Shubhkaran Vs State of Hp

The petitioner has filed the present petition for seeking regular bail in FIR No. 206 of 2025, dated 12.10.2025, registered for the commission of offences punishable under Sections 20 and 29 of the Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances Act (hereinafter referred to as ‘the NDPS Act’) and Section 181 of the Motor Vehicles (MV) Act at Police Station Nurpur, District Kangra, H.P.

¶13

1 Whether reporters of Local Papers may be allowed to see the judgment? Yes.

¶14

2

¶15

2026:HHC:11140

¶16

It has been asserted that the police had stopped a car bearing registration No.TO25HP1132L in a nakka on 12.10.2025. The driver identified himself as Anu Kumar, the person sitting beside the driver identified himself as Suresh Kumar, and the person sitting in the rear seat identified himself as Ram Lal. The police recovered 6.044 kilograms of charas during the search of the vehicle. The police arrested the occupants of the vehicle and seized the charas. The accused Suresh Kumar disclosed that the petitioner used to ask him to collect the consignment from an unknown person at Kullu and deliver it to Gurpeet. The police arrested the petitioner based on the statement. The statement made by the co-accused is inadmissible in evidence. F.I.R. No. 13 of 2023, dated 16.01.2023, and F.I.R. No. 64 of 2024, dated 12.03.2024, were registered against the petitioner, which are pending before the Court. The police have filed the charge sheet, and no fruitful purpose would be served by detaining the petitioner in custody; hence, it was prayed that the present petition be allowed and the petitioner be released on bail.

¶17

The petition is opposed by filing a status report, asserting that the police were on patrolling duty on 11.10.2025. They received secret information at 8:15 p.m. that a vehicle

¶18

3

¶19

2026:HHC:11140

¶20

bearing a temporary registration No. TO25HP1132L was transporting a huge quantity of charas. The police reduced the information to writing and sent it to the Sub Divisional Police Officer (SDPO), Nurpur. The police joined Anish Kumar and Rahul Patel and waited for the car. The car reached the spot at 8:50 p.m. The police signalled the driver to stop the car. The driver identified himself as Anu Kumar. The person sitting beside the driver identified himself as Suresh Kumar, and the person sitting in the rear seat identified himself as Ram Lal. The police searched the vehicle after completing the formalities and recovered a carry bag containing 6.044 kilograms of charas. The police seized the charas and arrested the occupants of the vehicle. Suresh Kumar disclosed that he was transporting the charas at the instance of Shubhkaran (present petitioner). The police arrested the occupants of the vehicle and seized the charas. The charas was to be delivered to Gurpreet. The police arrested Shubhkaran and Vijay Kumar. F.I. R. No. 13 of 2023, dated 16.01.2023, and F.I.R. No. 64 of 2024, dated 12.03.2024, were registered against the petitioner. The petitioner was released on bail, but he violated the terms and conditions of the bail order. The petitioner had abetted the possession of a

¶21

4

¶22

2026:HHC:11140

¶23

commercial quantity of charas. Bhag Singh is yet to be arrested. Hence, the status report.

¶24

I have heard Mr Sanjeev Kumar Suri, learned counsel for the petitioner and Mr Jitender K. Sharma, learned Additional Advocate General, for the respondent/State.

¶25

Mr Sanjeev Kumar Suri, learned counsel for the petitioner, submitted that the petitioner is innocent and he was falsely implicated based on the statement made by the co-accused. The police have filed the charge-sheet before the Court and no fruitful purpose would be served by detaining the petitioner in custody; therefore, he prayed that the present petition be allowed and the petitioner be released on bail. He relied upon the judgment of this Court in Mahesh Thakur vs. State of H.P. 2025: HHC:24720 in support of his submission.

¶26

Mr Jitender K. Sharma, learned Additional Advocate General, for the respondent/State, submitted that the petitioner had abetted the possession of a commercial quantity of charas and the rigours of Section 37 of the NDPS Act apply to the present case. The petitioner has failed to satisfy the twin conditions laid down

¶27

5

¶28

2026:HHC:11140

¶29

under Section 37 of the NDPS Act, and he is not entitled to bail; therefore, he prayed that the present petition be dismissed.

