Dismissed

Nitesh Kumar Singh v. the State of Jharkhand through the Secretary Rural Development Department

Jharkhand HC17 Jul 2023WPC/4665/2018

Case brief

AI extract

What is this about?

A writ petition seeking mandatory direction for payment of admitted dues and completion of a road construction contract was dismissed. The Court held that the claim was not an 'admitted debt' as respondent letters were internal guidance solicitations without specific admission. Disputed factual issues regarding alignment and completion barred writ jurisdiction.

What did the court decide?

Petitioner directed to approach Civil Court for reliefs claimed.

Nitesh Kumar Singh Vs the State of… — Contract and Commercial Disputes | Jharkhand HC (2023)

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IN THE HIGH COURT OF JHARKHAND AT RANCHI W.P.(C) No. 4665 of 2018

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Nitesh Kumar Singh son of late Anil Kumar, resident of Village Kalyanpur, PO PS and District Jamui.

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… Petitioner

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Versus

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The State of Jharkhand through the Secretary, Rural Development Department, Government of Jharkhand, having its Office at Project Building, Dhurwa, Ranchi.

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Jharkhand State Rural Road Development Authority, Government of Jharkhand Undertaking, through its Chief Executive Officer, having its Office at Third Floor, FFP Building, Dhurwa, Ranchi.

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Chief Engineer, Jharkhand State Rural Development Authority, having Office at Third Floor, FFP Building, Dhurwa, Ranchi.

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The Executive Engineer, Rural Development Department (Rural Work Affairs), Work Division Deoghar.

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The Assistant Engineer, Rural Development Department (Rural Work Affair) Work Division Deoghar.

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… Respondents

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CORAM : SRI SANJAYA KUMAR MISHRA, C.J. SRI ANANDA SEN, J.

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For the Petitioner: Mr. Rupesh Singh, Advocate Mr. Jagdeesh, Advocate For the Respondents: Mr. Mithilesh Singh, SC

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7/ 17.07.2023 Upon hearing the learned counsel for the parties, this Court passed the following, (Per Ananda Sen, J.)

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O R D E R

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1. This writ petition by the petitioner is under Article 226 of the Constitution of India, praying for mandamus commanding upon the respondents to release the admitted dues payable to the petitioner in relation to NIT bearing Re-e-Tender No.20/2014 dated 13.08.2014 for construction of Dumargardi to Garo Road in the District of Deoghar. Further, a prayer has also been made to direct the respondents to permit the petitioner to complete the work as per the detailed project report prepared by the consultant.

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CASE OF THE PETITIONER

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2. The petitioner is a civil contractor. A road, under the Rural Road Project in the State of Jharkhand was to be laid/constructed. One of such contract was Dumargardi-Garo Road in the District of Deoghar, having a length of 1.6 k.m. at an estimated cost of Rs.76.18 lakh and the cost of maintenance for five years tuned at Rs.5.52 lakh. A notice inviting tender was

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issued being Re-e-Tender No.20/2014 on 13.08.2014, wherein, on amongst others the road from Dumargardi to Garo under Package No. JH03SIPL01 was to be constructed. The petitioner participated in the tendering process and was declared successful. Being the successful L-1 bidder, an agreement was executed on 12.02.2015 between the State and the petitioner for construction of the aforesaid road. The petitioner started making the construction, but, all of a sudden, vide letter No.1493 dated 18.09.2015, petitioner was stopped from executing the work. Petitioner stopped further construction pursuant to the aforesaid direction. The Executive Engineer, vide letter No. 9944 dated 19.09.2015 requested the Chief Engineer, JSRRDA to give permission in respect of construction of the road and sought permission to release payment to the extent of the work executed by the petitioner. Reminders, thereafter, were sent, but in vain. The Chief Engineer informed that the road, which was under construction, does not extend any benefit to the residents of Village Garo as the population of the said village is only 395 and the cut off population for construction of roads being 500, there is no justification of the construction of the said road, thus, directed the Executive Engineer to identify the erring Officers and take appropriate action against them. Considering the aforesaid fact, it is the case of the petitioner that several letters were written by the Executive Engineer to the higher authorities, seeking instructions in respect of making payment to the petitioner, for the work to the extent which has been done by him, but as the same has not been paid till date, the instant writ petition was filed, claiming payment for the work, which has already been done by the petitioner and also praying to direct the respondents to allow the petitioner to construct the remaining portion of the road, which is yet to be construction.

