Allowed

Shailesh Kumar Singh v. the State of Jharkhand through the Secretary Pr Secretary School Education And Literacy Deptt and O

Jharkhand HC4 Mar 2020LPA/585/2016

Case brief

AI extract

What is this about?

These Letters Patent Appeals challenge the High Court Single Judge's order denying salary for the interim dismissal period. The High Court allowed the appeals, holding that appellants entitled to salary for the period between dismissal and reinstatement as the punishment was found illegal and charges not proved.

What did the court decide?

Appellants directed to be paid full salary and allowances for the period from 21.12.2010 to 24.01.2014 within three months.

Shailesh Kumar Singh Vs the State of Jharkhand… — Service and Employment | Jharkhand HC (2020)

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L.P.A. Nos. 584 & 585 of 2016

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IN THE HIGH COURT OF JHARKHAND AT RANCHI L.P.A. No. 584 of 2016

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Sheoji Goswami ..... … Appellant With L.P.A. No. 585 of 2016 Shailesh Kumar Singh ….. … Appellant

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Versus

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The State of Jharkhand,

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through the Secretary/Principal Secretary,

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School Education & Literacy Department, Ranchi

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The Director, Secondary Education-cum-Special Secretary, School Education & Literacy Department, Ranchi.

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The Regional Deputy Director of Education (RDDE), Kolhan Division, Chaibasa, West Singhbhum.

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The District Education Officer-cum-Inquiry Officer, Chaibasa, West Singhbhum. …. … Respondents (In both cases)

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CORAM : HON’BLE MR. JUSTICE H. C. MISHRA : HON’BLE MR. JUSTICE DEEPAK ROSHAN -------For the Appellants : Mr. Rahul Kumar, Advocate Ms. Apoorva Singh, Advocate For the Respondents-State : Mr. Vijay Shankar Prasad, G.P. I Mr. V.N. Jha, AC to G.P. I

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08/ 04.03.2020 As both these Letters Patent Appeals arise out of the common Judgement, they have been heard together and are being disposed of by this

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common Judgement.

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Heard learned counsel for the appellants and learned counsel for the respondents State.

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3 . The appellants are aggrieved by the common Judgment dated 27.09.2016, passed by the Writ Court in W.P.(S) Nos. 1016 and 1083 of 2014, only to the extent that the petitioners were denied the salary for the interregnum period they were out of service pursuant to their dismissal from service till they were reinstated back in service, pursuant to the order passed by the Appellate Authority. The punishment orders imposed by the Appellate Authority also, however were quashed by the Writ Court and the writ applications of the petitioners were allowed.

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L.P.A. Nos. 584 & 585 of 2016

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The facts of the case lie in a short compass. The appellants were working as Head Clerk / Clerk in the Office of District Superintendent of Education, Chaibasa, when a large number teachers were transferred from one place to another, in the month of January, 2008, pursuant to the decision of the District Education Establishment Committee. The transferred teachers joined their respective posts, but the Director, Primary Education, cancelled their transfer orders, vide order dated 14.07.2008, which was challenged by the teachers in this Court in W.P.(S) No. 3731 of 2008 and analogous matters, which were allowed by order dated 16.10.2008, quashing the order dated 14.07.2008, passed by the Director, Primary Education.

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The appellants however, were put under suspension vide order dated 24.05.2008 on the ground that due to the bulk transfer order, there was no teacher left in about 100 schools, which caused adverse effect on the Mid-Day-Meal Scheme. They were also put to disciplinary proceeding and memo of charges was served on them on 28.03.2009. However, after the enquiry, the Enquiry Officer exonerated the appellants writ petitioners by his report dated 01.04.2010, wherein none of the charges leveled against them were found to be proved. However, differing from the views of the Enquiry Officer, the Disciplinary Authority imposed the punishment of dismissal from service upon the appellants, vide order dated 21.12.2010, without even giving any notice to the appellants. The appellants challenged their dismissal order before the Appellate Authority, but in-advertently, they filed their appeals before the Commissioner of Kolhan Division, and not before the Director, Primary Education. Pursuant to the direction of the Commissioner Kolhan Division, they again preferred their appeals before the Appellate Authority, i.e., the Director, Primary Education, who by his order dated 24.01.2014, set aside the orders of dismissal, and reduced the punishment as follows:-

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(a) Censor,

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(b) Stoppage of three increments with cumulative effect and

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service.

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Apart from the above, the salary of the suspension period was also denied to the appellants. The appellants challenged the aforesaid order passed by the Appellate Authority, before the Writ Court in W.P.(S)

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L.P.A. Nos. 584 & 585 of 2016 - 3 -

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Nos. 1016 and 1083 of 2014, which were adjudicated together by the Hon’ble Single Judge, who came to the conclusion that since the Enquiry Officer had exonerated the writ petitioners from the charges leveled against them, the Disciplinary Authority could not have imposed the major punishment of dismissal from service, without communicating the reasons for differing with the findings of the Enquiry Officer, and without issuing notice to the appellants, and the action of the Disciplinary Authority was in utter violation of the principles laid down by the Hon’ble Apex Court in Punjab National Bank & Ors. Vs. Kunj Behari Misra, reported in (1998) 7 SCC 84 .

