Suraj Vs State of Hp

2026:HHC:10208

IN THE HIGH COURT OF HIMACHAL PRADESH, SHIMLA

Cr. MP(M) Nos. 359, 363, 364, 365 and 368 of 2026 Reserved on: 30.03.2026 Date of Decision: 06.04.2026.

_________________________ 1.Cr.MP(M) No. 359 of 2026	____________
Swati Versus	...Petitioner
State of Himachal Pradesh	...Respondent
_________________________ 2.Cr.MP(M) No. 363 of 2026	_____________
Karan Versus	...Petitioner
State of Himachal Pradesh	...Respondent
_________________________ 3.Cr.MP(M) No. 364 of 2026	_____________
Suraj Versus	…. Petitioner
State of Himachal Pradesh	…. Respondent
_________________________ 4.Cr.MP(M) No. 365 of 2026	_____________
Binta Versus	...Petitioner
State of Himachal Pradesh	...Respondent
_________________________ 5.Cr.MP(M) No. 368 of 2026	_____________
Pawan Kumar Bhatti	...Petitioner

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2026:HHC:10208

Versus

State of H.P. …. Respondent

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Coram

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Hon’ble Mr Justice Rakesh Kainthla , Judge. Whether approved for reporting?¹ No

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For the Petitioner(s) :	Mr Sanjeev Kumar Suri, A all the petitions except in 368 of 2026.	dvocate, in Cr.MP No.
	Mr Parveen Chauhan, A the petitioner in Cr.M.P. 2026.	dvocate for No. 368 of
For the Respondents/State:	Mr Jitender Sharma, Advocate General,	Additional for the
	respondent/State, in petitions.	all the

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Rakesh Kainthla, Judge

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The petitioners have filed the present petitions for seeking regular bail, in FIR No. 282 of 2025 dated 22.11.2025 registered at Police Station Sadar, Chamba, H.P., for the commission of offences punishable under Sections 21 and 29 of the Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances Act (NDPS) and Sections 221 and 132 of the Bhartiya Nyaya Sanhita (BNS). Since all the petitions have arisen out of the same FIR; therefore, they are being taken up together for disposal.

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1 Whether reporters of Local Papers may be allowed to see the judgment? Yes.

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It has been asserted that, as per the prosecution, the police had set up a nakaa on 22.11.2025 at 7 AM at Bhatti Nala near Sulatanpur-Chamba- Pathankot NH-154A. They received a secret information that one Binta Mahajan and her son Aryan Mahajan were dealing in heroin, and a huge quantity of heroin could be recovered by searching their house. The police went to the house. Binta Mahajan was not present in her home, but her son Aryan was present. The police searched the house and recovered one electronic weighing machine, two burnt foil papers, one folded and burnt ₹20/- currency note and one syringe. Binta Mahajan also came to the spot and raised a hue and cry. One room was locked. The police opened it and recovered a polythene bag containing some material. The police also recovered 14 mobile phones, several small packets containing 20.65 grams of heroin, currency notes and jewellery. The petitioners are innocent, and they were falsely implicated. The co-accused Rajesh Kumar, Ankush Thakur, Sachin and Sorabh have been released on bail by this Court. Sameer Ali and Sunil Kumar were released on bail by learned Special Judge-II, District Chamba, H.P, Shimla. The police have filed the charge sheet, and no fruitful purpose would be served by detaining the petitioners in custody. The petitioners

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would abide by the terms and conditions that the Court may impose. Hence, it was prayed that the present petitions be allowed and the petitioners be released on bail.

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The petitions are opposed by filing a status report asserting that the police received a secret information on 22.11.2015 that Binta Mahajan and her son Aryan Mahajan were selling heroin, and a huge quantity of heroin could be recovered by searching their house. The information was credible, and it was reduced to writing. It was sent to the Additional Superintendent of Police, Chamba, who issued an authorisation letter. The police associated Seema Kumari and Mahender Kumar and went to the house of Binta Mahajan. The police found Aryan Mahajan in the house. The police searched the house and recovered an electronic weighing machine, two burnt foil papers, one burnt and one folded currency note of ₹20/- and one syringe. Binta Mahajan also came to the spot. The police conducted a further search of the house and recovered 14 mobile phones, jewellery, 20.65 grams of heroin, and ₹2,33,377/- in cash. The petitioner, Swati, was found locked in a room. The police seized all the articles and arrested the occupants. The investigation revealed that Swati, Binta and Aryan Mahajan had sold the heroin

