Piyush Garg Vs State of Hp and Others

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IN THE HIGH COURT OF HIMACHAL PRADESH, SHIMLA

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CWP No. 6919/2026

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Decided on: 08.05.2026

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Piyush Garg …Petitioner

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Versus State of H.P. & Ors. .…Respondents. ………………………………………………………………………………. Coram Ms. Justice Jyotsna Rewal Dua, Judge.

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Whether approved for reporting?¹

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For the petitioner: Mr. Sudhir Thakur, Sr. Advocate with Mr. Somesh Sharma, Advocate. For the respondents: Ms. Seema Sharma, Deputy Advocate General Nos.1 & 2. Mr. Varun Rana, Advocate for respondent No3. Mr. Surender Sharma, Advocate for respondent No.5. Mr. Pawan Kashyap-respondent No.4 present in person.

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Jyotsna Rewal Dua , J.

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Pursuant to the notice issued to respondent No.4, the

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said respondent has attended the hearing in person and stated that

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whatever submissions he had to make, have already been made in

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1 Whether reporters of the local papers may be allowed to see the judgment?

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his objections dated 04.05.2026 (Annexure P-2) and he has nothing

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further to add.

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2. Keeping in view the urgency projected for the petitioner, the matter has been heard at this stage with the consent of learned counsel for the parties.

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Learned Deputy Advocate General has placed on record instructions dated 08.05.2026 from the Assistant Returning Officercum-Sub Divisional Magistrate Solan, Tehsil and District Solan. Learned Deputy Advocate General has also produced the entire case file. Learned counsel for all the parties have made their submissions.

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3. Respondent No.2-Assistant Returning Officer-cum-Sub Divisional Magistrate, Solan, vide order dated 04.05.2026, has disqualified the petitioner from contesting the elections for Councillor, Municipal Corporation Solan, from Ward No.3 on account of encroachment over Government land and has thereby rejected petitioner’s nomination from Ward No.3. Feeling aggrieved, the petitioner has invoked the extraordinary jurisdiction of this Court under Article 226 of the Constitution of India.

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3(i) Under notification dated 21.04.2026, respondent No.5the State Election Commission, Himachal Pradesh, notified the election programme for conduct of the general elections for Urban Local Bodies in the State, including Municipal Corporation Solan. In terms of the election programme, nomination papers were to be

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scrutinized w.e.f. 04.05.2026. The last date for withdrawal of candidature was 06.05.2026.

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3(ii) Petitioner filed his nomination for contesting the election for the seat of Councillor, Municipal Corporation Solan, from Ward No.3. An objection thereto was filed by respondent No.4 on 04.05.2026 before respondent No.2. Substance of the objection was that the petitioner has to be disqualified from contesting the election on account of encroachment over Government land. Petitioner denied the allegations in his reply submitted on 04.05.2026.

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3(iii) While rejecting petitioner’s nomination, respondent No.2, inter alia, held that:-

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 The demarcation report dated 09.07.2014 prepared by the Field Kanungo, Solan, established that ‘Matu Ram Deepak Kumar Memorial Educational Society’ had encroached upon the land comprised in Khasra Nos. 1113/786 (175 square meters of road) and 1111/783 (228 square meters of road) by raising construction in the form of a building and developing a park;

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 The said demarcation report was confirmed vide order dated 23.01.2024 passed by the Assistant Collector Second Grade, Solan, in Demarcation Case No. 10/8 of 2013 ( A.E. NH Sub Division Chambaghat Vs. Principal Gurukul International Public School, Solan );

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 Petitioner’s father, Sh. Dinesh Garg, in his statement recorded at the time of demarcation i.e. on 09.07.2014, had acknowledged himself to be the President of ‘Matu Ram Deepak Kumar Memorial Educational Society’;

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 The petitioner has been reflected as Manager of the School Management Committee of the aforesaid Educational Society in the documents relating to the school.

