Hem Lata Vs State of Hp

The petitioner has filed the present petition for seeking regular bail in FIR No. 72 of 2025, dated 03.04.2025, registered at Police Station Chamba, District Chamba, H.P., for the commission of an offence punishable under Section 103 of Bharatiya Nyaya Sanhita, 2023 (BNS).

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It has been asserted that, as per the prosecution, the police received a telephonic information on 03.04.2025 that one

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Whether reporters of Local Papers may be allowed to see the judgment? Yes.

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person was lying unconscious in his house at Mugla. The police went to the spot and found the dead body of Kewal Kumar. The informant made a statement to the police that Kewal Kumar (deceased) was her neighbour. He used to reside with his wife, Hem Lata (petitioner), and his son Vinay Kumar. He and the petitioner used to quarrel with each other. The informant was sleeping in her room on 02.04.2025, when she heard the noise of a quarrel at about 11:00 PM from the house of the deceased. Since this was a daily occurrence, she did not pay any attention to it. The petitioner left for her work on 03.04.2025. The deceased, Kewal Kumar, called the informant and asked for water. The informant went inside the room and found the deceased lying on the double bed with an injury near his eyes. He was unable to hold the glass of water. The informant served him water. She enquired from the deceased about the injuries, and he revealed that the petitioner had beaten him with a stick and pushed him against the wall. The informant telephoned Vinay. The informant’s husband returned at about 2:30 PM, and she narrated the incident to him. The informant’s husband and his cousin Raj Kumar went to the room and found Kewal Kumar lying unconscious. They checked him and found that he was dead. The

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matter was reported to the police. The police registered the FIR and investigated the matter. The petitioner is innocent and has been falsely implicated. The police have filed a charge sheet before the Court, and no fruitful purpose would be served by detaining the petitioner in custody. The petitioner is a permanent resident of District Chamba and has roots in the society. The petitioner has been in custody since 04.04.2025, and the prosecution has not completed the evidence, which violates the petitioner’s right to a speedy trial. Hence, it was prayed that the present petition be allowed and the petitioner be released on bail.

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The petition is opposed by filing a status report mentioning that the police received information that one person was lying unconscious in his house at Mugla on 03.04.2025 at 6:58 PM. The police went to the spot where a person was found dead in a room. The petitioner identified him as her husband, and the informant identified him as her brother-in-law. The informant made a statement that Kewal Kumar and the petitioner used to quarrel with each other. The informant was sleeping in her room on 02.04.2025, when she heard a noise from the room of the deceased. This was a routine matter, and she did not pay any attention to it. The petitioner left for her work on

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03.04.2025. The deceased, Kewal Kumar, called the informant at about 8:30 AM and asked for water. The informant went inside the room and found that Kewal Ram had sustained injuries. He was unable to hold the glass of water. The informant enquired from Kewal Ram about the injuries, and he revealed that the petitioner had beaten him with the stick and pushed him against the wall. The informant telephoned Vinay and narrated the incident to him. The informant’s husband returned at about 2:30/3:00 PM, and she narrated the incident to him. He and his cousin Raj Kumar went to the room and found Kewal Kumar lying unconscious. The informant called the petitioner. Vinay also came to the spot in the meantime. All went to the room and found Kewal Kumar to be dead. The police investigated the matter. The police seized various articles. The petitioner took out one stick kept beneath the bed and handed it over to the police. The material objects were sent to the SFSL, and as per the report of analysis, the DNA of the deceased was found on the stick produced by the petitioner. As per the report of the post-mortem examination, the injuries were found on the body of Kewal Kumar, which could have been caused by means of a stick. The cause of death was hemorrhagic shock secondary to multiple

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blunt injuries. Ethyl alcohol concentration was found in the blood of the deceased to the extent of 159.55 mg%=1.80. The charge sheet was filed before the Court on 23.08.2025. Twenty-seven witnesses have been cited by the prosecution, and the matter is listed before the learned Trial Court on 25.05.2026 and 26.06.2026 for recording the statements of prosecution witnesses. FIR No. 101/2020 was registered against the petitioner in which a fine of ₹5,000/- was imposed upon her. Hence, the report.

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I have heard Mr Sanjeev Kumar Suri, learned counsel for the petitioner and Mr Jitender Sharma, learned Additional Advocate General for the respondent/State.

