Laxmi Pradhan Vs State

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2026:HHC:29444-DB

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IN THE HIGH COURT OF HIMACHAL PRADESH, SHIMLA

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CWP No.2028 of 2011

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Decided on: 18^th July, 2026

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------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- Laxmi Pradhan …..Petitioner

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Versus

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State of H.P. and others .....Respondents

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Coram

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Ms. Justice Jyotsna Rewal Dua

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Whether approved for reporting?¹

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For the Petitioner: Mr. Ajay Sharma, Senior Advocate with Mr. Tarun Brakta, Advocate.

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For the Respondents: Mr. Y.P.S. Dhaulta, Additional Advocate General, for respondents No.1 and 2.

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Mr. Abhinav Thakur, Advocate vice Mr. Jeevesh Sharma, Advocate, for respondent No.3.

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Respondents No.4 and 5 stand deleted.

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Jyotsna Rewal Dua, Judge

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Petitioner is a subsequent purchaser of the land that was granted by the respondent-State to the predecessor of respondent No.3. She has laid challenge to the order dated 27.12.1999 passed by respondent No.2,

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holding that the original grantee was not eligible for the

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1 Whether reporters of print and electronic media may be allowed to see the order? Yes.

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2

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2026:HHC:29444-DB

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grant of land. Accordingly, patta issued in favour of the original grantee was cancelled and withdrawn. The land in question was ordered to be resumed by the State Government free from all encumbrances with further direction to the State to take possession of the land.

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2. Respondent No.3 is son of late Sh. Mathru. On 13.08.1975, the Sub-Divisional Officer (Civil) Theog, District Shimla sanctioned land comprised in Khasra No.427/61/3, measuring 5 bighas, situated at Mauza Bago-Sandhu, Tehsil Theog, District Shimla in favour of Sh. Mathru under the Himachal Pradesh Grant of Nautor Land to Landless and other eligible persons Scheme, 1975 (in short ‘Scheme’). Mutation was attested in favour of the grantee on 26.06.1977. On the basis of a complaint moved by respondent No.5, a case was registered in the year 1999 to verify as to whether the above described land was sold by the original grantee to respondent No.4 in contravention to the provisions of the Scheme and also to verify as to whether the original grantee had cultivated the land within the two years’ period as provided in the Scheme. Vide impugned order dated 27.12.1999, respondent No.2-the Deputy Commissioner, Shimla held that:-

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3

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(i). The grantee was not an eligible person as per the provisions of the Scheme at the time the land was allotted to him.

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(ii). The subject land had been alienated to respondent No.3 before the period of 20 years stipulated under the Scheme, thereby violating the provisions of para 11 of the Scheme.

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Petitioner had purchased the subject land from respondent No.4 under sale deed No.241, registered on 17.06.1998. Feeling aggrieved against the aforesaid order passed by respondent No.2, she has preferred this writ petition. Petitioner is still stated to be in possession of the subject land.

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3. Heard learned counsel for the parties and considered the case file.

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4. The first reason given by respondent No.2, ordering resumption of the subject land in favour of the State Government, cannot be held to be justified. The land was granted to the predecessor of respondent No.3 under the Scheme on 13.08.1975. It is not the case of the respondent-State that at the time of grant of land, the grantee had concealed any information or projected some false facts before the State in order to seek the grant. Respondent No.2 has relied upon following Clause 9-A of

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4

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the Scheme to conclude that in case grantee was not eligible for allotment of the land, then such grant (allotment of land) could be cancelled at any time as and when the illegality comes to the notice of the competent authority:-

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“9-A. -Revision;- If at any time, it comes to the notice of the Deputy Commissioner either through an application made by any person or otherwise, that the allotment of any land under this scheme was made to a person who was not entitled or eligible for such allotment or the allotment was wrong on any other grounds, he may call for the record of the case and after making such enquiries as he thinks proper in person or through a Revenue Officer subordinate to him and after giving an opportunity to the parties concerned, he may cancel the grant of land and make such other orders in connection therewith as he deems necessary in the circumstances of the case.”

