Vijay Kumar Vs State of Hp

2026:HHC:15372

IN THE HIGH COURT OF HIMACHAL PRADESH, SHIMLA

Cr. MP(M) No. 636 of 2026 Reserved on: 04.05.2026 Date of Decision: 08.05.2026.

Vijay Kumar Thakur Versus	…. Petitioner
State of HP	…. Respondent

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Coram

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Hon’ble Mr Justice Rakesh Kainthla , Judge. Whether approved for reporting?¹ No

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For the Petitioner : Mr R.S. Jaswal, Advocate. For the Respondent/State: Mr Ajit Sharma, Deputy Advocate General.

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Rakesh Kainthla, Judge

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The petitioner has filed the present petition for seeking regular bail in FIR No. 93 of 2025, dated 16.04.2025, registered at Police Station Sadar, District Mandi, H.P., for the commission of an offence punishable under Section 21 of the Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances Act (hereinafter referred to as “NDPS”).

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1 Whether reporters of Local Papers may be allowed to see the judgment? Yes.

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It has been asserted that false allegations were made against the petitioner that 8 grams of heroin were recovered from his possession. The petitioner has been in judicial custody since 19.04.2025. The police filed the charge sheet before the Court, and the matter is pending before the learned Special Judge, Mandi, for adjudication. The petitioner is the sole earner of the family. The quantity of heroin stated to have been found in the petitioner’s possession is intermediate, and the rigours of Section 37 of the NDPS Act do not apply to the present case. The petitioner had earlier filed a bail petition before this Court, which was registered as Cr.MP(M) No. 1276 of 2025 and was dismissed on 04.07.2025. The petitioner approached the Hon’ble Supreme Court, and his Special Leave Petition (Criminal) No. 15207/2025, titled Vijay versus State of H.P., was dismissed on 15.12.2025. A liberty was granted to the petitioner to renew his bail application after the charges were framed. The charges have been framed, and statements of some of the witnesses have been recorded. Six FIRs were registered against the petitioner, and he was acquitted in all of them except FIR No.31 of 2024, which is pending before the learned Sessions Judge, Joginder Nagar, District Mandi. The petitioner would abide by the terms and conditions that the Court

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may impose. Hence, it was prayed that the present petition be allowed and the petitioner be released on bail.

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The petition is opposed by filing a status report asserting that the police had set up a nakka on 16.04.2025 at Malori near the ofÏce of the Society for Technology and Development. The police stopped a bus bearing registration No. DD-o1P-9322 and checked the passengers. They noticed that the driver had taken something out and put it in the bottle holder rack. The police checked the rack in the presence of the witnesses and recovered a polythene bag containing 8 grams of heroin. The police seized the heroin and arrested the petitioner. The heroin was sent to SFSL, Junga and was confirmed to be Diacetylmorphine (Heroin). As per the certificate of identity, the following FIRs are pending against the petitioner.

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1.	F.I.R. No. 51 of 2007, dated 03.03.2007
2.	F.I.R. No. 32 of 2008 dated 26.08.2008
3.	F.I.R. No.114 of 2014 dated 20.12.2014
4.	F.I.R. No. 30 of 2017 dated 07.05.2017
5.	F.I.R. No.31 of 2024+ dated 06.03.2024
6.	F.I.R. No. 133 of 2021 dated 24.08.2021

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The police filed the chargesheet on 16.06.2025 in the Court of Learned Special Judge, Mandi. Statements of 5 witnesses have been recorded, and statements of 13 witnesses are yet to be recorded. The matter is listed on 25.05.2026 for recording the statements of prosecution witnesses. Hence, the status report.

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I have heard Mr R.S. Jaswal, learned counsel for the petitioner and Mr Ajit Sharma, Deputy Advocate General, for the respondent/State.

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Mr R.S. Jaswal, learned counsel for the petitioner, submitted that the petitioner is innocent and he has been falsely implicated. The police have filed the charge sheet, and the charges have been framed. A liberty was granted to the petitioner to file an application for bail after the filing of the chargesheet. The charge sheet has been filed. The prosecution has failed to complete the evidence, which violates the petitioner’s right to a speedy trial. Hence, he prayed that the present petition be allowed and the petitioner be released on bail.