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3. After the writ petition was filed, the respondents were directed to file counter affidavit. The respondents filed their counter affidavit, which was duly sworn by the present Executive Engineer, RDD (RWA) Work Division, Deoghar.

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CASE OF THE RESPONDENTS

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4. In the Counter Affidavit, the State has admitted the fact of floating a tender for construction and maintenance of road from Dumargardi to Garo under the PMGSY package in the District of Deoghar. The Project Report was prepared by one Shanvi Infrastructure Private Ltd., Noida, Uttar Pradesh, who was engaged by the Chief Engineer, JSRRDA, Ranchi. It is also admitted that

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the petitioner participated in the tender and the work was awarded to the petitioner. Work order was issued in favour of the petitioner, but the Executive Engineer, respondent No.4, found that the petitioner had started the work in a different alignment in PWD Road to Garo. Due to the above fact, the respondent No.4 asked the petitioner to stop all works. The respondent No.4 sought clarification from the higher officers. Guidance on several points were sought for. Ultimately vide letter No.1839 dated 7^th October, 2016, direction was given to execute the work from TO3 to Dumargardi Road. Respondents gave similar instructions to the petitioner, but despite the said instructions, petitioner did not resume the work. It is the specific case of the respondents that the petitioner was asked to stop the work as his alignment was not correct. Nowhere in the Counter Affidavit any monetary dues were admitted. SUBMISSIONS OF THE PETITIONER

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5. Learned counsel appearing for the petitioner submitted that the fact that the agreement was entered into by and between the petitioner and the respondents for construction of the road is admitted and so it has been admitted that the petitioner has constructed part of the road, but, due to inaction of the respondents and upon their direction the construction had to be stopped. The difficulty, which has been faced by the petitioner in respect of alignment of the road is generated from the end of the respondents and not from the side of the petitioner, thus, the petitioner is entitled to receive the dues for the work to the extent, which he has completed. He further submits that since the work remained incomplete, respondents be directed to allow the petitioner to complete the work. As per the petitioner, since all the facts are admitted and there is no disputed or complicated question of facts involved, this Court can give a direction to the respondents to release the admitted dues in favour of the petitioner. In course of argument, the petitioner confined his prayer only to the extent of release of monetary dues, which according to him is admitted by the respondents. Learned counsel for the petitioner submits that when the respondents have themselves, vide letter, requested the higher officers, seeking a direction in respect of release of the amount, which the petitioner is entitled to, the respondents are now estopped from questioning the entitlement of the petitioner. As per him, the dues are, thus, “admitted” and the doctrine of promissory estoppel is applicable in this case. He further submits that the Court can mold the relief and when there is a legal right of this petitioner and a corresponding legal duty on the part of the respondents, a writ

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petition, even in contractual matter is maintainable. He relies upon the following judgments of the Hon’ble Supreme Court:-

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(i) Manuelsons Hotels (P) Ltd. v. State of Kerala [(2016)

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6 SCC 766]

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(ii) Food Corpn. of India v. S.N. Nagarkar [(2002) 2 SCC 475]

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(iii) Hindalco Industries Ltd. v. Union of India [(1994) 2 SCC 594]

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(iv) Central Bank of India v. Devi Ispat Ltd. [(2010) 11 SCC 186]

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(v) Haryana Financial Corpn. V. Jagdamba Oil Mills [(2002) 3 SCC 496]

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ARGUMENTS OF THE RESPONDENTS

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6. Learned counsel appearing for the respondents argues that though it is admitted that the petitioner being L-1 was awarded the work, but he did not construct the road as per the alignment. He refers to paragraph 11 of the counter affidavit, wherein it has been mentioned that the respondent No.4 found that the petitioner had started the work in a different alignment under PWD Road to Garo. Due to the aforesaid action, the respondents asked the petitioner to stop all works and he was communicated the aforesaid decision along with sketch line in the manner in which the work was actually supposed to be executed. Further, inspite of instructions of the respondents No.2 to respondent No.4, to execute the work in TO3 to Dumargardi Road, vide letter dated 7^th October, 2016, which was communicated to the petitioner vide letter No.1839 dated 26.10.2016, the petitioner did not resume the work. It is his contention that there are serious disputed question of facts about the alignment of the road and as inspite of direction, petitioner did not resume the work, thus, the writ petition, seeking money claim, which is not admitted, is not maintainable. He further submits that from the pleadings of the petitioner, it is clear that the construction of the road was stopped in the year 2015 itself and thereafter the petitioner has not made any construction.