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to Mukul Bhardwaj, Saurav, Sachin, Ankush, Rajesh, Karan, Suraj, Kirpal, Vinod Kumar and other persons. There were financial transactions between them. They were in constant touch with each other. The petitioner Suraj had transferred ₹33,500/- to the account of Aryan Mahajan and Binta Mahajan between January, 2025 and November, 2025. The petitioner Karan had transferred ₹35,100/- to the account of Aryan and Binta Mahajan between February, 2025 and November, 2025. A total transaction of ₹42,09,216/- was found in the petitioner Pawan Kumar's account between 01.01.2025 and 28.11.2025. Aryan Mahajan and Binta Mahajan had transferred ₹8,79,303/- to his account. Petitioner Pawan Kumar Bhatti was the supplier of the heroin to petitioners Binta and her son Aryan. The charge sheet was filed before the Court on 20.1.2026. The prosecution has cited 41 witnesses. Hence, the status report.

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I have heard Mr Sanjeev Kumar Suri, learned counsel for the petitioners Karan, Suraj, Binta and Swati and Mr Parveen Chauhan, learned counsel for petitioner Pawan Kumar Bhatti and Mr Jitender Sharma, Additional Advocate General for the respondent/State.

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Mr Sanjeev Kumar Suri, learned counsel for the petitioners Karan, Suraj, Binta and Swati, submitted that the petitioners are innocent and they were falsely implicated. The quantity of heroin stated to have been recovered by the police is less than the commercial quantity, and the rigours of Section 37 of the NDPS Act do not apply to the present case. The petitioners, Binta Mahajan and Swati, are entitled to special consideration as women. The police have filed the chargesheet, and no fruitful purpose would be served by detaining the petitioners in custody. The petitioners would abide by the terms and conditions that the Court may impose. Hence, he prayed that the present petitions be allowed and the petitioners be released on bail.

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Mr Praveen Chauhan, learned counsel for the petitioner Pawan Kumar Bhatti, submitted that there is no material against the petitioner except the financial transaction, which is not sufficient to connect him to the commission of a crime. Hence, he prayed that the present petition be allowed and that the petitioner, Pawan Kumar Bhatti, be released on bail.

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Mr Jitender Sharma, learned Additional Advocate General for the respondents/State, submitted that petitioners

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Binta and Swati were found in possession of heroin, a large quantity of jewellery, and cash, which prima facie indicate their involvement in the sale of heroin. This is confirmed by the fact that various persons had transferred money to their accounts. They had transferred a significant amount of money to petitioner Pawan Kumar’s account. Heroin adversely affects society, and no leniency should be shown to the petitioners. Therefore, he prayed that the present petitions be dismissed.

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I have given considerable thought to the submissions made at the bar and have gone through the records carefully.

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The parameters for granting bail were considered by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Pinki v. State of U.P., (2025) 7 SCC 314: 2025 SCC OnLine SC 781, wherein it was observed at page 380:

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( i ) Broad principles for the grant of bail

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56. In Gudikantis Narasimhulu v. High Court of A.P., (1978) 1 SCC 240: 1978 SCC (Cri) 115 , Krishna Iyer, J., while elaborating on the content of Article 21 of the Constitution of India in the context of personal liberty of a person under trial, has laid down the key factors that should be considered while granting bail, which are extracted as under: (SCC p. 244, paras 7-9)

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“ 7 . It is thus obvious that the nature of the charge is the vital factor, and the nature of the evidence is also pertinent. The punishment to which the party may be liable, if convicted or a conviction is confirmed, also bears upon the issue.

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8 . Another relevant factor is whether the course of justice would be thwarted by him who seeks the benignant jurisdiction of the Court to be freed for the time being . [ Patrick Devlin, “The Criminal Prosecution in England” (Oxford University Press, London 1960) p. 75 — Modern Law Review, Vol. 81, Jan. 1968, p. 54.]