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Respondent No.2 further held that the demarcation report dated 09.07.2014, the order passed by the Assistant Collector Second Grade, Solan, on 23.01.2024 confirming the said demarcation report, and the statement made by petitioner’s father on 09.07.2014 at the time of demarcation, prima facie established that the Society had unauthorizedly occupied Government land. The petitioner was associated with the concerned Educational Society and, therefore, attracted disqualification under Section 8(2)(l) of the Himachal Pradesh Municipal Corporation Act, 1994. Respondent No.2 also held that, in view of Section 122(1)(c), significance is attached only to the factum of encroachment; To attract disqualification, declaration of concerned person being an encroacher after adjudication is not necessary in view of the decisions rendered in Ram Lal vs. State of H.P.² and State of H.P.

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2 CWP No. 921/2019 decided on 25.07.2016

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& Ors. Vs Surinder Singh Banolta & Ors.³ In view of the aforesaid factual and legal position, the petitioner was disqualified from contesting the election.

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4. Heard learned counsel for the parties & considered the case file, instructions & documents placed on record by both sides during hearing of the case and also considered the record produced by learned Deputy Advocate General.

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4(i) At this stage, it would be pertinent to notice that, in terms of Section 162 of the Himachal Pradesh Panchayati Raj Act, 1994, ‘no election under the Act shall be called in question except by an election petition presented in accordance with the provisions of Chapter XI under the heading ‘Disputes Relating to Election’. In terms of Section 175(1)(c) of the Himachal Pradesh Panchayati Raj Act, 1994, improper rejection of nomination is a ground for declaring an election void. Section 175 of the H.P. Panchayati Raj Act reads as follow: -

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“175. Grounds for declaring election to be void.- (1) If the authorized officer is of the opinion-

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(a) that on the date of his election the elected person was not qualified, or was disqualified to be elected under this Act; or

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(b) that any corrupt practice has been committed by the elected person or his agent or by any other person with the consent of the elected person or his agent; or

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(c) that any nomination has been improperly rejected; or

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(d) that the result of the election, in so far as it concerns the elected person, has been materially affected-

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(i) by the improper acceptance of any nomination, or (ii) by the improper reception, refusal or rejection of any vote or the reception of any vote which is void, or (iii) by any non-compliance with the provisions of this Act or of any rule made under this Act, the authorized officer shall declare the election of the elected persons to be void.

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(2) Subject to the provisions of section 175-A, when an election of an elected person has been declared to be void under sub-section (1), a fresh election shall be held under the provisions of this Act and the rules made thereunder.”

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Similar provisions exist under the Himachal Pradesh

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Municipal Act, 1994. Chapter XVII thereof, under the heading ‘Disputes Relating to Election’ particularly Section 283, provides that ‘no election under the Act shall be called in question except by an election petition presented in accordance with the provisions of the said Chapter’. Improper rejection of nomination is one of the grounds for setting aside an election under Section 296(1)(c) of the Himachal

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Pradesh Municipal Act, 1994. Section 296 of the H.P. Municipal Act reads as under: -

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“296. Grounds for setting aside election.- (1) If the authorised officer is of the opinion –

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(a) that on the date of his election the elected person was not qualified, or was disqualified to be elected under this Act; or

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(b) that any corrupt practice has been committed by the elected person or his agent or by any other person with the consent of the elected person or his agent; or

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(c) that any nomination has been improperly rejected; or

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(d) that the result of the election, in so far as it concerns the elected person, has been materially affected –

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(i) by the improper acceptance of any nomination; or

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(ii) by improper reception, refusal or rejection of any vote or the reception of any vote which is void; or

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(iii) by any non-compliance with the provisions of this Act or of any rule made under this Act;

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the authorised officer shall set aside the election of the elected person.

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(2) When an election has been set aside under sub-section (1), a fresh election shall be held.”