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ANALYSIS AND FINDING

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7. In the writ petition under Article 226 of the Constitution of India, petitioner has made two fold prayer: first fold , to release the monetary dues for the part of the work which the petitioner has already completed and the second fold to direct the respondents to allow the petitioner to complete the

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remaining construction. Though two prayers were made in the writ petition, yet during argument, petitioner confined his prayer only to the extent of release of monetary dues.

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8. According to the petitioner, the monetary dues is admitted as the respondent No.4, on several occasions, sought guidance from the higher officers on the point of release of the amount in relation to the extent of work, which has already been completed by the petitioner. The main prayer, thus, is of claiming money dues arising out of a contract.

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9. The Hon’ble Supreme Court, in the case of Joshi Technologies International Inc. versus Union of India & Others reported in (2015) 7 SCC 728 at paragraph 69 thereof, has held that there is no absolute bar in relation to maintainability of the writ petition even in contractual matters or where there are disputed questions of fact or even when monetary claim is raised. It is a discretionary jurisdiction of the High Court, which the High Court, under certain circumstances, can refuse to exercise. In the said paragraph, the circumstances, when “normally” the Court should not exercise such discretion, have been enumerated. It is necessary to quote paragraph 69 of the aforesaid judgment, which reads as under:-

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69. The position thus summarized in the aforesaid principles has to be understood in the context of discussion that preceded which we have pointed out above. As per this, no doubt, there is no absolute bar to the maintainability of the writ petition even in contractual matters or where there are disputed questions of fact or even when monetary claim is raised. At the same time, discretion lies with the High Court which under certain circumstances, it can refuse to exercise. It also follows that under the following circumstances, “normally”, the Court would not exercise such a discretion:

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69.1. The court may not examine the issue unless the action has some public law character attached to it.

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69.2. Whenever a particular mode of settlement of dispute is provided in the contract, the High Court would refuse to exercise its discretion under Article 226 of the Constitution and relegate the party to the said mode of settlement, particularly when settlement of disputes is to be resorted to through the means of arbitration.

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69.3. If there are very serious disputed questions of fact which are of complex nature and require oral evidence for their determination.

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69.4. Money claims per se particularly arising out of contractual obligations are normally not to be entertained except in exceptional circumstances.

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10. In paragraph 69.4, the Hon’ble Supreme Court has held that normally the money claim arising out of contractual obligations not to be entertained in writ jurisdiction, except in exceptional circumstances. 11. In the case of Punjab National Bank & Others versus Atmanand Singh & Others reported in (2020) 6 SCC 256 , while taking note of several other judgments, the Hon’ble Supreme Court in paragraph 22 has held that when the facts are complex in nature, which may, for their determination require oral and documentary evidence to be produced and proved by the party concerned, the High Court should be loath in entertaining such writ petition, and instead must relegate the parties to remedy of a civil suit. It is necessary to quote paragraph 22 of the said judgment, which reads as under: -

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22. We restate the above position that when the petition raises questions of fact of complex nature, such as in the present case, which may for their determination require oral and documentary evidence to be produced and proved by the party concerned and also because the relief sought is merely for ordering a refund of money, the High Court should be loath in entertaining such writ petition and instead must relegate the parties to remedy of a civil suit. Had it been a case where material facts referred to in the writ petition are admitted facts or indisputable facts, the High Court may be justified in examining the claim of the writ petitioner on its own merits in accordance with law.

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12. In the aforesaid judgment, the Hon’ble Supreme Court has also relied upon the judgment in the case of Gunwant Kaur versus Municipal Committee, Bhatinda reported in (1969) 3 SCC 769, wherein at paragraph 14 the Hon’ble Supreme Court has held that the discretion of exercising jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution of India, must be exercised on sound judicial principles. It has been held that when the petition raises question of fact of a complex nature, which may for their determination require oral evidence to be taken and on that account the High Court is of the view that the dispute may not appropriately be tried in a writ petition, the High Court may decline to try a petition.

