Defamation damages suit of ₹50,000 for alleged public imputation of an extramarital affair. Trial court dismissed relying on witness enmity; first appellate court reversed and decreed. High Court held enmity alone cannot discredit testimony and pure findings of fact are beyond second appeal; RSA dismissed.
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2026:HHC:18703
IN THE HIGH COURT OF HIMACHAL PRADESH, SHIMLA
RSA No. 325 of 2008 Reserved on: 01.04.2026 Date of Decision:21.05.2026
| Kamla Devi | Versus | ...Appellant |
|---|---|---|
| Reshmu Devi | ...Respondent | |
| ___________ Coram |
_____________ | _____________ |
Hon’ble Mr Justice Rakesh Kainthla , Judge.
Whether approved for reporting?1 No.
For the appellant : Mr Surya Chauhan, Advocate. For the respondents : Mr Hitender Verma, Advocate.
Rakesh Kainthla, Judge
The present appeal is directed against the judgment and decree dated 04.05.2006, passed by the learned District Judge, Bilaspur, H.P. (learned Appellate Court) vide which the judgment and decree dated 20.11.2004, passed by the learned Civil Judge (Senior Division), Bilaspur, H.P. (learned Trial Court Court) were set aside and the suit of the respondent (plaintiff
1 Whether reporters of Local Papers may be allowed to see the judgment? Yes.
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before learned Trial Court) was decreed. ( The parties shall hereinafter be referred to in the same manner as they were arrayed before the learned trial Court for convenience) .
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it was admitted that the parties are residents of the same village and the defendant was working in her field. It was asserted that the defendant never defamed the plaintiff, and the plaintiff had filed a false suit. Hence, it was prayed that the suit be dismissed.
and the plaintiff examined herself (PW-1), Nirmla Devi (PW-2) and Suharu (PW-3). The defendant examined herself (DW-1) and Vijay Sood (DW-2).
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Sood. The learned Trial Court answered issue No.1 in negative and dismissed the suit.
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the appellant/defendant and Mr Hitender Verma, learned counsel for the respondent/plaintiff.
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witnesses, and the learned Trial Court had erred in rejecting the statements of the witnesses due to the enmity alone. Learned Appellate Court had rightly held that enmity is a double-edged weapon and cannot be used to discard the testimony of a witness. Hence, he prayed that the present appeal be dismissed. He relied upon judgments of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Santosh Hazari vs. Purushottam Tiwari (deceased) by LRs (2001) 3 SCC 179 and Chanderbhan vs. Sarswati (2022) 20 SCC 199 in support of his submission.
made at the bar and have gone through the records carefully.
Substantial question of law No.2.
defendant, submitted that the learned Trial Court had rightly discarded the statements of the witnesses because of the enmity with the defendant. He read the cross-examination of the witnesses to show that the relationship between the parties, the witnesses and the defendant was strained. He submitted that the learned Appellate Court has erred in relying upon the statements of the inimical witnesses. This submission is not acceptable. It
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was laid down by the Supreme Court in Ramashish Rai v. Jagdish Singh, (2005) 10 SCC 498 , that the testimony of a witness cannot be discarded because of enmity. The Court has to see the statement of inimical witnesses with due care and caution. It was observed:
7… The requirement of law is that the testimony of inimical witnesses has to be considered with caution. If otherwise, the witnesses are true and reliable, their testimony cannot be thrown out on the threshold by branding them as inimical witnesses. By now, it is a wellsettled principle of law that enmity is a double-edged sword. It can be a ground for false implication. It can also be a ground for assault. Therefore, a duty is cast upon the court to examine the testimony of inimical witnesses with due caution and diligence. In the present case, the High Court has rejected the otherwise creditworthy testimony of an eyewitness account merely on the ground that there was enmity between the prosecution party and the accused party.
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Substantial question of law No. 1.
16. Plaintiff, Reshmu Devi, stated that she was working
in the field of Sukhia on 26.06.2002 with Nirmla, Suharu, Parvatu and her sister-in-law. Defendant was working in her field at a distance of 35-40 feet. The plaintiff was chatting with other women. The defendant told them that they were abusing her. Nirmla replied that they were talking to each other and were not discussing the defendant. The plaintiff asked Nirmla to keep quiet. The defendant told the plaintiff that she (plaintiff) had an extramarital relationship with the defendant’s husband. The plaintiff was taking the money from the defendant’s husband, and the defendant would not let the plaintiff live. This incident spread in the locality, and the plaintiff was defamed. She stated in her cross-examination that she had not talked to the defendant for 7-8 years. She volunteered to say that she and the defendant belonged to different castes. She admitted that Suharu and the defendant had a litigation.
