Shashi Yadav Vs State of Hp

Police Station Nalagarh, District Solan, H.P., for the commission of o昀昀ences punishable under Section 75 of the Bharatiya Nayaya Sanhita (BNS), 2023 and Section 12 of the Protection of Children

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from Sexual O昀昀ences Act, 2012 (POCSO Act).

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1 Whether reporters of Local Papers may be allowed to see the judgment? Yes.

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2

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It has been asserted that the petitioner was arrested on

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02.03.2025. He has nothing to do with the commission of the o昀昀ences. He is the sole bread earner of the family. The charge sheet has been 昀椀led before the competent Court, and the trial has not commenced as yet. No fruitful purpose will be served by detaining the petitioner. The petitioner is a respectable person in society, and there is no chance of his absconding. He would abide by all the terms and conditions that the Court may impose. Petitioner had earlier 昀椀led a bail petition before the Court, which was registered as Cr.MP(M) No. 1446 of 2025 and was dismissed on 07.07.2025. No witness has been examined after the dismissal of the bail petition. Hence, the present petition.

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The petition is opposed by 昀椀ling a status report asserting that the victim’s father made a complaint to the police, stating that the victim, aged 14 years, was going to the bathroom on 02.03.2025 at 4:00 p.m. The petitioner called her and took her to the bathroom, where he sexually assaulted her by touching her stomach and breasts. The victim’s brother saw her and saved her

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from the petitioner. The police registered the F.I.R. and investigated

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the matter. The police arrested the petitioner on 02.03.2025. The victim was born on 22.01.2013. The charge sheet has been 昀椀led before the Court, and the matter is listed on 23.03.2026 for the prosecution’s evidence. Hence, the status report.

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I have heard Ms Kanta Thakur, learned counsel for the petitioner and Mr Lokender Kutlehria, learned Addl. Advocate General for the respondent/State. 5. Ms Kanta Thakur, learned counsel for the petitioner, submitted that the petitioner is innocent and he was falsely implicated. The prosecution has failed to commence the evidence despite a lapse of about one year from the date of the arrest of the petitioner. The matter is listed for recording of statements of the prosecution witnesses on 23.03.2026, and there is no likelihood of the completion of the trial at the earliest; hence, it is prayed that the present petition be allowed and the petitioner be released on bail.

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Mr Lokender Kutlehria, learned Addl. Advocate General for the respondent/State submitted that the witnesses could not be examined due to the absence of the Presiding O昀케cer on the date 昀椀xed. The matter was listed for recording the statements of

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prosecution witnesses w.e.f. 13.10.2025 to 17.10.2025, however, the statements of the prosecution witnesses could not be recorded as the Presiding O昀케cer was on leave during the aforesaid period.

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Hence, he prayed that the present petition be dismissed.

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I have given considerable thought to the submissions

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made at the bar and have gone through the records carefully.

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It is undisputed that the petitioner had earlier also 昀椀led a bail petition, which was registered as Cr.MP(M) No. 1446 of 2025

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and was dismissed on 07.07.2025. It was held in State of Maharashtra. Captain Buddhikota Subha Rao (1989) Suppl. 2 SCC

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605, that once a bail application has been dismissed, a subsequent

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bail application can only be considered if there is a change of

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circumstances. It was observed:

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“Once that application was rejected, there was no question of granting a similar prayer. That is virtually overruling the earlier decision without there being a change in the fact situation. And when we speak of change, we mean a substantial one, which has a direct impact on the earlier decision and not merely cosmetic changes, which are of little or no consequence. 'Between the two orders, there was a gap of only two days, and it is nobody's case that during these two days, drastic changes had taken place, necessitating the release of the respondent on bail. Judicial discipline, propriety and comity demanded that the impugned order should not have been passed, reversing all

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earlier orders, including the one rendered by Puranik, J., only a couple of days before, in the absence of any substantial change in the fact situation. In such cases, it is necessary to act with restraint and circumspection so that the process of the Court is not abused by a litigant and an impression does not gain ground that the litigant has either successfully avoided one judge or selected another to secure an order which had hitherto eluded him.

