Vinod Kumar Vs State of Hp

The petitioner has filed the present petition for seeking regular bail in FIR No. 55 of 2025, dated 17.03.2025, registered at Police Station Dharampur, District Solan, H.P., for the commission of offences punishable under Sections 6 and 8 of the Protection of Children from Sexual Offences Act (in short

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‘the POCSO Act’).

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1 Whether reporters of Local Papers may be allowed to see the judgment? Yes.

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It has been asserted that the petitioner was arrested on 18.03.2025. The investigation is complete. No case is made out against the petitioner based on the averments made in the final report. The grounds of arrest were not communicated to the petitioner, which is a violation of Article 22 of the Constitution of India. The petitioner would abide by the terms and conditions that the Court may impose. Hence, it was prayed that the present petition be allowed and the petitioner be released on bail.

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The petition is opposed by filing a status report asserting that the victim’s mother made a complaint to the police stating that her son was admitted to Boxing coaching on 14.03.2025. The petitioner was running the coaching class. The victim made a complaint on 14.03.2025 that the petitioner had kissed him and paid ₹500/- to him. He declined, but the petitioner forcibly put ₹100/- in the victim’s pocket. The victim refused to go to the class on 17.03.2025. He revealed during the enquiry that the petitioner had attempted to sexually penetrate his anus. The police registered the FIR and investigated the matter. The victim was found to have been born on 13.02.2015. Thus, he was a minor on the date of the incident. The petitioner

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was working as a boxing coach for a long time. The samples were sent to SFSL, Junga and as per the report, human semen was detected on the petitioner’s underwear. The charge sheet was filed before the Court on 29.03.2025, and the matter was listed on 10.07.2025. Hence, the status report.

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The victim’s mother also filed a reply/objection to the bail petition, reiterating the contents of the FIR. It was asserted that the charge sheet had been filed before the Court. The victim has no apprehension of the petitioner. Hence, it was prayed that the present petition be dismissed.

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The Court granted an interim bail on 05.08.2025 in terms of the order in Mihir Rajesh Shah vs. State of Maharashtra, SLP (Crl.) No. 17132 of 2024 dated 22.04.2025 because there was no material on record to prima facie show that the grounds of arrest were communicated to the petitioner. The matter was ordered to be listed after the decision of Mihir Rajesh Shah (supra).

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I have heard Mr Anirudh Sharma, learned counsel for the petitioner, Mr Prashant Sen, learned Deputy Advocate

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General for respondent No.1/State and Mr Parikshit Rathour, learned counsel for the victim’s mother.

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Mr Anirudh Sharma, learned counsel for the petitioner, submitted that the petitioner is innocent and he was falsely implicated in this case. The allegations in the FIR do not show the commission of any cognizable offence. The grounds of arrest were not communicated to the petitioner, and the matter is pending before the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Prakash Chand @ Rakesh versus State of H.P. SLP Cr.Appeal No. 364 of 2026 . Hence, he prayed that the present petition be allowed and the petitioner be released on bail.

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Mr Prashant Sen, learned Deputy Advocate General for the respondent No.1/State submitted that the petitioner had attempted to sexually penetrate the victim’s anus. The offence is heinous, and the petitioner should not be released on bail.

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Mr Prikshit Rathore, learned counsel for the victim, submitted that an appropriate order be passed in the matter.

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I have given considerable thought to the submissions made at the bar and have gone through the records carefully.

