Partly allowed

Anuradh Sharma Alias Aradhna Sharma And Ors. v. The State Of Jharkhand And Anr.

Jharkhand HC4 Jan 2024Cr.M.P./1011/2016

Case brief

AI extract

What is this about?

Four quashing petitions arising from a land dispute between the Pradhans and Anuradha Sharma. The Court held officials acted in discharge of official duty attracting section 197 Cr.P.C., quashed the complaint and cognizance order against them, but dismissed the petition challenging the F.I.R. against the Pradhans since charge sheet had been filed.

What did the court decide?

Entire criminal proceeding and order dated 09.10.2015 in C.P.Case No.C-2954 of 2013 quashed in three petitions; Cr.M.P. No.3385 of 2013 dismissed; interim orders vacated.

Anuradh Sharma Alias Aradhna Sharma And Ors. Vs The State… — Quashing and FIR | Jharkhand HC (2024)

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IN THE HIGH COURT OF JHARKHAND, RANCHI

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----

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Cr.M.P. No. 579 of 2016

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---- Amit Kumar @ Ameet Kumar .... Petitioner -- Versus -- 1.The State of Jharkhand 2.Sri Krishna Pradhan .... Opposite Parties With Cr.M.P. No. 3385 of 2013 ---- 1.Sri Krishna Pradhan 2.Ran Vijay Pradhan @ Kallu 3.Digvijay Pradhan 4.Ravindra Pradhan 5.Mahavir Pradhan @ Veer Vijay Pradhan .... Petitioners -- Versus -- 1.The State of Jharkhand 2.Umesh Rajak .... Opposite Parties With Cr.M.P. No. 1008 of 2016 ---- 1.Ms. Nisha Murmu 2.Umesh Rajak 3.Ms. Aradhana Singh 4.Shailesh Kumar Gupta .... Petitioners -- Versus -- 1.The State of Jharkhand 2.Sri Krishna Pradhan .... Opposite Parties With Cr.M.P. No. 1011 of 2016 ---- 1.Anuradh Sharma @ Anuradha Sharma 2.Rajiv Kumar Sharma @ Rajeev 3.Pankaj Kumar Sharma @ Pankaj 4.Rishikesh Kumar Sharma @ Rishikesh .... Petitioners -- Versus -- 1.The State of Jharkhand 2.Sri Krishna Pradhan .... Opposite Parties ----

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CORAM: HON’BLE MR. JUSTICE SANJAY KUMAR DWIVEDI

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For the Petitioners :- Mr. R.S. Mazumdar, Senior Advocate Mr. Nishant Roy, Advocate

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[Cr.M.P. No. 579 of 2016, Cr.M.P. No. 1008 of 2016 &

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Cr.M.P. No. 1011 of 2016]

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Mr. Sumeet Gadodia, Advocate [Cr.M.P. No. 3385 of 2013]

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For the Opp.Party No.2 :- Mr. Sumeet Gadodia, Advocate [Cr.M.P. No. 579 of 2016, Cr.M.P. No. 1008 of 2016 & Cr.M.P. No. 1011 of 2016]

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Mr. Sahil, Advocate

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Cr.M.P. No. 3385 of 2013

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For the State :- Mr. Sanjay Kumar Srivastava, Advocate [Cr.M.P. No. 1011 of 2016] Mr. Pankaj Kumar Mishra, Advocate [Cr.M.P. No. 579 of 2016] Mrs. Nehala Sharmin, Advocate

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[Cr.M.P. No. 3385 of 2013 & Cr.M.P. No. 1008 of 2016]

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43 /04.01.2024 Heard Mr. R.S. Mazumdar, the learned Senior counsel assisted by Mr. Nishant Roy, the learned vice counsel appearing on behalf of the petitioners in Cr.M.P. No.579 of 2016, Cr.M.P. No.1008 of 2016 & Cr.M.P. No.1011 of 2016, Mr. Sumeet Gadodia, the learned counsel appearing on behalf of the petitioners in Cr.M.P. No.3385 of 2013 and on behalf of the Opposite Party No.2 in Cr.M.P. No.579 of 2016, Cr.M.P. No.1008 of 2016 & Cr.M.P. No.1011 of 2016, Mr. Sahil, the learned counsel appearing on behalf of the Opposite Party No.2 in Cr.M.P. No.3385 of 2013 and Mr. Sanjay Kumar Srivastava, Mr. Pankaj Kumar Mishra as well as Mrs. Nehala Sharmin, the learned counsels appearing on behalf of the respondent-State in Cr.M.P. No.1011 of 2016, Cr.M.P. No.579 of 2016 and Cr.M.P. No.3385 of 2013 & Cr.M.P. No.1008 of 2016, respectively.

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Cr.M.P. No.579 of 2016, Cr.M.P. No.1008 of 2016 and Cr.M.P. No.1011 of 2016- in all these three cases, the common complaint case is under challenge as well as the order taking cognizance and in Cr.M.P. No.3385 of 2013 there is F.I.R which is the consequence of the complaint case which are the subject matter in all three cases and in view of that,

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all these petitions have been heard together with consent of the parties.

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In Cr.M.P. No.579 of 2016, Cr.M.P. No.1008 of 2016 and Cr.M.P. No.1011 of 2016 the prayer is made for quashing of the entire criminal proceeding as well as the order dated 09.10.2015 in connection with C.P.Case No.C-2954 of 2013, pending in the court of learned Sub Divisional Judicial Magistrate, Ranchi.

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In Cr.M.P. No.3385 of 2013, the prayer is made for quashing of the F.I.R. being Doranda P.S. Case No.617 of 2013 dated 03.12.2013, pending in the court of learned Sub Divisional Judicial Magistrate, Ranchi as also the order dated 07.12.2013 passed in the same whereby warrants of arrest have been issued.

