chief Engineer, Patratu Thermal Power Station, P.O. & P.S Patratu, District-Hazaribagh

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5. The Deputy Director of Personnel, Patratu Thermal Power Station, Patratu, P.O. & P.S. Patratu, District-Hazaribagh.

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6. The Deputy Director Accounts, Patratu Thermal Power Station, Patratu, P.O. + P.S.-Patratu, District-Hazaribagh.

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…. …. Appellants/Respondents

Versus

1. Bina Devi

2. Niranjan Kumar

3. Reena Singh

4. Priya Ranjan Kumar

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5. Sangeeta Kumari

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6. Rajeev Ranjan Kumar

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7. Manoranjan Kumar .... .... Respondent/Petitioner

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CORAM : HON’BLE MR. JUSTICE SUJIT NARAYAN PRASAD HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE ARUN KUMAR RAI

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For the Appellant-JSEB : Mr. Mrinal Kanti Roy, Sr. SC (JSEB) Mr. Chandan Tiwari, Advocate

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14/Dated: 13.06.2024

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Per Sujit Narayan Prasad, J.

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1. The instant appeal preferred under Clause-10 of Letters Patent is directed against the order dated 16.12.2021 passed by this Court in W.P.(S) No.777 of 2012, whereby and whereunder, the order dated 11.08.2011 passed in pursuant to the provision of Rule 43(b) of the Jharkhand Pension Rules by deducting 50 per cent of the pension, has been quashed and set aside by allowing the writ

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petition.

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2. The instant appeal is barred by limitation of 422 days as per the office note.

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3. One interlocutory application being I.A. No.9379 of 2023 has been filed for condoning the said delay.

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I.A. No.9379 of 2023

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4. The instant interlocutory application has been filed under Section 5 of the Limitation Act to condone the delay of 422 days, for which, explanation has been furnished in the instant interlocutory application.

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5. The appeal has been filed after much delay.

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6. This Court has consistently passed the order in so many Letters Patent Appeals by dismissing the appeals on the ground of delay where the sufficient cause has not been shown.

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7. This is one of the cases where the similar ground has been taken for movement of file from one department to another or one table to another.

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8. Mr. Mrinal Kanti Roy, learned counsel appearing for the Appellant-JUVNL has submitted that the appeal has been filed after inordinate delay of 422 days but the issue is required to be considered that the learned Single Judge has gone into the provision of Rule 43(b) of the Jharkhand Pension Rule by its wrong interpretation.

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9. It has been contended by making reference of the provision of Rule 43(b) of the Pension Rule that the Rule 43(b) of the Jharkhand

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Pension Rules empowers the State Government to withhold or withdraw a pension of any part of it, whether permanently or for a specified period, and the right of ordering the recovery from a pension of the whole or part of any pecuniary loss cause to the Government if the pensioner is found in departmental or judicial proceeding to have been guilty of grave misconduct; or to have cause pecuniary loss to Government by misconduct or negligence, during the service including service rendered on reemployment after retirement subject to certain conditions provided therein.

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10. The explanation, as under Rule 43(b) stipulates the conditions, as to what to be done, if departmental proceeding has been initiated under the applicable Conduct Rule and if the employee retires on attaining the age of superannuation, but even though, the charge was there but the proceeding could not have been initiated. 11. So far as the first eventuality is concerned, i.e., the initiation of departmental proceeding under the applicable Conduct Rule and in course of its pendency, if the person concerned retires on attaining the age of superannuation, then the departmental proceeding under the Conduct Rule will be seized and it will be deemed to be converted under the provisions of the Jharkhand Pension Rule. But in an eventuality, if misconduct has been committed by the public servant while in service but no departmental proceeding had been initiated in course of service, then, even after retirement, the proceeding under Rule 43 can be initiated but subject to the condition as stipulated under the explanation of Rule 43.