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9. Similarly, it was held in Kalyan Chandra Sarkar v. Rajesh

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Ranjan @ Pappu Yadav (2004) 7 SCC 528 that where an earlier bail application has been rejected, the Court has to consider the rejection of the earlier bail application and then consider why the

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subsequent bail application should be allowed. It was held:

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“11. In regard to cases where earlier bail applications have been rejected, there is a further onus on the court to consider the subsequent application for grant of bail by noticing the grounds on which earlier bail applications have been rejected and after such consideration, if the court is of the opinion that bail has to be granted then the said court will have to give speci昀椀c reasons why in spite of such earlier rejection the subsequent bail application should be granted.”

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A similar view was taken in State of T.N. v. S.A. Raja,

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(2005) 8 SCC 380 , wherein it was observed:

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When a learned Single Judge of the same court had denied bail to the respondent for certain reasons, and that order was unsuccessfully challenged before the appellate forum, without there being any major change of circumstances, another fresh application should not have been dealt with

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within a short span of time unless there were valid grounds giving rise to a tenable case for bail. Of course, the principles of res judicata are not applicable to bail applications, but the repeated 昀椀ling of bail applications without there being any change of circumstances would lead to bad precedents.”

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This position was reiterated in Prasad Shrikant Purohit

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v. State of Maharashtra (2018) 11 SCC 458 , wherein it was observed:

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“30. Before concluding, we must note that though an accused has a right to make successive applications for the grant of bail, the court entertaining such subsequent bail applications has a duty to consider the reasons and grounds on which the earlier bail applications were rejected. In such cases, the court also has a duty to record the fresh grounds, which persuade it to take a view di昀昀erent from the one taken in the earlier applications.”

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It was held in Ajay Rajaram Hinge v. State of Maharashtra, 2023 SCC OnLine Bom 1551, that a successive bail application can be 昀椀led if there is a material change in the circumstances, which means a change in the facts or the law. It was observed:

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“7. It needs to be noted that the right to 昀椀le successive bail applications accrues to the applicant only on the existence of a material change in circumstances. The sine qua non for 昀椀ling subsequent bail applications is a material change in circumstances. A material change in circumstances settled by law is a change in the fact situation or law that requires the earlier view to be interfered with or where the earlier 昀椀nding has become obsolete. However, a change in circumstance

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has no bearing on the salutary principle of judicial propriety that successive bail application needs to be decided by the same Judge on the merits, if available at the place of sitting. There needs to be clarity between the power of a judge to consider the application and a person's right based on a material change in circumstances. A material change in circumstance creates in a person accused of an o昀昀ence the right to 昀椀le a fresh bail application. But the power to decide such a subsequent application operates in a completely di昀昀erent sphere, unconnected with the facts of a case. Such power is based on the well-settled and judicially recognized principle that if successive bail applications on the same subject are permitted to be disposed of by di昀昀erent Judges, there would be con昀氀icting orders, and the litigant would be pestering every Judge till he gets an order to his liking resulting in the credibility of the Court and the con昀椀dence of the other side being put in issue and there would be wastage of Court's time and that judicial discipline requires that such matter must be placed before the same Judge, if he is available, for orders. The satisfaction of material change in circumstances needs to be adjudicated by the same Judge who had earlier decided the application. Therefore, the same Judge needs to adjudicate whether there is a change in circumstance as claimed by the applicant, which entitles him to 昀椀le a subsequent bail application.”

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Therefore, the present bail petition can only be

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considered on the basis of the change in the circumstances, and it is not permissible to review the order passed by the Court.