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In Cr.M.P. No.579 of 2016, Cr.M.P. No.1008 of 2016 and Cr.M.P. No.1011 of 2016, the complaint case was filed alleging therein inter alia, that the complainant amongst other properties, owns a piece of land in North Office Para, having an area of 3.065 acres of land situated in Khata No. 191, Plot Nos. 918 and 919, P.O. & P.S. Doranda, District Ranchi, which is a part and parcel of the complainant's residential house, which is his ancestral property. It has been further alleged that the State of Jharkhand through the Deputy Commissioner, Ranchi had made a of false claim regarding the ownership of land and the complainant, along with his brothers, being law abiding citizens filed Title Suit No. 134 of 1999, being a suit for declaration of right, title and possession and in the alternative for restoration of possession in the Court of learned Munsif, Ranchi who decreed the suit in favour of the applicant and his brothers vide judgment and decreed dated 31.7.2002. Thereafter the State preferred a Title Appeal before the learned Judicial Commissioner, Ranchi, which was numbered as Title Appeal No.21 of 2002/ 19 of 2003, which was dismissed vide order dated 22.12.2003 by the Judicial Commissioner, learned F.T.C., Additional Ranchi. Thereafter a

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Second Appeal being S.A. No. 216 of 2005 was preferred by the State before the Hon'ble High Court of Jharkhand, which was also dismissed by order dated 7.1.2008. The State again preferred a Special Leave Petition before the Hon'ble Supreme Court of India vide S.L.P. (Civil) No. 29275 of 2010, which was also dismissed by order dated 19.11.2010 and the review petition filed against this order has also been dismissed vide order dated 27.9.2011.

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It has further been alleged on 3.12.2013, the on 3.12.2013, the complainant received a telephone call from the Doranda Police Station asking them or their representatives to appear before the Dy.S.P., Hatia at Doranda P.S. at 12.30 p.m. on the same day i.e. 2.12.2013. The son of the complainant who is a practicing Advocate namely, in the Hon'ble High Court, Shri Veer Vijay Pradhan, accompanies by two other Advocates, namely, Sri Rajesh Kumar and Sri Abhinesh Kumar reached the Police Station at 12.30 in the afternoon. The Deputy Superintendent of 1, Hatia was present in the Police Station and called for the son of the complainant and others at about 12.40-12.45 p.m. soon after they entered into the room of Doranda P.S. where the Dy.S.P. was sitting and enquired as to why he had been called, she started abusing them and asked for the papers of their ancestral land and house stating that she had received a complaint from one Anuradha Sharma that they were wanting to grab her land. The son of the complainant and the representatives of the complainant, namely, Shri Veer Vijay Pradhan informed the Dy.S.P., Hatia that said Anuradha Sharma seemed to have got wrong and incorrect information since the land, as being described by her, being a piece of land measuring 3.065 acres, Khata No. 191, Plot Nos. 918, 919 which belonged to the family of the complainant herein, i.e. jointly owned by the complainant, which at one point of time, had been claimed by the State Government.

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It has been further alleged that the details, as mentioned in the Para-2 of the instant complaint petition along with the copies of the orders of the various Hon'ble Courts were handed over to the accused No. 1, Dy.S.P. Hatia at Doranda Police Station, but she threw them away saying that she was the law and she can handle law. The said misconduct of the Dy.S.P., Hatia was informed to various forums.

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It is further alleged that the complainant who is suffering from knee problem and stays generally at home, he was informed by this staff a police team headed by Dy.S.P., Hatia were breaking open the lock put on the gate of their campus and simultaneously by using a gas cutter, were cutting off the hinge by which the gate was affixed to the ground. The complainant went there to enquire about the matter, but he was also abused by Ms. Nisha Murmu, Dy. S.P., Hatia, who got the lock to the gate broken and the lower hinge and forcibly entered into the campus of the complainant along with 10-12 police personnel including the Sub Inspectors and others, all of whom were variously armed with the automated rifles/ carbines and side arms. The complainant requested the Dy.S.P. Hatia to show him any order of the competent court of law or authorizing her to break open the lock, damage the gate and forcibly enter their campus, to which she replied that she herself was the law and had seen many people like the complainant as also the Advocate like his son and it would be in his interest that he stop back otherwise, she would get him thrash by the accompanying armed police party and thrown him in Jail. Thereafter the complainant immediately informed his son, Veer Vijay Pradhan, who along his colleagues reached the site and tried to explained the to actual position the Dy.S.P., but she just pushed them aside with the armed police party and entered the premises while all along threatening them with severe beating as also telling them that she would lock them up in the Police Station, It has been further alleged

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that several people of the area gathered and other colleagues of the Shri Veer Vijay Pradhan, namely, Shri Rajesh Kumar, Shir Abhinesh Kumar, Shri Shiv Shankar, Shri Navin Kumar, Shri P.C. Roy (Advocate), Shri P.C. Tripathy (Sr. Advocate) also reached the site along with other persons. In spite of lapse of over two hours, the Dy. S.P., Hatia, refused to wait and on being asked pointed out a gentleman who was accompanying her, stating that he was the Magistrate deputed to ensure breaking open of the lock and cutting the gate hinge and taking possession of the land in question. The said person revealed as name as Umesh Rajak, Block Statistical Supervisor, Bero/ Itki, Ranchi. He said he has been verbally deputed by the S.D.O., Sadar, Ranchi. The complainant at about 5.40 p.m. came to know about registration of Doranda P.S. None F.I.R. No. 01/2013 dated 3.12.2013 u/s 147 Cr.P.C. The Dy.S.P. left the site. However, 4-5 armed constables remained at the site. The said constables entered into the premises at about 8.00 p.m. and asked the complainant they had been ordered by accused No. 1 to inform you that it would be better for their health to follow her orders and even give her one acre from the properties in question for her residence otherwise, she would put them in the lock- up of Doranda P.S. and shoot them stating that they were trying to escape and show it as a police encounter.

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It has been further alleged that the complainant submitted his show cause to the notice dated 3.12.2013, as aforesaid.

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It has been further alleged that in a highly arbitrary manner, the Doranda Police Station and the Dy.S.P. Hatia, as also the personnel present there refused to accept the reply dated 4.12.2013. The Dy.S.P., Hatia, namely, Nisha Murmu has grossly misused the powers conferred upon her and has taken the law into her hands and has tortured, harassed, brutalized and insulted the complainant and their family members and friends in an act of police atrocities and thereby violating

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their human rights as guaranteed under Article 21 of the Constitution of India, in spite of several orders of Hon’ble Court in favour of the complainant. It has further been alleged that the complainant tried to lodge an F.I.R but the Doranda P.S. refused to register the same and therefore this complainant.