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9 . Thus, the legal principles and practice validate the Court considering the likelihood of the applicant interfering with witnesses for the prosecution or otherwise polluting the process of justice. It is not only traditional but rational, in this context, to enquire into the antecedents of a man who is applying for bail to find whether he has a bad record, particularly a record which suggests that he is likely to commit serious offences while on bail. In regard to habituals, it is part of criminological history that a thoughtless bail order has enabled the bailee to exploit the opportunity to inflict further crimes on the members of society. Bail discretion, based on evidence about the criminal record of a defendant, is therefore not an exercise in irrelevance .” (emphasis supplied)

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57. In Prahlad Singh Bhati v. State (NCT of Delhi), (2001) 4 SCC 280: 2001 SCC (Cri) 674 , this Court highlighted various aspects that the courts should keep in mind while dealing with an application seeking bail. The same may be extracted as follows: (SCC pp. 284-85, para 8)

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“ 8 . The jurisdiction to grant bail has to be exercised on the basis of well-settled principles, having regard to the circumstances of each case and not in an arbitrary manner. While granting the bail, the court has to keep in mind the nature of accusations, the nature of evidence in support thereof, the severity of the punishment which conviction will entail, the character, behaviour, means and standing of the accused, circumstances which are peculiar to the accused, reasonable possibility of securing the presence of the accused at the trial, reasonable apprehension of the witnesses being tampered with, the larger interests of the public or State and similar other considerations. It has also to be kept in mind that for the purposes of granting the bail

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the legislature has used the words “reasonable grounds for believing” instead of “the evidence” which means the court dealing with the grant of bail can only satisfy it (sic itself) as to whether there is a genuine case against the accused and that the prosecution will be able to produce prima facie evidence in support of the charge .” (emphasis supplied)

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58. This Court in Ram Govind Upadhyay v. Sudarshan Singh, (2002) 3 SCC 598: 2002 SCC (Cri) 688 , speaking through Banerjee, J., emphasised that a court exercising discretion in matters of bail has to undertake the same judiciously. In highlighting that bail should not be granted as a matter of course, bereft of cogent reasoning, this Court observed as follows: (SCC p. 602, para 3)

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“ 3 . Grant of bail, though being a discretionary order, but, however, calls for the exercise of such a discretion in a judicious manner and not as a matter of course. An order for bail bereft of any cogent reason cannot be sustained. Needless to record, however, that the grant of bail is dependent upon the contextual facts of the matter being dealt with by the court and facts do always vary from case to case. While the placement of the accused in society, though it may be considered by itself, cannot be a guiding factor in the matter of grant of bail, the same should always be coupled with other circumstances warranting the grant of bail. The nature of the offence is one of the basic considerations for the grant of bail — the more heinous is the crime, the greater is the chance of rejection of the bail, though, however, dependent on the factual matrix of the matter .” (emphasis supplied)

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59. In Kalyan Chandra Sarkar v. Rajesh Ranjan, (2004) 7 SCC 528: 2004 SCC (Cri) 1977 , this Court held that although it is established that a court considering a bail application cannot undertake a detailed examination of evidence and an elaborate discussion on the merits of the case, yet the court is required to indicate the prima facie reasons justifying the grant of bail.

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60. In Prasanta Kumar Sarkar v. Ashis Chatterjee, (2010) 14 SCC 496: (2011) 3 SCC (Cri) 765 , this Court observed that where a High Court has granted bail mechanically, the said order would suffer from the vice of non-application of mind, rendering it illegal. This Court held as under with regard to the circumstances under which an order granting bail may be set aside. In doing so, the factors which ought to have guided the Court's decision to grant bail have also been detailed as under: (SCC p. 499, para 9)

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“ 9 . … It is trite that this Court does not, normally, interfere with an order passed by the High Court granting or rejecting bail to the accused. However, it is equally incumbent upon the High Court to exercise its discretion judiciously, cautiously and strictly in compliance with the basic principles laid down in a plethora of decisions of this Court on the point. It is well settled that, among other circumstances, the factors to be borne in mind while considering an application for bail are :

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( i ) whether there is any prima facie or reasonable ground to believe that the accused had committed the offence ;

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( ii ) nature and gravity of the accusation ;

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( iii ) severity of the punishment in the event of conviction ;

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( iv ) danger of the accused absconding or fleeing, if released on bail ;

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( v ) character, behaviour, means, position and standing of the accused ;

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( vi ) likelihood of the offence being repeated ;

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( vii ) reasonable apprehension of the witnesses being influenced; and

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( viii ) danger, of course, of justice being thwarted by grant of bail .” (emphasis supplied)