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14. Photocopies of the order sheets show that the matter

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was listed for recording the statements of prosecution witnesses

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w.e.f. 13.10.2025 till 17.10.2025. However, the matter was not taken

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up because of the absence of the learned Presiding O昀케cer. The

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matter was taken up on 14.11.2025, and was ordered to be listed for recording the statements of prosecution witnesses on 23.03.2026, 25.03.2026 and 26.03.2026. Section 35(1) of the POCSO Act provides that the Special Court must record the evidence of a child victim within 30 days of taking cognisance of the o昀昀ence, and Section 35(2) provides that the trial shall be completed as far as possible within a period of one year from the date of taking cognisance of the o昀昀ence. The status report shows that the challan

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was 昀椀led before the learned Trial Court on 01.05.2025. The fact that the Special Court has failed to record the statement of the child witness within a period of 30 days or complete the trial within one year shows the inability of the learned Trial Court to conduct the trial expeditiously. Hon’ble Supreme Court directed in Alakh Alok

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Srivastava v. Union of India, (2018) 17 SCC 291: (2019) 4 SCC (Cri)

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184: 2018 SCC OnLine SC 478 that the trial of cases registered under the POCSO Act be conducted expeditiously. It was observed:

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“25.3. The instructions should be issued to the Special Courts to fast-track the cases by not granting unnecessary adjournments and following the procedure laid down in

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the POCSO Act, and thus complete the trial in a time-bound manner or within a speci昀椀c time-frame under the Act.”

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In the present case, the matter has been listed for the

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recording the statements of prosecution witnesses No.1 to 6 w.e.f. 23.03.2026 till 26.03.2026, whereas it was listed for recording of statements of prosecution witnesses No.1 to 11 w.e.f. 13.10.2025 till 17.10.2025, which shows that the direction of the Hon’ble Supreme Court is unlikely to be complied with in future.

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It was laid down by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Javed

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Gulam Nabi Shaikh v. State of Maharashtra (2024) 9 SCC 813: 2024 SCC OnLine SC 1693 that when the State or any prosecuting agency including the Court concerned has no wherewithal to provide the right to speedy trial of the accused, the bail should not be opposed on the ground that crime committed is serious. It was observed at page 820:

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17. If the State or any prosecuting agency, including the court concerned, has no wherewithal to provide or protect the fundamental right of an accused to have a speedy trial as enshrined under Article 21 of the Constitution, then the State or any other prosecuting agency should not oppose the plea for bail on the ground that the crime committed is serious. Article 21 of the Constitution applies irrespective of the nature of the crime.

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18. We may hasten to add that the petitioner is still an accused, not a convict. The overarching postulate of criminal jurisprudence that an accused is presumed to be innocent until proven guilty cannot be brushed aside lightly, however stringent the penal law may be.

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19. We are convinced that the manner in which the prosecuting agency, as well as the Court, have proceeded, the right of the accused to have a speedy trial could be said to have been infringed, thereby violating Article 21 of the Constitution.

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It was held in Ajay Kumar Choudhary v. Union of India,

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(2015) 7 SCC 291: (2015) 2 SCC (L&S) 455: 2015 SCC OnLine SC 127

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that the right to a speedy trial is a fundamental right of the accused.

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It was observed at page 298:

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“ 13. Article 12 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, 1948, assures that:

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“ 12 . No one shall be subjected to arbitrary interference with his privacy, family, home or correspondence, nor to attacks upon his honour and reputation. Everyone has the right to the protection of the law against such interference or attacks.”

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14. More recently, the European Convention on Human Rights in Article 6(1) promises that:

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“ 6. (1) In the determination of his civil rights and obligations or of any criminal charge against him, everyone is entitled to a fair and public hearing within a reasonable time….”

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And in its second sub-article, that:

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“ 6. (2) Everyone charged with a criminal o昀昀ence shall be presumed innocent until proved guilty according to law.” 15. The Supreme Court of the United States struck down the use of nolle prosequi , an inde昀椀nite but ominous and omnipresent postponement of civil or criminal prosecution in Klopfer v. North Carolina [18 L Ed 2d 1: 386 US 213 (1967)] .

