Uchechukwau Emmanuel Vs State of Hp

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2026:HHC:29469

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IN THE HIGH COURT OF HIMACHAL PRADESH, SHIMLA

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Cr. MP(M) No. 901 of 2026 Reserved on: 17.07.2026 Decided on: 20.07.2026

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Uchechukwau Emmanuel …. Petitioner Versus State of HP …. Respondent

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Coram

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Hon’ble Mr Justice Rakesh Kainthla , Judge. Whether approved for reporting?¹ No. For the Petitioner : Mr Vishal Singh Thakur, Advocate. For the Respondent/State : Mr Ajit Sharma, Deputy Advocate General.

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Rakesh Kainthla, Judge

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The petitioner has filed the present petition seeking

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regular bail in FIR No. 28 of 2024 registered at Police Station, Nahan, District Sirmaur, for the commission of offences punishable under Sections 21, 22 and 29 of the Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances Act (NDPS Act).

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It has been asserted that the matter was listed on

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03.06.2026 and 04.06.2026 for recording the statements of

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1 Whether reporters of Local Papers may be allowed to see the judgment? Yes.

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prosecution witnesses. The prosecution failed to complete the evidence. The petitioner had earlier filed bail petitions, which were registered as CrMP (M) No. 19 of 2025 and Cr.MP(M) No. 2552 of 2025, and were dismissed on 05.05.2025 and 23.01.2026. The petitioner has not been involved in the commission of any other offence, and this is the first offence registered against him. No fruitful purpose would be served by detaining the petitioner in custody. The petitioner would abide by the terms and conditions that the Court may impose. Hence, it was prayed that the present petition be allowed and the petitioner be released on bail.

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The petition is opposed by filing a status report asserting that the police were on patrolling duty on 20.02.2024. They received secret information at about 6:20 p.m. that Roshan Lal was transporting the intoxicating drugs in his vehicle bearing registration No. HR12Y-8814, and a huge quantity of capsules could be recovered by its search. The police reduced the information into writing and sent it to the Superintendent of Police, Nahan. The police joined Harish and Harinder and set up a Nakka. A vehicle bearing registration No. HR-12Y-8814 reached the spot. The police stopped the vehicle. Roshan Lal was driving

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it. The police recovered 960 capsules of Parivon Spas Plus containing Tramadol and a polythene containing 22.92 grams of heroin. The police seized the heroin and capsules and arrested the driver, Roshan Lal, who revealed that he had purchased the heroin and capsules from Tej Pratap. The police checked the mobile phone of Roshan Lal and found the financial transaction with 15-20 persons through Google Pay. Roshan Lal had paid ₹60,000/-in cash and the other amount by Google Pay to Tej Pratap. The police found the transaction of ₹6,05,000/- between the mobile number used by Roshan Lal and Tej Pratap. The police obtained the call detail record and the customer application form, and the mobile number xxxx xx7649 was found registered in the name of Neetu Devi, and the mobile number xxxx xx5555 was found registered in the name of Tej Partap. The location of these mobile numbers was found to be at Ambala on 15.02.2024. The police arrested Tej Pratap. He produced his vehicle bearing registration No. HR-85F-0550. Tej Pratap revealed during interrogation that he had purchased the heroin from some Foreign Nationals. He also disclosed the place from where he had purchased the heroin. The police arrested Uchechukwau Emmanual (the present petitioner) with a carry bag containing

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32.45 grams of heroin. The police also arrested Rajwinder Kaur and Nitu Devi, the owners of the accounts, which were used for the transfer of money. The police filed the charge sheet before the Court. Prosecution has cited 44 witnesses, out of whom 22 have been examined and the matter is listed on 02.09.2026 and 03.09.2026 for recording the statements of prosecution witnesses. The petitioner can abscond in case of his release on bail. Hence, the status report.

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I have heard Mr Vishal Singh Thakur, learned counsel for the petitioner and Mr Ajit Sharma, learned Deputy Advocate General for the respondent/State.