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In Cr.M.P. No.3385 of 2013, the F.I.R has been registered alleging therein that the informant who happens to be the Block Statistical Supervisor at Bero being deputed as Magistrate by the Order of the Sub Divisional Officer, Ranchi, vide his letter No.2672 dated 03.12.2013 to maintain law and order with respect to the dispute in between the petitioner no.1 and others and one Anuradha Sharma, along with police officials and force of Doranda Police Station reached at about 2.30 p.m. on 03.12.2013 near the house of Anuradha Sharma. It is stated that while Anuradha Sharma took the informant and others inside her gate and was explaining the situation, in the meantime, the petitioners and others reached there and enquired as to how the lock of their gate was broken. In response to their query, the informant said that, they have not opened the gate rather they came to maintain the law and order. It is further alleged that keeping in view the aggressive attitude of the petitioners and others and on receipt of information to that effect, the other police officials and force of Doranda Police Station reached there, but the petitioners and others compelled the informant to write in a blank paper and under compelling situation the informant written as desired by them to maintain the law and order and the informant and other police officials immediately left the place, to avoid serious law and order problem.

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Mr. R.S. Mazumdar, the learned Senior counsel appearing on behalf of the petitioners in all the three cases being Cr.M.P. No.579 of 2016, Cr.M.P. No.1008 of 2016 and Cr.M.P. No.1011 of 2016, submits that

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Mr. Amit Kumar, who is the petitioner in Cr.M.P. No.579 of 2016 was posted as S.D.O (Sadar), Ranchi at the relevant point of time. He submits that the petitioners in Cr.M.P. No.1008 of 2016 were posted as, being petitioner no.1, namely, Ms.Nisha Murmu, Deputy Superintendent of Police, Hatia, petitioner no.2, namely, Umesh Rajan, Block Statistical Supervisor, Bero, Itki, petitioner no.3, namely, Ms. Aradhana Singh, Sub Inspector of Police, Doranda Police Station and petitioner no.4, namely, Shailesh Kumar Singh, Sub Inspector of Police Doranda Police Station at the relevant point of time. He submits that all these officers were discharging the official duties and the contents of the complaint petition is with regard to the dispute of land (in-gress and out-gress) between Anuradha Sharma and Krishna Pradhan and his family members. He submits that the law and order situation was arisen and pursuant to that, the complaint was made by Anuradha Sharma and that led to the act on behalf of these officials. He further submits that Anuradha Sharma lodged the case being Doranda P.S. Case No.614 of 2013 on 02.12.2013 against Krishna Pradhan and Biren Pradhan and 30-40 unknown persons stating that her in-gress and out-gress has been blocked by these accused persons and pursuant to that on the request of officer incharge of Doranda Police Station, Mr. Amit Kumar, the then S.D.O.(Sadar), Ranchi passed the order of deputation of Magistrate, namely, Umesh Rajak who was posted as Block Statistical Supervisor at that time and that order is at Annexure-3 at page no.12 of the supplementary affidavit. He further submits that pursuant to that, the deputed magistrate as well as the Deputy Superintendent of Police and other police officials made camp at the disputed site. He submits that section 147 Cr.P.C. proceeding was initiated by Amit Kumar on 04.12.2013 and the order is contained in Annexure-5 at page no.17 of the supplementary affidavit. He submits that since in-gress and out-gress of Anuradha Sharma was blocked by

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the complainant, the deputed magistrate and the police officials have acted and got opened the lock. He further submits that said Umesh Rajak has filed the case against Pradhan family being Doranda P.S. Case No.617 of 2013 on 03.12.2013 alleging therein that Pradhans have obstructed in the official duty of the deputed officers and the allegations of abuse are also there. By way of referring paragraph no.17 and 18 of the complaint petition, he submits that apart from that, there is no allegation against Amit Kumar who at that time was posted as S.D.O. (Sadar), Ranchi. He further submits that Anuradha Sharma has lodged Doranda P.S. Case No.614 of 2013 on 02.12.2013 alleging therein that ingress and out-gress was blocked by Pradhan family and pursuant to that, the deputation was made by the S.D.O.(Sadar), Ranchi. He further referred to the supplementary affidavit and submits that there is no allegation of any overt-act against Amit Kumar. He submits that so far the petitioners in Cr.M.P. No.1008 of 2016 are concerned, they were discharging the official duty pursuant to the direction of the higher authority. He further submits that in these background, the complaint case has been lodged against these petitioners which is a malicious complaint case. He further submits that so far as petitioner Anuradha Sharma in Cr.M.P. No.1011 of 2016 is concerned, there is no allegation against her in the solemn affirmation of the complainant. He submits that since Anuradha Sharma has lodged the case, as a counter blast, the present complaint case is lodged against the government officials as well as Anuradha Sharma. In this background, he submits that the case has been maliciously lodged against the petitioners and in view of that the entire criminal proceeding may kindly be quashed. He further submits that the petitioners were discharging the official duty and Section 197 Cr.P.C is attracted and to buttress his argument, he relied in the case of Om Prakash and Others v. State of Jharkhand through the

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Secretary, Department of Home, Ranchi and Another, (2012) 12

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SCC 72 and referred to paragraph nos.32, 34 and 41 of the said judgment which are quoted below:

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“ 32. The true test as to whether a public servant was acting or purporting to act in discharge of his duties would be whether the act complained of was directly connected with his official duties or it was done in the discharge of his official duties or it was so integrally connected with or attached to his office as to be inseparable from it (K. Satwant Singh [AIR 1960 SC 266 : 1960 Cri LJ 410 : (1960) 2 SCR 89] ). The protection given under Section 197 of the Code has certain limits and is available only when the alleged act done by the public servant is reasonably connected with the discharge of his official duty and is not merely a cloak for doing the objectionable act. If in doing his official duty, he acted in excess of his duty, but there is a reasonable connection between the act and the performance of the official duty, the excess will not be a sufficient ground to deprive the public servant of the protection (Ganesh Chandra Jew [(2004) 8 SCC 40 : 2004 SCC (Cri) 2104] ). If the above tests are applied to the facts of the present case, the police must get protection given under Section 197 of the Code because the acts complained of are so integrally connected with or attached to their office as to be inseparable from it. It is not possible for us to come to a conclusion that the protection granted under Section 197 of the Code is used by the police personnel in this case as a cloak for killing the deceased in cold blood.