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Present dispute pertains to elections to the Municipal Corporation Solan and is governed by H.P. Municipal Corporation Act, 1994. Section 8 of the said Act stipulates certain situations, which would attract disqualification for a candidate for being chosen as, and for being a Councillor of the Corporation. Relevant to the controversy is the situation provided in Clause-l to Sub section 2 of Section 8 that reads as under: -

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“8. Disqualifications of Councillors- (1) A person shall be disqualified for being chosen as, and for being, a Mayor, Deputy Mayor and Councillor of the Corporation-

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xxxxxxx

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(2) A person shall also be disqualified for being chosen as, and for being, a Councillor-

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(l) if he has encroached upon or is a beneficiary of the encroachment upon any land belonging to, or taken on lease or requisitioned by or on behalf of, the State Government, a municipality, a panchayat, a co-operative society or any other local authority, unless a period of six years has elapsed since the date

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on which he is ejected therefrom or he ceases to be the encroacher.

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Explanation.- For the purposes of this clause the expression "beneficiaries" shall include the spouse and legal heirs of the encroacher; …….”

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Section 14 of the H.P. Municipal Corporation Act, 1994

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inter alia provides that no election of a Councillor shall be called in

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question except by election petition. The said section reads as under: -

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“14. Election petitions.- (1) No election of a Councillor shall be called in question except by any election petition presented to the [Divisional Commissioner], having jurisdiction over that municipal area hereinafter in this Chapter referred to as the prescribed authority within thirty days from the date of the publication of the result of the election under section 13.

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(2) An election petition calling in question any such election may be presented on one or more of the grounds specified in section 16, by any candidate at such election or by any elector of the ward concerned.

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(3) Petitioner shall join as respondents to his petition all the candidates at his election.

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(4) An election petition-

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(a) shall contain a concise statement of the material facts on which the petitioner relies;

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(b) shall, with sufficient particulars, set forth the ground or grounds on which the election is called in question; and

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(c) shall be signed by the petitioner and verified in the manner laid down in the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (5 of 1908), for the verification of pleadings.”

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Section 16 of the Himachal Pradesh Municipal

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Corporation Act, 1994 lays down the grounds for declaring an election to be void. The provisions of the said section are as follows: -

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“16. Grounds for declaring election to be void.- (1) Subject to the provisions of sub-section (2), if the prescribed authority is of the opinion –

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(a) that on the date of his election a returned candidate was not qualified or was disqualified, to be chosen as a Councillor; or

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(b) that any corrupt practice has been committed by a returned candidate or his agent or by any other person with the consent of a returned candidate or his agent; or

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(c) that any nomination paper has been improperly rejected; or (d) that the result of the election in so far as it concerns, a returned candidate has been materially affected-

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(i) by the improper acceptance of any nomination; or (ii) by any corrupt practice committed in the interest of the returned candidate by a person other than the candidate or his agent or a person acting with the consent of such candidate or agent; or

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(iii) by the improper acceptance or refusal of any vote or reception of any vote which is void; or

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(iv) by the non-compliance with the provisions of this Act or any rules or orders made thereunder,

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prescribed authority shall declare the election of the returned candidate to be void.

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(2) If in the opinion of the prescribed authority, a returned candidate or any of his agents, has been alleged to be guilty of any corrupt practice, but the prescribed authority is satisfied-

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(a) that no such corrupt practice was committed at the election by the candidate, or such corrupt practice was committed contrary to the orders, and without the consent of the candidate;

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(b) that the candidate took all reasonable means for preventing the commission of corrupt practices at the election; and

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(c) that in all other respects the election was free from any corrupt practice on the part of the candidate or any of his agents, the prescribed authority may decide that the election of the returned candidate is not void.”

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There is a marked distinction in Section 16 of the H.P.