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12. The learned State Counsel, based upon the aforesaid legal premise, has submitted by referring to the impugned order particularly the paragraph-13 thereof that the provision of Rule 43(b) has wrongly been appreciated.

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13. Therefore, the argument has been advanced that although, the instant appeal is barred by limitation of 422 days but if on the ground of limitation, the instant appeal will be dismissed, then the impugned order will be treated to be precedence.

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14. The submission has been made on the aforesaid ground that the limitation may be condoned and the matter may be heard on merit.

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15. This Court has heard the learned counsel for the appellantJUVNL.

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16. The question of entering into the merit of the issue will only come if the issue of limitation first is to be dealt with, it is due to the reason that if the appeal has not been filed by the litigant concerned within the period of limitation, then a valuable and substantial right is said to be accrued in favour of the other side and as such, it has been mandated that the issue of limitation is first to be dealt with.

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17. The provision has been made under Section 5 of the Limitation Act, wherein, it has been provided that irrespective of the period of delay, if sufficient cause is being shown, the limitation is to be condoned.

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18. The “sufficient cause” has been defined by the Hon’ble Apex Court in the case of in Basawaraj & Anr. Vrs. Spl. Land Acquisition Officer,

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[(2013) 14 SCC 81 , wherein, it has been held by the Hon’ble Apex Court that “sufficient cause” means that the party should not have acted in a negligent manner or there was a want of bona fide on its part in view of the facts and circumstances of a case or it cannot be alleged that the party has “not acted diligently” or “remained inactive”. For ready reference the relevant paragraph of the aforesaid judgment are being quoted as under:-

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“9. Sufficient cause is the cause for which the defendant could not be blamed for his absence. The meaning of the word “sufficient” is “adequate” or “enough”, inasmuch as may be necessary to answer the purpose intended. Therefore, the word “sufficient” embraces no more than that which provides a platitude, which when the act done suffices to accomplish the purpose intended in the facts and circumstances existing in a case, duly examined from the viewpoint of a reasonable standard of a cautious man. In this context, “sufficient cause” means that the party should not have acted in a negligent manner or there was a want of bona fide on its part in view of the facts and circumstances of a case or it cannot be alleged that the party has “not acted diligently” or “remained inactive”. However, the facts and circumstances of each case must afford sufficient ground to enable the court concerned to exercise discretion for the reason that whenever the court exercises discretion, it has to be exercised judiciously. The applicant must satisfy the court that he was prevented by any “sufficient cause” from prosecuting his case, and unless a satisfactory explanation is furnished, the court should not allow the application for condonation of delay. The court has to examine whether the mistake is bona fide or was merely a device to cover an ulterior purpose. (See Manindra Land and Building Corpn. Ltd. v. Bhutnath Banerjee [AIR 1964 SC 1336] , Mata Din v. A. Narayanan [(1969) 2 SCC 770 : AIR 1970 SC 1953] , Parimal v. Veena [(2011) 3 SCC 545 : (2011) 2 SCC (Civ) 1 : AIR 2011 SC 1150] and Maniben Devraj Shah v. Municipal Corpn. of Brihan Mumbai [(2012) 5 SCC 157 : (2012) 3 SCC (Civ) 24 : AIR 2012 SC 1629] .) 10. In Arjun Singh v. Mohindra Kumar [AIR 1964 SC 993] this Court explained the difference between a “good cause” and a “sufficient cause” and observed that every “sufficient cause” is a good cause and vice versa. However, if any difference exists it can only be that the requirement of good cause is complied with on a lesser degree of proof than that of “sufficient cause”.

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11. The expression “sufficient cause” should be given a liberal interpretation to ensure that substantial justice is done, but only so long as negligence, inaction or lack of bona fides cannot be imputed to the party concerned, whether or not sufficient cause has been furnished, can be decided on the facts of a particular case and no straitjacket formula is possible. (Vide Madanlal v.