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Mr Ajit Sharma, learned Deputy Advocate General for the respondent/State, submitted that the petitioner had earlier filed a bail petition which was dismissed by this Court. This order

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was upheld by the Hon’ble Supreme Court. A subsequent petition only lies when there is a change in the circumstances. The petitioner has not shown any change in the circumstances, and the present petition is not maintainable. Hence, he prayed that the present petition be dismissed.

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I have given a considerable thought to the submissions made at the bar and have gone through the records carefully.

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It is undisputed that the petitioner had earlier filed a bail petition, which was registered as Cr.MP(M) No. 1276 of 2025 and was dismissed on 04.07.2025. This order was unsuccessfully challenged in a petition for Special Leave to Appeal (criminal) No.15207/2025 titled Vijay Kumar versus State of H.P. The Hon’ble Supreme Court was pleased to dismiss the petition. It was held in State of Maharashtra. Captain Buddhikota Subha Rao (1989) Suppl. 2 SCC 605, that once a bail application has been dismissed, a subsequent bail application can only be considered if there is a change of circumstances. It was observed:

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“Once that application was rejected, there was no question of granting a similar prayer. That is virtually overruling the earlier decision without there being a change in the fact situation. And when we speak of change, we mean a

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substantial one, which has a direct impact on the earlier decision and not merely cosmetic changes, which are of little or no consequence. 'Between the two orders, there was a gap of only two days, and it is nobody's case that during these two days, drastic changes had taken place, necessitating the release of the respondent on bail. Judicial discipline, propriety and comity demanded that the impugned order should not have been passed, reversing all earlier orders, including the one rendered by Puranik, J., only a couple of days before, in the absence of any substantial change in the fact situation. In such cases, it is necessary to act with restraint and circumspection so that the process of the Court is not abused by a litigant and an impression does not gain ground that the litigant has either successfully avoided one judge or selected another to secure an order which had hitherto eluded him.

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Similarly, it was held in Kalyan Chandra Sarkar v.

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Rajesh Ranjan @ Pappu Yadav (2004) 7 SCC 528 that where an earlier bail application has been rejected, the Court has to consider the rejection of the earlier bail application and then consider why the subsequent bail application should be allowed. It was held:

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“11. In regard to cases where earlier bail applications have been rejected, there is a further onus on the court to consider the subsequent application for grant of bail by noticing the grounds on which earlier bail applications have been rejected and after such consideration, if the court is of the opinion that bail has to be granted then the said court will have to give specific reasons why in spite of such earlier rejection the subsequent bail application should be granted.”

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10. A similar view was taken in State of T.N. v. S.A. Raja,

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(2005) 8 SCC 380 , wherein it was observed:

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When a learned Single Judge of the same court had denied bail to the respondent for certain reasons, and that order was unsuccessfully challenged before the appellate forum, without there being any major change of circumstances, another fresh application should not have been dealt with within a short span of time unless there were valid grounds giving rise to a tenable case for bail. Of course, the principles of res judicata are not applicable to bail applications, but the repeated filing of bail applications without there being any change of circumstances would lead to bad precedents.”

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This position was reiterated in Prasad Shrikant Purohit

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v. State of Maharashtra (2018) 11 SCC 458 , wherein it was observed:

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“30. Before concluding, we must note that though an accused has a right to make successive applications for the grant of bail, the court entertaining such subsequent bail applications has a duty to consider the reasons and grounds on which the earlier bail applications were rejected. In such cases, the court also has a duty to record the fresh grounds, which persuade it to take a view different from the one taken in the earlier applications.”

