Allowed

Vinod Kumar Ganjhu Alias Binod Ganjhu Alias Binod Kumar Ganjhu v. State through National Investigation Agency

Jharkhand HC8 Apr 2024Cr.A(DB)/1019/2018

Case brief

AI extract

What is this about?

Appeal against rejection of bail to an alleged TPC terrorist-gang member accused of extortion levy collection from coal traders, with Rs.91.75 lakh cash recovered from his house. Considering six years' custody, pending trial, bail granted to similarly placed co-accused, and K.A. Najeeb principles, the court set aside the rejection and released him on bail.

What did the court decide?

Impugned order dated 06.08.2018 rejecting bail set aside; appellant to be released on bail on usual conditions to be fixed by the learned trial court.

Vinod Kumar Ganjhu Alias Binod Ganjhu Alias Binod Kumar… — Money Laundering | Jharkhand HC (2024)

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IN THE HIGH COURT OF JHARKHAND AT RANCHI Criminal Appeal (D.B.) No. 1019 of 2018

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Vinod Kumar Ganjhu @ Binod Ganjhu @ Binod Kumar Ganjhu

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… … Appellant

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Versus

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State through National Investigation Agency, Ranchi

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… … Respondent

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CORAM : HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE RONGON MUKHOPADHYAY : HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE AMBUJ NATH

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For the Appellant : M/s. Balaji Srinivasan, Niranjan Kumar, Rohan Dewan and D. K. Prasad, Advocate For the Respondent : Mr. A. K. Das, Special P. P.

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15/08.04.2024 Heard Mr. Balaji Srinivasan, learned counsel for the appellant and Mr. A. K. Das, learned Special P. P. for the respondent – NIA.

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This appeal is directed against the order dated 06.08.2018 passed in connection with Misc. Cr. Application No. 781 of 2018 arising out of Special (NIA) 03/2018 corresponding to RC-06/2018/NIA/DLI arising out of Tandwa P. S. Case No. 02/2016 registered for the offence under Sections 414/384/386/387/120B of the I.P.C., 25 (1-b) (a), 26 & 35 of the Arms Act, Section 17 (1) (2) of the Criminal Law Amendment Act & Sections 16, 17, 20 & 23 of the Unlawful Activities (Prevention) Act, 1967 by which the prayer for bail of the appellant was rejected by the learned Judicial Commissioner cum Special Judge, NIA, Ranchi.

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A written report was submitted by Ramdhari Singh, SubInspector posted at Simaria Police Station to the effect that on 10.01.2016, a secret information was received by the Superintendent of Police that in Amrapali and Magadh Coal Area, Tandwa some local persons have formed an association which is related to the banned extremist organization outfit – TPC. The members of said organization were extracting levy from the coal traders and D.O. holders by creating a fear in the name of the extremists of T.P.C. – Gopal Singh Bhokta @

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Brajesh Ganjhu, Mukesh Ganjhu, Kohramjee, Akramanjee @ Ravindra Ganjhu, Anischay Ganjhu, Bhikan Ganjhu, Deepu Singh @ Bhikan and Bindu Ganjhu.

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It has been alleged that if any of the businessmen hesitate to pay levy, they were threatened by members of such organization and are also subjected to hardships. In order to verify the truthfulness or otherwise of such information, a raiding party was constituted on the orders of the Superintendent of Police, Chatra. A raid was conducted in the house of the President of the Association, Binod Kumar Ganjhu and from under his bed as well as from his almirah Rs. 91,75,890/- cash was recovered. No satisfactory explanation could be submitted by Binod Kumar Ganjhu with respect to recovery of such a huge amount of cash. From the house of Binod Kumar Ganjhu, two persons were also apprehended who disclosed their names as Birbal Ganjhu and Munesh Ganjhu and on search of their persons, a loaded mauser pistol was recovered from the possession of Birbal Ganjhu while from the possession of Munesh Ganjhu, a countrymade pistol and two live cartridges were recovered. Both have confessed of being associated with the T.P.C. organization. Binod Kumar Ganjhu had disclosed that he is the President of Magadh Sanchalan Samiti and the levy collected is sent to Gopal Singh Bhokta @ Brajesh Ganjhu and thereafter it is distributed between Mukesh Ganjhu, Kohramjee, Akramanjee @ Ravindra Ganjhu, Anischay Ganjhu, Bhikan Ganjhu, Deepu Singh @ Bhikan. He has disclosed that Bindu Ganjhu is a member of Amrapali Sanchalan Samiti who collects levy on behalf of TPC and since he is at present in jail, the collection of levy is being done by Pradip Ram. On such information, a raid was conducted in the house of Pradip Ram and from under his bed as well as from an almirah Rs. 57,57,710/- in cash was recovered. No satisfactory explanation could be furnished by Pradip Ram with respect to such recovery of cash.