¶30

I have given considerable thought to the submissions made at the bar and have gone through the records carefully.

¶31

The parameters for granting bail were considered by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Pinki v. State of U.P., (2025) 7 SCC

¶32

314: 2025 SCC OnLine SC 781 , wherein it was observed at page 380:

¶33

( i ) Broad principles for the grant of bail

¶34

In Gudikanti Narasimhulu v. High Court of A.P., (1978) 1 SCC 240: 1978 SCC (Cri) 115 , Krishna Iyer, J., while elaborating on the content of Article 21 of the Constitution of India in the context of personal liberty of a person under trial, has laid down the key factors that should be considered while granting bail, which are extracted as under: (SCC p. 244, paras 7-9)

¶35

“ 7 . It is thus obvious that the nature of the charge is the vital factor, and the nature of the evidence is also pertinent. The punishment to which the party may be liable, if convicted or a conviction is confirmed, also bears upon the issue.

¶36

8 . Another relevant factor is whether the course of justice would be thwarted by him who seeks the benignant jurisdiction of the Court to be freed for the time being . [ Patrick Devlin, “The Criminal Prosecution in England ” (Oxford University Press, London 1960) p. 75 — Modern Law Review, Vol. 81, Jan. 1968, p. 54.]

¶37

9 . Thus, the legal principles and practice validate the Court considering the likelihood of the applicant interfering with witnesses for the prosecution or otherwise polluting the process of justice. It is not only traditional but rational, in

¶38

6

¶39

2026:HHC:11140

¶40

this context, to enquire into the antecedents of a man who is applying for bail to find whether he has a bad record, particularly a record which suggests that he is likely to commit serious offences while on bail. In regard to habituals, it is part of criminological history that a thoughtless bail order has enabled the bailee to exploit the opportunity to inflict further crimes on the members of society. Bail discretion, on the basis of evidence about the criminal record of a defendant, is therefore not an exercise in irrelevance .” (emphasis supplied)

¶41

In Prahlad Singh Bhati v. State (NCT of Delhi), (2001) 4 SCC 280: 2001 SCC (Cri) 674 , this Court highlighted various aspects that the courts should keep in mind while dealing with an application seeking bail. The same may be extracted as follows: (SCC pp. 284-85, para 8)

¶42

“ 8 . The jurisdiction to grant bail has to be exercised on the basis of well-settled principles, having regard to the circumstances of each case and not in an arbitrary manner. While granting the bail, the court has to keep in mind the nature of accusations, the nature of evidence in support thereof, the severity of the punishment which conviction will entail, the character, behaviour, means and standing of the accused, circumstances which are peculiar to the accused, reasonable possibility of securing the presence of the accused at the trial, reasonable apprehension of the witnesses being tampered with, the larger interests of the public or State and similar other considerations. It has also to be kept in mind that for the purposes of granting the bail the legislature has used the words “reasonable grounds for believing” instead of “the evidence” which means the court dealing with the grant of bail can only satisfy it (sic itself) as to whether there is a genuine case against the accused and that the prosecution will be able to produce prima facie evidence in support of the charge .” (emphasis supplied)

¶43

This Court in Ram Govind Upadhyay v. Sudarshan Singh, (2002) 3 SCC 598: 2002 SCC (Cri) 688 , speaking through Banerjee, J., emphasised that a court exercising discretion in matters of bail has to undertake the same judiciously. In

¶44

7

¶45

2026:HHC:11140

¶46

highlighting that bail should not be granted as a matter of course, bereft of cogent reasoning, this Court observed as follows: (SCC p. 602, para 3)

¶47

“ 3 . Grant of bail, though being a discretionary order, but, however, calls for the exercise of such a discretion in a judicious manner and not as a matter of course. An order for bail bereft of any cogent reason cannot be sustained. Needless to record, however, that the grant of bail is dependent upon the contextual facts of the matter being dealt with by the court and facts do always vary from case to case. While the placement of the accused in society, though it may be considered by itself, cannot be a guiding factor in the matter of grant of bail, the same should always be coupled with other circumstances warranting the grant of bail. The nature of the offence is one of the basic considerations for the grant of bail — the more heinous is the crime, the greater is the chance of rejection of the bail, though, however, dependent on the factual matrix of the matter .” (emphasis supplied)

¶48

In Kalyan Chandra Sarkar v. Rajesh Ranjan, (2004) 7 SCC 528: 2004 SCC (Cri) 1977 , this Court held that although it is established that a court considering a bail application cannot undertake a detailed examination of evidence and an elaborate discussion on the merits of the case, yet the court is required to indicate the prima facie reasons justifying the grant of bail.