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The parameters for granting bail were considered by

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the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Ajwar v. Waseem (2024) 10 SCC

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768: 2024 SCC OnLine SC 974, wherein it was observed at page

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783: -

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“Relevant parameters for granting bail

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26. While considering as to whether bail ought to be granted in a matter involving a serious criminal offence, the Court must consider relevant factors like the nature of the accusations made against the accused, the manner in which the crime is alleged to have been committed, the gravity of the offence, the role attributed to the accused, the criminal antecedents of the accused, the probability of tampering of the witnesses and repeating the offence, if the accused are released on bail, the likelihood of the accused being unavailable in the event bail is granted, the possibility of obstructing the proceedings and evading the courts of justice and the overall desirability of releasing the accused on bail. [Refer: Chaman Lal v. State of U.P. [ Chaman Lal v. State of U.P . , ( 2004) 7 SCC 525: 2004 SCC (Cri) 1974]; Kalyan Chandra Sarkar v. Rajesh Ranjan [Kalyan Chandra Sarkar v. Rajesh Ranjan, (2004) 7 SCC 528: 2004 SCC (Cri) 1977]; Masroor v. State of U.P. [Masroor v. State of U.P., (2009) 14 SCC 286 : (2010) 1 SCC (Cri) 1368]; Prasanta Kumar Sarkar v. Ashis Chatterjee [Prasanta Kumar Sarkar v. Ashis Chatterjee, (2010) 14 SCC 496 : (2011) 3 SCC (Cri) 765]; Neeru Yadav v. State of U.P. [Neeru Yadav v. State of U.P., (2014) 16 SCC 508 : (2015) 3 SCC (Cri) 527]; Anil Kumar Yadav v. State (NCT of Delhi)[Anil Kumar Yadav v. State (NCT of Delhi), (2018) 12 SCC 129 : (2018) 3 SCC (Cri) 425]; Mahipal v. Rajesh Kumar [Mahipal v. Rajesh Kumar, (2020) 2 SCC 118 : (2020) 1 SCC (Cri) 558] . ]

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This position was reiterated in Ramratan v. State of

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M.P., 2024 SCC OnLine SC 3068, wherein it was observed as under:

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“12. The fundamental purpose of bail is to ensure the accused's presence during the investigation and trial. Any conditions imposed must be reasonable and directly related to this objective. This Court in Parvez Noordin Lokhandwalla v. State of Maharastra (2020) 10 SCC 77 observed that though the competent court is empowered to exercise its discretion to impose “any condition” for the grant of bail under Sections 437(3) and 439(1)(a) CrPC, the discretion of the court has to be guided by the need to facilitate the administration of justice, secure the presence of the accused and ensure that the liberty of the accused is not misused to impede the investigation, overawe the witnesses or obstruct the course of justice. The relevant observations are extracted herein below:

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“14. The language of Section 437(3) CrPC, which uses the expression “any condition … otherwise in the interest of justice” has been construed in several decisions of this Court. Though the competent court is empowered to exercise its discretion to impose “any condition” for the grant of bail under Sections 437(3) and 439(1)(a) CrPC, the discretion of the court has to be guided by the need to facilitate the administration of justice, secure the presence of the accused and ensure that the liberty of the accused is not misused to impede the investigation, overawe the witnesses or obstruct the course of justice. Several decisions of this Court have dwelt on the nature of the conditions which can legitimately be imposed both in the context of bail and anticipatory bail.” (Emphasis supplied)

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13. In Sumit Mehta v. State (NCT of Delhi) (2013) 15 SCC 570 , this Court discussed the scope of the discretion of the Court to impose “any condition” on the grant of bail and observed in the following terms: —

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“15. The words “any condition” used in the provision should not be regarded as conferring absolute power on a court of law to impose any condition that it chooses to impose. Any condition has to be interpreted as a reasonable condition acceptable in the facts permissible

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in the circumstance, and effective in the pragmatic sense, and should not defeat the order of grant of bail. We are of the view that the present facts and circumstances of the case do not warrant such an extreme condition to be imposed.” (Emphasis supplied)

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14. This Court, in Dilip Singh v. State of Madhya Pradesh (2021) 2 SCC 779 , laid down the factors to be taken into consideration while deciding the bail application and observed:

