Penba Lama Vs State of Hp

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IN THE HIGH COURT OF HIMACHAL PRADESH, SHIMLA

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Cr. MP (M) No. 2657 of 2025 Reserved on: 26.02.2026 Date of Decision: 09.03.2026.

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Penba Lama ...Petitioner Versus State of Himachal Pradesh ...Respondent

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Coram

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*Hon’ble Mr Justice Rakesh Kainthl*	a,****Judge.
*Whether approved for reporting?*¹	No
For the Petitioner :	Mr Parkshit Rathour, Advocate.
For the Respondent/State :	Mr Lokender Kutlehria, Additional Advocate General.

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Rakesh Kainthla, Judge

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The petitioner has fled the present petition for i seeking regular bail in F.I.R. No. 4 of 2025, dated 04.01.2025, registered at Police Station, Baddi, District Solan, H.P., for the commission of of f ences punishable under Sections 109 and 333 of Bhartiya Nayaya Sanhita (BNS), 2023.

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2 . It has been asserted that, as per the prosecution, the victim was running a jewellery shop. The petitioner visited his

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1 Whether reporters of Local Papers may be allowed to see the judgment? Yes.

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shop on 03.01.2025 at about 8:30 PM armed with a Khukhari and asked the victim to hand over silver, gold and other valuable articles. The victim refused, and the petitioner attacked him with a Khukhri. The victim sustained injuries to his hand. The victim shouted for help. The neighbours came to the spot after hearing the victim’s cries and rescued him from the petitioner. The police registered the FIR and investigated the matter. The charge sheet was fled before the learned Trial Court on i 06.01.2025 after the completion of the investigation. No recovery is to be made from the petitioner. The investigation is complete, and no fruitful purpose would be served by detaining the petitioner in custody. The petitioner has been behind bars for 11 months, and the trial has not yet commenced, which is violative of the petitioner’s right to a speedy trial. The petitioner would abide by the terms and conditions that the Court may impose. Hence, it was prayed that the present petition be allowed and the petitioner be released on bail.

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3 . The petition is opposed by fling a status report i asserting that the victim was running a jewellery shop at Chakka road Baddi. He was present in his shop on 03.01.2025 at about 8:30 PM. The petitioner went to his shop armed with a Khukhri

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and asked the victim to hand over gold, silver and other valuable articles. The victim refused, and the petitioner attacked him with a Khukhri . The victim tried to save himself and sustained injuries on his left hand. The petitioner again attacked the victim, and the victim sustained injury on his right hand. The victim shouted for help, after which the neighbours came to the spot and rescued him from the petitioner. The police registered the FIR and arrested the petitioner. The material objects were seized and sent to SFSL. The petitioner and the victim were medically examined. The DNA of the victim was found in the pants, hood of the petitioner and the Khukhri recovered from the petitioner. The Medical Ofcer stated that the nature of the fi injury was grievous and could have been caused by sharp edged weapon. The injury was dangerous to life. The police fled the i charge sheet before the Court. The matter was listed for consideration of the charge on 21.11.2025. Hence, the status report.

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4 . I have heard Mr Prikshit Rathour, learned counsel for the petitioner and Mr Lokender Kutlehria, learned Additional Advocate General for the respondent/State.

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5 . Mr Prikshit Rathour, learned counsel for the petitioner, submitted that the petitioner is innocent and that he was falsely implicated. The petitioner had sustained grievous injuries that have not been explained by the prosecution. The copy of his MLC was also not annexed to the chargesheet. The non-explanation of the injuries sustained by the petitioner shows that the prosecution has suppressed the genesis of the incident. The petitioner was arrested on 04.01.2025, and the trial has not yet commenced. The investigation is complete, and the charge sheet has been fled before the Court. No fruitful purpose i would be served by detaining the petitioner in custody. Hence, he prayed that the present petition be allowed and the petitioner be released on bail.

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6 . Mr Lokender Kutlehria, learned Additional Advocate General for the respondent/State, submitted that the petitioner went to the victim’s shop and attacked him with a Khukhri after the victim had refused to hand over gold, silver and other valuable articles to the petitioner. The victim sustained injuries that were dangerous to life. The of f ence committed by the petitioner is heinous, and he is not entitled to bail. Hence, he prayed that the present petition be dismissed.

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7 . I have given considerable thought to the submissions

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made at the bar and have gone through the records carefully.

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8 . The parameters for granting bail were considered by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Pinki v. State of U.P., (2025) 7 SCC

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314: 2025 SCC OnLine SC 781 , wherein it was observed at page

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380:-

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( i ) Broad principles for the grant of bail

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In Gudikanti Narasimhulu v. High Court of A.P., (1978) 1 SCC 240: 1978 SCC (Cri) 115 , Krishna Iyer, J., while elaborating on the content of Article 21 of the Constitution of India in the context of personal liberty of a person under trial, has laid down the key factors that should be considered while granting bail, which are extracted as under: (SCC p. 244, paras 7-9)

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“ 7 . It is thus obvious that the nature of the charge is the vital factor, and the nature of the evidence is also pertinent. The punishment to which the party may be liable, if convicted or a conviction is confirmed, also bears upon the issue.

