Shiva Educational Society Vs the State of Hp and Another

Petitioner questions the decision of the respondents in refusing to grant it Letter of Intent (LOI)/ No Objection Certificate (NOC) for establishing Multipurpose Health Worker (Male) [MPHW(M)] Training Institute as being arbitrary, discriminatory and nonspeaking.

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2. Heard and considered the case file.

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2(i). The respondent- State notified a policy on 31.08.2023 regarding start of MPHW(M) Training Courses in the State in private sector. Pursuant to this policy, notice inviting Expression of Interest (EOI)/ Letter of Intent

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1 Whether reporters of print and electronic media may be allowed to see the order? Yes.

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for opening MPHW(M) Training Institutions in private sector was circulated and applications were invited. The policy spelt out eligibility conditions for applying, minimum requirement of land, transport, infrastructure facilities, trainer faculty and other ancillary factors etc. 2(ii). Petitioner, on 30.10.2023, applied for grant of NOC/ permission to establish MPHW(M) Training Institute at Village Luhnoo Kanatian, P.O. Chandpur, District Bilaspur, H.P. The requisite documents alongwith prescribed fee also submitted alongwith application. Detailed Project Report of the proposed institution of the petitioner was also made part of the application. The date of applying for running the training course was extended by the respondents upto 12.02.2024. Certain clauses of the policy were also amended by the respondents during this period.

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2(iii). On 20.07.2024, the Inspection Committee as also the Evaluation Committee were constituted to inspect and evaluate the proposal of the applicants for starting the institutes in question. The report submitted by the Inspection Committee regarding petitioner’s institute was evaluated by the Evaluation Committee. The Evaluation Committee on 25.07.2024 recommended the

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petitioner institute for issuance of LOI for establishment/ opening of MPHW(M) Training Course.

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2(iv). The office letter dated 04.09.2024 makes it evident that apart from petitioner’s institute, two other institutes namely, Dogra Institute, Village Mehan, P.O. Chandpur, Tehsil Sadar, District Bilaspur and Adarsh Training Institute Amarpur, Ghumarwin, District Bilaspur, H.P. were also recommended for running the training course in question in District Bilaspur.

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2(v). On 13.05.2025, the Principal Secretary, Health to the Government of Himachal Pradesh- respondent No.1 conveyed the decision of the Council of Ministers that before proceeding further in the matter of granting LOI for starting MPHW(M) Training Course in private sector in the State, the department may examine employment opportunities of the course in question in the State as also in the Country. The department was also to intimate the retirement status for the next three years of the incumbents working in the department. The petitioner assailed this decision by instituting Shiva Educational

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Society versus State of H.P² . The writ petition was disposed of as under:-

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“By way of this petition, the petitioner has, inter alia, prayed for the following reliefs:-

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2CWP No.8259/2025, decided on 25.08.2025.

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“A) That writ may kindly be allowed and the communication dated 13.5.2025 contained in Annexure P-11 may kindly be quashed and set aside and the decision contained therein may kindly be declared as null and void. B) That the respondent No.1 may kindly be directed to issue Letter of Intent (LOI) to the petitioner institute to establish Shiv Multipurpose Health Worker (Male) Training Institute at Village Luhnoo Kanatain, PO Chandpur, Distt. Bilaspur and for starting up MPHW(M) course.”

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I have heard learned Counsel for the petitioner as well as learned Advocate General. 3. Learned Advocate General informs the Court that the position as it is today is that the matter has been discussed by the Cabinet and it has been decided that call thereupon will either be taken by the Cabinet or the highest Authority within some reasonable time. He submits that needful is likely to be done within six weeks.

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Learned Counsel for the petitioner submits that whereas permission has not been granted to the petitioner, on the pretext that the decision has to be taken by the Cabinet. Institutions similarly situated as the petitioner have already been granted permission that that too in the month of September, 2024.

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Be that as it may, having perused the impugned order (Annexure P-11), this Court is of the considered view that to some extent the petition is pre-mature. In terms of Annexure P-11, the case of the petitioner has not been rejected by the Authority, but it has been intimated that taking into consideration the larger picture, the Government intends to take a decision with regard to feasibility of granting permission to such kind of Institution to crop up in the State of Himachal Pradesh.

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In the light of the statement of the learned Advocate General that the Government of Himachal Pradesh is already seized of the matter, this petition is closed with the direction that whatever has to be done at the end of the State be positively done within a period of three weeks from

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today and appropriate decision be taken in the case of the petitioner accordingly.

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The petition stands disposed of, in above terms. Pending miscellaneous application(s), if any also stand disposed of accordingly.”