¶49

In Prasanta Kumar Sarkar v. Ashis Chatterjee, (2010) 14 SCC 496: (2011) 3 SCC (Cri) 765 , this Court observed that where a High Court has granted bail mechanically, the said order would suffer from the vice of non-application of mind, rendering it illegal. This Court held as under with regard to the circumstances under which an order granting bail may be set aside. In doing so, the factors which ought to have guided the Court's decision to grant bail have also been detailed as under: (SCC p. 499, para 9)

¶50

“ 9 . … It is trite that this Court does not, normally, interfere with an order passed by the High Court granting or rejecting

¶51

8

¶52

2026:HHC:11140

¶53

bail to the accused. However, it is equally incumbent upon the High Court to exercise its discretion judiciously, cautiously and strictly in compliance with the basic principles laid down in a plethora of decisions of this Court on the point. It is well settled that, among other circumstances, the factors to be borne in mind while considering an application for bail are :

¶54

( i ) whether there is any prima facie or reasonable ground to believe that the accused had committed the offence ;

¶55

( ii ) nature and gravity of the accusation ;

¶56

( iii ) severity of the punishment in the event of conviction ; ( iv ) danger of the accused absconding or fleeing, if released on bail ;

¶57

( v ) character, behaviour, means, position and standing of the accused ;

¶58

( vi ) likelihood of the offence being repeated ;

¶59

( vii ) reasonable apprehension of the witnesses being influenced; and

¶60

( viii ) danger, of course, of justice being thwarted by grant of bail .” (emphasis supplied)

¶61

xxxxxxx

¶62

One of the judgments of this Court on the aspect of application of mind and requirement of judicious exercise of discretion in arriving at an order granting bail to the accused is Brijmani Devi v. Pappu Kumar, (2022) 4 SCC 497 : (2022) 2 SCC (Cri) 170 , wherein a three-Judge Bench of this Court, while setting aside an unreasoned and casual order ( Pappu Kumar v. State of Bihar, 2021 SCC OnLine Pat 2856 and Pappu Singh v. State of Bihar, 2021 SCC OnLine Pat 2857 ) of the High Court granting bail to the accused, observed as follows: ( Brijmani Devi v. Pappu Kumar, (2022) 4 SCC 497 : (2022) 2 SCC (Cri) 170] ), SCC p. 511, para 35)

¶63

“ 35 . While we are conscious of the fact that liberty of an individual is an invaluable right, at the same time while considering an application for bail courts cannot lose sight

¶64

9

¶65

2026:HHC:11140

¶66

of the serious nature of the accusations against an accused and the facts that have a bearing in the case, particularly, when the accusations may not be false, frivolous or vexatious in nature but are supported by adequate material brought on record to enable a court to arrive at a prima facie conclusion. While considering an application for the grant of bail, a prima facie conclusion must be supported by reasons and must be arrived at after having regard to the vital facts of the case brought on record. Due consideration must be given to facts suggestive of the nature of crime, the criminal antecedents of the accused, if any, and the nature of punishment that would follow a conviction vis-à-vis the offence(s) alleged against an accused .” (emphasis supplied)

¶67

Hon’ble Supreme Court held in State of Rajasthan v.

¶68

Balchand , (1977) 4 SCC 308: 1977 SCC (Cri) 594: 1977 SCC OnLine SC 261 that the normal rule is bail and not jail, except where the

¶69

gravity of the crime or the heinousness of the offence suggests otherwise. It was observed at page 308:

¶70

The basic rule may perhaps be tersely put as bail, not jail, except where there are circumstances suggestive of fleeing from justice or thwarting the course of justice or creating other troubles in the shape of repeating offences or intimidating witnesses and the like, by the petitioner who seeks enlargement on bail from the Court. We do not intend to be exhaustive but only illustrative.