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Municipal Corporation Act, 1994 as compared to Section 175 of the H.P. Panchayati Raj Act, 1994 and Section 296 of the H.P. Municipal

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Act, 1994. The distinction being that improper rejection of nomination has specifically been made a ground for declaring an election void under the H.P. Panchayati Raj Act, 1994 as also under the H.P. Municipal Act, 1994, however no such provision exists under Section 16 of the H.P. Municipal Corporation Act, 1994. Therefore, there is substance in the submissions made by learned Senior Counsel for the petitioner that against rejection of petitioner’s nomination, he has no specific statutory remedy except to invoke the extraordinary jurisdiction of this Court under Article 226 of the Constitution of India at this stage. Learned counsel for the respondents did not point out any provision or precedent to oppose the above submission.

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4(ii) In the impugned order passed by respondent No.2, reliance has been placed upon i) Section 122 of the H.P. Panchayati Raj Act, 1994 ii) Demarcation report dated 09.07.2014, as confirmed by the Assistant Collector Second Grade, Solan on 23.01.2024, and iii) the statement made by petitioner’s father at the time the demarcation was carried out on 09.07.2014. Since the matter pertains to the election of Councillors to Municipal Corporation Solan, the reliance placed by respondent No.2 upon provisions of the H.P. Panchayati Raj Act, 1994, for rejecting petitioner’s nomination was misconceived. As noticed earlier, it is Section 8(2)(l) of the H.P. Municipal Corporation Act that governs the objection taken by respondent No.4.

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Respondent No.2 has placed reliance, inter alia , upon

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Surinder Singh Banolta³ as also upon Ram Lal² to hold that a prior declaration of a person as an encroacher is not a sine qua non for attracting the disqualification.

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The issue before the Hon’ble Apex Court in Surinder Singh Banolta³ was that question with regard to declaring a candidate as disqualified under the H.P. Panchayati Raj Act, may arise not only before an election is held but also after the election process is over, and thus, whereas in the former case, it will be the Authorised Officer concerned who can determine the question of disqualification but in a case where processes are initiated after the election, the Deputy Commissioner alone would be the prescribed authority. The Hon’ble Apex Court held that once a person is declared to be an encroacher prior to the date on which he has been declared as elector and if the said order has attained finality, the question as to whether he stood disqualified in terms of the provisions of Section 122 of the Act, must be raised by way of an election petition alone. Para 17 of the judgment reads as under: -

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“17. Once, thus, a person is declared to be an encroacher prior to the date on which he has been declared as elector and if the said order has attained finality, the question as to whether he stood disqualified in terms of the provisions of Section 122 of the Act, in our opinion, must be raised by way of an election petition alone…...”

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In Ram Lal² , the petitioner therein had admitted as

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having encroached the Government land but still raised objections that declaration was required for him/his ancestors as encroachers. Facts of the case were as under: -

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“10. Keeping in mind the broad Scheme of the 1994 Act, let us now come back to the facts of the present case. The election of the petitioner was challenged by the second respondent primarily on the ground that the petitioner's grandfather had encroached upon a Government land and that therefore, the petitioner had suffered disqualification in terms of Clause (c) of sub-Section (1) of Section 122, read with the Explanation thereunder. The second respondent had pleaded in his Election Petition specifically that two persons by name Sang Dass and Mal Sukh, both of whom are the grand fathers of the petitioner had admittedly encroached into the Government land comprised in khewat/Khatoni No. 115 min/335 khasra Nos. 312, 445, 509, 510, 520, 521, 947, 958 and 1196 kita 9 total measuring 00-57-36 hect., situated in Up-Muhal Panvi, Tehsil Nichar, District Kinnaur, HP and khewat No. 45/137, khasra Nos. 162, 163 and 165 kita 3, total measuring 00-30-51 hect., situated in Up Muhal Faktowar Dhar, Tehsil Nichar, District Kinnaur.