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Mr Sanjeev Kumar Suri, learned counsel for the petitioner, submitted that the petitioner is innocent and that he has been falsely implicated. The police have filed the charge sheet before the Court, and no fruitful purpose would be served by detaining the petitioner in custody. The petitioner would abide by the terms and conditions that the Court may impose. Hence, he prayed that the present petition be allowed and the petitioner be released on bail.

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Mr Jitender Sharma, learned Additional Advocate General for the respondent/State, submitted that the petitioner is involved in the commission of a heinous offence. The petitioner and the deceased were found together in a room, and the burden is upon the petitioner to explain the circumstances leading to the death of Kewal Kumar. The petitioner has not provided any explanation, and the prosecution's version that the petitioner had murdered the deceased has to be accepted as correct. Hence, he prayed that the present petition be dismissed.

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I have given a considerable thought to the submissions made at the bar and have gone through the records carefully.

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The parameters for granting bail were considered by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Pinki v. State of U.P., (2025) 7 SCC 314: 2025 SCC OnLine SC 781, wherein it was observed at page 380:

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( i ) Broad principles for the grant of bail

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56. In Gudikanti Narasimhulu v. High Court of A.P., (1978) 1 SCC 240: 1978 SCC (Cri) 115 , Krishna Iyer, J., while elaborating on the content of Article 21 of the Constitution of India in the context of personal liberty of a person under trial, has laid down the key factors that should be considered while granting bail, which are extracted as under: (SCC p. 244, paras 7-9)

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“ 7 . It is thus obvious that the nature of the charge is the vital factor, and the nature of the evidence is also pertinent. The punishment to which the party may be liable, if convicted or a conviction is confirmed, also bears upon the issue.

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8 . Another relevant factor is whether the course of justice would be thwarted by him who seeks the benignant jurisdiction of the Court to be freed for the time being . [ Patrick Devlin, “The Criminal Prosecution in England” (Oxford University Press, London 1960) p. 75 — Modern Law Review, Vol. 81, Jan. 1968, p. 54.]

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9 . Thus, the legal principles and practice validate the Court considering the likelihood of the applicant interfering with witnesses for the prosecution or otherwise polluting the process of justice. It is not only traditional but rational, in this context, to enquire into the antecedents of a man who is applying for bail to find whether he has a bad record, particularly a record which suggests that he is likely to commit serious offences while on bail. In regard to habituals, it is part of criminological history that a thoughtless bail order has enabled the bailee to exploit the opportunity to inflict further crimes on the members of society. Bail discretion, on the basis of evidence about the criminal record of a defendant, is therefore not an exercise in irrelevance .” (emphasis supplied)

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57. In Prahlad Singh Bhati v. State (NCT of Delhi), (2001) 4 SCC 280: 2001 SCC (Cri) 674 , this Court highlighted various aspects that the courts should keep in mind while dealing with an application seeking bail. The same may be extracted as follows: (SCC pp. 284-85, para 8)

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“ 8 . The jurisdiction to grant bail has to be exercised on the basis of well-settled principles, having regard to the circumstances of each case and not in an arbitrary manner. While granting the bail, the court has to keep in mind the nature of accusations, the nature of evidence in support thereof, the severity of the punishment which conviction will entail, the character, behaviour, means and standing

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of the accused, circumstances which are peculiar to the accused, reasonable possibility of securing the presence of the accused at the trial, reasonable apprehension of the witnesses being tampered with, the larger interests of the public or State and similar other considerations. It has also to be kept in mind that for the purposes of granting the bail the legislature has used the words “reasonable grounds for believing” instead of “the evidence” which means the court dealing with the grant of bail can only satisfy it (sic itself) as to whether there is a genuine case against the accused and that the prosecution will be able to produce prima facie evidence in support of the charge .” (emphasis supplied)

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58. This Court in Ram Govind Upadhyay v. Sudarshan Singh, (2002) 3 SCC 598: 2002 SCC (Cri) 688 , speaking through Banerjee, J., emphasised that a court exercising discretion in matters of bail has to undertake the same judiciously. In highlighting that bail should not be granted as a matter of course, bereft of cogent reasoning, this Court observed as follows: (SCC p. 602, para 3)