¶71

It is true that the gravity of the offence involved is likely to induce the petitioner to avoid the course of justice and must weigh with us when considering the question of jail. So also, the heinousness of the crime….”

¶72

The present petition has to be decided as per the

¶73

parameters laid down by the Hon’ble Supreme Court.

¶74

10

¶75

2026:HHC:11140

¶76

The status report mentions that the police interrogated Rohit, who disclosed that charas was being transported at the instance of the present petitioner, which was to be delivered to Gurpreet. Thus, the police are relying upon the statement made by the co-accused to connect the petitioner to the commission of the crime.

¶77

It was laid down by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Dipakbhai Jagdishchandra Patel v. State of Gujarat, (2019) 16 SCC 547: (2020) 2 SCC (Cri) 361: 2019 SCC OnLine SC 588 that a statement made by co-accused during the investigation is hit by Section 162 of Cr.P.C. (corresponding to Section 181 of BNSS) and cannot be used as a piece of evidence. Further, the confession made by the co-accused is inadmissible because of Section 25 of the Indian Evidence Act (corresponding to Section 23 of BSA). It was observed at page 568: -

¶78

“44. Such a person, viz., the person who is named in the FIR, and therefore, the accused in the eyes of the law, can indeed be questioned, and the statement is taken by the police officer. A confession that is made to a police officer would be inadmissible, having regard to Section 25 of the Evidence Act. A confession, which is vitiated under Section 24 of the Evidence Act, would also be inadmissible. A confession, unless it fulfils the test laid down in Pakala Narayana Swami v. King Emperor, 1939 SCC OnLine PC 1: (1938-39) 66 IA 66: AIR 1939 PC 47 and as accepted by this

¶79

11

¶80

2026:HHC:11140

¶81

Court, may still be used as an admission under Section 21 of the Evidence Act. This, however, is subject to the bar of admissibility of a statement under Section 161 CrPC. Therefore, even if a statement contains an admission, the statement being one under Section 161, it would immediately attract the bar under Section 162 CrPC.”

¶82

Similarly, it was held in Surinder Kumar Khanna vs

¶83

Intelligence Officer Directorate of Revenue Intelligence 2018 (8) SCC 271 that a confession made by a co-accused cannot be taken as a substantive piece of evidence against another co-accused and can only be utilised to lend assurance to the other evidence. The Hon’ble Supreme Court subsequently held in Tofan Singh Versus State of Tamil Nadu 2021 (4) SCC 1 that a confession made to a police officer during the investigation is hit by Section 25 of the Indian Evidence Act. Therefore, no advantage can be derived by the prosecution from the confessional statement made by the coaccused to implicate the petitioner.

¶84

14. The police have also relied upon the call detail record to connect the petitioner with the commission of crime. It was laid down by this Court in Saina Devi vs State of Himachal Pradesh 2022 Law Suit (HP) 21 1 that where the police have no material except the call details record and the disclosure statement of the co-accused, the petitioner cannot be kept in custody. It was observed: -

¶85

12

¶86

2026:HHC:11140

¶87

“ [16] In the facts of the instant case, the prosecution, for implicating the petitioner, relies upon firstly the confessional statement made by accused Dabe Ram and secondly the CDR details of calls exchanged between the petitioner and the wife of co-accused Dabe Ram. Taking into consideration the evidence with respect to the availability of CDR details involving the phone number of the petitioner and the mobile phone number of the wife of co-accused Dabe Ram, this Court had considered the existence of a prima facie case against the petitioner and had rejected the bail application as not satisfying the conditions of Section 37 of the NDPS Act.

¶88

[17] Since the existence of CDR details of accused person(s) has not been considered as a circumstance sufficient to hold a prima facie case against the accused person(s), in Pallulabid Ahmad's case (supra), this Court is of the view that petitioner has made out a case for maintainability of his successive bail application as also for grant of bail in his favour.