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62. One of the judgments of this Court on the aspect of application of mind and requirement of judicious exercise of discretion in arriving at an order granting bail to the accused is Brijmani Devi v. Pappu Kumar, (2022) 4 SCC 497 : (2022) 2 SCC (Cri) 170 , wherein a three-Judge Bench of this Court, while setting aside an unreasoned and casual order ( Pappu Kumar v. State of Bihar, 2021 SCC OnLine Pat 2856 and Pappu Singh v. State of Bihar, 2021 SCC OnLine Pat 2857 ) of the High Court granting bail to the accused, observed as follows: ( Brijmani Devi v. Pappu Kumar, (2022) 4 SCC 497 : (2022) 2 SCC (Cri) 170] ), SCC p. 511, para 35)

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“ 35 . While we are conscious of the fact that liberty of an individual is an invaluable right, at the same time while considering an application for bail courts cannot lose sight of the serious nature of the accusations against an accused and the facts that have a bearing in the case, particularly, when the accusations may not be false, frivolous or vexatious in nature but are supported by adequate material brought on record to enable a court to arrive at a prima facie conclusion. While considering an application for the grant of bail, a prima facie conclusion must be supported by reasons and must be arrived at after having regard to the vital facts of the case brought on record. Due consideration must be given to facts suggestive of the nature of crime, the criminal antecedents of the accused, if any, and the nature of punishment that would follow a conviction vis-à-vis the offence(s) alleged against an accused .” (emphasis supplied)

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Hon’ble Supreme Court held in State of Rajasthan v. Balchand , (1977) 4 SCC 308: 1977 SCC (Cri) 594: 1977 SCC OnLine SC 261 that the normal rule is bail and not jail, except where the gravity of the crime or the heinousness of the ofence suggests f otherwise. It was observed at page 308:

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2. The basic rule may perhaps be tersely put as bail, not jail, except where there are circumstances suggestive of fleeing from justice or thwarting the course of justice or creating other troubles in the shape of repeating offences or intimidating witnesses and the like, by the petitioner who seeks enlargement on bail from the Court. We do not intend to be exhaustive but only illustrative.

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3. It is true that the gravity of the offence involved is likely to induce the petitioner to avoid the course of justice and must weigh with us when considering the question of jail. So also, the heinousness of the crime….”

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The present petitions have to be decided as per the parameters laid down by the Hon’ble Supreme Court.

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The status report mentions that the police searched the house of Binta Mahajan, where Aryan and Swati were present. The police recovered 20.65 grams of heroin, an electronic weighing machine, transparent polythene packets containing traces of heroin, ₹2,33,377/-, a huge quantity of jewellery, and 14 mobile phones from the house. Binta also arrived during the search. She and Swati created a hue and cry and obstructed the police from searching the house. All these circumstances primafacie shows the involvement of the petitioners, Binta and Swati, in the commission of the crime.

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The status report also mentions that the petitioners, Karan and Suraj, were arrested based on the financial

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transactions made by them to the account of the petitioner Binta and her son Aryan. The status report also mentions that money was transferred by petitioners Binta Mahajan and Aryan Mahajan to the account of Pawan Kumar Bhatti. There is no other material to connect them to the heroin. The mere transfer of money is insufficient to connect the petitioners, Pawan, Suraj and Karan, to the commission of crime. It was laid down by the Kerala High Court in Amal E vs State of Kerala 2023:KER:39393 that financial transactions are not sufficient to connect the accused with the commission of crime. It was observed:

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“From the perusal of the case records, it can be seen that, apart from the aforesaid transactions, there is nothing to show the involvement of the petitioners. It is true that the documents indicate the monetary transactions between the petitioners and some of the accused persons, but the question that arises is whether the said transactions were in connection with the sale of Narcotic drugs. To establish the same, apart from the confession statements of the accused, there is nothing. However, as it is an aspect to be established during the trial, I do not intend to enter into any finding at this stage, but the said aspect is sufficient to record the satisfaction of the conditions contemplated under section 37 of the NDPS Act, as the lack of such materials evokes a reasonable doubt as to the involvement of the petitioner.”

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The police also relied upon the call detail record to

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conclude that the petitioners had talked to the co-accused. This is

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also not sufficient. It was laid down by this Court in Dinesh Kumar @ Billa Versus State of H.P. 2020 Cri. L.J. 4564, that the phone calls are not sufficient to deny bail to a person.