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11. It is seen from the order of the Authorized Officer that the petitioner herein did not file a reply in the first instance to the Election Petition but filed a petition under Section 164(1)(c) and 165 of the Act for the dismissal of the petition. After nearly two years, the petitioner filed a reply to the main Election Petition. Interestingly, the stand taken by the petitioner before the Authorized Officer was that he had been living separately since 1991 and that since no proceedings for removal of encroachment were initiated against his grand father under the Himachal Pradesh Land Revenue Act, 1954 (hereinafter referred to as “the Revenue Act, 1954”), he cannot be said to have suffered a disqualification under Section 122(1)(c). In other words, the petitioner did not go before the Authorized Officer with a plea that his grand father

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never encroached upon any Government land. All that the petitioner stated was (i) that till his grand father is declared as an encroacher under Section 163 of the Revenue Act, 1954 and an order of eviction passed under the Act, he cannot be taken to be disqualified; and (ii) that in any case he has been living separately from 1991 and hence the allegations of encroachment cannot be put against him.”

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In view of the factual background of the case under the

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H.P. Panchayati Raj Act, it was held as under: -

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“34. Relying upon the decision of the Supreme court in State of H.P. and others vs. Surinder Singh Banolta (2006) 12 SCC 484, it was contended by the learned Senior Counsel for the petitioner that a declaration that a person is an encroacher, is sine qua non for attributing the disqualification. But we do not think so. Section 122 (1) (c) merely speaks about encroachment and not about either the removal of encroachment or the declaration of encroachment. They are extraneous to Section 122 (1) (c). The language employed in clause (c) of sub-section (1) of section 122 is “has encroached upon”. The section does not use the expression “has been declared to be an encroacher.

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35. Therefore, in fine, we find that all the grounds of attack to the impugned orders are wholly unsustainable. Two authorities have reached concurrent findings on a question of fact. This question of fact has clearly led to the legal conclusion that the petitioner is disqualified. We find no scope for any interference with the orders of these quasi judicial authorities under Article 226 of the Constitution. Hence the writ petition is dismissed, along with pending applications, if any.”

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4(iii) Respondent No.2 has disqualified the petitioner and

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rejected his nomination on the sole assigned ground that the petitioner is a direct beneficiary of the entity that encroached upon the

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Government land and directly connected with the running of the concerned educational institution. This finding has been returned on the basis of the demarcation report dated 09.07.2014, the statement of petitioner’s father recorded on the said date, and the order passed by the Assistant Collector Second Grade, Solan on 23.01.2024 confirming the demarcation report.

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There has to be an ‘encroachment’ to attract the bar of disqualification. Learned Deputy Advocate General has produced the entire case file. The file reflects that the demarcation was conducted by the Revenue Department in segregated manner on different dates. It was finally concluded on 09.07.2014, whereby Khasra Nos. 1113/786 and 1111/783, to the extent of 175 and 228 square meters respectively, were reported to be under the unauthorized possession of the educational society. The following statement of petitioner’s father, recorded on 09.07.2014 as the President of the Society, is also available in the case file (translation as supplied by learned counsel for the petitioner): -

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“Statement of Dinesh Kumar Son of Matu Ram Resident of upper Bazaar along with President Matu Ram Deepak Kumar Memorial Educational Society Solan.

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Stated that today on dated 09.07.2014 on the application of the demarcation of Government of Himachal Pradesh of Khasra No. 1111/783 and 1113/786 Kita 2 situsted in Mauza Kather Solan, the field Kanungo along with concerned Patwari came on spot for the demarcation. Alongside the aforesaid Numbers land, our ownership exists. In this context it is my statement that I had got demarcated the land owned by me adjoining to the DAV in the year 2005-2006, copy

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of the demarcation report thereof, I will provide later. I want to get my owned land demarcated also. The demarcation which was conducted in the year 2005-2006 it was conducted in presence of HPPWD (NH), DAV School Management and mine. The aforesaid demarcation was conducted by the Officer of Tehsildar level. As per the same the possession of DAV was found to be unauthorized and the map of encroachment was also prepared. The same was decided by the Ld. Court. As per the demarcation report by the then Tehsildar, the constructed building of Gurukul School has been shown in land in my ownership and the land of PWD road measuring 24 Sq. Mt. is upto the nala in front of constructed building. Hence, I want to state that the demarcation which has been done today on the application of the Public Works Department has also been conducted earlier by the department. Which bears my signatures and of office bearers of PWD department. The land which has been taken by the Govt. for construction of National Highway, since the same has been abandoned as such I filed application to the X.en. National Highway for resumption of the same land and the Xen. has recommended the case for acquisition for the authority, which is still pending. As such, it is requested that the same demarcation report be suspended till the decision is taken by the authority. This is my statement.