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16. In Kartar Singh v. State of Punjab [(1994) 3 SCC 569: 1994 SCC (Cri) 899] the Constitution Bench of this Court unequivocally construed the right of speedy trial as a fundamental right, and we can do no better than extract these paragraphs from that celebrated decision: (SCC pp. 638-39, paras 86-87)

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“ 86 . The concept of speedy trial is read into Article 21 as an essential part of the fundamental right to life and liberty guaranteed and preserved under our Constitution. The right to speedy trial begins with the actual restraint imposed by arrest and consequent incarceration and continues at all stages, namely, the stage of the investigation, inquiry, trial, appeal and revision so that any possible prejudice that may result from the impermissible and avoidable delay from the time of the commission of the o昀昀ence till it consummates into a 昀椀nality, can be averted. In this context, it may be noted that the constitutional guarantee of a speedy trial is properly re昀氀ected in Section 309 of the Code of Criminal Procedure.

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87 . This Court in Hussainara Khatoon (1) v. State of Bihar [(1980) 1 SCC 81: 1980 SCC (Cri) 23], while dealing with Article 21 of the Constitution of India, has observed thus: (SCC p. 89, para 5)

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‘ 5 . … No procedure which does not ensure a reasonably quick trial can be regarded as “reasonable, fair or just” and it would fall foul of Article 21. There

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can, therefore, be no doubt that a speedy trial, and by speedy trial we mean reasonably expeditious trial, is an integral and essential part of the fundamental right to life and liberty enshrined in Article 21. The question which would, however, arise is as to what would be the consequence if a person accused of an o昀昀ence is denied a speedy trial and is sought to be deprived of his liberty by imprisonment as a result of a longdelayed trial in violation of his fundamental right under Article 21. Would he be entitled to be released unconditionally, freed from the charge levelled against him on the ground that trying him after an unduly long period of time and convicting him after such a trial would constitute a violation of his fundamental right under Article 21?”

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17. The legal expectation of expedition and diligence being present at every stage of a criminal trial and a fortiori in departmental enquiries has been emphasised by this Court on numerous occasions. The Constitution Bench in Abdul Rehman Antulay v. R.S. Nayak [(1992) 1 SCC 225: 1992 SCC (Cri) 93] underscored that this right to speedy trial is implicit in Article 21 of the Constitution and is also re昀氀 ected in Section 309 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973; that it encompasses all stages viz. investigation, inquiry, trial, appeal, revision and retrial; that the burden lies on the prosecution to justify and explain the delay; that the Court must engage in a balancing test to determine whether this right had been denied in the particular case before it.”

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19. It was held in Shaheen Welfare Association. v. Union of

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India, (1996) 2 SCC 616: 1996 SCC (Cri) 366 that a person cannot be

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kept behind bars when there is no prospect of trial being concluded

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expeditiously. It was observed at page 621:

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“ 8. It is in this context that it has become necessary to grant some relief to those persons who have been deprived of their personal liberty for a considerable length of time without any prospect of the trial being concluded in the near future. Undoubtedly, the safety of the community and the nation needs to be safeguarded, looking to the nature of the o昀昀ences these undertrials have been charged with. But the ultimate justi昀椀cation for such deprivation of liberty pending trial can only be their being found guilty of the o昀昀ences for which they have been charged. If such a 昀椀nding is not likely to be arrived at within a reasonable time, some relief becomes necessary.”

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20. Similarly, it was laid down by the Hon’ble Supreme Court

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in Jagjeet Singh v. Ashish Mishra , (2022) 9 SCC 321: (2022) 3 SCC (Cri)

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560: 2022 SCC OnLine SC 453 that no accused can be subjected to

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unending detention pending trial. It was observed at page 335:

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“40. Having held so, we cannot be oblivious to what has been urged on behalf of the respondent-accused that cancellation of bail by this Court is likely to be construed as an inde昀椀nite foreclosure of his right to seek bail. It is not necessary to dwell upon the wealth of case law which, regardless of the stringent provisions in a penal law or the gravity of the o昀昀ence, has time and again recognised the legitimacy of seeking liberty from incarceration. To put it di昀昀erently, no accused can be subjected to unending detention pending trial, especially when the law presumes him to be innocent until proven guilty. Even where statutory provisions expressly bar the grant of bail, such as in cases under the Unlawful Activities (Prevention) Act, 1967, this Court has expressly ruled that after a reasonably long period of incarceration, or for any other valid reason, such stringent provisions will melt

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down, and cannot be measured over and above the right of liberty guaranteed under Article 21 of the Constitution (see Union of India v. K.A. Najeeb [Union of India v. K.A. Najeeb, (2021) 3 SCC 713 , paras 15 and 17] ).”