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“ 3 . Grant of bail, though being a discretionary order, but, however, calls for the exercise of such a discretion in a judicious manner and not as a matter of course. An order for bail bereft of any cogent reason cannot be sustained. Needless to record, however, that the grant of bail is dependent upon the contextual facts of the matter being dealt with by the court and facts do always vary from case to case. While the placement of the accused in society, though it may be considered by itself, cannot be a guiding factor in the matter of grant of bail, the same should always be coupled with other circumstances warranting the grant of bail. The nature of the offence is one of the basic considerations for the grant of bail — the more heinous is the crime, the greater is the chance of rejection of the bail, though, however, dependent on the factual matrix of the matter .” (emphasis supplied)

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59. In Kalyan Chandra Sarkar v. Rajesh Ranjan, (2004) 7 SCC 528: 2004 SCC (Cri) 1977 , this Court held that although it is

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established that a court considering a bail application cannot undertake a detailed examination of evidence and an elaborate discussion on the merits of the case, yet the court is required to indicate the prima facie reasons justifying the grant of bail.

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60. In Prasanta Kumar Sarkar v. Ashis Chatterjee, (2010) 14 SCC 496: (2011) 3 SCC (Cri) 765 , this Court observed that where a High Court has granted bail mechanically, the said order would suffer from the vice of non-application of mind, rendering it illegal. This Court held as under with regard to the circumstances under which an order granting bail may be set aside. In doing so, the factors which ought to have guided the Court's decision to grant bail have also been detailed as under: (SCC p. 499, para 9)

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“ 9 . … It is trite that this Court does not, normally, interfere with an order passed by the High Court granting or rejecting bail to the accused. However, it is equally incumbent upon the High Court to exercise its discretion judiciously, cautiously and strictly in compliance with the basic principles laid down in a plethora of decisions of this Court on the point. It is well settled that, among other circumstances, the factors to be borne in mind while considering an application for bail are :

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( i ) whether there is any prima facie or reasonable ground to believe that the accused had committed the offence ;

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( ii ) nature and gravity of the accusation ;

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( iii ) severity of the punishment in the event of conviction ;

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( iv ) danger of the accused absconding or fleeing, if released on bail ;

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( v ) character, behaviour, means, position and standing of the accused ;

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( vi ) likelihood of the offence being repeated ;

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( vii ) reasonable apprehension of the witnesses being influenced; and

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( viii ) danger, of course, of justice being thwarted by grant of bail .” (emphasis supplied)

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62. One of the judgments of this Court on the aspect of application of mind and requirement of judicious exercise of discretion in arriving at an order granting bail to the accused is Brijmani Devi v. Pappu Kumar, (2022) 4 SCC 497 : (2022) 2 SCC (Cri) 170 , wherein a three-Judge Bench of this Court, while setting aside an unreasoned and casual order ( Pappu Kumar v. State of Bihar, 2021 SCC OnLine Pat 2856 and Pappu Singh v. State of Bihar, 2021 SCC OnLine Pat 2857 ) of the High Court granting bail to the accused, observed as follows: ( Brijmani Devi v. Pappu Kumar, (2022) 4 SCC 497 : (2022) 2 SCC (Cri) 170] ), SCC p. 511, para 35)

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“ 35 . While we are conscious of the fact that liberty of an individual is an invaluable right, at the same time while considering an application for bail courts cannot lose sight of the serious nature of the accusations against an accused and the facts that have a bearing in the case, particularly, when the accusations may not be false, frivolous or vexatious in nature but are supported by adequate material brought on record to enable a court to arrive at a prima facie conclusion. While considering an application for the grant of bail, a prima facie conclusion must be supported by reasons and must be arrived at after having regard to the vital facts of the case brought on record. Due consideration must be given to facts suggestive of the nature of crime, the criminal antecedents of the accused, if any, and the nature of punishment that would follow a conviction vis-à-vis the offence(s) alleged against an accused .” (emphasis supplied)

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Hon’ble Supreme Court held in State of Rajasthan v.

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Balchand , (1977) 4 SCC 308: 1977 SCC (Cri) 594: 1977 SCC OnLine SC

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261 that the normal rule is bail and not jail, except where the

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gravity of the crime or the heinousness of the offence suggests otherwise. It was observed at page 308:

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2. The basic rule may perhaps be tersely put as bail, not jail, except where there are circumstances suggestive of fleeing from justice or thwarting the course of justice or creating other troubles in the shape of repeating offences or intimidating witnesses and the like, by the petitioner who seeks enlargement on bail from the Court. We do not intend to be exhaustive but only illustrative.