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34. In Matajog Dobey [AIR 1956 SC 44 : 1956 Cri LJ 140 : (1955) 2 SCR 925] the Constitution Bench of this Court was considering what is the scope and meaning of a somewhat similar expression “any offence alleged to have been committed by him while acting or purporting to act in the discharge of his official duty” occurring in Section 197 of the Criminal Procedure Code (5 of 1898). The Constitution Bench observed that no question of sanction can arise under Section 197 unless the act complained of is an offence; the only point to determine is whether it was committed in the discharge of official duty. On the question as to which act falls within the ambit of abovequoted expression, the Constitution Bench concluded that there must be a reasonable connection between the act and the discharge of official duty; the act must bear such relation to the duty that the accused could lay a reasonable, but not a pretended or fanciful claim that he did it in the course of performance of his duty. While dealing with the question whether the need for sanction has to be considered as soon as the complaint is

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lodged and on the allegations contained therein, the Constitution Bench referred to Hori Ram Singh [AIR 1939 FC 43 : (1939) 1 FCR 159] and observed that at first sight, it seems as though there is some support for this view in Hori Ram Singh [AIR 1939 FC 43 : (1939) 1 FCR 159] because Sulaiman, J. has observed in the said judgment that as the prohibition is against the institution itself, its applicability must be judged in the first instance at the earliest stage of institution and Varadachariar, J. has also stated that: (Matajog Dobey case [AIR 1956 SC 44 : 1956 Cri LJ 140 : (1955) 2 SCR 925] , AIR p. 49, para 20)

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“20. … the question must be determined with reference to the nature of the allegations made against the public servant in the criminal proceedings.”

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It is pertinent to note that the Constitution Bench has further observed that a careful perusal of the later parts of the judgment however show that the learned Judges did not intend to lay down any such proposition. The Constitution Bench quoted the said later parts of the judgment as under: (Matajog Dobey case [AIR 1956 SC 44 : 1956 Cri LJ 140 : (1955) 2 SCR 925] , AIR pp. 4950, para 20)

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“20. … Sulaiman, J. refers to the prosecution case as disclosed by the complaint or the ‘police report’ and he winds up the discussion in these words: (Hori Ram Singh case [AIR 1939 FC 43 : (1939) 1 FCR 159] , AIR p. 52 : FCR p. 179)

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‘… Of course, if the case as put forward fails, or the defence establishes that the act purported to be done [is] in execution of duty, the proceedings will have to be dropped and the complaint dismissed on that ground.’

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The other learned Judge also states: (Hori Ram Singh case [AIR 1939 FC 43 : (1939) 1 FCR 159] , AIR p. 55 : FCR p. 185)

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‘… At this stage, we have only to see whether the case alleged against the appellant or sought to be proved against him relates to acts done or purporting to be done by him in the execution of his duty.’

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It must be so. The question may arise at any stage of the proceedings. The complaint may not disclose that the act constituting the offence was done or purported to be done in the discharge of official duty; but facts subsequently coming to light on a police or judicial inquiry or even in the course of the prosecution evidence at the trial, may establish the necessity for sanction.

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Whether sanction is necessary or not may have to be determined from stage to stage. The necessity may reveal itself in the course of the progress of the case.” The legal position is thus settled by the Constitution Bench in the above paragraph. Whether sanction is

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necessary or not may have to be determined from stage to stage. If, at the outset, the defence establishes that the act purported to be done is in execution of official duty, the complaint will have to be dismissed on that ground.”

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41. The upshot of this discussion is that whether sanction is necessary or not has to be decided from stage to stage. This question may arise at any stage of the proceeding. In a given case, it may arise at the inception. There may be unassailable and unimpeachable circumstances on record which may establish at the outset that the police officer or public servant was acting in performance of his official duty and is entitled to protection given under Section 197 of the Code. It is not possible for us to hold that in such a case, the court cannot look into any documents produced by the accused or the public servant concerned at the inception. The nature of the complaint may have to be kept in mind. It must be remembered that previous sanction is a precondition for taking cognizance of the offence and, therefore, there is no requirement that the accused must wait till the charges are framed to raise this plea. At this point, in order to exclude the possibility of any misunderstanding, we make it clear that the legal discussion on the requirement of sanction at the very threshold is based on the finding in the earlier part of the judgment that the present is not a case where the police may be held guilty of killing Munna Singh in cold blood in a fake encounter. In a case where on facts it may appear to the court that a person was killed by the police in a stage-managed encounter, the position may be completely different.”

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Relying on the above judgment, he submits that law and

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order situation is there and in view of that, the authorities have acted bonafidely and in view of that, this judgment is applicable so far the petitioner namely, Amit Kumar and other petitioners in Cr.M.P. No.1008 of 2016 are concerned. On the same point, he further relied in the case of Surinderjit Singh Mand and Another v. State of Punjab and Another, (2016) 8 SCC 722 , and referred to paragraph nos.30 and 31 of the said judgment, which are quoted below:

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“ 30. The law declared by this Court emerging from the

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judgments referred to hereinabove, leaves no room for any doubt that under Section 197 of the Code and/or sanction mandated under a special statute (as postulated under Section 19 of the Prevention of Corruption Act) would be a

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necessary prerequisite before a court of competent jurisdiction takes cognizance of an offence (whether under the Penal Code, or under the special statutory enactment concerned). The procedure for obtaining sanction would be governed by the provisions of the Code and/or as mandated under the special enactment. The words engaged in Section 197 of the Code are,

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“… no court shall take cognizance of such offence except with previous sanction…”.