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Based on the aforesaid allegations, Tandwa P. S. Case No. 2 of 2016 was instituted for the offences under Sections 414, 384, 386, 387, 120 (B) I.P.C., Sections 25 (1-b) (a)/26/35 of the Arms Act and Section 17 (1) (2) of the Criminal Law Amendment Act against Binod Ganjhu, Munesh

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Ganjhu, Pradip Ram, Birbal Ganjhu, Gopal Singh Bhokta @ Brajesh Ganjhu, Mukesh Ganjhu, Kohramjee, Akramanjee @ Ravindra Ganjhu, Anischay Ganjhu, Deepu Singh @ Bhikan, Bindu Ganjhu and Bhikan Ganjhu.

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In course of investigation Sections 16, 17, 20 & 23 of the Unlawful Activities (Prevention) Act, 1967 (hereinafter referred to as ‘UAP Act’) were added. Since the offence involved is a scheduled offence in exercise of the power conferred under Section 6 (5) read with Section 8 of the National Investigation Agency Act, 2008, the Central Government by order dated 13.02.2018 had directed the National Investigation Agency to take up the investigation of the case and consequently Tandwa P. S. Case No. 2 of 2016 was re-registered as NIA Case No. RC6/2018/NIA/DLI.

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It has been submitted by Mr. Balaji Srinivasan, learned counsel appearing for the appellant that the learned court below has failed to take into consideration the business operations of the appellant and acknowledge the fact that the appellant himself runs a transportation business. He is a land loser under the Rehabilitation Scheme introduced by the Central Coalfields Ltd. and had erroneously come to a conclusion that the appellant was involved in collection of levy from the transporters and D. O. holders. It has been submitted that the first supplementary charge-sheet submitted against the appellant does not suggest that the appellant was a member of the terrorist organization and that the properties acquired by the appellant are from the levy collected on behalf of the terrorist organization. The services of the appellant were utilized under the Rehabilitation Policy by the Central Coalfields Ltd. The appellant worked in tandem with other known local leaders for smooth running of the Magadh Amrapali Project as the appellant was also a land loser and comes under the purview of the Rehabilitation Policy 2012. Mr. Srinivasan has further submitted that the only allegation against the appellant was that he was in possession of cash worth Rs. 91,75,890/- and that he was conspiring with others in collection of extortion money from contractors/coal traders/coal transporters for which a separate case under PLMA Act was instituted in

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which the appellant has been granted bail. Several co-accused persons who have been charge-sheeted by the NIA have been granted bail. He has made reference to the case of “Ajit Kumar Thakur Vs. Union of India through NIA” {Criminal Appeal (DB) No. 999 of 2019}, “Subhan Mian Vs. Union of India through NIA” {Criminal Appeal (DB) No. 394 of 2021}, “Vernon Vs. State of Maharashtra & Another” reported in (2023) SCC Online SC 885 . Reference has also been made to the case of “Union of India Vs. K. A. Najeeb” reported in (2021) 3 SCC 713 and the said reference was in the context of the appellant remaining in custody since 30.06.2018. So far as the antecedents of the appellants are concerned, it has been stated that 10 cases have been instituted against the appellant and in all the cases either he has been acquitted or is on bail.

