Chanchal Singh Vs Manjeet Singh and Anr.

2026:HHC:7139

IN THE HIGH COURT OF HIMACHAL PRADESH, SHIMLA

Cr. MP (M) Nos. 1551 & 1552 of 2025 Reserved on: 03.03.2026 Date of Decision: 13.3.2026.

1. Cr.MP(M) No. 1551 of 2025
Chanchal Singh Versus		… Petitioner
Manjeet Singh and another		...Respondents
___________________ 2. Cr.MP(M) No. 1552 of 2025	___	_______________
Chanchal Singh		...Petitioner
Versus
Raj Kumari and another		...Respondents
Coram
*Hon’ble Mr Justice Rakesh Kainthl* *Whether approved for reporting?*¹	a,Va No	*cation Judge.*
For the Petitioner(s) :	Mr Adv Bra peti	Ajay Sharma, Senior ocate, with Mr Tarun kta, Advocate, in both the tions.
For Respondent No.1/State :	Mr Adv	Animesh Pathak, ocate, in both the petitions
For Respondent No.2 :	Mr Adv peti	Prashant Sen, Deputy ocate General, in both the tions.

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1 Whether reporters of Local Papers may be allowed to see the judgment? Yes.

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Rakesh Kainthla, Judge

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The petitioner(s) has filed the present petitions for cancellation of bail granted to the respondents/accused in FIR No. 38 of 2025, dated 07.05.2025, registered at Police Station Mehatpur, District Una, for the commission of offences punishable under Section 108 read with Section 3(5) of Bhartiya . Nyaya Sanhita, 2023 (BNS)

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It has been asserted that the petitioner/informant made a complaint to the police that the marriage of his daughter, Ms Pooja, was solemnised in the year 2016 with the accused Manjeet Singh. A daughter was born to her. Manjeet Singh started harassing Pooja soon after the marriage. She made complaints to the informant. Raj Kumari, mother-in-law of Pooja, also used to harass her. Pooja called the informant over Mobile Phone on 05.06.2025 and told him not to visit her matrimonial home because his life was in danger. She promised to mention the details in the morning. The informant received a call from Manjeet Singh on 06.05.2025 at 12:00-12:30 pm that Pooja had consumed poison. The informant went to the regional hospital, Una, where Pooja was lying conscious. Manjeet Singh

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was also present in the Hospital but he was intoxicated. Pooja was referred to PGI. She was taken to Gurdev Hospital, Nurpur Bedi, District Ropar (Punjab), where she died. Postmortem of the dead body was conducted, and the cause of death was found to be the consumption of the insecticides. The police arrested the respondents. They filed bail petitions, which were allowed by the learned Additional Sessions Judge, Una, District Una (learned Trial Court). The police recovered a suicide note in which Pooja had attributed the cause of her death to her harassment. The offence is grave, and the learned Additional Sessions Judge-II, Una, erred in releasing the respondents on bail. The respondents threatened the informant after getting bail from the Court. Hence, it was prayed that the present petitions be allowed and the bail of the respondents be cancelled.

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The State has filed a status report asserting that the police received information on 07.05.2025 from Gurdev Hospital, Nurpur Bedi, District Ropar (Punjab) that Pooja Devi had died. The police went to the hospital and obtained the treatment summary. The informant made a complaint to the police that Pooja was married to Manjeet Singh in the year 2016, as per Hindu rites and customs. A daughter was born to her.

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Manjeet Singh and Raj Kumari used to harass Pooja. Pooja called the informant on 05.06.2025 and advised him not to visit her matrimonial home, as his life was in danger. She asked the informant to visit in the morning with some people, as she was being harassed. Manjeet Singh called the informant at about 12:30 pm and told him that Pooja had consumed insecticide. The informant went to the hospital and found that Pooja was under treatment. Manjeet Singh was also present in the hospital, but he was intoxicated. Pooja was referred to a higher institution, and she was taken to Gurdev Hospital, Nurpur Bedi, District Ropar (Punjab). Pooja died during the treatment. The police registered the FIR and investigated the matter. The police recovered the bottle of insecticide from Pooja's house. The police arrested the respondents. One suicide note was found to have been written by Pooja, stating that Manjeet Singh used to remain intoxicated. He used to abuse Pooja. Her mother-in-law also used to taunt and blame her for every wrong. The police seized the suicide note. The respondents filed bail applications, which were allowed by the learned Trial judge. The admitted signatures of the deceased were taken and sent to RFSL; however, the handwriting expert demanded more admitted

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signatures. The informant made a statement that he did not have any documents written by Pooja with him. Hence, the status report.

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I have heard Mr Ajay Sharma, learned Senior Advocate, assisted by Mr Tarun Brakta, learned counsel for the petitioner, Mr Animesh Pathak, learned counsel for respondent No.1 in both the petitions, and Mr Prashant Sen, learned Deputy Advocate General for respondent No.2/State.

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Mr Ajay Shrama, learned Senior Counsel for the petitioner/informant, submitted that the learned Trial Court erred in granting bail to the respondents. The deceased had complained about her repeated harassment; therefore, a presumption would arise that she had committed suicide because of her harassment. The allegation against the respondents are serious, and the learned Trial Court erred in releasing the respondents on bail by writing a cryptic order; therefore, he prayed that the present petitions be allowed and the bail granted by the learned Trial Court be cancelled.

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Mr Animesh Pathak, learned counsel for the accused/respondent No.1, in both the petitions submitted that

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the learned Trial Court had exercised the discretion in favour of the respondents based on the relevant consideration. This Court should not interfere with the discretion exercised by the learned Trial Court unless it is shown to be perverse or arbitrary. The informant had not made any complaint to any person. The suicide note is not connected to Pooja. No complaint of any threat was made to any person. Therefore, he prayed that the present petitions be dismissed.