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2(vi). The documents appended with the writ petition (Annexure P-13) are to the effect that the respondentdepartment received 36 proposals from private institutions for running MPHW(M) course, out of which, 27 proposals were found fit by the Inspection/Evaluation Committee and were also recommended by the Director, Medical Education & Research, H.P. The name of the petitioner figures at Sr. No.21 in the list of institutions found fit & recommended for opening MPHW(M) Training Institute. Out of 27 proposals including that of petitioner, recommended for issuance of LOI, the State conveyed its approval on 04.09.2025 in favour of four institutions that figured at Sr. Nos. 6, 12, 11 & 7 of the list. The noting sheets obtained by the petitioner under Right to Information Act reveal that pursuant to the directions issued in Shiva Educational Society² , the respondents also considered petitioner’s case for issuance of LOI/opening of MPHW(M) Training Institute. It has come in the reply filed by the respondents that petitioner’s institute was “not approved” by the Council of Ministers in the meeting convened on 15.09.2025.

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2(vii). With the above background facts, petitioner has instituted this writ petition seeking directions to respondent No.1 to issue LOI in its favour for establishing MPHW(M) Training Institute at Village Luhnoo Kanatian, P.O. Chandpur, District Bilaspur, H.P.

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3. Learned counsel for the petitioner submitted that apart from four institutions (mentioned in para-2 (vi) above), the Competent Authority had approved five more institutes figuring at Sr. Nos, 1, 8, 14, 22 & 24 in the list of 27 proposals found fit by the Inspection Committee/ Evaluation Committee for opening MPHW(M) Training Institute. The decision of the Competent Authority was thereafter placed before the Council of Ministers and expost facto approval was granted in favour of these five additional institutes. Thus, in all, LOI has been sanctioned in favour of 04+05= 09 institutes in the State for starting the MPHW(M) course. Learned counsel for the petitioner submits that action of the respondents in not issuing LOI/ NOC in petitioner’s favour for opening/ establishing MPHW(M) Training Institute sets out clear line of arbitrariness. The respondents have discriminatively acted in the matter. Petitioner’s case has been rejected by an arbitrary exercise of power without passing any speaking order. Opposing this, learned Assistant Advocate

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General reiterated the pleaded defence of the respondents and highlighted that Cabinet has taken the impugned decision in accordance with law.

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4. Under the policy notified on 31.08.2023, no criteria has been fixed by the respondents as to how many institutes for running MPHW(M) Training Course are to be opened, in which districts these are to be established and the basis for selecting/approving the applications recommended by the Inspection/Evaluation Committee for starting the institutes. The policy does not throw any light as to how to move forward in situation where multiple applicants apply for grant of NOC/LOI in one particular district and their names are recommended by Inspection/Evaluation Committee. The policy does not explain whether approval/LOI/NOC can be withheld from duly recommended institutes, or the parameters thereof to be considered or the process and procedure to be followed for restricting issuance of LOI for establishing MPHW(M) Training Courses. There is nothing on record to show that any such criteria was even followed by the respondents while processing the applications of those institutes which were found eligible and fit for establishing MPHW(M) Training Institute. Nothing has come on record as to why out of 27 proposals

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which were found fit by the respective Inspection/Evaluation Committees, the respondents chose to grant LOI/ NOC only in favour of 04+05=09 institutes. In fact five additional institutions were approved by the Competent Authority on 17.09.2025 which were later on, granted ex-post facto approval by the Council of Ministers. The basis of considering only these 09 institutions for running Training Course has not come forth. There cannot be absolute power to be exercised in whimsical manner without regard to well established principles of law and procedure. Learned counsel for the petitioner has also pointed out that 02 out of these 09 institutes to whom LOI has been granted, figured at Sr. Nos. 11 & 12 of the list and were not otherwise found completely compliant with laid down conditions of the policy dated 31.08.2023. The case of the petitioner, despite there being directions in Shiva Educational Society,² has been rejected by the respondent simply as ‘not approved’. No reasons have been assigned for rejecting petitioner’s case. In the given facts and circumstances, it is apt to reiterate well settled principles that reasons are hallmark of the decision. In State Project Director, U.P. Education for all Project

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Board and others ,³ Hon’ble Apex Court reiterated that a

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judgment cannot be sustained in absence of reasons. Relevant paras are as under:-

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“4. We are of the opinion that in the absence of any reasoning in the impugned judgment, the same cannot be sustained. In this regard, we are benefitted by the following observations made by this Court in CCT v. Shukla & Bros., (2010) 4 SCC 785. The relevant paragraphs of the judgment are extracted hereinbelow: -