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It was laid down in Mohd. Muslim v. State (NCT of Delhi),

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(2023) 18 SCC 166: 2023 SCC OnLine SC 352, that the right to a speedy trial is a constitutional right of an accused. The right of bail is curtailed on the premise that the trial would be concluded expeditiously. It was observed at page 174: -

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13. When provisions of law curtail the right of an accused to secure bail, and correspondingly fetter judicial discretion (like Section 37 of the NDPS Act, in the present case), this Court has upheld them for con昀氀ating two competing values i.e. the right of the accused to enjoy freedom, based on the presumption of innocence, and societal interest — as observed in Vaman Narain Ghiya v. State of Rajasthan [Vaman Narain Ghiya v. State of Rajasthan, (2009) 2 SCC 281: (2009) 1 SCC (Cri) 745: (2008) 17 SCR 369] (“ the concept of bail emerges from the con昀氀ict between the police power to restrict liberty of a man who is alleged to have committed a crime, and presumption of innocence in favour of the alleged criminal ….”). They are, at the same time, upheld on the condition that the trial is concluded expeditiously. The Constitution Bench in Kartar Singh v. State of Punjab [Kartar Singh v. State of Punjab, (1994) 3 SCC 569: 1994 SCC (Cri) 899: (1994) 2 SCR 375] made observations to this e昀昀ect. In the Shaheen Welfare Association. v. Union of India [Shaheen Welfare Assn. v. Union of India, (1996) 2 SCC 616: 1996 SCC (Cri) 366: (1996) 2 SCR 1123] again, this Court expressed the same sentiment, namely, that when stringent provisions are enacted, curtailing the provisions of bail, and restricting

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judicial discretion, it is on the basis that investigation and trials would be concluded swiftly. The Court said that parliamentary intervention is based on: (Shaheen Welfare case [Shaheen Welfare Assn. v. Union of India, (1996) 2 SCC 616: 1996 SCC (Cri) 366: (1996) 2 SCR 1123] , SCC p. 624, para 17)

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“ 17 . … a conscious decision has been taken by the legislature to sacri昀椀ce to some extent, the personal liberty of an undertrial accused for the sake of protecting the community and the nation against terrorist and disruptive activities or other activities harmful to society, it is all the more necessary that investigation of such crimes is done e昀케ciently and an adequate number of Designated Courts are set up to bring to book persons accused of such serious crimes. This is the only way in which society can be protected against harmful activities. This would also ensure that persons ultimately found innocent are not unnecessarily kept in jail for long periods.”

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The Court highlighted the e昀昀ects of pre-trial detention

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and the importance of a speedy trial as under at page 178:

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“23. Before parting, it would be important to re昀氀ect that laws which impose stringent conditions for the grant of bail may be necessary in the public interest; yet, if trials are not concluded in time, the injustice wreaked on the individual is immeasurable. Jails are overcrowded, and their living conditions, more often than not, are appalling. According to the Union Home Ministry's response to Parliament, the National Crime Records Bureau had recorded that as on 3112-2021, over 5,54,034 prisoners were lodged in jails against a total capacity of 4,25,069 prisoners in the country [ National Crime Records Bureau, Prison Statistics in India <https://ncrb.gov.in/sites/default/昀椀les/PSI-2021/Executive_nc

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rb_Summary-2021.pdf>]. Of these, 1,22,852 were convicts; the rest, 4,27,165, were undertrials.