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Ro &AC Sd/-

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Attested\SD/F. Kanugo 09/07/14”

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The statement of petitioner’s father recorded on

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09.07.2014 in no manner can be construed as an admission of encroachment over Government land. He has reportedly referred to some previous demarcation and also requested for demarcation of his adjoining owned land. The statement also gives an inference that the land was perhaps acquired by the National Highways Authority of India for construction/widening of the National Highway, but thereafter

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the project was abandoned. Petitioner’s father/the Educational Society represented seeking resumption of the land. The case, as per the statement, had been recommended by the concerned Executive Engineer and pending consideration. Petitioner’s father had specifically requested in this statement that the demarcation proceedings be kept in abeyance till a decision was taken by the competent authority on the resumption file.

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It appears that no further order was passed in the demarcation file for almost ten years. On 23.01.2024, the Assistant Collector Second Grade, Solan, confirmed the demarcation dated 09.07.2014 only on the ground that the file was too old and, for this reason, did not even deem it appropriate to hear the parties. The Assistant Collector also ordered that in case the petitioner/objector files fresh application for demarcation under Section 107 of the H.P. Land Revenue Act, the same may be considered and allowed. It needs to be noticed here that ordinarily demarcation once accepted are not carried out again on the mere asking of the applicant. The order passed by the Assistant Collector Second Grade confirming the demarcation reads as under: -

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“ORDER

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23.01.2024

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Whereas, the file is lying pending for final orders since field report submitted by the field kanungo on 28.08.2014. In compliance of this office direction, the Field Kanungo has carried out the

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demarcation in question in the presence of both the parties and submitted his detailed report. I have perused the demarcation report as submitted by the Field Kanungo which reveals that he has called both the parties to be present on the spot and carried out the same as per provisions contained in para 10.2 of H.P. Land Revenue Manual and instructions given by the Financial Commissioner time to time. Since the file is too old and it would not be appropriate to hear the parties at this belated stage. Hence, the demarcation on spot is accepted. It is hereby further ordered that if any respondent/objector files fresh application for demarcation under section 107 in future he/she may be considered and allowed. The case file be consigned to the General Record Room DHQs Solan after due completion all codal formalities.”

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Pertinently, demarcation of boundaries is governed by

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Section 107 of the H.P. Land Revenue Act, 1954, which reads as

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under: -

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“107. Power of Revenue Officers to define boundaries.- (1) A Revenue Officer may, for the purpose of framing any record or making any assessment under this Act or on the application of any person interested, define the limits of any estate, or of any holding, field or other portion of an estate, and may, for the purpose of indicating those limits, require survey marks to be erected or repaired.

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(2) In defining the limits of any land under sub-section (1) the Revenue Officer may, cause survey-marks to be erected on any boundary already determined by, or by order of any Court, Revenue Officer or Forest Settlement Officer, or restore any survey-marks already set up by, or by order of any Court or any such Officer.

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(3) The Revenue Officer shall define the limits of boundaries mentioned in sub-section (1) by conducting measurements on the basis of the method of surveys used during the last settlement that

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is by triangulation system or square system or electronic total station system of measurement etc. as the case may be.

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(4) The Revenue Officer shall decide the proceeding of defining the boundaries within two months from the date of filing of application thereof:

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Provided that for the reasons to be recorded in writing the time period may be extended by one month.