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13. In the Constitutional Bench decision in the case of Suganmal versus State of M.P. reported in AIR 1965 SC 1740, the Hon’ble Supreme Court has held as under: -

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“6. On the first point, we are of opinion that though the High Courts have power to pass any appropriate order in the exercise of the powers conferred under Article 226 of the Constitution, such a petition solely praying for the issue of a writ of mandamus directing the State to refund the money is not ordinarily maintainable for the simple reason that a claim for such a refund can always be made in a suit against the authority which had illegally collected the money as a tax. … We do not find any good reason to extend this principle and, therefore, hold that no petition for the issue of a writ of mandamus will be normally entertained for the purpose of merely ordering a refund of money to the return of which the petitioner claims a right.”

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14. Further, in paragraph 9 of the said judgment in the case of Suganmal (supra) the Hon’ble Supreme Court has held as under:-

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“9. We, therefore, hold that normally petitions solely praying for the refund of money against the State by a writ of mandamus are not to be entertained. The aggrieved party has the right of going to the civil court for claiming the amount and it is open to the State to raise all possible defences to the claim, defences which cannot, in most cases be appropriately raised and considered in the exercise of writ jurisdiction.”

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15. The aforesaid judgment in the case of Suganmal (supra) has been taken note of and reiterated by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of Punjab National Bank (supra) at paragraph 20 thereof.

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16. In this case, it is the strong contention of the petitioner that the amounts of money, which the petitioner is claiming, by filing this writ petition, is admitted by the respondents. No doubt, a judgment can be given on an admission. Order XII Rule 6 of the Code of Civil Procedure confers discretionary power to a Court, which may, at any stage of the suit, give a judgment on admission made by a party. Though Code of Civil Procedure is not applicable to writ jurisdiction, but the underlying principle of Order XII Rule 6 of the Code of Civil Procedure can be applied when the issue is related to any admitted claim.

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17. In the case of Karan Kapoor versus Madhuri Kumar reported in (2022) 10 SCC 496, at paragraph 24 thereof, the Hon’ble Supreme Court, while dealing with Order XII Rule 6 of the Code of Civil Procedure, has held that the power is discretionary and depends upon the nature of admission. The said provision has been brought with an intention that if admission of fact is raised by one and admitted by another and the Court is satisfied with such

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nature of admission, then without compelling for full-fledged trial, judgment can be passed. From the aforesaid judgment, it is clear that there first has to be an admission by the parties, a fact should be raised by a party, which should be admitted by another.

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18. In the case of Nagindas Ramdas versus Dalpatram Ichharam reported in (1974) 1 SCC 242, at paragraph 27 thereof, the Hon’ble Supreme Court has held as under:-

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“27. From a conspectus of the cases cited at the bar, the principle that emerges is, that if at the time of passing of the decree, there was some material before the Court, on the basis of which, the Court could be prima facie satisfied, about the existence of a statutory ground for eviction, it will be presumed that the Court was so satisfied and the decree for eviction though apparently passed on the basis of a compromise, would be valid. Such material may take the shape either of evidence recorded or produced in the case, or, it may partly or wholly be in the shape of an express or implied admission made in the compromise agreement, itself. Admissions, if true and clear, are by far the best proof of the facts admitted. Admissions in pleadings or judicial admissions, admissible under Section 58 of the Evidence Act, made by the parties or their agents at or before the hearing of the case, stand on a higher footing than evidentiary admissions. The former class of admissions are fully binding on the party that makes them and constitute a waiver of proof. They by themselves can be made the foundation of the rights of the parties. On the other hand, evidentiary admissions which are receivable at the trial as evidence, are by themselves, not conclusive. They can be shown to be wrong.”

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19. Now, the question is what would be the nature of admission to bring a money claim within the ambit of “admitted dues”. In our opinion, a party must raise a claim of money and there has to be specific claim with an assertion that the dues are admitted by the other side. Once the said claim is made, the person against whom the said claim is made, must admit the claim made by the former. The said admission must be clear, specific and unambiguous, then only the same can be used against the person making them. The admissions have to be clear and must have a binding effect on the person making such admission. The Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of Bharat Singh versus Bhagirathi reported in AIR 1966 SC 405 at paragraph 19 thereof has held as under: -

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“19. Admissions have to be clear if they are to be used against the person making them. Admissions are substantive evidence by themselves, in view of Sections 17, and 21 of the Indian Evidence Act, though they are not conclusive proof of the matters admitted. We are of opinion that the admissions duly proved are admissible evidence irrespective of whether the party making them appeared in the witness box or not and whether that party when appearing as witness was confronted with those statements in case it made a statement contrary to those admissions. The purpose of contradicting the witness under Section 145 of the Evidence Act is very much different from the purpose of proving the admission. Admission is substantive evidence of the fact admitted while a previous statement used to contradict a witness does not become substantive evidence and merely serves the purpose of throwing doubt on the veracity of the witness. What weight is to be attached to an admission made by a party is a matter different from its use as admissible evidence.”