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It was held in Ajay Rajaram Hinge v. State of

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Maharashtra, 2023 SCC OnLine Bom 1551, that a successive bail

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application can be filed if there is a material change in the circumstances, which means a change in the facts or the law. It was observed:

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“7. It needs to be noted that the right to file successive bail applications accrues to the applicant only on the existence of a material change in circumstances. The sine qua non for filing subsequent bail applications is a material change in circumstances. A material change in circumstances settled by law is a change in the fact situation or law that requires the earlier view to be interfered with or where the earlier finding has become obsolete. However, a change in circumstance has no bearing on the salutary principle of judicial propriety that successive bail application needs to be decided by the same Judge on the merits, if available at the place of sitting. There needs to be clarity between the power of a judge to consider the application and a person's right based on a material change in circumstances. A material change in circumstance creates in a person accused of an offence the right to file a fresh bail application. But the power to decide such a subsequent application operates in a completely different sphere, unconnected with the facts of a case. Such power is based on the well-settled and judicially recognized principle that if successive bail applications on the same subject are permitted to be disposed of by different Judges, there would be conflicting orders, and the litigant would be pestering every Judge till he gets an order to his liking resulting in the credibility of the Court and the confidence of the other side being put in issue and there would be wastage of Court's time and that judicial discipline requires that such matter must be placed before the same Judge, if he is available, for orders. The satisfaction of material change in circumstances needs to be adjudicated by the same Judge who had earlier decided the application. Therefore, the same Judge needs to adjudicate whether there is a change in circumstance as claimed by the applicant, which entitles him to file a subsequent bail application.”

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Therefore, the present bail petition can only be considered on the basis of the change in circumstances, and it is not permissible to review the order passed by the Court.

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The status report mentions that the petitioner was found in possession of 8 grams of heroin. The quantity of heroin stated to have been recovered from the petitioner’s possession is intermediate, and the rigours of Section 37 of the NDPS do not apply to the present case.

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The status report mentions that the petitioner was arrested on 16.04.2025, and more than one year has elapsed since then.

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The Central Government has specified 250 grams of heroin as the commercial quantity, which means that a person possessing 250 grams of heroin can be sentenced to imprisonment for 10 years. If the principle of proportionality is applied, the petitioner has undergone a substantial part of the imprisonment that can be awarded to him. This Court held in Shubham Chaudhary vs State of H.P 2026:HHC:6937 that where the accused has already undergone a substantial part of the imprisonment which can be awarded to him in case of his

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conviction, his further detention is not justified. The petitioner has also undergone a substantial part of his imprisonment that can be awarded to him in case of his conviction, and his further detention in custody is not justified.

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It was submitted that the petitioner has criminal antecedents and is not entitled to bail on this consideration. This submission will not help the State. It was laid down by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Ayub Khan v. State of Rajasthan, 2024 SCC OnLine SC 3763: 2024:INSC:994 that the criminal antecedents may not be a reason to deny bail to the accused in case of long incarceration. It was observed:

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“10. The presence of the antecedents of the accused is only one of the several considerations for deciding the prayer for bail made by him. In a given case, if the accused makes out a strong prima facie case, depending upon the fact situation and period of incarceration, the presence of antecedents may not be a ground to deny bail. There may be a case where a Court can grant bail only on the grounds of long incarceration. The presence of antecedents may not be relevant in such a case. In a given case, the Court may grant default bail. Again, the antecedents of the accused are irrelevant in such a case. Thus, depending upon the peculiar facts, the Court can grant bail notwithstanding the existence of the antecedents.”

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In view of the above, the present petition is allowed,

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and the petitioner is ordered to be released on bail, subject to his

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furnishing bail bonds in the sum of ₹1,00,000/- with one surety

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in the like amount to the satisfaction of the learned Trial Court. While on bail, the petitioner will abide by the following conditions: -

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(I) The petitioner will not intimidate the witnesses, nor will he influence any evidence in any manner whatsoever.

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(II) The petitioner shall attend the trial on each and every hearing and will not seek unnecessary adjournments.

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(III) The petitioner will not leave the present address for a continuous period of seven days without furnishing the address of the intended visit to the SHO concerned, the Police Station concerned and the Trial Court.

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(IV) The petitioner will surrender his passport, if any, to the Court; and

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(V) The petitioner will furnish his mobile number and social media contact to the Police and the Court and will abide by the summons/notices received from the Police/Court through SMS/WhatsApp/Social Media Account. In case of any change in the mobile number or social media accounts, the same will be intimated to the Police/Court within five days from the date of the change.

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