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Likewise sub-section (1) of Section 19 of the Prevention of Corruption Act provides—

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“ 19. Previous sanction necessary for prosecution .—(1) No court shall take cognizance … except with the previous sanction ….”

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The mandate is clear and unambiguous that a court “shall not” take cognizance without sanction. The same needs no further elaboration. Therefore, a court just cannot take cognizance without sanction by the appropriate authority. Thus viewed, we find no merit in the second contention advanced at the hands of the learned counsel for the respondents that where cognizance is taken under Section 319 of the Code, sanction either under Section 197 of the Code (or under the special enactment concerned) is not a mandatory prerequisite.

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31. According to the learned counsel representing Respondent 2, the position concluded above would give the impression that the determination rendered by a court under Section 319 of the Code is subservient to the decision of the competent authority under Section 197. No, not at all. The grant of sanction under Section 197 can be assailed by the accused by taking recourse to judicial review. Likewise, the order declining sanction can similarly be assailed by the complainant or the prosecution.”

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Relying on the above judgments, he submits that if such a

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situation is there, as referred in his argument, section 197 Cr.P.C is attracted. On the same point, he further relied in the case of Amal

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Kumar Jha v. State of Chhatisgarh and Another, (2016) 6 SCC

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734 and referred to paragraph nos.14 of the said judgment which is quoted below:

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“ 14. In view of the aforesaid discussion, it is clear that the omission complained of, due to which offence is stated to have been committed, was intrinsically connected with discharge of official duty of the appellant, as such the protection under Section 197 CrPC from prosecution without

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sanction of the competent authority, is available to the appellant. Thus, he could not have been prosecuted without sanction. It would be for the competent authority to consider the question of grant of sanction in accordance with law. In case sanction is granted only then the appellant can be prosecuted and not otherwise. Resultantly, the impugned orders are set aside, the appeal is allowed.”

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Relying on the above, he submits that if the acts disclosed is

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in the nature of discharge of official duty, section 197 Cr.P.C is attracted and in view of that this judgment is applicable so far the petitioners, who are government officials, are concerned. On the same point, he further

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relied in the case of A. Srinivasulu v. State Reb. By Inspector of Police, 2023 SCC OnLine SC 900 . Paragraph nos.47 to 53 of the said judgment are quoted below:

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“ 47. For the purpose of finding out whether A-1 acted or purported to act in the discharge of his official duty, it is enough for us to see whether he could take cover, rightly or wrongly, under any existing policy. Paragraph 4.2.1 of the existing policy extracted above shows that A-1 at least had an arguable case, in defence of the decision he took to go in for Restricted Tender. Once this is clear, his act, even if alleged to be lacking in bona fides or in pursuance of a conspiracy, would be an act in the discharge of his official duty, making the case come within the parameters of Section 197(1) of the Code. Therefore, the prosecution ought to have obtained previous sanction. The Special Court as well as the High Court did not apply their mind to this aspect.

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48. Shri Padmesh Mishra, learned counsel for the respondent placed strong reliance upon the observation contained in paragraph 50 of the decision of this Court in Parkash Singh Badal v. State of Punjab¹⁰ . It reads as follows:—

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“50. The offence of cheating under Section 420 or for that matter offences relatable to Sections 467, 468, 471 and 120-B can by no stretch of imagination by their very nature be regarded as having been committed by any public servant while acting or purporting to act in discharge of official duty. In such cases, official status only provides an opportunity for commission of the offence.”

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49. On the basis of the above observation, it was contended by the learned counsel for the respondent

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that any act done by a public servant, which constitutes an offence of cheating, cannot be taken to have been committed while acting or purporting to act in the discharge of official duty.

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50. But the above contention in our opinion is farfetched. The observations contained in paragraph 50 of the decision in Parkash Singh Badal (supra) are too general in nature and cannot be regarded as the ratio flowing out of the said case. If by their very nature, the offences under sections 420, 468, 471 and 120B cannot be regarded as having been committed by a public servant while acting or purporting to act in the discharge of official duty, the same logic would apply with much more vigour in the case of offences under the PC Act. Section 197 of the Code does not carve out any group of offences that will fall outside its purview. Therefore, the observations contained in para 50 of the decision in Parkash Singh Badal cannot be taken as carving out an exception judicially, to a statutory prescription. In fact, Parkash Singh Badal cites with approval the other decisions (authored by the very same learned Judge) where this Court made a distinction between an act, though in excess of the duty, was reasonably connected with the discharge of official duty and an act which was merely a cloak for doing the objectionable act. Interestingly, the proposition laid down in Rakesh Kumar Mishra (supra) was distinguished in paragraph 49 of the decision in Parkash Singh Badal, before the Court made the observations in paragraph 50 extracted above.

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51. No public servant is appointed with a mandate or authority to commit an offence. Therefore, if the observations contained in paragraph 50 of the decision in Parkash Singh Badal are applied, any act which constitutes an offence under any statute will go out of the purview of an act in the discharge of official duty. The requirement of a previous sanction will thus be rendered redundant by such an interpretation.

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52. It must be remembered that in this particular case, the FIR actually implicated only four persons, namely PW-16, A-3, A-4 an A-5. A-1 was not implicated in the FIR. It was only after a confession statement was made by PW-16 in the year 1998 that A-1 was roped in. The allegations against A-1 were that he got into a criminal conspiracy with the others to commit these offences. But the Management of BHEL refused to grant sanction for prosecuting A-3 and A-4, twice, on the ground that the decisions taken were in the realm of commercial wisdom of the Company. If according to the Management of the Company, the very same act of the co-conspirators fell in the realm of

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¶93

commercial wisdom, it is inconceivable that the act of A-1, as part of the criminal conspiracy, fell outside the discharge of his public duty, so as to disentitle him for protection under Section 197(1) of the Code .

¶94

53. In view of the above, we uphold the contention advanced on behalf of A-1 that the prosecution ought to have taken previous sanction in terms of Section 197(1) of the Code, for prosecuting A-1, for the offences under the IPC.”