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Mr. A. K. Das, learned Special P. P. appearing for the NIA has submitted that the appellant is the member of terrorist organization and the appellant in conspiracy with the other accused persons used to collect levy from the contractors, coal traders and D.O. holders. It has been submitted that in the case of “Bindeshwar Ganjhu @ Bindu Ganjhu”, the prayer for bail of the said accused was rejected by this court in Criminal Appeal (DB) No. 29 of 2021 which was affirmed upto the Hon’ble Supreme Court. It has been stated that recovery of a huge amount of money from the house of the appellant which is unaccounted for indicates about the involvement of the appellant in subversive activities and being a member of the terrorist organization. He has stated that the angle of conspiracy alleged against the appellant is also established beyond doubt and he is involved in collection of levy amount in coordination and in association with the other accused persons including Bindeshwar Ganjhu @ Bindu Ganjhu whose prayer for bail has been rejected. Mr. Das has submitted that the appellant is a hardened criminal and had managed to secure a job in the Central Coalfields Ltd. being a land loser and in course of liaisoning with the villagers through Shanti Sah Sanchalan Samiti had set-up a transport company which was also from the proceeds of the terrorism which would be evident from the first supplementary charge-sheet submitted by the NIA. Mr. Das has therefore submitted that the entire facets of the case would clearly

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indicate that a prima-facie case under Section 43-D(5) of the Unlawful Activities (Prevention of Atrocities) Act, 1967 is made out against the appellant and therefore he does not deserve to be released on bail. So far as the trial is concerned, Mr. Das has submitted that the same is being expedited and grant of bail to the appellant at this stage would disrupt the trial and there is every possibility of the appellant tampering with the evidence.

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We have heard the learned counsel for the respective parties and have also perused the various affidavits which have been brought on record.

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The appellant has been arrayed as A-1 and the role played by him has been demarcated in paragraph 17.12 of the first supplementary charge-sheet, which is quoted as under:

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“17.12 Role and activities of/offences established against Binod Kumar Ganjhu (A-1): Therefore, as per the averments made hereinabove/in the pre-paragraphs, it is established that he is member of Shanti Sah Sanchalan Samiti of Magadh coal mine area. He being member of terrorist gang, was closely associated with top leaders of the gang and used to extort levy from coal transporters/contractors and raised funds for the terrorist gang and acquired Proceeds of Terrorism. He was arrested on 11.01.2016 with cash worth Rs. 91,75,890/- Therefore, it is established that Binod Kumar Ganjhu (A-1) by becoming member of terrorist gang/unlawful association TPC, proscribed by Government of Jharkhand, assisted in the operations/management of TPC in criminal conspiracy with members of the terrorist gang including A-2, A-3, A-4, A-6, A-14 with intent to aid the above said terrorist gang collected funds from illegitimate sources through extortion from the contractors/coal traders/coal transporters and knowingly concealed/retained/dishonestly possessed such extorted cash amount worth Rs. 91,75,890/- and acquired proceeds of terrorism in the form of movable/immovable properties through the terrorist fund and further in his residential premise, A-2 and A-3 were found to be in unathorised possession of fire arms and ammunition inter-alia inferring that A-1 conspired with A-2, A-3 and others for terrorist act. Thereby accused Binod Kumar Ganjhu (A-1) committed offences under sections 120B r/w 387, 384, 386, 386 r/w 411, 414 of the I.P.C., sections 17, 18, 20 and 21 of the U.A.(P) Act, 25 (1B) a, 26 and 35 of the Arms Act, section 17 of the C.L.A. Act, 1908.”

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What would therefore, appear from the offences established against the appellant is that an amount of Rs. 91,75,890/- was recovered from his house and therefore it was deduced that being a member of the

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Shant Sah Sanchalan Samiti of Magadh Coal Mine Area, he was associated with a terrorist gang as well top leaders of the gang and in conspiracy with the members of the terrorist organization, he used to collect funds from illegitimate sources through extortion from the contractors/coal traders/coal transporters.

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So far as recovery of the proceeds of terrorism as stated in the first supplementary affidavit submitted by the NIA is concerned, it appears that a separate case was instituted by the Enforcement Directorate in which the appellant has been granted bail. Apart from the recovery of the amount as noted in the first supplementary charge-sheet from the house of the appellant, there does not seem to be any other incriminating material which would indicate about the active involvement of the appellant in the terrorist organization. It has also to be borne in mind that some of the co-accused who were actively involved in the running of the Shanti Sah Sanchalan Samiti including the then General Manager of Central Coalfields Ltd. namely, Ajit Kumar Thakur and Subhan Mian have been granted bail by this court in Criminal Appeal (DB) No. 999 of 2019 and Criminal Appeal (DB) No. 394 of 2021. The NIA had challenged the order dated 19.12.2022 passed in Criminal Appeal (DB) No. 394 of 2021 in Special Leave Petition (Crl.) Diary No. 21803 of 2023 before the Hon’ble Supreme Court which was dismissed vide order dated 06.07.2023. Mr. Das in course of his submission has referred to the case of Bindeswar Ganjhu @ Bindu Ganjhu whose prayer for bail was rejected by this court in Criminal Appeal (DB) No. 29 of 2021 and which was affirmed upto the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Special Leave to Appeal (Crl.) No.(s) 7609 of 2022 in which a direction was given to the learned trial court to conclude the trial at the earliest and preferably within a period of one year.