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The Hon’ble Single Judge further held that even before imposing the punishment, no second show cause notice was given to the writ petitioners rendering the entire proceeding vitiated in the eyes of law. It was further held that from the initiation of the departmental proceeding till its culmination, there was complete violation of the principles of natural justice, and on that score as well, the impugned order was liable to be quashed. The Writ Court also held that the appellants to be entitled to get the full salary for the period of suspension, i.e., on 24.05.2008 to 20.12.2010. However, taking into consideration the fact that it was not fully proved that the delinquents were not responsible for the transfers in question, as also due to the fact that the writ petitioners had knocked the wrong door for preferring the appeal, which took about two years to approach the right forum, the writ petitioners were not held entitled to get the salary for the interregnum period of dismissal from service till reinstatement. It is only this part of the order passed by the Writ Court, which is under challenge in both these appeals.

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Learned counsel for the appellants has submitted that the appellants being the Head Clerk / Clerk could not be saddled with the responsibility of illegally transferring the teachers, particularly in view of the fact that the transfers were made by the District Education Establishment Committee. Even the order passed by the Director, Primary Education, cancelling the transfer orders, was also quashed by the High Court by order dated 16.10.2008, in W.P.(S) No. 3731 of 2008 and analogous matters. It is further submitted by the learned counsel that in the departmental proceeding, the charges could not be proved against the appellants and they were exonerated of the charges by the Enquiry Officer.

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L.P.A. Nos. 584 & 585 of 2016 - 4 -

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The disciplinary authority without communicating any reason for differing from the enquiry report, and without giving second show cause notice to the appellants, imposed the punishment of dismissal from the service. The Appellate Authority however, reduced the quantum of punishment, but still the major punishment was imposed upon the appellants of stoppage of three increments with cumulative effect. Learned counsel submitted that this order was also quashed by the Hon’ble Single Judge, holding the same to be in utter violation of the principles of natural justice, but simply due to the fact that the initial appeal was not preferred before the right authority, the appellants have been denied the salary for the interregnum period. Learned counsel submitted that even in view of Rule 97 (2) of the Jharkhand Service Code, 2001, the appellants could not have been denied the salary, in view of the fact that none of the charges were proved against the appellants.

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Learned counsel for the State on the other hand has submitted that the appellants remained out of service since 21.12.2010 to 24.01.2014, and on the principle of ‘no work no pay’ they are not entitled to any salary for that period. It is submitted by learned counsel for the State that the petitioners themselves were responsible for delay by preferring appeal before the wrong authority. It is further submitted by learned counsel for the State that Rule 97 (2) of the Jharkhand Service Code, is of no help to the appellants, as there is no finding that the appellants were fully exonerated of the charges, rather this is a case where only the charges could not be fully proved.

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Having heard learned counsels for both the sides and upon going through the record, we find that no fault could be found in the petitioners preferring the appeal before the wrong forum, when ultimately, the punishment orders were set aside by the Writ Court, holding the same to be in utter violation of the principles of natural justice. In any event, the appellants were not responsible for passing the illegal orders of punishment, which were per se illegal. The appellants were forced to challenge the illegal actions of the respondent authorities in order to get justice, and presently their reinstatement in service is without any stigma, pursuant to the order passed by the Writ Court, as even the orders of punishment passed by the Appellate Authority, which admittedly was a major punishment, have been quashed by the Writ Court.

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L.P.A. Nos. 584 & 585 of 2016 - 5 -

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On this score alone, we are of the considered view that the order passed by the Writ Court, withholding the salary of the appellants for the interregnum period of dismissal from service till reinstatement, i.e., from 21.12.2010 to 24.01.2014, cannot be sustained in the eyes of law, inasmuch as, the impugned orders of punishments per se, were absolutely illegal and could not be sustained in the eyes of law. Furthermore, the Writ Court also held that the appellants to be entitled to get the full salary for the period of suspension. As such, we find no valid reason to deny the salary to the appellants for the interregnum period of dismissal from service till their reinstatement in service.

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In view of the aforementioned discussions, we find that the impugned Judgement passed by the Writ Court, so far as the appellants writ petitioners have been denied the salary for the period 21.12.2010 to 24.01.2014, cannot be sustained in the eyes of law. We accordingly, set aside this part of the Judgement and hold the appellants writ petitioners fully entitled to the salary and allowance for the said period, without treating any break in service of the appellants. The respondent authorities are directed to make the payment of the salary and allowance of the appellants writ petitioners for the aforesaid period, within the period of three months from the date of communication of this order.

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Both these appeals are accordingly, allowed, with the directions, as above.

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(Deepak Roshan, J.)

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Pramanik-Amardeep/-

Shailesh Kumar Singh v. the State of Jharkhand through the Secretary Pr Secretary School Education And Literacy Deptt and O

Case brief

What is this about?

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Shailesh Kumar Singh v. the State of Jharkhand through the Secretary Pr Secretary School Education And Literacy Deptt and O

Case brief

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What did the court decide?

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