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3. It is true that the gravity of the offence involved is likely to induce the petitioner to avoid the course of justice and must weigh with us when considering the question of jail. So also, the heinousness of the crime….”

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The present petition has to be decided as per the parameters laid down by the Hon’ble Supreme Court.

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The status report mentions that the informant heard the noise of a quarrel from the room in which the petitioner and Kewal Kumar were present. Subsequently, Kewal Kumar was found injured. He told the informant that the petitioner had given him beatings. The Medical Officer found that the cause of death was hemorrhagic shock secondary to multiple blunt injuries, which were consistent with the stick. The petitioner produced the stick, and the DNA of the deceased was found on the stick. These circumstances prima facie show that the

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petitioner is involved in the commission of an offence punishable under Section 103 of the BNS.

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It was submitted that the prosecution has not completed the evidence within one year, which violates the petitioner’s right to a speedy trial. This submission will not help the petitioner. It was laid down by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Anil Kumar Yadav v. State (NCT of Delhi) , (2018) 12 SCC 129: (2018) 3 SCC (Cri) 425: 2017 SCC OnLine SC 1363 that the custody of more than one year would not by itself entitle a person to bail in a crime like murder. It was observed at page 141:

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“24. As pointed out earlier, one of the grounds for the grant of bail to the appellant Anil Kumar Yadav by the Sessions Court was that he was in custody for more than one year. In crimes like murder, the mere fact that the accused was in custody for more than one year may not be a relevant consideration. In Gobarbhai Naranbhai Singala v. State of Gujarat, (2008) 3 SCC 7775:(2008) 2 SCC (Cri) 743] , it was observed that the period of incarceration by itself would not entitle the accused to be enlarged on bail. The same was reiterated in Ram Govind Upadhyay v. Sudarshan Singh, (2002) 3 SCC 598: 2002 SCC (Cri) 688 ”

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Therefore, the petitioner cannot be held entitled to

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bail because of the delay in the progress of the trial

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The offence of murder is punishable with extreme punishment of death or life imprisonment. It was laid down by

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the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Gudikanti Narasimhulu v. Public Prosecutor, High Court of A.P. , (1978) 1 SCC 240: 1978 SCC (Cri) 115: 1977 SCC OnLine SC 327 that when the punishment is severe, the person is not entitled to bail. It was observed at page 244:

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“6. Let us have a glance at the pros and cons and the true principle around which other relevant factors must revolve. When the case is finally disposed of and a person is sentenced to incarceration, things stand on a different footing. We are concerned with the penultimate stage, and the principal rule to guide release on bail should be to secure the presence of the applicant who seeks to be liberated, to take judgment and serve a sentence in the event of the Court punishing him with imprisonment. In this perspective, the relevance of considerations is regulated by their nexus with the likely absence of the applicant for fear of a severe sentence, if such be plausible in the case. As Erle. J. indicated that when the crime charged (of which a conviction has been sustained) is of the highest magnitude and the punishment for it assigned by law is of extreme severity, the Court may reasonably presume, some evidence warranting, that no amount of bail would secure the presence of the convict at the stage of judgment, should he be enlarged. [ Mod. Law Rev. p. 50 ibid., 1852 I E & B 1] Lord Campbell, C.J., concurred in this approach in that case, and Coleridge J. set down the order of priorities as follows: [ Mod. Law Rev. ibid., pp. 50-51 ]

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“I do not think that an accused party is detained in custody because of his guilt, but because there are sufficient probable grounds for the charge against him as to make it proper that he should be tried, and because the detention is necessary to ensure his appearance at trial .... It is a very important element in considering whether the party, if admitted to bail, would appear to take his trial; and I think that in coming to a determination on that point, three

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elements will generally be found the most important: the charge, the nature of the evidence by which it is supported, and the punishment to which the party would be liable if convicted. In the present case, the charge is that of wilful murder; the evidence contains an admission by the prisoners of the truth of the charge, and the punishment of the offence is, by law, death.”

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7. It is thus obvious that the nature of the charge is the vital factor, and the nature of the evidence also is pertinent. The punishment to which the party may be liable, if convicted or conviction is confirmed, also bears upon the issue.

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