¶95

Relying on the above judgment, he submits that even prior sanction is required even for the act done in excess of discharge of official duty. In view of that, he submits that the entire criminal proceeding is bad so far the government officials are concerned in the present case. On the same point, he further relied in the case of Abdul

¶96

Wahab Ansari v. State of Bihar and Another, (2008) 8 SCC 500

¶97

and referred to paragraph nos.5 and 9 of the said judgment, which are quoted below:

¶98

“ 5. In view of the rival submissions at the Bar, two questions arise for our consideration:

¶99

1. Assuming the provisions of Section 197 of the Code of Criminal Procedure applies, at what stage the accused can take such plea? Is it immediately after the cognizance is taken and process is issued or is it only when the court reaches the stage of framing of charge as held by this Court in Birendra K. Singh case [(2000) 8 SCC 498 : JT (2000) 8 SC 248] ?

¶100

2. Whether in the facts and circumstances of the present case, is it possible for the Court to come to a conclusion that the appellant was discharging his official duty and in course of such discharge of duty, ordered for opening of fire to control the mob in consequence of which a person died and two persons were injured and in which event, the provisions of Section 197 of the Code of Criminal Procedure can be held to be attracted?

¶101

9. Coming to the second question, it is now well settled by the Constitution Bench decision of this Court in Matajog Dobey v. H.C. Bhari [AIR 1956 SC 44 : (1955) 2 SCR 925] that in the matter of grant of sanction under Section 197 of the Code of Criminal Procedure the offence alleged to have been committed by the accused must have something to do, or must be related in some manner, with the discharge of official duty. In other words, there must be a reasonable

¶102

¶103

connection between the act and the discharge of official duty; the act must bear such relation to the duty that the accused could lay a reasonable claim, but not a pretended or fanciful claim, that he did it in the course of the performance of his duty. In the said case it had been further held that where a power is conferred or a duty imposed by statute or otherwise, and there is nothing said expressly inhibiting the exercise of the power or the performance of the duty by any limitations or restrictions, it is reasonable to hold that it carries with it the power of doing all such acts or employing such means as are reasonably necessary for such execution, because it is a rule that when the law commands a thing to be done, it authorises the performance of whatever may be necessary for executing its command. This decision was followed by this Court in Suresh Kumar Bhikamchand Jain case [(1998) 1 SCC 205 : 1998 SCC (Cri) 1] and in a recent judgment of this Court in the case of Gauri Shankar Prasad v. State of Bihar [(2000) 5 SCC 15 : 2000 SCC (Cri) 872] . The aforesaid case has full force even to the facts of the present case inasmuch as in the said case, the Court had observed: (SCC p. 21, para 14)

¶104

“[I]t is manifest that the appellant was present at the place of occurrence in his official capacity as Sub-Divisional Magistrate for the purpose of removal of encroachment from government land and in exercise of such duty, he is alleged to have committed the acts which form the gravamen of the allegations contained in the complaint lodged by the respondent. In such circumstances, it cannot but be held that the acts complained of by the respondent against the appellant have a reasonable nexus with the official duty of the appellant. It follows, therefore, that the appellant is entitled to the immunity from criminal proceedings without sanction provided under Section 197 CrPC.”

¶105

It is not necessary for us to multiply authorities on this point and bearing in mind the ratio of the aforesaid cases and applying the same to the facts of the present case as indicated in the complaint itself, we have no hesitation to come to the conclusion that the appellant had been directed by the Sub-Divisional Magistrate to be present with police force and remove the encroachment in question and in course of discharge of his duty to control the mob, when he had directed for opening of fire, it must be held that the order of opening of fire was in exercise of the power conferred upon him and the duty imposed upon him under the orders of the Magistrate and in that view of the matter the provisions of Section 197(1) applies to the facts of the present case. Admittedly, there being no sanction, the cognizance taken by the Magistrate is bad in law and unless the same is quashed qua the appellant, it will be an abuse of the process of Court. Accordingly, we allow this appeal and

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quash the criminal proceeding, so far as the appellant is concerned.”

¶108

He submits that identical was the situation in the present case whereby removal of encroachment order was there and pursuant to that the case is arisen and the Hon’ble Supreme Court interfered and in present case identical is the situation so far government official in the present dispute is concerned. He further submits that the complaint case is filed against the government officials and if such situation is there, it is malicious as held in the case of Anjani Kumar v. State of Bihar and Another, (2008) 5 SCC 248 . Paragraph no.12 and 14 of the said judgment are quoted below:

¶109

“ 12. As the factual scenario goes to show the complaint filed on 4-2-1993 appears to be a counterblast by Respondent 2 for the action taken by the appellant against him.

¶110

14. When the factual background as noted above is considered on the touchstone of legal principles set out above the inevitable conclusion is that certainly mala fides were involved apart from the applicability of Section 197 of the Code. It is no doubt true that at the threshold interference by exercise of Section 482 of the Code has to be in rare cases. The present case appears to be of that nature and falls under Category (7) indicated in State of Haryana v. Bhajan Lal [1992 Supp (1) SCC 335 : 1992 SCC (Cri) 426] . The continuance of the proceedings by the prosecution would amount to abuse of the process of law. The criminal proceedings in the Court of the learned Chief Judicial Magistrate, Begusarai in PS Case No. 63 of 1993 are quashed. The appeal is allowed.”

¶111

Relying on the above judgments and these facts, he submits

¶112

that the entire criminal proceeding so far as the petitioners in Cr.M.P. No.579 of 2016, Cr.M.P. No.1008 of 2016 and Cr.M.P. No.1011 of 2016 are concerned, may kindly be quashed.