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24. The danger of unjust imprisonment is that inmates are at risk of “prisonisation”, a term described by the Kerala High Court in A Convict Prisoner v. State [A Convict Prisoner v. State, 1993 SCC OnLine Ker 127: 1993 Cri LJ 3242 ] as “ a radical transformation ” whereby the prisoner: (SCC OnLine Ker para 13)

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“ 13 . … loses his identity. He is known by a number. He loses personal possessions. He has no personal relationships. Psychological problems result from loss of freedom, status, possessions, dignity and autonomy of personal life. The inmate culture of prison turns out to be dreadful. The prisoner becomes hostile by ordinary standards. Self-perception changes.”

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25. There is a further danger of the prisoner turning to crime, “ as crime not only turns admirable, but the more professional the crime, more honour is paid to the criminal ” [ Working Papers - Group on Prisons & Borstals - 1966 U.K.] (also see Donald Clemmer's “ The Prison Community ” published in 1940 [ Donald Clemmer, The Prison Community (1968) Holt, Rinehart & Winston, which is referred to in Tomasz Sobecki, “Donald Clemmer's Concept of Prisonisation”, available at:<https://www.tkp.edu.pl/wpcontent/uploads/2020/12/Sob ecki_sklad.pdf> (accessed on 23-3-2023).] ). Incarceration has further deleterious e昀昀ects, where the accused belongs to the weakest economic strata: immediate loss of livelihood, and in several cases, scattering of families as well as loss of family bonds and alienation from society. The courts, therefore, have to be sensitive to these aspects (because in the event of an acquittal, the loss to the accused is irreparable), and ensure that trials—especially in cases where special laws enact stringent provisions- are taken up and concluded speedily.”

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It was laid down by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Javed

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Gulam Nabi Shaikh (supra) that the right to speedy trial of the

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o昀昀enders facing criminal charges is an important facet of Article 21 of the Constitution of India, and inordinate delay in the conclusion of the trial entitles the accused to the grant of bail. It was observed at page 817: -

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“ 10. Long back, in Hussainara Khatoon (1) v. State of Bihar [Hussainara Khatoon (1) v. State of Bihar, (1980) 1 SCC 81: 1980 SCC (Cri) 23] , this Court had declared that the right to speedy trial of o昀昀enders facing criminal charges is “implicit in the broad sweep and content of Article 21 as interpreted by this Court”. Remarking that a valid procedure under Article 21 is one which contains a procedure that is “reasonable, fair and just”, it was held that: (SCC p. 89, para 5)

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“ 5 . … Now obviously procedure prescribed by law for depriving a person of liberty cannot be “reasonable, fair or just” unless that procedure ensures a speedy trial for determination of the guilt of such person. No procedure which does not ensure a reasonably quick trial can be regarded as “reasonable, fair or just” and it would fall foul of Article 21. There can, therefore, be no doubt that a speedy trial, and by speedy trial we mean reasonably expeditious trial, is an integral and essential part of the fundamental right to life and liberty enshrined in Article 21. The question which would, however, arise is as to what would be the consequence if a person accused of an o昀昀ence is denied a speedy trial and is sought to be deprived of his liberty by imprisonment as a result of a long-delayed trial in violation of his fundamental right under Article 21.”

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11. The aforesaid observations have resonated, time and again, in several judgments, such as Kadra Pahadiya v. State of Bihar [Kadra Pahadiya v. State of Bihar, (1981) 3 SCC 671: 1981 SCC (Cri) 791] and Abdul Rehman Antulay v. R.S. Nayak [Abdul Rehman Antulay v. R.S. Nayak, (1992) 1 SCC 225: 1992 SCC (Cri) 93] . In the latter, the court re-emphasised the right to a speedy trial and further held that an accused, facing a prolonged trial, has no option: ( Abdul Rehman Antulay case [Abdul Rehman Antulay v. R.S. Nayak, (1992) 1 SCC 225: 1992 SCC (Cri) 93] , SCC p. 269, para 84)

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“ 84 . … The State or complainant prosecutes him. It is, thus, the obligation of the State or the complainant, as the case may be, to proceed with the case with reasonable promptitude. Particularly, in this country, where the large majority of accused come from poorer and weaker sections of society, not versed in the ways of law, where they do not often get competent legal advice, the application of the said rule is wholly inadvisable. Of course, in a given case, if an accused demands a speedy trial and yet he is not given one, it may be a relevant factor in his favour. But we cannot disentitle an accused from complaining of infringement of his right to a speedy trial on the ground that he did not ask for or insist upon a speedy trial.”