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8 . Another relevant factor is whether the course of justice would be thwarted by him who seeks the benignant jurisdiction of the Court to be freed for the time being . [ Patrick Devlin, “The Criminal Prosecution in England ” (Oxford University Press, London 1960) p. 75 — Modern Law Review, Vol. 81, Jan. 1968, p. 54.]

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9 . Thus, the legal principles and practice validate the Court considering the likelihood of the applicant interfering with witnesses for the prosecution or otherwise polluting the process of justice. It is not only traditional but rational, in this context, to enquire into the antecedents of a man who is applying for bail to find whether he has a bad record, particularly a record which

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suggests that he is likely to commit serious offences while on bail. In regard to habituals, it is part of criminological history that a thoughtless bail order has enabled the bailee to exploit the opportunity to inflict further crimes on the members of society. Bail discretion, on the basis of evidence about the criminal record of a defendant, is therefore not an exercise in irrelevance .” (emphasis supplied)

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In Prahlad Singh Bhati v. State (NCT of Delhi), (2001) 4 SCC 280: 2001 SCC (Cri) 674 , this Court highlighted various aspects that the courts should keep in mind while dealing with an application seeking bail. The same may be extracted as follows: (SCC pp. 284-85, para 8)

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“ 8 . The jurisdiction to grant bail has to be exercised on the basis of well-settled principles, having regard to the circumstances of each case and not in an arbitrary manner. While granting the bail, the court has to keep in mind the nature of accusations, the nature of evidence in support thereof, the severity of the punishment which conviction will entail, the character, behaviour, means and standing of the accused, circumstances which are peculiar to the accused, reasonable possibility of securing the presence of the accused at the trial, reasonable apprehension of the witnesses being tampered with, the larger interests of the public or State and similar other considerations. It has also to be kept in mind that for the purposes of granting the bail the legislature has used the words “reasonable grounds for believing” instead of “the evidence” which means the court dealing with the grant of bail can only satisfy it (sic itself) as to whether there is a genuine case against the accused and that the prosecution will be able to produce prima facie evidence in support of the charge .” (emphasis supplied)

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This Court in Ram Govind Upadhyay v. Sudarshan Singh, (2002) 3 SCC 598: 2002 SCC (Cri) 688 , speaking through Banerjee, J., emphasised that a court exercising discretion in matters of bail has to undertake the same judiciously. In highlighting that bail should not be

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granted as a matter of course, bereft of cogent reasoning, this Court observed as follows: (SCC p. 602, para 3)

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“ 3 . Grant of bail, though being a discretionary order, but, however, calls for the exercise of such a discretion in a judicious manner and not as a matter of course. An order for bail bereft of any cogent reason cannot be sustained. Needless to record, however, that the grant of bail is dependent upon the contextual facts of the matter being dealt with by the court and facts do always vary from case to case. While placement of the accused in the society, though it may be considered by itself, cannot be a guiding factor in the matter of grant of bail, and the same should always be coupled with other circumstances warranting the grant of bail. The nature of the offence is one of the basic considerations for the grant of bail — the more heinous is the crime, the greater is the chance of rejection of the bail, though, however, dependent on the factual matrix of the matter .” (emphasis supplied)

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In Kalyan Chandra Sarkar v. Rajesh Ranjan, (2004) 7 SCC 528: 2004 SCC (Cri) 1977 , this Court held that although it is established that a court considering a bail application cannot undertake a detailed examination of evidence and an elaborate discussion on the merits of the case, yet the court is required to indicate the prima facie reasons justifying the grant of bail.

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In Prasanta Kumar Sarkar v. Ashis Chatterjee, (2010) 14 SCC 496: (2011) 3 SCC (Cri) 765 , this Court observed that where a High Court has granted bail mechanically, the said order would suffer from the vice of non-application of mind, rendering it illegal. This Court held as under with regard to the circumstances under which an order granting bail may be set aside. In doing so, the factors which ought to have guided the Court's decision to grant bail have also been detailed as under: (SCC p. 499, para 9)

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“ 9 . … It is trite that this Court does not, normally, interfere with an order passed by the High Court granting or rejecting bail to the accused. However, it is

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equally incumbent upon the High Court to exercise its discretion judiciously, cautiously and strictly in compliance with the basic principles laid down in a plethora of decisions of this Court on the point. It is well settled that, among other circumstances, the factors to be borne in mind while considering an application for bail are :

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( i ) whether there is any prima facie or reasonable ground to believe that the accused had committed the offence ;

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( ii ) nature and gravity of the accusation ;

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( iii ) severity of the punishment in the event of conviction ;

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( iv ) danger of the accused absconding or fleeing, if released on bail ;

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( v ) character, behaviour, means, position and standing of the accused ;

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( vi ) likelihood of the offence being repeated ;

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( vii ) reasonable apprehension of the witnesses being influenced; and