¶113

Per contra, Mr. Sumeet Gadodia, the learned counsel appearing on behalf of the O.P.No.2 in all these three cases, submits that Anuradha Sharma was having in-gress and out-gress on the other side of the disputed land and she was not using the said land and forcibly she

¶114

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has opened the gate in the premises of Pradhans and in view of that, the dispute was there. He submits that the plot in question is in possession of Pradhans and the dispute of that has gone up to Hon’ble Supreme Court and in view of that, action on behalf of the officials on the complaint of Anuradha Sharma was not within the purview of official duty and in view of that, rightly the complaint case is filed. He further submits that Umesh Rajak has filed the counter affidavit in Cr.M.P. No.3385 of 2013 and subsequently, he has filed one I.A. before this Court praying therein to ignore the said counter affidavit and to accept the said I.A as a counter affidavit. He submits that the said prayer was allowed by the coordinate Bench of this Court by order dated 02.08.2016. He submits that in these background, when the order taking cognizance is already there, the complaint may not be quashed. He further submits that maliciously in this background, the case is registered against Krishna Pradhan, Ran Vijay Pradhan, Digvijay Pradhan, Ravindra Pradhan and Mahavir Pradhan by Umesh Rajak being Doranda P.S. Case No.617 of 2013 dated 03.12.2013. He submits that maliciously the present F.I.R is lodged against Pradhan family and the entire criminal proceeding may kingly be quashed. He submits that in this background, the plot in question is in possession of Pradhans and there was no occasion to the police officials to act forcibly. He submits that there is no order of demolition, however, the said act is taken place on the verbal direction of Amit Kumar who is the then S.D.O.(Sadar), Ranchi. He submits that the direction was not there and such act of the government officials are not coming within the nature of official duty. By way of referring to page 127, he submits that Umesh Rajak has stated that on the oral instruction of the S.D.O.(Sadar), Ranchi he has acted. He further refers to the I.A. filed by Umesh Rajak and submits that in the I.A. he has stated that there was no aggression on the part of Pradhans. On these ground, he submits that the entire criminal

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¶117

proceeding may kindly be quashed. He submits that there are line of judgments of Hon’ble Supreme Court as well as by this Court and whereby the malicious prosecution has proved, the Courts have interfered. Lastly, he relied in the case of Mahmood Ali and Others v. State of Uttar Pradesh and Others, 2023 SCC OnLine SC 950 and upon relying on this judgment, he submits that if such act is there, the Court is required to read the things in between the lines and the Court can interfere. He further submits that this Court has also interfered in the case of Ram Shankar Singh v. State of Jharkhand and Deo Narayan Ranju @ D.N. Ranju [Cr.M.P. No.702 of 2011 with Cr.M.P. No.918 of 2011] by order dated 06.12.2023 and in the case of Dr. Om Prakash Anand v. The State of Jharkhand and Another [Cr. M.P. No.1914 of 2021] by order dated 20.07.2022. On these grounds, he submits that the case filed by the government official may kindly be dismissed and the F.I.R filed by Umesh Rajak may kindly be quashed.

¶118

Mr. Sahil, the learned counsel appearing on behalf of O.P.No.2, namely, Umesh Rajak in Cr.M.P. No.3385 of 2013 submits that initially he has filed the counter affidavit and found that certain fact is not correct and in view of that the I.A. has been filed which was accepted by the coordinate Bench of this Court by order dated 02.08.2016. He submits that on verbal order he has acted, however, filing of F.I.R being Doranda P.S. Case No.617 of 2013 he is not disputing.

¶119

The learned counsels appearing on behalf of the respondent State submits that the petitioners in three cases were discharging official duty and in view of that, maliciously the present cases has been filed against these petitioners after lodging of the F.I.R. by Anuradha Sharma being Doranda P.S. Case No.614 of 2013. They jointly submit that it was

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¶121

in the discharge of official duty and maliciously the present cases have been filed against the government officials. They submits that Umesh Rajak case is still being investigated and only FIR is under challenge in Cr.M.P. No.3385 of 2013. They submit that there are parameters of quashing and no case of interference is made out and accordingly, Cr.M.P. No.3385 of 2013 as also all the three cases may kindly be dismissed.

¶122

In view of above submission of learned counsel for the parties, the Court has gone through the documents of all these three Cr.M.Ps. minutely including the contents of the concerned F.I.Rs which are the subject matter of these Cr.M.Ps. Admittedly, it appears that there is dispute with regard to in-gress and out-gress with Anuradha Sharma and Pradhans and for that the case has been registered by Anuradha Sharma being Doranda P.S. Case No.614 of 2013. On the report of the Sub- Inspector of Doranda police station Mr. Amit Kumar, who was the then S.D.O.(Sadar) Ranchi acted and deputed Umesh Rajak who was Block Statistical Supervisor as Magistrate to maintain the law and order and pursuant to that, Mr. Rajak, along with other officers were camping in the disputed site. Proceeding under section 147 Cr.P.C has also been initiated by Mr. Amit Kumar the then S.D.O.(Sadar), Ranchi by order dated 04.12.2013. Mr. Umesh Rajak has filed Doranda P.S. Case No.617 of 2013 on 03.12.2013 stating therein that Pradhans have made aggression and they have interfered with the official duty of the officers and that case is still being investigated by the police. In the solemn affirmation there is no averment against Mr. Amit Kumar except of verbal instruction by said Amit Kumar. In the solemn affirmation there is further no allegation so far Anuradha Sharma is concerned. Thus, it appears that for maintaining law and order situation Mr. Amit Kumar has acted upon and pursuant to that, he has deputed Mr. Rajak as Magistrate and said

¶123

¶124

Rajak has filed the F.I.R being Doranda P.S. Case No.617 of 2013 stating that Pradhans have made aggression on the site and they have interfered with the official duty of the officers. The government official being Mr. Rajak has all of sudden taken U-turn by way of filing an affidavit that on the oral instruction of Mr. Amit Kumar, he has acted, is a matter of concern. When he himself has filed the FIR being Doranda P.S. Case No.617 of 2013 the filing of the counter affidavit and later on filing the I.A. for treating that counter affidavit as erroneous and to treat the I.A. has further raised the eye-brow and these all are the subject matter of investigation. If a law and order situation is arisen, it is within the domain of the district authority to swiftly act to prevent any untoward incident and what has been discussed hereinabove and the documents on record suggest that if such a situation was there and in view of that the government officials have acted and if it was the official duty, section 197 Cr.P.C. is certainly attracted against the government officials and in view of that, the judgment relied by Mr. Mazumdar, the learned Senior counsel in Cr.M.P. No.579 of 2016, Cr.M.P. No.1008 of 2016 and Cr.M.P. No.1011 of 2016 (supra) are in favour of the government officials who are the petitioners in said three Cr.M.Ps. It has been pointed out in course of argument that in Doranda P.S. Case No.617 of 2013 the charge sheet has already been submitted by the police and the learned court has already taken cognizance and it is running for appearance. In Cr.M.P.No.3385 of 2013 only the F.I.R is under challenge. No I.A. has been filed for challenging the further development and what are the materials in the charge sheet is not before the Court which can only be the subject matter of trial. Thus, no case of interference is made out so far as Cr.M.P.No.3385 of 2013 is concerned as the charge sheet is already there and even accepting the argument with regard to Mr. Rajak, the affidavit and withdrawal of the counter affidavit and the I.A, no case of