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It was laid down by this Court in Saina Devi vs State of Himachal Pradesh 2022 Law Suit (HP) 211 that the petitioner cannot be kept in custody based on the call detail records. It was observed: -

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“ [16] In the facts of the instant case, the prosecution, for implicating the petitioner, relies upon firstly the confessional statement made by accused Dabe Ram and secondly the CDR details of calls exchanged between the petitioner and the wife of co-accused Dabe Ram. Taking into consideration the evidence with respect to the availability of CDR details involving the phone number of the petitioner and the mobile phone number of the wife of co-accused Dabe Ram, this Court had considered the existence of a prima facie case against the petitioner and had rejected the bail application as not satisfying the conditions of Section 37 of the NDPS Act.

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[17] Since the existence of CDR details of accused person(s) has not been considered as a circumstance sufficient to hold a prima facie case against the accused person(s), in Pallulabid Ahmad's case (supra), this Court is of the view that petitioner has made out a case for maintainability of his successive bail application as also for grant of bail in his favour.

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[18] Except for the existence of CDRs and the disclosure statement of the co-accused, no other material appears to have been collected against the petitioner. The disclosure made by the co-accused cannot be read against the petitioner as per the mandate of the Hon'ble Supreme

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Court in Tofan Singh Vs State of Tamil Nadu, 2021 4 SCC 1 . Further, on the basis of the aforesaid elucidation, the petitioner is also entitled to the benefit of bail.

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A similar view was taken by this Court in Dabe Ram vs.

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State of H.P., Cr.MP(M) No. 1894 of 2023, decided on 01.09.2023, Parvesh Saini vs State of H.P., Cr.MP(M) No. 2355 of 2023, decided on 06.10.2023 and Relu Ram vs. State of H.P. Cr.MP(M) No. 1061 of 2023, decided on 15.05.2023.

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The police have also added Section 27A of the NDPS Act, which deals with the financing of drugs. The term financing was explained by the Bombay High Court in Rhea Chakraborty v. Union of India 2021 Cr LJ 248 as under: -

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“ 66. Section 27A is much wider if sub-clause (iv) of Section 2(viiia) is taken into account. This sub-clause (iv) of Section 2(viiia) takes in its sweep all the remaining activities which are not mentioned in sub-clauses (i),(ii) & (iii). This covers just about every activity that can be described as dealing in narcotic drugs or psychotropic substances. The interpretation of Section 27A should not be stretched to the extent of rendering the classification of sentences depending on the quantities in penal Sections 20, 21, 22 and 23 otiose.

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67. Sub-clause (viiia) of Section 2 of the NDPS Act is an inclusive definition. The inclusive part mentions financing, abetting, conspiring and harbouring. The financing and harbouring parts are specifically made punishable under Section 27A.

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68. The activities mentioned in Section 2(viiia)(iii) and Section 8(c) refer to sale, purchase, export, import, etc. All these

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activities involve monetary transactions. For every sale or purchase, there can be a use of money. But that will not mean that either of the parties has “financed” the transaction. Such sales and purchases are separately prohibited and made punishable under Section 8(c), read with Section 20 and other similar Sections. Therefore, “financing” is something more than just paying for purchases and other activities involving contraband as defined under Section 8(c). Contravention of that Section and indulging in activities mentioned in Sections 20, 21, 22 and 23 incur punishment depending on the quantity of the contraband .

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69. For interpreting Section 27A harmoniously with the Scheme of the Act and other Sections, it is necessary to go to the Statement of Objects and Reasons for incorporating this Section in the Act w.e.f. 29.5.1989. The Statement of Objects and Reasons of the 1989 Amendment, which is reproduced hereinbefore, mentions that India was facing a problem of transit traffic in illicit drugs. The spillover from such traffic was causing problems of abuse and addiction. Therefore, a need was felt to amend the Law to further strengthen it.

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70. Thus, the aim was to control the traffic in illicit drugs as the spillover from such traffic was causing problems of abuse and addiction. The Legislature wanted to attack the basic cause of the illicit traffic of drugs. The prohibitory Section 8 already existed at that time. Therefore, a separate Section 27A was introduced to check these activities, which were the root cause of illicit traffic. “Financing” and “harbouring” such activities were, therefore, specifically mentioned under Section 27A.