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( viii ) danger, of course, of justice being thwarted by grant of bail .” (emphasis supplied)

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One of the judgments of this Court on the aspect of application of mind and requirement of judicious exercise of discretion in arriving at an order granting bail to the accused is Brijmani Devi v. Pappu Kumar, (2022) 4 SCC 497 : (2022) 2 SCC (Cri) 170 , wherein a three-Judge Bench of this Court, while setting aside an unreasoned and casual order ( Pappu Kumar v. State of Bihar, 2021 SCC OnLine Pat 2856 and Pappu Singh v. State of Bihar, 2021 SCC OnLine Pat 2857 ) of the High Court granting bail to the accused, observed as follows: ( Brijmani Devi v. Pappu Kumar, (2022) 4 SCC 497 : (2022) 2 SCC (Cri) 170 ] ), SCC p. 511, para 35)

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“ 35 . While we are conscious of the fact that liberty of an individual is an invaluable right, at the same time

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while considering an application for bail courts cannot lose sight of the serious nature of the accusations against an accused and the facts that have a bearing in the case, particularly, when the accusations may not be false, frivolous or vexatious in nature but are supported by adequate material brought on record so as to enable a court to arrive at a prima facie conclusion. While considering an application for the grant of bail, a prima facie conclusion must be supported by reasons and must be arrived at after having regard to the vital facts of the case brought on record. Due consideration must be given to facts suggestive of the nature of crime, the criminal antecedents of the accused, if any, and the nature of punishment that would follow a conviction vis-à-vis the offence(s) alleged against an accused .” (emphasis supplied)

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9 . The present petition has to be decided as per the parameters laid down by the Hon’ble Supreme Court.

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10. The status report specifcally mentions that the i Khukhri . petitioner had attacked the victim on his neck with a The victim tried to avert the blow with his left hand, and three fngers were cut. The petitioner again attacked him, and the i victim sustained injuries on his right hand. The copy of the MLC (Annexure A3) shows that the Medical Ofcer had found fi lacerated wounds over the left-hand thumb, index fnger and i the middle fnger, which were severely bleeding, and the distal i phalanx and bone were visible. The report of the analysis shows that the petitioners’ hood and pants contained the blood stains

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with the DNA of the victim. A Khukhri was also snatched from the petitioner, which was containing the blood of the victim. All these circumstances prima facie corroborated the victim’s version that the petitioner had attacked him with a Khukhri and caused injuries to him.

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11 . The petitioner had entered the victim’s shop and asked him to hand over gold, silver and valuable articles. The Khukhri . victim refused, and the petitioner attacked him with a This shows the scant regard for human life. The manner in which the petitioner had attacked the victim makes the ofence f grievous.

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12. The Medical Ofcer found that the nature of injuries fi sustained by the victim was grievous and dangerous to life. This report prima facie shows the involvement of the petitioner in the commission of an ofence punishable under Section 109 of BNS, f which is punishable with imprisonment for life. It was laid down by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Gudikanti Narasimhulu v. Public Prosecutor, High Court of A.P. , (1978) 1 SCC 240: 1978 SCC (Cri) 115: 1977 SCC OnLine SC 327 that when the punishment is severe, the person is not entitled to bail. It was observed at page 244:

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“6. Let us have a glance at the pros and cons and the true principle around which other relevant factors must revolve. When the case is finally disposed of and a person is sentenced to incarceration, things stand on a different footing. We are concerned with the penultimate stage, and the principal rule to guide release on bail should be to secure the presence of the applicant who seeks to be liberated, to take judgment and serve a sentence in the event of the Court punishing him with imprisonment. In this perspective, the relevance of considerations is regulated by their nexus with the likely absence of the applicant for fear of a severe sentence, if such be plausible in the case. As Erle. J. indicated that when the crime charged (of which a conviction has been sustained) is of the highest magnitude and the punishment for it assigned by law is of extreme severity, the Court may reasonably presume, some evidence warranting, that no amount of bail would secure the presence of the convict at the stage of judgment, should he be enlarged. [ Mod. Law Rev. p. 50 ibid., 1852 I E & B 1 ] Lord Campbell, C.J., concurred in this approach in that case, and Coleridge J. set down the order of priorities as follows: [ Mod. Law Rev. ibid., pp. 50-51 ]

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“I do not think that an accused party is detained in custody because of his guilt, but because there are sufficient probable grounds for the charge against him as to make it proper that he should be tried, and because the detention is necessary to ensure his appearance at trial .... It is a very important element in considering whether the party, if admitted to bail, would appear to take his trial; and I think that in coming to a determination on that point three elements will generally be found the most important: the charge, the nature of the evidence by which it is supported, and the punishment to which the party would be liable if convicted. In the present case, the charge is that of wilful murder; the evidence contains an admission

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by the prisoners of the truth of the charge, and the punishment of the offence is, by law, death.”

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It is thus obvious that the nature of the charge is the vital factor, and the nature of the evidence also is pertinent. The punishment to which the party may be liable, if convicted or conviction is confirmed, also bears upon the issue.

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