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20. In the case of Himani Alloys Ltd. versus Tata Steel Ltd. reported in (2011) 15 SCC 273, the Hon’ble Supreme Court at paragraph 11 thereof, has held that a judgment can be given on admission, but the admission should be categorical. It should be a conscious and deliberate act of the party making it, showing an intention to be bound by it. In the said judgment, while dealing with Order XII Rule 6 of the Code of Civil Procedure, the Hon’ble Supreme Court cautioned that the said provision is neither mandatory nor peremptory, but discretionary and the Court has to exercise its judicial discretion keeping in mind that a judgment on admission is a judgment without trial, which permanently denies any remedy to the defendant by way of an appeal. Thus, unless, there is clear, unambiguous admission, the Court should not exercise the discretion. Thus, as per the Hon’ble Supreme Court, the said discretion can be used only where there is clear admission, which was to be acted upon. It is necessary to quote paragraph 11 of the said judgment, which reads as under: -

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“11. It is true that a judgment can be given on an “admission” contained in the minutes of a meeting. But the admission should be categorical. It should be a conscious and deliberate act of the party making it, showing an intention to be bound by it. Order 12 Rule 6 being an enabling provision, it is neither mandatory nor peremptory but discretionary. The court, on examination of the facts and circumstances, has to exercise its judicial discretion, keeping in mind that a judgment on admission is a judgment

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without trial which permanently denies any remedy to the defendant, by way of an appeal on merits. Therefore unless the admission is clear, unambiguous and unconditional, the discretion of the Court should not be exercised to deny the valuable right of a defendant to contest the claim. In short the discretion should be used only when there is a clear “admission” which can be acted upon. (See also Uttam Singh Duggal & Co. Ltd. v. United Bank of India [(2000) 7 SCC 120], Karam Kapahi v. Lal Chand Public Charitable Trust [(2010) 4 SCC 753 : (2010) 2 SCC (Civ) 262] and Jeevan Diesels and Electricals Ltd. v. Jasbir Singh Chadha [(2010) 6 SCC 601 : (2010) 2 SCC (Civ) 745].) There is no such admission in this case.”

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21. Thus what falls from all these judgments, which has been referred above, is that in a contractual matter, if there is a disputed question of fact and the facts which have been pleaded need to be proved by evidence, the Court exercising jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution of India, should relegate the parties before a Civil Court. Further, when a party claims any relief, which they are claiming to be admitted by the other side, then the Court has to see that the admission is conscious, unambiguous and categorical and the person is showing intention that he is bound by it.

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22. Keeping in view the aforesaid proposition of law, now let us examine the pleadings and the materials and the documents annexed with the pleadings, so as to conclude as to whether the petitioner is entitled for any relief or not.

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23. Petitioner has claimed money dues, which, according to the petitioner is admitted. While we go through the annexures of the writ petition and the counter affidavit, we find that nowhere the respondents have admitted the dues of the petitioner. Petitioner has relied upon some of the letters issued by the respondent No.4, which are annexures, to substantiate his case that the dues have been admitted by the respondents. These letters are at Annexure 5 (letter dated 19.09.2015) and Annexure 9 (letter dated 24.06.2017). These letters are written by the Executive Engineer to the Chief Engineer. Nowhere in the aforesaid letters, it has been admitted by the respondents that the monetary claim of the petitioner has been admitted. By the aforesaid letters, only a guidance has been sought for from the higher authorities in respect of making payment. Prayer has been made by the Executive Engineer to the Chief Engineer, requesting him to give direction to the Executive Engineer to make payment of the work so done till date as per the DPR. Thus, these