¶125

¶126

interference is made out as the charge sheet is already there. So far as the said three cases are concerned what has been discussed hereinabove, the Court comes to the definite conclusion that these petitioners, except Anuradha Sharma in Cr.M.P. No.579 of 2016, Cr.M.P. No.1008 of 2016 and Cr.M.P. No.1011 of 2016 were discharging the official duty. In view of these facts, the cases relied by Mr. Gadodia, the learned counsel appearing on behalf of the petitioner in Cr.M.P.No.3385 of 2013 and also appearing on behalf of the Opposite Party no.2 in said three cases i.e. Cr.M.P. No.579 of 2016, Cr.M.P. No.1008 of 2016 and Cr.M.P. No.1011 of 2016, are not helping the petitioner in Cr.M.P.No.3385 of 2013. There is allegation of aggression by Pradhans and interfering in the official duty and the charge sheet is already there and in view of that, even the Court is trying to read the things in between the lines, is not finding the case of interference and in view of that, the judgment relied by Mr. Gadodia, the learned counsel for the petitioners in Cr.M.P.No.3385 of 2013 in Mahmood Ali and Others v. State of Uttar

¶127

Pradesh and Others (supra) is not helping the petitioners in Cr.M.P.No.3385 of 2013. The other cases relied by Mr. Gadodia, the learned counsel appearing for the petitioners in Cr.M.P.No.3385 of 2013 where the facts are different and in view of that, the Court has interfered in those judgments which are also not helping the petitioners in Cr.M.P.No.3385 of 2013. The law is well settled regarding interference by the High Court with the investigation of a case. The extraordinary power under Article 226 of the Constitution of India or inherent power under section 482 Cr.P.C cannot be exercised by the High Court either to prevent the abuse of process of any court or otherwise to secure the ends of justice. The power of quashing a criminal proceeding can be exercised sparingly and with circumspection and that too in the rarest of the rare case. Thus, the specific allegations were made in the F.I.R and

¶128

¶129

prima facie case is made out against the accused persons, the High Court is restricted to pass such order of quashing and there are lines of judgment on these points and the reference of certain judgments will suffice; in the case of State of Bihar and Another v. Md. Khalique and Another, (2002) 1 SCC 652 ; in the case of Som Mittal v. Government of Karnataka, (2008) 3 SCC 753 and further in the case of Hareram Satpathy v. Tikaram Agarwala and Others, (1978) 4 SCC 58 . It is necessary to protect the public servants in discharge of their official duties. In the facts and circumstances of the each case, protection of public servants functioning in discharge of their official duties and protection of private citizens have to be balanced by finding out as to what extent and how far is a public servant working in discharge of his duties or purported discharge of his duties, and whether the public servant has exceeded his limit. What has been narrated hereinabove, it is a crystal case of discharging the official duty on behalf of the public servant. It is the quality of the act which is important and protection by these sections is available if the act falls within the range of official duty. There cannot be universal rule to determine whether there is reasonable connection between the act done and official duty nor is possible to lay down any such rule. Admittedly, the government officers have acted pursuant to the complaint made by Anuradha Sharma and other orders on record. Section 147 Cr.P.C. further suggest that in view of law and order situation they have acted. In the counter affidavit filed by Mr. Rajak which was ignored by the order of this Court, he has stated that he has received Memo No.2672 dated 03.12.2013, however in the affidavit he has turned down the said statement, which suggest that he was being guided by the Pradhans.

¶130

In view of above facts and reasons, the Court finds that the complaint case is maliciously lodged which are the subject matter in

¶131

¶132

Cr.M.P. No.579 of 2016, Cr.M.P. No.1008 of 2016 and Cr.M.P. No.1011 of 2016 as a consequence of the F.I.R being filed against Anuradha Sharma and even the government officials have not been spared by Pradhans. The rule of law is prime concern to maintain a self-behaved society and prima facie it appears that Pradhans have acceeded and false complaint case being C.P.Case No.C-2954 of 2013 is filed which are subject matter in Cr.M.P. No.579 of 2016, Cr.M.P. No.1008 of 2016 and Cr.M.P. No.1011 of 2016.

¶133

Accordingly, the prayer made in the Cr.M.P. No.579 of 2016, Cr.M.P. No.1008 of 2016 and Cr.M.P. No.1011 of 2016 are allowed, and the entire criminal proceeding as well as the order dated 09.10.2015 in connection with C.P.Case No.C-2954 of 2013, pending in the court of learned Sub Divisional Judicial Magistrate, Ranchi are quashed.

¶134

Cr.M.P. No.579 of 2016, Cr.M.P. No.1008 of 2016 and Cr.M.P. No.1011 of 2016 are allowed in above terms and disposed of.

¶135

So far as Cr.M.P.No.3385 of 2013 is concerned, for the reasons disclosed hereinabove, the Court finds that no case of interference is made out.

¶136

Accordingly, Cr.M.P.No.3385 of 2013 is dismissed. The learned court will proceed in accordance with law.

¶137

Pending petition if any also stands disposed of accordingly. 24. Interim order passed in respective cases stand vacated. 25. The case record may be returned back to the learned court concerned forthwith.

¶138

( Sanjay Kumar Dwivedi, J.)

¶139

SI/ A.F.R,

Anuradh Sharma Alias Aradhna Sharma And Ors. v. The State Of Jharkhand And Anr.

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Anuradh Sharma Alias Aradhna Sharma And Ors. v. The State Of Jharkhand And Anr.

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