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(5) If the Revenue officer fails to decide the case within the extended period, the proceedings shall not become invalid for final adjudication merely on the ground of lapse of the stipulated period. However the Revenue officer shall submit a report in the manner as may be prescribed citing reasons for such delay to the officer under whose control he is subjected to and after considering the report and examining the record, if the Controlling Officer is satisfied that there were valid and genuine reasons for delay in deciding the case he may accept the report with no further action. In case the Controlling officer is not satisfied with the report, he shall submit his observations to the Government for such action and in such manner as may be prescribed. Against the erring officer.

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(6) If the Revenue Officer fails to submit a report required under sub-section (5), he shall be liable for an action under relevant service rules applicable to such officer after following due procedure.

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(7) If all the interested parties have agreed to and accepted the limits defined by the Revenue officer under sub-section (1) and objections have not been raised by any of the interested party during the proceedings, no appeal shall lie against the order of the Revenue Officer in such prceedings.”

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The concerned Revenue Officer, in the instant case, did

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not conclude the demarcation proceedings in terms of Section 107 of the H.P. Land Revenue Act, 1954. Further, Clause 10.9 of Chapter

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10 under the heading ‘Demarcation of Boundaries’ of the Himachal

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Pradesh Land Records Manual provides that the Revenue Officer shall pass a final order on the demarcation application in presence of the parties. It is for this reason that an order passed under Section 107 of the Himachal Pradesh Land Revenue Act has been made appealable under Section 14 of the H.P. Land Revenue Act, 1954. Such an order is required to be based upon facts and supported by reasons. Clause 10.9 reads as under: -

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“10.9 Revenue Officer shall pass the final orders on demarcation application in the presence of the parties As the order passed under Section 107 of Himachal Pradesh land Revenue Act by a Revenue Officer is appealable under Section 14 of the Act, the order should be perfect and based upon facts and reasonings.”

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The order passed by the Assistant Collector Second

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Grade, Solan on 23.01.2024 confirming the demarcation dated 09.07.2014 is bereft of any reason, save and except that the demarcation file was too old and it was not possible to hear the parties at such belated stage. For that reason, the authority accepted the demarcation dated 09.07.2014. and also ordered for giving liberty to the petitioner/objector to apply again for demarcation, which application was to be considered & allowed. On the basis of such confirmation order passed by the Assistant Collector Second Grade, the petitioner cannot be said to be an encroacher/beneficiary of encroachment over the land in question so as to attract disqualification under Section 8(2)(l) of the H.P. Municipal

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Corporation Act, 1994. The confirmation order passed by the Assistant Collector Second Grade on 23.01.2024 was illegal, contrary to the provisions of the H.P. Land Revenue Act, 1954 as also the H.P. Land Records Manual, and in breach of the principles of natural justice. The petitioner/his family members who presumably were not even aware of the passing of the confirmation order, stand denied the opportunity to assail such order, which entails serious adverse consequences. In the statement of petitioner’s father recorded on 09.07.2014, inter alia besides referring to a previous demarcation request for demarcation of his own adjoining land, prayer was made to keep the demarcation proceedings in abeyance till the decision of the case for resumption of the land, which according to him had been favourably recommended by the competent authority. There cannot be said to an ‘encroachment’ over the Government land on the basis of above order so as to attract bar of disqualification. All these aspects have not been considered by respondent No.2.

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5. For the foregoing reasons, keeping in view the specific facts & circumstances of the case, and considering the provisions of H.P. Municipal Corporation Act, 1994, the impugned order dated 04.05.2026 rejecting petitioner’s nomination cannot be sustained and is accordingly quashed and set aside. Consequences shall follow. It is, however, made clear that the election programme as notified on

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21

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( 2026:HHC:15493 )

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21.04.2026 shall not be deviated from or hampered in any manner

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whatsoever.

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The instant petition to stand disposed of in above terms. All pending miscellaneous application(s) to also stand disposed of.

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Jyotsna Rewal Dua Judge