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letters are nothing but a communication seeking guidance by a subordinate officer from his higher authority. These letters do not even specify the amount of money, neither admits any dues. The letters are vague and cannot be said to be specific and unambiguous. There is no statement in these letters which can be said to have binding effect upon the respondents. A junior officer of the Government seeking guidance from his superior Officer, in respect of making payment cannot be said to be an admission of dues. Further, the Executive Engineer is much junior in the hierarchy, whose admission (though there is none in this case) cannot bind the entire department. As per the judgments, which have been referred above, for a submission to come within the ambit of admission, the same has to be specific and must have a binding effect on the respondents. We do not find any statement by the respondents, which is either specific or binds the respondents. In the Counter Affidavit also, there is no statement admitting any dues of the petitioner. Be it noted that the petitioner has simply claimed money dues without quantifying any amount. Respondents have also denied the claim. Thus, there is no hesitation in holding that the dues which the petitioner is claiming is not admitted. Since the dues are not admitted and there is no admission on the part of the respondents, we hold that the money claim of the petitioner will not fall within the category of “admitted dues”.

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24. Further, from the Counter Affidavit, we find that it is the specific case of the respondents in paragraph 11 that the respondent No.4 found that the petitioner had started the work in different alignment in PWD Garo Road. It is necessary to quote paragraph 11 of the counter affidavit, which reads as under:-

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“11. That the work order was issued to the Petitioner to start work by Respondent No.4 vide his letter bearing number 186 dated 12^th of February 2015, but Respondent Number 4 found that the Petitioner had started the work in a different alignment in PWD Road to Garo.”

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25. Though it is admitted by the respondents that the respondents had directed the work to be stopped, but, again there was an instruction to the petitioner to execute the work in T03 to Dumargardi Road, which is evident from paragraph 16 of the Counter Affidavit. Paragraph 16 of the Counter Affidavit reads as under: -

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“16. That Respondent No.2 Instructed Respondent No.4 to execute the work in T03 to Dumargardi Road vide letter bearing number 1839 dated 7^th of October 2016.”

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26. The said instruction was communicated to the petitioner, which is evident from paragraph 16 above. In paragraph 17 of the Counter Affidavit, a specific plea has been taken by the respondents that inspite of such instructions, petitioner did not resume the work.

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27. In the writ petition, the petitioner has projected that it is because of the respondents and their wrong design, the work was not completed. This statement clearly suggests that there is disputed question of facts. This disputed question of fact as to whether there was defect in the design; whether the construction was on a wrong alignment and who are to be blamed for the same; and whether the petitioner did or did not resume the work inspite of direction; needs to be proved / disproved by leading evidence. These disputes are essentially questions of facts and these facts are rather not simple.

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28. Further, in a case of money claim, ordinarily, there is also a question of limitation, which is a mixed question of law and facts, which needs leading of evidence.

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29. As held by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in the judgments referred to above that when the facts are complicated, it would not be proper for the High Court to interfere in the writ jurisdiction in the matter of contracts involving disputes. Further, in view of the judgment of Joshi Technologies International Inc (supra), especially paragraph 69.4, to entertain monetary claim arising out of contract, there has to be an exceptional circumstances. In this case we do not find any such exceptional circumstance.

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30. Learned counsel for the petitioner while arguing the case, has heavily harped upon the principle of promissory estoppel. We are unable to accept the argument of the petitioner as from the material on record, we find that there is no promise which binds the respondents. As we have held earlier that there is no admission on the part of the respondents, admitting any dues, thus, we also conclude that the principles of promissory estoppel will not be applicable in this case, where there is neither any promise to attract estoppel.

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31. Considering what has been held above, since we have held that there is no admission by the respondents, accepting the dues as claimed by the petitioner and there are disputed question of facts, which needs a proper trial by leading evidence, we refuse to entertain this writ petition filed under Article 226 of the Constitution of India. The petitioner is not entitled to any relief as claimed, in this writ petition. However, if so advised, petitioner may

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approach a Civil Court of competent jurisdiction for the reliefs as claimed by the petitioner in this writ petition.

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32. With the aforesaid liberty, this writ petition is dismissed.

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33. There shall be no orders as to costs. Urgent certified copies of this order shall be issued as per the Rules.

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(Sanjaya Kumar Mishra, C.J.)

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(Ananda Sen, J.)

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Kumar/Cp-02

Nitesh Kumar Singh v. the State of Jharkhand through the Secretary Rural Development Department

Case brief

What is this about?

What did the court decide?

Nitesh Kumar Singh v. the State of Jharkhand through the Secretary Rural Development Department

Case brief

What is this about?

What did the court decide?

What the court decided

A compact analysis

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