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The above clause cannot be read in abstract

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terms to hold that ‘anytime’ would include any indefinite period whatsoever. The clause though empowers the Deputy Commissioner to take appropriate action in accordance with law once it comes to his notice that the person concerned was not entitled or eligible for allotment, to cancel the grant of land and to pass such other orders as deemed necessary in the circumstances of the case, however, such power is not an absolute power to be exercised without any regard to limitation of time for exercise of such power.

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5

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Hon’ble Apex Court in Joint Collector Ranga

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Reddy District and another Versus D. Narsing Rao and

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others² held that the competent authorities cannot alter or reopen long standing land records after an inordinate delay, even if there is no explicitly prescribed time limit in the governing statute. Hon’ble Apex Court reiterated the decision in Ibrahimpatnam Taluk Vyavasaya Collie Sangham v. K. Suresh Reddy³ that statutory powers exercisable ‘at any time’ must be exercised within a reasonable period, preventing arbitrary interference with long-settled land rights. Relevant portion from the decision reads as under:-

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“12.5. In the decision in Ibrahimpatnam Taluk Vyavasaya Coolie Sangham vs. K. Suresh Reddy and others this Court while dealing with suo motu power of revision under Section 50-B(4) of the Andhra Pradesh (Telangana Area) Tenancy and Agricultural Land Act, 1950 held as follows: (SCC pp. 676-77, para 9)

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“9. …… In the absence of necessary and sufficient particulars pleaded as regards fraud and the date or period of discovery of fraud and more so when the contention that the suo motu power could be exercised within a reasonable period from the date of discovery of fraud was not urged, the learned Single Judge as well as the Division Bench of the High Court were right in not examining the question of fraud alleged to have been committed by the non-official respondents. Use of the words ‘at any time’ in sub-section (4) of Section 50-B of the Act only indicates that no specific period of limitation is prescribed within which the suo motu

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2 (2015) 3 SCC 695

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3 (2003) 7 SCC 667

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2026:HHC:29444-DB

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power could be exercised reckoning or starting from a particular date advisedly and contextually. Exercise of suo motu power depended on facts and circumstances of each case. In cases of fraud, this power could be exercised within a reasonable time from the date of detection or discovery of fraud. While exercising such power, several factors need to be kept in mind such as effect on the rights of the third parties over the immovable property due to passage of considerable time, change of hands by subsequent bona fide transfers, the orders attaining finality under the provisions of other Acts (such as the Land Ceiling Act). Hence, it appears that without stating from what date the period of limitation starts and within what period the suo motu power is to be exercised, in sub-section (4) of Section 50-B of the Act, the words “at any time” are used so that the suo motu power could be exercised within reasonable period from the date of discovery of fraud depending on facts and circumstances of each case in the context of the statute and nature of rights of the parties. Use of the words ‘at any time’ in sub-section (4) of Section 50-B of the Act cannot be rigidly read letter by letter. It must be read and construed contextually and reasonably. If one has to simply proceed on the basis of the dictionary meaning of the words ‘at any time’, the suo motu power under subsection (4) of Section 50-B of the Act could be exercised even after decades and then it would lead to anomalous position leading to uncertainty and complications seriously affecting the rights of the parties, that too, over immovable properties. Orders attaining finality and certainty of the rights of the parties accrued in the light of the orders passed must have sanctity. Exercise of suo motu power at any time only means that no specific period such as days, months or years are not prescribed reckoning from a particular date. But that does not mean that at any time should be unguided and arbitrary. In this view, ‘at any time’ must be understood as within a reasonable time depending on the facts and circumstances of each case in the absence of prescribed period of limitation.”

