State of Hp and Others Vs Roshan Lal

The date of joining of the petitioner was to be taken on daily wage basis w.e.f. 01.12.2009 on consideration. Since no relief of work-charge status had been claimed, therefore, no observation was made on this count by the learned Single Judge. The benefits which accrued were to be notional, and the actual benefits were to be conferred upon the petitioner by the State from the date of filing of the writ petition.

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The objection of the learned Addl. Advocate General is that the petitioner's services were engaged under the MGNREGA Scheme and that he had no right of regularization, which was rejected by the learned Single Judge, keeping in view the fact that earlier there was litigation inter se the parties and there was an award dated 04.01.2016 (Annexure P-1), passed by the Labour Court, whereby the workman had been directed to be reinstated. It was held that before the Labour Court, there was no such stance taken and, therefore, the State could not, as such, take such a stance, and it was nothing but an afterthought to conclude its case. The relevant portion of the order under challenge reads as under:-

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“10. Few facts which are not in dispute, are that the petitioner was engaged as a daily wager on 01.12.2009. His services were terminated on 13.10.2010. In an industrial dispute raised by the petitioner, learned Labour Court held in terms of Award dated 04.01.2026

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that the termination of the petitioner was bad in law and ordered his reinstatement with seniority and continuity. It is further not in dispute that in compliance to the said Award passed by the learned Labour Court, the services of the petitioner were re-engaged and he is serving the Department, though on daily wage basis.

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11. A perusal of the Award passed by the learned Labour Court demonstrates that therein, no defense was taken by the respondents to the effect that the petitioner was engaged under the MGNREGA Scheme. Though, it is evident from the Award that the stand of the respondents was that the petitioner was engaged to remove bushes etc. from outside the office of the respondents, as per availability of work, for which he was compensated from the contingency fund of the Block and as there was no work for the petitioner, his services were terminated, but this contention of the respondents did not find favour with the learned Labour Court and in light of the fact that the Award passed by the learned Labour Court has attained finality, now the State cannot take a stand contrary to the contents of the Award. Therefore, as it was neither the stand of the respondents before the learned Labour Court that this petitioner was engaged under the MGNREGA Scheme nor any finding has been returned to this effect by the learned Labour Court, the stand so taken by the respondents in the reply apparently is nothing but an afterthought. The respondents cannot take a stand other than it took before the learned Labour Court so as to improve their case.”

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Learned Addl. Advocate General has stressed on the

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same argument, submitting that a perusal of the communication dated

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09.09.2019 (Annexure P-2), addressed to the Block Development Officer, would go on to show that since an Execution Petition had been filed before the District and Sessions Court, Shimla, H.P., the workman had been reinstated. It had been mentioned in the said letter that he be reinstated in the MGNREGA programme, in which he was earlier working, as per the existing wages, and, therefore, it is submitted that the learned Single Judge was not justified in directing the reinstatement on account of the fact that Scheme is of the Union of India and that the State would have no liability as such.

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The argument, on the face of it, looks attractive, but one has to look into the award of the Labour Court to see the recorded background and from the perusal of which, it would be clear that the petitioner had been terminated on 13.10.2010 and, resultantly, had raised an industrial dispute on the ground that it was without complying with the provisions of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947. The Labour Court had granted him the benefit of reinstatement in service forthwith, with seniority and continuity, while denying him back wages, as per the award dated 04.01.2016 (Annexure P-1).

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The said award was never challenged and the finding of the Award, as such, is binding inter se the parties. It is pertinent to notice that before the Labour Court, the workman had succeeded on the ground that he had worked for 240 days in the preceding 12 calendar months and that the provisions of Section 25F of the Industrial

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Disputes Act had not been complied with, as the requisite notice and compensation had not been given while dispensing with his services, thus resulting in the order of reinstatement.

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The workman himself had also raised the issue that the respondents had retained the juniors and those persons had been engaged and the principle of "last come first go" had been violated. A finding in favour of the State has been recorded that the persons, who had been engaged by the Department were under the MGNREGA Scheme; therefore, the petitioner had failed to prove that his juniors had been retained and were still working in the Department. The relevant portion reads as under:-

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“The learned counsel of the petitioner also contended that at the time of the termination of the petitioner, the respondent had retained his juniors who are still working and besides this even fresh persons have been engaged by the respondent as such the respondent had violated the principles of "last come first go". However, except for the bald statement of the petitioner by way of affidavit Ex. PW-1/A, no other is evidence has been led by him to prove that the persons junior to him have been retained contingency funds, no person had been employed by the department after his by the respondent. Even, in his cross-examination, the petitioner has admitted that under termination He also admitted that the persons who have been engaged by the department were engaged under the scheme of MANREGA. Thus, keeping in view the entire evidence on record, the petitioner has failed to prove that his juniors have been retained and are still working with the respondent. Hence, the case of the

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petitioner does not fall under section 25-G and 25-H of the Act.”

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On the basis of the material on record, the Labour Court

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had given the finding and merely in view of the communication dated 09.09.2019 (Annexure P-2), inter se the two Departments, wherein it had been stated that the petitioner had to be employed on daily wage basis as a Beldar under the MGNREGA Scheme would not mean that the workman was employed as such. Even otherwise, it had been noticed by the learned Single Judge that the defence was never such before the Labour Court also, in order to repel the challenge to the illegal termination. The State has chosen to give reinstatement and not challenged the finding of the violation of the provisions of Section 25F of the Industrial Disputes Act.

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Resultantly, we do not find any plausible reason to interfere with the well-reasoned order passed by the learned Single Judge, since it is the settled principle that the State, in its own wisdom, has already framed policies for regularization of employees, i.e. daily wagers and employees who have served them for a considerably long period.

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The Constitution Bench of the Apex Court in its authoritative pronouncement in Secretary, State of Karnataka and Ors. Vs. Uma Devi and Ors. , (2006) 4 SCC 1 , has already held that the right of regularization would flow from a policy which is in place, and that is the remedy the workman was seeking on account of the fact that

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his services had been dispensed with, and the said period of retrenchment had to be counted for the said purpose.

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The appellant was successful only in the first round of litigation by way of getting reinstatement through the Labour Court and, therefore, having got the benefit of continuity of service, he was entitled to regularization as per the policy of the State itself, and the State is not in a position to run away from its own policies.

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Thus, we are of the considered view that the learned Single Judge has not erred in any manner in allowing the writ petition and we do not find any plausible reason to take a different view. Resultantly, the Letters Patent Appeal being devoid of any merit is dismissed. Pending applications, if any, also stand disposed of.

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(G.S. Sandhawalia) Chief Justice

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(Bipin Chander Negi) Judge

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17^th July, 2026 (Gaurav Rawat)

State of Hp and Others v. Roshan Lal

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State of Hp and Others v. Roshan Lal

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