State of Hp Vs Nirmal Singh

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State of H.P. vs. Nirmal Singh

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Cr.MP(M) No.855 of 2024 Reserved on: 19.06.2026

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06.07.2026 Present: Mr Lokender Kutlehira, Additional Advocate General, for the petitioner/appellant.

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Mr H.S. Rana, Advocate, for the respondent.

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The applicant/appellant has filed the present application for condonation of the delay in filing the appeal. It has been asserted that a certified copy of the judgment was applied on 22.09.2023, which was delivered on 28.09.2023. The case was examined by Learned District Attorney, Bilaspur, H.P. and was sent to District Magistrate, Bilaspur, H.P., who forwarded it to the Principal Secretary (Home) to the Government of HP for taking a final decision. It was received in the Home Department on 12.01.2024 and was referred to the Law Department for seeking their opinion on 19.01.2024. The Law Department gave its opinion, and the file was received on 23.01.2024. The case was submitted to the competent authority for a decision, and the appeal was filed after the approval of the competent authority. The processing of the file by the various

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authorities led to a delay of 64 days, which is not intentional. Hence, it was prayed that the present application be allowed and the delay in filing the appeal be condoned.

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The application is opposed by filing a reply asserting that each day's delay has not been explained by the applicant. The applicant is a State that is well conversant with the procedure; hence, it was prayed that the present application be dismissed.

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3 This Court framed the following issues on 27.09.2024:

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Whether there are sufficient reasons for condonation of delay? OPP

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Relief.

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4 The parties were called upon to produce the evidence, and the applicant examined Megh Singh (AW-1) and Ashish Kumar (AW-2). No evidence was produced by the respondent.

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5 I have heard Mr Lokender Kutlehria, learned Additional Advocate General, for the applicant/State and Mr H.S. Rana, learned Counsel, for the respondent/accused.

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6 Mr Lokender Kutlehria, learned Additional Advocate General, for the applicant/State, submitted that the State has to consult various authorities before filing an appeal. This takes some time. The delay in the present matter arose because of the processing of the file by various offices/authorities; therefore, he prayed that the present application be allowed and the delay in filing the appeal be condoned.

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Mr H. S. Rana, learned counsel for the respondent accused, submitted that each day's delay has not been explained, and a general statement that the file was processed by various offices/authorities is not sufficient. Hence, he prayed that the present application be dismissed.

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I have a given considerable thought to the submissions made at the bar and have gone through the records carefully.

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Megh Singh (AW-1) has explained the movement of the file before various authorities and placed on record various documents in support of the same. A similar statement was made by Ashish Kumar, Clerk (AW2).

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These statements have been made on oath and are duly supported by the documents placed on record, which show the movement of the file between the offices of District Attorney, District Magistrate, Home Department and Law Department and thereafter back to Home Department, District Magistrate and District Attorney. It was rightly submitted on behalf of the State that the State cannot take an action like an individual and has to consult its various wings before filing an appeal. Therefore, some delay is inevitable. It was laid down by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Oriental Aroma Chemical Industries Ltd. v. Gujarat Industrial Development Corpn. , (2010) 5 SCC 459 , that the Court has adopted a liberal approach in condoning delay in short duration and a stricter approach, where the delay is inordinate. The Court should allow a certain latitude to the Government because the State represents the collective cause of the community, and the decisions are taken by the officers at a slow pace, causing the delay. It was observed: -

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15. The expression “sufficient cause” employed in Section 5 of the Limitation Act, 1963 and similar other statutes is elastic enough to enable the courts to apply the law in a meaningful manner which subserves the ends

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of justice. Although, no hard-and-fast rule can be laid down in dealing with the applications for condonation of delay, this Court has justifiably advocated adoption of a liberal approach in condoning the delay of short duration and a stricter approach where the delay is inordinate— Collector (L.A.) v. Katiji [(1987) 2 SCC 107: AIR 1987 SC 1353], N. Balakrishnan v. M. Krishnamurthy [(1998) 7 SCC 123: JT (1998) 6 SC 242] and Vedabai v. Shantaram Baburao Patil [(2001) 9 SCC 106] .

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16. In dealing with the applications for condonation of delay filed on behalf of the State and its agencies/instrumentalities this Court has, while emphasising that same yardstick should be applied for deciding the applications for condonation of delay filed by private individuals and the State, observed that certain amount of latitude is not impermissible in the latter case because the State represents collective cause of the community and the decisions are taken by the officers/agencies at a slow pace and encumbered process of pushing the files from table to table consumes considerable time causing delay— G. Ramegowda v. Land Acquisition Officer [(1988) 2 SCC 142], State of Haryana v. Chandra Mani [(1996) 3 SCC 132: AIR 1996 SC 1623], State of U.P. v. Harish Chandra [(1996) 9 SCC 309: 1996 SCC (L&S) 1240], State of Bihar v. Ratan Lal Sahu [(1996) 10 SCC 635], State of Nagaland v. Lipok AO [(2005) 3 SCC 752: 2005 SCC (Cri) 906] and State (NCT of Delhi) v. Ahmed Jaan [(2008) 14 SCC 582 : (2009) 2 SCC (Cri) 864] .

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