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In the case of “Union of India Vs. K. A. Najeeb” reported in (2021) 3 SCC 713 (supra), it has been held as follows:

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“17. It is thus clear to us that the presence of statutory restrictions like Section 43-D(5) of the UAPA per se does not oust the ability of the constitutional courts to grant bail on grounds of violation of Part III of the Constitution. Indeed, both the restrictions under a statute as well as the powers exercisable under constitutional jurisdiction can be well harmonised.

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Whereas at commencement of proceedings, the courts are expected to appreciate the legislative policy against grant of bail but the rigours of such provisions will melt down where there is no likelihood of trial being completed within a reasonable time and the period of incarceration already undergone has exceeded a substantial part of the prescribed sentence. Such an approach would safeguard against the possibility of provisions like Section 43-D(5) of the UAPA being used as the sole metric for denial of bail or for wholesale breach of constitutional right to speedy trial.”

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Reference has also been made to the case of “Vernon Vs.

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State of Maharastra” (supra), wherein it has been held as follows:

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“ 39. We have already analysed Sections 38 and 39 of the 1967 Act. The interpretation given by us to the phrase “intention to further activities” of terrorist organisation could also apply in the same way in relation to Section 39 of the same statute. There has been no credible evidence against the appellants of commission of any terrorist act or enter into conspiracy to do so to invoke the provisions of Section 43D(5) of the 1967 Act.

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40. As far as raising funds for a terrorist organisation is concerned, we do not think at this stage, in absence of better evidence, the account statement is credible enough to justify invoking the bail-restricting clause by attracting Section 40 of the 1967 Act.

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41 . We are returning these findings as the restrictions on the Court while examining the question of bail under the 1967 Act is less stringent in comparison to the provisions of Section 37 of the Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances Act, 1985. We are not called upon, for granting a bail to an accused with commercial quantity of contraband article under the 1985 Act, to satisfy ourselves that there are reasonable grounds for believing that an accused is not guilty of such offence and that he is not likely to commit any offence while on bail. Here, we have to satisfy ourselves that the specified offences alleged to have been committed by the appellants cannot be held to be prima facie true. 42. We shall now turn to the other offence under the 1967 Act, which is under Section 13 thereof, and the 1860 Code offences. The yardstick for justifying the appellants' plea for bail is lighter in this context. The appellants are almost five years in detention. In the cases of K.A. Najeeb (supra) and Angela Harish Sontakke (supra), delay of trial was considered to be a relevant factor while examining the plea for bail of the accused. In the case of K.A. Najeeb (supra), in particular, this same provision, that is Section 43D (5) was involved.

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43. In these two proceedings, the appellants have not crossed, as undertrials, a substantial term of the sentence that may have been ultimately imposed against them if the prosecution could establish the charges against them. But the fundamental proposition of law laid down in K.A. Najeeb (supra), that a bailrestricting clause cannot denude the jurisdiction of a Constitutional Court in testing if continued detention in a given case would breach the concept of liberty enshrined in Article 21 of

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the Constitution of India, would apply in a case where such a bailrestricting clause is being invoked on the basis of materials with prima facie low-probative value or quality.