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“ 4. It is well settled by a plethora of decisions of this Court that criminal proceedings are not for the realisation of disputed dues. It is open to a court to grant or refuse the prayer for anticipatory bail, depending on the facts and circumstances of the particular case. The factors to be taken into consideration while considering an application for bail are the nature of the accusation and the severity of the punishment in the case of conviction and the nature of the materials relied upon by the prosecution; reasonable apprehension of tampering with the witnesses or apprehension of threat to the complainant or the witnesses; the reasonable possibility of securing the presence of the accused at the time of trial or the likelihood of his abscondence; character, behaviour and standing of the accused; and the circumstances which are peculiar or the accused and larger interest of the public or the State and similar other considerations. A criminal court, exercising jurisdiction to grant bail/anticipatory bail, is not expected to act as a recovery agent to realise the dues of the complainant, and that too, without any trial.” (Emphasis supplied)

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A similar view was taken in Shabeen Ahmed versus

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State of U.P., 2025 SCC Online SC 479.

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The present petition is to be decided as per the parameters laid down by the Hon’ble Supreme Court.

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The status report specifically mentions that the petitioner had attempted to sexually penetrate the victim’s anus. The victim also made a statement before the police, mentioning the details of the incident. Therefore, prima-facie there is sufficient material to connect the petitioner to the commission of the crime.

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The petitioner was running a coaching class for boxing. The victim was a student in the class. The petitioner was in a relationship of trust because the victim was a student with him, and the petitioner was bound to protect him. However, the petitioner took advantage of his position and attempted to sexually penetrate the victim’s anus. Therefore, there is a force in the submission of the learned Deputy Advocate General that the nature of the offence is heinous.

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It was submitted that the grounds of arrest were not communicated to the petitioner, and his arrest is illegal. This submission is not acceptable. Hon’ble Supreme Court held in Mihir Rajesh Shah v. State of Maharashtra, 2025 SCC OnLine SC 2356 that the communication of the grounds of the arrests in all

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the offences would apply prospectively from the date of the pronouncement of the judgment. It was observed:

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“58. We are cognizant that there existed no consistent or binding requirement mandating the written communication of the grounds of arrest for all the offences. Holding as above, in our view, would ensure implementation of the constitutional rights provided to an arrestee as engrafted under Article 22 of the Constitution of India in an effective manner. Such clarity on obligation would avoid uncertainty in the administration of criminal justice. The ends of fairness and legal discipline, therefore, demand that this procedure, as affirmed above, shall govern arrests henceforth .” (Emphasis supplied)

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This judgment was followed by a Co-ordinate Bench

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of this Court in Kabir Khan vs State 2025:HHC:39246, wherein it was observed:

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“7. In light of the fact that in the said judgment, Hon’ble Supreme Court has been pleased to clearly hold that as previously there existed no consistent or binding requirements mandating written communication of the grounds of arrest for all the offences, the ends of fairness and legal discipline, therefore, demand that this procedure as affirmed shall govern arrests henceforth, this means that the Hon’ble Supreme Court has been pleased to make directions issued therein prospective.”

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This Court held in Arvind Kumar @Chahna vs State of

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HP CrMP (M) no. 2329 of 2025, decided on 13.11.2025, that the requirement of providing the grounds of arrests is prospective . This judgment was unsuccessfully assailed in Arvind Kumar

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@Chahna vs State of HP SLP (Criminal) no. 797 of 2026. Therefore, the petitioner cannot get bail because the grounds of arrest were not communicated to him.

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It was submitted that the charge sheet has been filed, and no fruitful purpose would be served by detaining the petitioner in custody. The mere filing of the charge sheet in the present case will not entitle the petitioner to bail because of the heinous nature of the crime alleged against the petitioner. Therefore, the petitioner cannot be released on bail simply because the charge sheet has been filed before the Court.

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In view of the above, the present petition fails, and the same is dismissed. The petitioner will surrender within 15 days, failing which he be arrested and committed to prison.

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The observation made herein before shall remain confined to the disposal of the instant petition and will have no bearing, whatsoever, on the merits of the case.

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2^nd March, 2026 (Nikita)

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( Rakesh Kainthla) Judge

Vinod Kumar v. State of Hp

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Vinod Kumar v. State of Hp

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