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“23. We are not venturing to comment upon the correctness or otherwise of the contentions of law raised before the High Court in the present petition, but it was certainly expected of the High Court to record some kind of reasons for rejecting the revision petition filed by the Department at the very threshold. A litigant has a legitimate expectation of knowing reasons for rejection of his claim/prayer. It is then alone, that a party would be in a position to challenge the order on appropriate grounds. Besides, this would be for the benefit of the higher or the appellate court. As arguments bring things hidden and obscure to the light of reasons, reasoned judgment where the law and factual matrix of the case is discussed, provides lucidity and foundation for conclusions or exercise of judicial discretion by the courts. 24. Reason is the very life of law. When the reason of a law once ceases, the law itself generally ceases (Wharton's Law Lexicon). Such is the significance of reasoning in any rule of law. Giving reasons furthers the cause of justice as well as avoids uncertainty. As a matter of fact it helps in the observance of law of precedent. Absence of reasons on the contrary essentially introduces an element of uncertainty, dissatisfaction and give entirely different dimensions to the questions of law

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3(2024) 12 SCC 609,

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raised before the higher/appellate courts. In our view, the court should provide its own grounds and reasons for rejecting claim/prayer of a party whether at the very threshold i.e. at admission stage or after regular hearing, howsoever concise they may be.

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We would reiterate the principle that when reasons are announced and can be weighed, the public can have assurance that process of correction is in place and working. It is the requirement of law that correction process of judgments should not only appear to be implemented but also seem to have been properly implemented. Reasons for an order would ensure and enhance public confidence and would provide due satisfaction to the consumer of justice under our justice dispensation system. It may not be very correct in law to say, that there is a qualified duty imposed upon the courts to record reasons.

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Our procedural law and the established practice, in fact, imposes unqualified obligation upon the courts to record reasons. There is hardly any statutory provision under the Income Tax Act or under the Constitution itself requiring recording of reasons in the judgments but it is no more res integra and stands unequivocally settled by different judgments of this Court holding that the courts and tribunals are required to pass reasoned judgments/orders. In fact, Order 14 Rule 2 read with Order 20 Rule 1 of the Code of Civil Procedure requires that, the court should record findings on each issue and such findings which obviously should be reasoned would form part of the judgment, which in turn would be the basis for writing a decree of the court.

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By practice adopted in all courts and by virtue of judge-made law, the concept of reasoned judgment has become an indispensable part of basic rule of law and, in fact, is a mandatory requirement of the

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procedural law. Clarity of thoughts leads to clarity of vision and proper reasoning is the foundation of a just and fair decision. In Alexander Machinery (Dudley) Ltd., 1974 ICR 120 (NIRC) there are apt observations in this regard to say “failure to give reasons amounts to denial of justice”. Reasons are the real live links to the administration of justice. With respect we will contribute to this view. There is a rationale, logic and purpose behind a reasoned judgment. A reasoned judgment is primarily written to clarify own thoughts; communicate the reasons for the decision to the concerned and to provide and ensure that such reasons can be appropriately considered by the appellate/higher court. Absence of reasons thus would lead to frustrate the very object stated hereinabove.”

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Kranti Associates Private Limited and another versus Masood Ahmed Khan and others,⁴

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inter- alia holds that even administrative decisions should

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record reasons if they cause prejudice:-

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“47. Summarizing the above discussion, this Court holds:

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(a). In India the judicial trend has always been to record reasons, even in administrative decisions, if such decisions affect anyone prejudicially.

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(b). A quasi-judicial authority must record reasons in support of its conclusions.

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(c). Insistence on recording of reasons is meant to serve the wider principle of justice that justice must not only be done it must also appear to be done as well.

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(d). Recording of reasons also operates as a valid restraint on any possible arbitrary exercise of judicial and quasi-judicial or even administrative power.

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(e). Reasons reassure that discretion has been exercised by the decision maker on relevant grounds and by disregarding extraneous considerations.

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4(2010)9 SCC 496,

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(f). Reasons have virtually become as indispensable a component of a decision making process as observing principles of natural justice by judicial, quasi-judicial and even by administrative bodies.

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(g). Reasons facilitate the process of judicial review by superior Courts.

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(h). The ongoing judicial trend in all countries committed to rule of law and constitutional governance is in favour of reasoned decisions based on relevant facts. This is virtually the life blood of judicial decision making justifying the principle that reason is the soul of justice.

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(i). Judicial or even quasi-judicial opinions these days can be as different as the judges and authorities who deliver them. All these decisions serve one common purpose which is to demonstrate by reason that the relevant factors have been objectively considered. This is important for sustaining the litigants' faith in the justice delivery system.

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(j). Insistence on reason is a requirement for both judicial accountability and transparency.

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(k). If a Judge or a quasi-judicial authority is not candid enough about his/her decision making process then it is impossible to know whether the person deciding is faithful to the doctrine of precedent or to principles of incrementalism.

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(l). Reasons in support of decisions must be cogent, clear and succinct. A pretence of reasons or `rubberstamp reasons' is not to be equated with a valid decision making process.