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Mr Vishal Singh Thakur, learned counsel for the petitioner, submitted that the petitioner has remained behind bars for about 2 years. The police had recovered 32.45 grams of heroin from the petitioner, as per the prosecution. The petitioner has undergone a substantial part of the imprisonment that can be awarded to him in case of his conviction. The petitioner's right to a speedy trial is being violated. Therefore, he prayed that the present petition be allowed and the petitioner be released on bail.

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Mr Ajit Sharma, learned Deputy Advocate General for the respondent/State, submitted that the petitioner was found to be the main drug supplier. The petitioner is a resident of Nigeria and would abscond if released on bail. This would compromise the fair trial. Hence, he prayed that the present petition be dismissed.

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I have given considerable thought to the submissions made at the bar and have gone through the records carefully.

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It is undisputed that the petitioner had filed two bail petitions, which were listed as Cr.MP(M) No. 19 of 2025 and Cr.MP(M) No. 2552 of 2026 and were dismissed by this Court on 05.05.2025 and 23.01.2026. It was held in the State of Maharashtra v Captain Buddhikota Subha Rao (1989) Suppl. 2 SCC 605, that once a bail application has been dismissed, a subsequent bail application can only be considered if there is a change of circumstances. It was observed:

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“Once that application was rejected, there was no question of granting a similar prayer. That is virtually overruling the earlier decision without there being a change in the fact situation. And when we speak of change, we mean a substantial one, which has a direct impact on the earlier decision and not merely cosmetic changes, which are of little or no consequence. 'Between the two orders, there was a gap of only two days, and it is

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nobody's case that during these two days, drastic changes had taken place, necessitating the release of the respondent on bail. Judicial discipline, propriety and comity demanded that the impugned order should not have been passed, reversing all earlier orders, including the one rendered by Puranik, J., only a couple of days before, in the absence of any substantial change in the fact situation. In such cases, it is necessary to act with restraint and circumspection so that the process of the Court is not abused by a litigant and an impression does not gain ground that the litigant has either successfully avoided one judge or selected another to secure an order which had hitherto eluded him.

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Similarly, it was held in Kalyan Chandra Sarkar v. Rajesh Ranjan @ Pappu Yadav (2004) 7 SCC 528 that where an earlier bail application has been rejected, the Court has to consider the rejection of the earlier bail application and then consider why the subsequent bail application should be allowed. It was held:

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“11. In regard to cases where earlier bail applications have been rejected, there is a further onus on the court to consider the subsequent application for grant of bail by noticing the grounds on which earlier bail applications have been rejected and after such consideration, if the court is of the opinion that bail has to be granted then the said court will have to give specific reasons why in spite of such earlier rejection the subsequent bail application should be granted.”

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A similar view was taken in State of T.N. v. S.A. Raja,

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(2005) 8 SCC 380 , wherein it was observed:

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When a learned Single Judge of the same court had denied bail to the respondent for certain reasons, and that order was unsuccessfully challenged before the appellate forum, without there being any major change of circumstances, another fresh application should not have been dealt with within a short span of time unless there were valid grounds giving rise to a tenable case for bail. Of course, the principles of res judicata are not applicable to bail applications, but the repeated filing of bail applications without there being any change of circumstances would lead to bad precedents.”

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This position was reiterated in Prasad Shrikant Purohit

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v. State of Maharashtra (2018) 11 SCC 458 , wherein it was observed:

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“30. Before concluding, we must note that though an accused has a right to make successive applications for the grant of bail, the court entertaining such subsequent bail applications has a duty to consider the reasons and grounds on which the earlier bail applications were rejected. In such cases, the court also has a duty to record the fresh grounds, which persuade it to take a view different from the one taken in the earlier applications.”