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71. “Financing” is not defined under the Act. The Concise Oxford Dictionary defines the word “finance” as “(1) the management of (esp. public) money, (2) monetary support for an enterprise, (3) (in pl.) the money resources of a state, company, or person, to provide capital for (a person or enterprise)”.

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72. Black's Law Dictionary gives the meaning of the word “finance” as “to raise or provide funds”.

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73. Thus, “financing” as generally understood is offering monetary support or providing funds.

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74. Therefore, simply providing money for a particular transaction or other transactions will not be financing of that activity. Financing will have to be interpreted to mean to provide funds for either making that particular activity operational or for sustaining it. It is the financial support that directly or indirectly causes the existence of such illicit traffic. The word “financing” would necessarily refer to some activities involving illegal trade or business

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75. The allegations against the Applicant of spending money in procuring drugs for Sushant Singh Rajput will not, therefore, mean that she had financed illicit traffic.” (emphasis supplied)

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Thus, the purchase of the drugs will not amount to financing, and the petitioners, Karan and Suraj, cannot be prima facie held liable for the commission of an offence punishable under Section 27A of the NDPS Act.

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The petitioners, Binta and Swati, were found in possession of 20.65 grams of heroin as per the status report. It was submitted that it is an intermediate quantity and the rigours of Section 37 of the NDPS Act do not apply to the present case, and the petitioners are entitled to bail as a matter of right. This submission is not acceptable. It was laid down by this Court in Khushi Ram Gupta v. State of H.P., 2022 SCC OnLine HP 3779, that

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the menace of drug addiction has seriously eroded into the fabric of society, and the release of an accused on bail in NDPS Act cases will send a negative signal to society. It was observed:

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“8. The menace of drug addiction, especially in adolescents and students, has seriously eroded into the fabric of society, putting the future generation as well as the prospects of future nation-building into serious peril.

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9. It is not a case where the investigating agency is clueless in respect of evidence against the petitioner. Though allegations against the petitioner are yet to be proved in accordance with the law, it cannot be taken singly as a factor to grant bail to the petitioner. Nothing has been placed on record on behalf of the petitioner to divulge as to how and in what manner he came in contact with the persons who were residents of the State of Himachal Pradesh. Thus, there is sufficient prima facie material to infer the implication of the petitioner in the crime. In such circumstances, the release of the petitioner on bail will send a negative signal in society, which will definitely be detrimental to its interests.

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10. The prima facie involvement of the petitioner in the dangerous trade of contraband cannot be ignored merely on account of the fact that he has no past criminal history. It cannot be guaranteed that there will be re-indulgence by the petitioner in similar activities, in case he is released on bail.”

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Similarly, it was held in Bunty Yadav v. State of H.P., 2022 SCC OnLine HP 4996, that the bail cannot be claimed as a matter of right even though the rigours of Section 37 of the NDPS Act do not apply to a case. Each case has to be adjudged on its own facts. It was observed:

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“6. The quantity involved in the case is 89.89 grams of heroin and 3.90 grams of MDMA. Such quantity may not technically fall under the category of commercial quantity; nevertheless, such quantity cannot be termed to be less by any stretch of the imagination. The evident nature of commercial transactions and dealing with the contraband aggravates the situation for the petitioner. In a case where Section 37 of the NDPS Act is not applicable, the bail cannot be claimed as a matter of right. The fate depends on the facts of each and every case.

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7. The menace of drug addiction, especially in adolescents and students, has seriously eroded into the fabric of society, putting the future generation as well as the prospects of future nation-building into serious peril.”

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It was laid down by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Union of India v Namdeo Ashruba Nakade SLP (Crl.) 9792/2025, decided on 07.11.2025, that there is a concerning increase in drug abuse amongst the youth. It was observed: -

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This Court is of the view that the issue of substance abuse has emerged as a global public health crisis in the twenty-first century, affecting every country worldwide, as drug trafficking and addiction have become pervasive. The United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC) reported in its 2025 World Drug Report that “As at 2023, some 316 million people worldwide had used drugs in the past year, representing an increase over the past decade that outpaces population growth, which indicates a higher prevalence of drug use.”