¶89

[18] Except for the existence of CDRs and the disclosure statement of the co-accused, no other material appears to have been collected against the petitioner. The disclosure made by the co-accused cannot be read against the petitioner as per the mandate of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in Tofan Singh Vs State of Tamil Nadu, 2021 4 SCC 1 . Further, on the basis of the aforesaid elucidation, the petitioner is also entitled to the benefit of bail.

¶90

A similar view was taken by this Court in Dabe Ram vs.

¶91

State of H.P., Cr.MP(M) No. 1894 of 2023, decided on 01.09.2023, Parvesh Saini vs State of H.P., Cr.MP(M) No. 2355 of 2023, decided on 06.10.2023 and Relu Ram vs. State of H.P. Cr.MP(M) No. 1061 of 2023, decided on 15.05.2023.

¶92

13

¶93

2026:HHC:11140

¶94

Therefore, there is prima facie insufficient material to connect the petitioner to the commission of crime.

¶95

It was submitted that the petitioner had violated the conditions laid down by this Court while granting bail in the previous F.I.R., and his bail is liable to be cancelled. Nothing is required to be said regarding this submission because the police have not applied for the cancellation of the bail, and any finding recoded by the Court would prejudice the proceedings, if any, taken for the cancellation of the bail.

¶96

18. In view of the above, the present petition is allowed, and the petitioner is ordered to be released on bail, subject to his furnishing bail bonds in the sum of ₹1,00,000/- with one surety in the like amount to the satisfaction of the learned Trial Court. While on bail, the petitioner will abide by the following conditions:

¶97

(I) The petitioner will not intimidate the witnesses, nor will he influence any evidence in any manner whatsoever.

¶98

(II) The petitioner shall attend the trial on each and every hearing and will not seek unnecessary adjournments.

¶99

(III) The petitioner will not leave the present address for a continuous period of seven days without furnishing the address of the intended visit to the SHO concerned, the Police Station concerned and the Trial Court.

¶100

14

¶101

2026:HHC:11140

¶102

(IV) The petitioner will surrender his passport, if any, to the Court; and

¶103

(V) The petitioner will furnish his mobile number and social media contact to the Police and the Court and will abide by the summons/notices received from the Police/Court through SMS/WhatsApp/Social Media Account. In case of any change in the mobile number or social media accounts, the same will be intimated to the Police/Court within five days from the date of the change.

¶104

It is expressly made clear that in case of violation of

¶105

any of these conditions, the prosecution will have the right to file a petition for cancellation of the bail.

¶106

The petition stands accordingly disposed of. A copy of this order be sent to the Jail Superintendent, Lala Lajpat Rai Correctional Home, Dharamshala, District Kangra, H.P. and the learned Trial Court by FASTER.

¶107

The observations made hereinabove are regarding the

¶108

disposal of this petition and will have no bearing, whatsoever, on the case's merits.

¶109

(Rakesh Kainthla) 09^th April,2026. Judge. (ravinder)

¶110

RAVINDER KUMAR Digitally signed by RAVINDER KUMARDN: C=IN, O=HIGH COURT OF HIMACHAL PRADESH SHIMLA, Phone=35ecb6f93c6891a7dae90f163e34d7ecaa420b13af1363204ab0e0f5c87077dc, PostalCode=171001, S=Himachal Pradesh, SERIALNUMBER=f6cc63c55495d14ce1f8623eacdb6cb9ef2c553803537a2f53c4ee637cbebaff, CN=RAVINDER KUMARReason: I am the author of this documentLocation: Date: 2026-04-09 15:08:16

Shubhkaran v. State of Hp

Case brief

What is this about?

What did the court decide?

Shubhkaran v. State of Hp

Case brief

What is this about?

What did the court decide?

Why is it important?

What the court decided

Issues for consideration

Cases cited

Statutes considered

Procedural history

Parties & counsel

Coram

Case details

Similar cases

Neha Kumari Vs State of Hp

Mangal Bahadur Vs State of Hp

Som Chand Vs State of Hp

Mridul Vs State of Hp

Junaid Khan Vs State of Hp

Shiv Dayal Vs Kansi Ram