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44. In the case of Zahoor Ahmad Shah Watali (supra) reference was made to the judgment of Jayendra Saraswathi Swamigal v. State of Tamil Nadu [(2005) 2 SCC 13) in which, citing two earlier decisions of this court in the cases of State v. Jagjit Singh (AIR 1962 SC 253) and Gurcharan Singh v. State of (UT of Delhi) [(1978) 1 SCC 118), the factors for granting bail under normal circumstances were discussed. It was held that the nature and seriousness of the offences, the character of the evidence, circumstances which are peculiar to the accused, a reasonable possibility of the presence of the accused not being secured at the trial; reasonable apprehension of witnesses being tempered with; the larger interest of the public or the State would be relevant factors for granting or rejecting bail. Juxtaposing the appellants' case founded on Articles 14 and 21 of the Constitution of India with the aforesaid allegations and considering the fact that almost five years have lapsed since they were taken into custody, we are satisfied that the appellants have made out a case for granting bail. Allegations against them no doubt are serious, but for that reason alone bail cannot be denied to them. While dealing with the offences under Chapters IV and VI of the 1967 Act, we have referred to the materials available against them at this stage. These materials cannot justify continued detention of the appellants, pending final outcome of the case under the others provisions of the 1860 Code and the 1967 Act.

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45. While forming our opinion over granting bail to the appellants, we have taken into account the fact that that VG was once earlier convicted involving offences, inter-alia, under 1967 Act and there is also a pending criminal case against him on the allegations of similar line of activities. Hence, we propose to impose appropriate conditions in respect of both, which they shall have to comply with, while on bail.”

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In “Subhan Mian Vs. Union of India through NIA” (supra) while considering the judgment rendered in the case of “Indra Das versus State of Assam” reported in (2011) 3 SCC 380 , this court has come to the following conclusion.

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“17. The appellant, therefore, seems to have been indicted on the doctrine of “guilt by association” associating himself with the terrorist gang for the purpose of furthering the cause of smooth running of the colliery as well as transportation of coal and also to further his business and financial gains by promoting the transport company which is in the name and his wife which would not prima facie make him an active member of the terrorist gang.”

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As we have noticed above, one of the primary allegations against the appellant is of conspiring with other members of the terrorist organization in extorting levy from coal traders, D.O. holders and coal transporters and the recovery of the amount of Rs. 91,75,890/- has been sought to be highlighted by the investigating agency as having a direct nexus with extortion activities which was being carried out the appellant on his being the member of the terrorist organization. It must be borne in mind that the appellant runs a transportation business and such recovery is the subject matter of a money laundering case. It should also be borne in mind that the appellant was the member of the Shanti Sah Sanchalan Samiti which was basically set-up for smooth running of the collieries which though as per the version of the NIA seems to have been infiltrated by the members of the terrorist organization, though we cannot lose sight of the fact that some of the co-accused persons actively involved in the functioning of the Shanti Sah Sanchalan Samiti have been granted bail by this court.

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The appellant is in custody since 30.06.2018 and is on the verge of completion of 6 years in custody. The long incarceration of the appellant would also be a dominant feature while considering grant of bail apart from the fact that the trial has not yet been concluded which have been taken into consideration in the case of “Union of India Vs. K. A. Najeeb” (supra) noted above.

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Submission of Mr. Das, learned counsel appearing for the respondent – NIA that the prayer for bail of one of the co-accused Bindeswar Ganjhu @ Bindu Ganjhu has been rejected by this court and affirmed by the Hon’ble Supreme Court, but it appears that the allegation against the present appellant and that of the co-accused Bindeswar Ganjhu @ Bindu Ganjhu operate on different spheres. Thus, on a totality of the circumstances noted above, including the period of incarceration undergone by the appellant, we accordingly set aside the impugned order dated 06.08.2018 passed by the learned Judicial Commissioner cum Special Judge, NIA, Ranchi in connection with Misc. Cr. Application No. 781 of 2018 arising out of Special (NIA) 03/2018 corresponding to RC-

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06/2018/NIA/DLI arising out of Tandwa P. S. Case No. 02/2016 by which the prayer for bail of the appellant was rejected.

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The appellant shall be released on bail on usual conditions to be decided by the learned trial court.

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We make it clear that the learned trial court shall not be influenced while conducting the trial of any of the observations made by us in this order, as such observation/finding is restricted only for the purpose of grant of bail to the appellant.

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This appeal is allowed.

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(Rongon Mukhopadhyay, J.)

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R. Shekhar Cp 3

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Vinod Kumar Ganjhu Alias Binod Ganjhu Alias Binod Kumar Ganjhu v. State through National Investigation Agency

Case brief

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Vinod Kumar Ganjhu Alias Binod Ganjhu Alias Binod Kumar Ganjhu v. State through National Investigation Agency

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