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Shyamlal [(2002) 1 SCC 535 : AIR 2002 SC 100] and Ram Nath Sao v. Gobardhan Sao [(2002) 3 SCC 195 : AIR 2002 SC 1201] 12. It is a settled legal proposition that law of limitation may harshly affect a particular party but it has to be applied with all its rigour when the statute so prescribes. The court has no power to extend the period of limitation on equitable grounds. “A result flowing from a statutory provision is never an evil. A court has no power to ignore that provision to relieve what it considers a distress resulting from its operation.” The statutory provision may cause hardship or inconvenience to a particular party but the court has no choice but to enforce it giving full effect to the same. The legal maxim dura lex sed lex which means “the law is hard but it is the law”, stands attracted in such a situation. It has consistently been held that, “inconvenience is not” a decisive factor to be considered while interpreting a statute.

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13. The statute of limitation is founded on public policy, its aim being to secure peace in the community, to suppress fraud and perjury, to quicken diligence and to prevent oppression. It seeks to bury all acts of the past which have not been agitated unexplainably and have from lapse of time become stale. According to Halsbury's Laws of England, Vol. 28, p. 266: “605. Policy of the Limitation Acts.—The courts have expressed at least three differing reasons supporting the existence of statutes of limitations namely, (1) that long dormant claims have more of cruelty than justice in them, (2) that a defendant might have lost the evidence to disprove a stale claim, and (3) that persons with good causes of actions should pursue them with reasonable diligence.” An unlimited limitation would lead to a sense of insecurity and uncertainty, and therefore, limitation prevents disturbance or deprivation of what may have been acquired in equity and justice by long enjoyment or what may have been lost by a party's own inaction, negligence or laches. (See Popat and Kotecha Property v. SBI Staff Assn. [(2005) 7 SCC 510] , Rajender Singh v. Santa Singh [(1973) 2 SCC 705 : AIR 1973 SC 2537]and Pundlik Jalam Patil v. Jalgaon Medium Project [(2008) 17 SCC 448]

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14. In P. Ramachandra Rao v. State of Karnataka [(2002) 4 SCC 578 ] this Court held that judicially engrafting principles of limitation amounts to legislating and would fly in the face of law laid down by the Constitution Bench in Abdul Rehman Antulay v. R.S. Nayak [(1992) 1 SCC 225].

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15. The law on the issue can be summarised to the effect that where a case has been presented in the court beyond limitation, the applicant has to explain the court as to what was the “sufficient cause” which means an adequate and enough reason which prevented him to approach the court within limitation. In case a party is found to be negligent, or for want of bona fide on his part in the facts and circumstances of the case, or found to have not acted diligently or remained inactive, there cannot be a justified ground to condone the delay. No court could be justified in condoning such an inordinate delay by imposing any condition whatsoever. The application is to be decided only within the parameters laid down by this Court in regard to the condonation of delay. In case there was no sufficient cause to prevent a litigant to approach the court on time condoning the delay without any justification, putting any condition whatsoever, amounts to passing an order in violation of the statutory provisions and it tantamounts to showing utter disregard to the legislature.”

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19. Thus, it is evident that the sufficient cause means that the party should not have acted in a negligent manner or there was a want of bona fide on its part in view of the facts and circumstances of a case or it cannot be alleged that the party has “not acted deliberately” or “remained inactive”. However, the facts and circumstances of each case must afford sufficient ground to enable the Court concerned to exercise discretion for the reason that whenever the Court exercises discretion, it has to be exercised judiciously. The applicant must satisfy the Court that he was prevented by any “sufficient cause” from prosecuting his case, and unless a satisfactory explanation is furnished, the Court should not allow the application for condonation of delay. The Court has to examine whether the mistake is bona fide or was merely a device to cover the ulterior purpose as has been held in Manindra Land and Building Corporation

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Ltd. Vrs. Bhutnath Banerjee & Ors., AIR 1964 SC 1336, Lala Matadin Vrs. A. Narayanan, (1969) 2 SCC 770, Parimal Vrs. Veena @ Bharti, (2011) 3 SCC 545 and Maniben Devraj Shah Vrs. Municipal Corporation of Brihan Mumbai, (2012) 5 SCC 157.