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This position was reiterated in Balwinder Singh v. State

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of Punjab, 2024 SCC OnLine SC 4354, wherein it was observed:

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7. An accused has a right to a fair trial, and while a hurried trial is frowned upon as it may not give su昀케cient time to prepare for the defence, an inordinate delay in the conclusion of the trial would infringe the right of an accused guaranteed under Article 21 of the Constitution.

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8. It is not for nothing that the Author Oscar Wilde, in “The Ballad of Reading Gaol”, wrote the following poignant lines while being incarcerated:

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“I know not whether Laws be right,

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Or whether Laws be wrong;

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All that we know who be in jail

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Is that the wall is strong;

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And that each day is like a year,

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A year whose days are long.”

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25. It was held in Athar Parwez v. Union of India , (2024) 20

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SCC 57: 2024 SCC OnLine SC 3762 that long incarceration and the

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delay in the conclusion of the trial will entitle the accused to bail. It

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was observed at page 63:

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19. Long incarceration and unlikely likelihood of trial being completed in near future has also been taken as a ground for exercising its constitutional role by the constitutional courts to grant bail on violation of Article 21 of the Constitution of India which guarantees trial to be concluded within a reasonable time. Gross delay in conclusion of the trial would justify such invocation leading to a conclusion of violation of Part III the Constitution of India, which may be taken as a ground to release an undertrial on bail.

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21. At the initial stage, the legislative policy needs to be appreciated and followed by the courts. Keeping the statutory provisions in mind but with the passage of time the e昀昀ect of that statutory provision would in fact have to be diluted giving way to the mandate of Part III of the Constitution where the accused as of now is not a convict and is facing the

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charges. Constitutional right of speedy trial in such circumstances will have precedence over the bar/strict provisions of the statute and cannot be made the sole reason for denial of bail. Therefore, the period of incarceration of an accused could also be a relevant factor to be considered by the constitutional courts not to be merely governed by the statutory provisions.

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It was laid down by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Tapas

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Kumar Palit v. State of Chhattisgarh, 2025 SCC OnLine SC 322 that

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the accused has a right to an expeditious trial. It was observed:

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10. However, many times we have made ourselves very clear that howsoever serious a crime may be the accused has a fundamental right of speedy trial as enshrined in Article 21 of the Constitution.

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Therefore, the petitioner is entitled to bail because of

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the inability to conclude the trial expeditiously.

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It was submitted that the petitioner is likely to in昀氀uence the victim and that he should not be released on bail. This submission cannot be accepted. The status report mentions that the victim was informed of the date of the hearing, but she chose not to appear before the Court to oppose the bail petition. This shows that the victim does not have any apprehension from the petitioner. Further, the apprehension can be removed by imposing

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stringent conditions, and this apprehesnion is not su昀케cient to deny bail to the petitioner.

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In view of the above, the present petition is allowed, and

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the petitioner is ordered to be released on bail in the sum of ₹1,00,000/- with one surety of the like amount to the satisfaction of

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the learned Trial Court. While on bail, the petitioner will abide by the

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following terms and conditions: -

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(I) The petitioner will not intimidate the witnesses, nor will he in昀氀uence any evidence in any manner whatsoever;

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(II) The petitioner shall attend the trial on each and every hearing and will not seek unnecessary adjournments;

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(III) The petitioner will not leave the present address for a continuous period of seven days without furnishing the address of the intended visit to the SHO concerned, the Police Station concerned and the Trial Court;

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(IV) The petitioner will surrender his passport, if any, to the Court; and

¶165

(V) The petitioner will furnish his mobile number and social media contact to the Police and the Court and will abide by the summons/notices received from the Police/Court through SMS/WhatsApp/Social Media Account. In case of any change in the mobile number or social media accounts, the same will be intimated to the Police/Court within 昀椀ve days from the date of the change.

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22

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