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It was held in Ajay Rajaram Hinge v. State of

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Maharashtra, 2023 SCC OnLine Bom 1551, that a successive bail application can be filed if there is a material change in the circumstances, which means a change in the facts or the law. It was observed:

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“7. It needs to be noted that the right to file successive bail applications accrues to the applicant only on the existence of a material change in circumstances. The sine qua non

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for filing subsequent bail applications is a material change in circumstances. A material change in circumstances settled by law is a change in the fact situation or law that requires the earlier view to be interfered with or where the earlier finding has become obsolete. However, a change in circumstance has no bearing on the salutary principle of judicial propriety that successive bail applications need to be decided by the same Judge on the merits, if available at the place of sitting. There needs to be clarity between the power of a judge to consider the application and a person's right based on a material change in circumstances. A material change in circumstance creates in a person accused of an offence the right to file a fresh bail application. But the power to decide such a subsequent application operates in a completely different sphere, unconnected with the facts of a case. Such power is based on the well-settled and judicially recognized principle that if successive bail applications on the same subject are permitted to be disposed of by different Judges, there would be conflicting orders, and the litigant would be pestering every Judge till he gets an order to his liking resulting in the credibility of the Court and the confidence of the other side being put in issue and there would be wastage of Court's time and that judicial discipline requires that such matter must be placed before the same Judge, if he is available, for orders. The satisfaction of material change in circumstances needs to be adjudicated by the same Judge who had earlier decided the application. Therefore, the same Judge needs to adjudicate whether there is a change in circumstance as claimed by the applicant, which entitles him to file a subsequent bail application.”

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The Court had found, while deciding the previous

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petition, that the petitioner had abetted the possession of a commercial quantity of contraband. The rigours of Section 37 of

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the NDPS Act applied to his case, and there was no material to

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show that he would not indulge in the commission of a similar offence if released on bail. He had failed to satisfy the twin conditions laid down under Section 37 of the NDPS Act. These considerations have not changed.

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It was submitted that there is a delay in the progress of the trial, and the petitioner is entitled to bail because of the delay. This submission will not help the petitioner. It was laid down by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Union of India vs. Vijin K. Varghese 2025:INSC:1316 that bail cannot be granted on the ground of prolonged incarceration without satisfying the twin conditions laid down under Section 37 of the NDPS Act. It was observed: -

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“17. The High Court then, on the strength of those premises, recorded a finding that there exist reasonable grounds to believe that the applicant is not guilty of the alleged offence, treating prolonged incarceration and likely delay as the justification for bail. Such a finding is not a casual observation. It is the statutory threshold under Section 37(1)(b)(ii), which would disentitle the discretionary relief and grant of bail must necessarily rest on careful appraisal of the material available. A conclusion of this nature, if returned without addressing the prosecution’s assertions of operative control and antecedent involvement, risks trenching upon the appreciation of evidence which would be in the domain of the trial court at first instance.

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This Court ordinarily shows deference to the discretion exercised by the High Court while considering the grant of bail. However, offences involving a commercial quantity of narcotic drugs stand on a distinct statutory footing. Section 37 enacts a specific embargo on the grant of bail and obligates the Court to record satisfaction on the twin requirements noticed above, in addition to the ordinary tests under the Code of Criminal Procedure.

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In the present case, the High Court has not undertaken the analysis of those twin requirements with reference to the material placed by the prosecution. The orders dated 22.01.2025 and 12.03.2025 do not advert to the allegation regarding the respondent’s prior involvement in a seizure of narcotic drugs and psychotropic substances only days prior to the seizure forming the subject matter of the present complaint, nor do they engage with the prosecution’s assertion as to the respondent’s role in arranging, importing, clearing and supervising the consignments. The omission to consider these factors bears directly upon the statutory satisfaction required by Section 37(1)(b).”

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A similar view was taken in Union of India v Namdeo

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Ashruba Nakade SLP (Crl.) 9792/2025, decided on 07.11.2025, wherein it was observed:

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“11. In the present case, this Court finds that though the Respondent-accused was in custody for one year, four months, and charges have not been framed, yet the allegations are serious since not only is the recovery much in excess of the commercial quantity, but the Respondentaccused allegedly got the cavities ingeniously fabricated below the trailer to conceal the contraband.

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Prima facie, this Court is of the opinion that the Respondent-accused is involved in drug trafficking in an organised manner. Consequently, no case for dispensing

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with the mandatory requirement of Section 37 of the NDPS Act is made out in the present matter.”

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