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(m). It cannot be doubted that transparency is the sine qua non of restraint on abuse of judicial powers. Transparency in decision making not only makes the judges and decision makers less prone to errors but also makes them subject to broader scrutiny. (See David Shapiro in Defence of Judicial Candor, (1987) 1100 Harvard law Review 731-37)

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(n). Since the requirement to record reasons emanates from the broad doctrine of fairness in decision making, the said requirement is now virtually a component of human rights and was considered part of Strasbourg Jurisprudence. See Rioz Tproka v. Spain, (1994) 19 EHRR 553 EHRR. at 562 para 29 and Anya v. University of Oxford,2001 EWCA Cov 405(CA), wherein the Court referred to Article 6 of European Convention of Human Rights

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which requires, "adequate and intelligent reasons must be given for judicial decisions".

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(o). In all common law jurisdictions judgments play a vital role in setting up precedents for the future. Therefore, for development of law, requirement of giving reasons for the decision is of the essence and is virtually a part of "Due Process".

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In Assistant Commissioner, Commercial Tax Department, Works Contract and Leasing, Kota

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versus Shukla Brothers⁵ , the Hon’ble Supreme Court reiterated that administrative process will best be vindicated by clarity in its exercise. It was further held that the distinction between passing of an order by an administrative or quasi-judicial authority has practically extinguished and both are required to pass reasoned orders. The relevant paras are as under:-

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The Supreme Court in the case of S.N. Mukherjee v. Union of India, while referring to the practice adopted and insistence placed by the Courts in United States, emphasized the importance of recording of reasons for decisions by the administrative authorities and tribunals. It said "administrative process will best be vindicated by clarity in its exercise". To enable the Courts to exercise the power of review in consonance with settled principles, the authorities are advised of the considerations underlining the action under review. This Court with approval stated:-

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"the orderly functioning of the process of review requires that the grounds upon which the administrative agency acted be clearly disclosed and adequately sustained."

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12. xxx

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At the cost of repetition, we may notice, that this Court has consistently taken the view that recording of reasons is an essential feature of

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5(2010) 4 SCC 785.

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dispensation of justice. A litigant who approaches the Court with any grievance in accordance with law is entitled to know the reasons for grant or rejection of his prayer. Reasons are the soul of orders. Non-recording of reasons could lead to dual infirmities; firstly, it may cause prejudice to the affected party and secondly, more particularly, hamper the proper administration of justice. These principles are not only applicable to administrative or executive actions, but they apply with equal force and, in fact, with a greater degree of precision to judicial pronouncements. A judgment without reasons causes prejudice to the person against whom it is pronounced, as that litigant is unable to know the ground which weighed with the Court in rejecting his claim and also causes impediments in his taking adequate and appropriate grounds before the higher Court in the event of challenge to that judgment. Now, we may refer to certain judgments of this Court as well as of the High Courts which have taken this view. 14. The principle of natural justice has twin ingredients; firstly, the person who is likely to be adversely affected by the action of the authorities should be given notice to show cause thereof and granted an opportunity of hearing and secondly, the orders so passed by the authorities should give reason for arriving at any conclusion showing proper application of mind. Violation of either of them could in the given facts and circumstances of the case, vitiate the order itself. Such rule being applicable to the administrative authorities certainly requires that the judgment of the Court should meet with this requirement with higher degree of satisfaction. The order of an administrative authority may not provide reasons like a judgment but the order must be supported by the reasons of rationality. The distinction between passing of an order by an administrative or quasi-judicial authority has practically extinguished and both are required to pass reasoned orders.”

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Respondents may not have acted as quasijudicial authority while rejecting petitioner’s case but considering the factual background of the case where there is no reflection whatsoever of the reasons for

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rejection of petitioner’s application, where there is nothing on record to figure out as to why the respondents have granted LOI in favour of some institutes and refused to the petitioner; where no criteria for grant of LOI or restricting it to the institutes to whom it has been granted has come forth, it has to be held that there cannot be an arbitrary exercise of power in favour of some & denial qua others. There is no absolute power with the respondents to be exercised in a discriminative manner without even giving the reasons for such discrimination. It is well settled that arbitrariness is antithetical to equality and any arbitrary State action violates Article 14 of the Constitution of India.

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For the foregoing reasons, the decision of the respondents in not granting Letter of Intent/ No Objection Certificate in favour of the petitioner’s institute for establishing/ running MPHW(M) Training Course is setaside. Respondent No.1/ Competent Authority is directed to consider the case of the petitioner afresh on its own merits in accordance with law keeping in view the observations made herein as also keeping in view the approvals granted to 09 institutions. This exercise be now carried out within three weeks. The copy of order so passed be also communicated to the petitioner.

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The writ petition stands disposed of in the

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above terms, so also the pending miscellaneous

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application(s), if any.

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Jyotsna Rewal Dua July 10, 2026 Judge yogesh

Shiva Educational Society v. the State of Hp and Another

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Shiva Educational Society v. the State of Hp and Another

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