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In India, there has been a concerning increase in drug abuse among the youth. Substance abuse not only affects individuals, families, and communities but also undermines various aspects of health, including physical, social, political, and cultural foundations, and mental well-being. (See: “Bhattacharya S, Menon GS, Garg S,

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Grover A, Saleem SM, Kushwaha P. The lingering menace of drug abuse among the Indian youth–it’s time for action. Indian J Community Med 2025;50:S9-12, published on 17th April, 2025”)

¶129

According to many news reports, India faces a clear dilemma between tackling the narcotics crisis systematically or sacrificing its most valuable resource, i.e. its young people. The extent of menace of drug abuse has also been highlighted by this Court in the case of Ankush Vipan Kapoor v. National Investigation Agency, (2025) 5 SCC 155 , wherein this Court has observed as under:

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“9.1 The ills of drug abuse seem to be shadowing the length and breadth of our country, with the Central and every State Government fighting against the menace of substance abuse. The debilitating impact of the drug trade and drug abuse is an immediate and serious concern for India. As the globe grapples with the menace of escalating Substance Use Disorders (“SUD”) and an ever accessible drug market, the consequences leave a generational Page 75 of 84 imprint on public health and even national security. Article 47 of the Constitution makes it a duty of the State to regard the raising of the level of nutrition and the standard of living of its people and the improvement of public health as among its primary duties and in particular the State shall endeavour to bring about prohibition of the consumption except for medicinal purposes of intoxicating drinks and of drugs which are injurious to health. The State has a responsibility to address the root causes of this predicament and develop effective intervention strategies to ensure that India’s younger population, which is particularly vulnerable to substance abuse, is protected and saved from such a menace. This is particularly because substance abuse is linked to social problems and can contribute to child maltreatment, spousal violence, and even property crime in a family.”

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Hence, the petitioners, Binta and Swati, cannot be released on bail merely because the rigours of Section 37 of the NDPS Act do not apply to the present case.

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The status report shows that the petitioners, Binta and Swati, were not only found in possession of heroin but also in possession of currency notes of ₹2,33,337/-, small packets of polythene, 14 mobile phones and a huge quantity of jewellery. Prima-facie the recovery of the small packets containing the traces of heroin, a huge quantity of jewelry and financial transactions in the account of the petitioners shows that they are drug dealers and no leniency can be shown to them. Further, the status report shows that FIR No. 167 of 2024 was registered against the petitioner Binta Mahajan, which is pending before the Court. Therefore, these circumstances will disentitle petitioners Binta and Swati from the concession of bail.

¶135

In view of the above, the petitions filed by Swati and Bimla are dismissed while the petitions filed by Pawan Kumar Bhatti, Karan and Suraj are allowed and they are ordered to be released on bail, subject to their furnishing bail bonds in the sum of ₹1,00,000/-each with one surety each in the like amount to the

¶136

22

¶137

2026:HHC:10208

¶138

satisfaction of the learned Trial Court. While on bail, the petitioners will abide by the following conditions: -

¶139

(I) The petitioners will not intimidate the witnesses, nor will they influence any evidence in any manner whatsoever.

¶140

(II) The petitioners shall attend the trial on each and every hearing and will not seek unnecessary adjournments.

¶141

(III) The petitioners will not leave the present address for a continuous period of seven days without furnishing the address of the intended visit to the SHO concerned, the Police Station concerned and the Trial Court.

¶142

(IV) The petitioners will surrender their passports, if any, to the Court; and

¶143

(V) The petitioners will furnish their mobile number and social media contact to the Police and the Court and will abide by the summons/notices received from the Police/Court through SMS/WhatsApp/Social Media Account. In case of any change in the mobile number or social media accounts, the same will be intimated to the Police/Court within five days from the date of the change.

¶144

It is expressly made clear that in case of violation of any of these conditions, the prosecution will have the right to file petitions for cancellation of the bail.

¶145

The petitions stand accordingly disposed of. A copy of this order be sent to the Jail Superintendent of District-cumOpen Air Jail Chamba, District Chamba and the learned Trial Court by FASTER.

¶146

23

¶147

2026:HHC:10208

¶148

27. The observations made hereinabove are regarding the

¶149

disposal of these petitions and will have no bearing, whatsoever,

¶150

on the case's merits.

¶151

6^thApril, 2026	(Rakes Ju	h Kainthla) dge
(Nikita)	CHANDER SHEKHAR	Digitally signed by CHANDER SHEKHAR Date: 2026.04.10 15:56:10 +0530

Suraj v. State of Hp

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Suraj v. State of Hp

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