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In the instant case, the land was allotted to the

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predecessor of respondent No.3 under the Scheme on 13.08.1975. Power to cancel the allotment was exercised in the year 1999. This was too late in the day for the respondent-State to exercise such power. There would be situations where after the prescribed prohibition period under the Scheme, the grantee would have lawfully transferred the land, thereby creating third party rights. It cannot be held that power under Clause 9-A of the Scheme, can be exercised without any regard of time, whatsoever or even after the prohibition period gets over. The power is exercisable within a reasonable time depending upon the attending facts and circumstances of the case. In the instant case, after about 25 years of the allotment of land (sanction of grant) in favour of the predecessor of respondent No.3, it was not open for respondent No.2 to hold in purported exercise of powers under Clause 9-A of the Scheme that the predecessor of respondent No.3 was not eligible for the allotment. By this time ownership of land had also undergone change.

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The second reason assigned by respondent No.2 for ordering resumption of the land in favour of the State is the transfer apparently effected by the grantee in favour of

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2026:HHC:29444-DB

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respondent No.4 prior to the prohibited 20 years period stipulated in the Scheme. Clause 11 of the Scheme that has been relied by respondent No.2 for ordering resumption of the subject land in favour of the respondent-State reads as

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under:-

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“11. Restriction on transfer.- The grantee shall not transfer the land granted under this Scheme to any person within a period of 20 years from the date of taking over possession of the land by him. In the event of contravention of the provisions of this para the grant shall be liable to be resumed by the State Government and no further allotment of land should be made to him thereafter. Similarly if he fails to break up the land within a period of 2 years from the date of taking over of the possession the grant shall be liable to be resumed:

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Provided that the land granted under this scheme shall not be subject to fragmentation by way of partition, transfer or by any other mean. The Revenue Officer shall record these conditions in the mutation orders to be passed by him. His orders shall further be recorded in the remarks column of the jamabandi in which the mutation pertaining to the land is incorporated.

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Provided the allottee may transfer the land by way of mortgage without possession in favour of Primary Agricultural Cooperative Credit Society, a Bank as defined in the H.P. Agricultural Credit Operations and Miscellaneous provisions (Banks) Act 1972 (Act No.7 of 1973) for the purpose of raising loans for development of such land, raising of crops, purchase of bullocks, seed and fertilizers etc. for bringing the land under cultivation.”

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It is not in dispute that period of 20 years was

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incorporated in Clause 11 vide notification dated

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09.12.1987. The notification thus came much after the land

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was allotted to the predecessor of respondent No.3, i.e. 13.08.1975. By the time, period of 20 years was substituted in Clause 11 of the Scheme, the mutation of the subject land had also been attested in favour of the predecessor of respondent No.3, i.e. on 26.06.1977.

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Pursuant to the orders passed in this writ petition from time to time, respondent-State has placed on record instructions dated 16.04.2026, 29.05.2026 and 16.06.2026. In terms of these instructions, prohibited period of 20 years, during which the grantee could not alienate/transfer the nautor land, was incorporated in Clause 11 of the 1975 Scheme vide notification dated 09.12.1987. The said notification was clarified vide office letter dated 02.12.1991 issued by the Financial Commissioner-cum-Secretary (Revenue) to the Government of Himachal Pradesh, conveying that prohibition qua transfer of nautor land for a period of 20 years imposed vide notification dated 09.12.1987, would have prospective operation, i.e. on the lands allotted after the issuance of notification and not qua the lands allotted before the notification dated 09.12.1987. It is further to be noticed that the revenue record of the subject land appended alongwith the office instructions does not contain any note

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(red entry), reflecting prohibition of transfer of such land for a period of 20 years. It is the admitted case of the parties that at the time of grant of land to the predecessor of respondent No.3, restriction on transfer imposed vide Clause 11 of the Scheme was for a period of 15 years. This 15 years’ period from the date of grant ended on 12.08.1990. The subject land was admittedly transferred by the predecessor of respondent No.3 after the expiry of 15 years period. Thus, the second reason assigned for ordering resumption of land in favour of the State also does not hold good.

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5. For the foregoing reasons, this writ petition is allowed. Impugned order dated 27.12.1999 passed by respondent No.2 is quashed and set aside. Pending miscellaneous application(s), if any, also stand disposed of.

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Jyotsna Rewal Dua July 18, 2026 Judge Mukesh

Laxmi Pradhan v. State

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Laxmi Pradhan v. State

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