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20 . It has further been held in the aforesaid judgments that the expression ‘sufficient cause’ should be given a liberal interpretation to ensure that substantial justice is done, but only so long as negligence, inaction or lack of bona fides cannot be imputed to the party concerned, whether or not sufficient cause has been furnished, can be decided on the facts of a particular case and no straitjacket formula is possible, reference in this regard may be made to the judgment rendered by the Hon’ble Apex Court in Ram Nath Sao @ Ram Nath Sahu & Ors. Vrs. Gobardhan Sao &

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Ors., (2002) 3 SCC 195 , wherein, at paragraph-12, it has been held as

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hereunder:-

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“12. Thus, it becomes plain that the expression “sufficient cause” within the meaning of Section 5 of the Act or Order 22 Rule 9 of the Code or any other similar provision should receive a liberal construction so as to advance substantial justice when no negligence or inaction or want of bona fides is imputable to a party. In a particular case whether explanation furnished would constitute “sufficient cause” or not will be dependent upon facts of each case. There cannot be a straitjacket formula for accepting or rejecting explanation furnished for the delay caused in taking steps. But one thing is clear that the courts should not proceed with the tendency of finding fault with the cause shown and reject the petition by a slipshod order in over-jubilation of disposal drive. Acceptance of explanation furnished should be the rule and refusal, an exception, more so when no negligence or inaction or want of bona fides can be imputed to the defaulting party. On the other hand, while considering the matter the courts should not lose sight of the fact that by not taking steps within the time prescribed a valuable right has accrued to the other party which should not be lightly defeated by condoning delay in a routine-like manner. However, by taking a pedantic and hypertechnical view of the matter the explanation furnished should not be rejected when stakes are high and/or arguable points of facts and law are involved in the case, causing enormous loss and irreparable injury to the party against whom the lis terminates, either by default or inaction and defeating valuable right of such a party to have the decision on merit. While considering the matter, courts have to strike a balance between resultant effect of the order it is going to pass upon the parties either way.”

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21. Now adverting in to the fact of the case it is evident that in addition to the explanation which has been furnished in the delay condonation application is only the movement of file from one department to another or from one table to another and further, the

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impugned order was passed on 16.12.2021 but the requisition was made for obtaining the certified copy on 18.09.2023 which is fairly after lapse of about more than 1 ½ year that to without any explanation as to why the State has made requisition after lapse of more than 1 ½ year, which is approximately one year and nine months.

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22. Therefore, this Court is of the view that the explanation which has been sought to be shown to establish the case of sufficient cause in filing the appeal after delay of 422 days appears to be lacking.

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23. Accordingly, we have found that the explanation which has been furnished, cannot be said to be sufficient one.

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24. But the question in addition to that which has been raised that the provision of Rule 43(b) has wrongly been referred by the learned Single Judge, therefore, this Court is of the view that this Court cannot enter into the merit of the issue since the appellant has failed to explain the sufficient cause for condoning the delay.

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25. The concern of the learned State Counsel is that the provision of Rule 43(b) has wrongly been appreciated which will not be a precedence, reason being that if any order has wrongly been passed by making any reference of the statutory provision, the statute will prevail not the sheer observation of the learned Single Judge.

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26. This Court, considering the aforesaid legal position, is of the view that it will not be proper for this Court to enter into the merit of the issue since there is no sufficient cause to explain the delay

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condonation application.

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27. Accordingly, the instant interlocutory application being I.A. No.9379 of 2023 is dismissed.

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28. In consequence thereof, the instant appeal also stands

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dismissed.

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(Sujit Narayan Prasad, J.)

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