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working in her field at some distance. The defendant said that they were discussing her. She (Nirmla Devi) replied that they were talking to each other and were not discussing the defendant. The plaintiff asked her (Nirmla Devi) to keep quiet. The defendant got infuriated and told the plaintiff that she (plaintiff) had an extramarital relationship with the defendant’s husband, and the plaintiff was taking the money from him. She threatened to kill the plaintiff. These words defamed the plaintiff. She stated in her cross-examination that Sukhia is her father-in-law, and he had a litigation with the defendant’s father-in-law. She admitted that the plaintiff and defendant were not on talking terms with each other for many years. She denied that a false case was made by the plaintiff and that no abuses were hurled.
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extramarital relationship with the defendant’s husband, and the plaintiff had taken money from him. The defendant threatened to kill the plaintiff. These words lowered the plaintiff’s estimation in their eyes. She stated in her cross-examination that the fields of Suharu and the defendant were located adjacent to each other. She was not aware that Nirmla and Suharu had a quarrel with each other. She admitted that her husband and Kamla’s father-in-law had litigation. She admitted that they were not on talking terms with each other during the litigation. She denied that she was making a false statement because of the enmity.
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“11. Even under the old Section 100 of the Code (pre-1976 amendment), a pure finding of fact was not open to challenge before the High Court in a second appeal. However, the Law Commission noticed a plethora of conflicting judgments. It noted that in dealing with second appeals, the courts were devising and successfully adopting several concepts, such as a mixed question of fact and law, a legal inference to be drawn from facts proved, and even the point that the case had not been properly approached by the courts below. This was creating confusion in the minds of the public as to the legitimate scope of second appeals under Section 100 and had burdened the High Courts with an unnecessarily large number of second appeals. Section 100 was, therefore, suggested to be amended so as to provide that the right of second appeal should be confined to cases where a question of law is involved and such a question of law is a substantial one. (See Statement of Objects and Reasons.) The Select Committee to which the Amendment Bill was referred felt that the scope of second appeals should be restricted so that litigation may not drag on for a long period. Reasons, of course, are not required to be stated for formulating any question of law under sub-section
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(4) of Section 100 of the Code; though such reasons are to be recorded under the proviso to sub-section (5) while exercising the power to hear on any other substantial question of law, other than the one formulated under sub-section (4).”
32.3. The general rule is that the High Court will not interfere with findings of fact arrived at by the courts below. But it is not an absolute rule. Some of the wellrecognised exceptions are where ( i ) the courts below have ignored material evidence or acted on no evidence; ( ii ) the courts have drawn wrong inferences from proved facts by applying the law erroneously; or ( iii ) the courts have wrongly cast the burden of proof. When we refer to “decision based on no evidence”, it not only refers to cases where there is a total dearth of evidence, but also refers to any case where the evidence, taken as a whole, is not reasonably capable of supporting the finding.
Final Order
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along with a copy of this judgment.
21st May, 2026
2 issues framed by the court
Whether testimony of witnesses inimical to the defendant can be discarded solely on the ground of enmity?
Whether the High Court in second appeal can interfere with the Appellate Court's pure finding of fact on appreciation of evidence?
Colour shows how this judgement treated each authority
Ramashish Rai v. Jagdish SinghRelied on¶14
Ramashish Rai v. Jagdish Singh, (2005) 10 SCC 498 · Who else cites this
Santosh Hazari v. Purushottam TiwariRelied on¶23
Santosh Hazari v. Purushottam Tiwari, (2001) 3 SCC 179: 2001 SCC OnLine SC 375 · Who else cites this
Chandrabhan v. SaraswatiRelied on¶24
Chandrabhan v. Saraswati, (2022) 20 SCC 199: 2022 SCC OnLine SC 127 · Who else cites this
Kamla Devi
Reshmu Devi
Rakesh Kainthla
As recorded by the court registry
Judgements on the same questions, provisions and authorities, from every court