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Mr Prashant Sen, learned Deputy Advocate General for the respondent No.2/State has nothing to state in this matter and prayed that an appropriate order may be passed.

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I have given considerable thought to the submissions made at the bar and have gone through the records carefully.

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It was laid down by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Zeba Khan v. State of U.P., 2026 SCC OnLine SC 188 that an order granting bail is liable to be interfered with when it is shown to be arbitrary, perverse or passed in disregard of the material consideration. It was observed:

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“13. It is trite that while personal liberty occupies a position of high constitutional value, an order granting bail does not enjoy immunity from appellate scrutiny

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where it is shown to be arbitrary, perverse, or passed in disregard of material considerations. The discretion to grant bail, though wide, is structured by well-settled legal principles and is neither uncanalised nor unfettered.

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14. In State of Karnataka v. Sri Darshan 2025 SCC OnLine SC 1702 , and Yogendra Pal Singh v. Raghvendra Singh @ Prince 2025 SCC OnLine SC 2580 , this Court authoritatively clarified that cancellation of bail on account of post-bail misconduct stands on a fundamentally different footing from annulment of a bail order which is itself unjustified or legally unsustainable at its inception. An order granting bail is liable to be interfered with where it reveals reliance on irrelevant considerations, ignores relevant material, or suffers from perversity without the necessity of waiting for supervening circumstances.

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15. In Manik Madhukar Sarve v. Vitthal Damuji Meher (2024) 10 SCC 753 , in which one of us (Ahsanuddin Amanullah, J.) was a member of the Bench, this Court set aside the grant of bail in appeal, holding that the discretion exercised by the High Court was vitiated. The Court comprehensively restated the parameters governing the exercise of jurisdiction to grant bail, including the nature and gravity of the accusation, the role attributed to the accused, criminal antecedents, the likelihood of tampering with evidence or witnesses, the risk of abscondence, and the overall impact on society. The following paragraphs are pertinent:

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“ 18. Courts, while granting bail, are required to consider relevant factors such as the nature of the accusation, the role ascribed to the accused concerned, possibilities/chances of tampering with the evidence and/or witnesses, antecedents, flight risk, et al. Speaking through Hima Kohli, J., the present coram in Ajwar v. Waseem [(2024) 10 SCC 768] , apropos relevant parameters for granting bail, observed: (SCC paras 2627)

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“26. While considering as to whether bail ought to be granted in a matter involving a serious criminal offence, the Court must consider relevant factors like the nature of the accusations made against the accused, the manner in which the crime is alleged to have been committed, the gravity of the offence, the role attributed to the accused, the criminal antecedents of the accused, the probability of tampering of the witnesses and repeating the offence, if the accused are released on bail, the likelihood of the accused being unavailable in the event bail is granted, the possibility of obstructing the proceedings and evading the courts of justice and the overall desirability of releasing the accused on bail . [Refer: Chaman Lal v. State of U.P. [(2004) 7 SCC 525: 2004 SCC (Cri) 1974]; Kalyan Chandra Sarkar v. Rajesh Ranjan [(2004) 7 SCC 528: 2004 SCC (Cri) 1977]; Masroor v. State of U.P. [(2009) 14 SCC 286 : (2010) 1 SCC (Cri) 1368]; Prasanta Kumar Sarkar v. Ashis Chatterjee [(2010) 14 SCC 496 : (2011) 3 SCC (Cri) 765]; Neeru Yadav v. State of U.P. [(2014) 16 SCC 508 : (2015) 3 SCC (Cri) 527]; Anil Kumar Yadav v. State (NCT of Delhi) [(2018) 12 SCC 129 : (2018) 3 SCC (Cri) 425]; Mahipal v. Rajesh Kumar [(2020) 2 SCC 118 : (2020) 1 SCC (Cri) 558].]

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27. It is equally well settled that bail once granted ought not to be cancelled in a mechanical manner. However, an unreasoned or perverse order of bail is always open to interference by the superior court . If there are serious allegations against the accused, even if he has not misused the bail granted to him, such an order can be cancelled by the same Court that has granted the bail. Bail can also be revoked by a superior court if it transpires that the courts below have ignored the relevant material available on record, or not looked into the gravity of the offence, or the impact on society, resulting in such an order . In P v. State of M.P. [(2022) 15 SCC 211] decided by a threeJudge Bench of this Court [authored by one of us

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(Hima Kohli, J.)] has spelt out the considerations that must weigh with the Court for interfering in an order granting bail to an accused under Section 439(1) CrPC in the following words: (SCC p. 224, para 24)

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‘24. As can be discerned from the above decisions, for cancelling bail once granted, the court must consider whether any supervening circumstances have arisen or the conduct of the accused post grant of bail demonstrates that it is no longer conducive to a fair trial to permit him to retain his freedom by enjoying the concession of bail during trial [Dolat Ram v. State of Haryana, (1995) 1 SCC 349: 1995 SCC (Cri) 237]. To put it differently, in ordinary circumstances, this Court would be loath to interfere with an order passed by the court below granting bail, but if such an order is found to be illegal or perverse or premised on material that is irrelevant, then such an order is susceptible to scrutiny and interference by the appellate court.’ (emphasis supplied)

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19. In State of Haryana v. Dharamraj [(2023) 17 SCC 510 ], speaking through one of us (Ahsanuddin Amanullah, J.), the Court, while setting aside an order [ Dharamraj v. State of Haryana, 2021 SCC OnLine P&H 4632 ] of the Punjab and Haryana High Court granting (anticipatory) bail, discussed and reasoned: (SCC paras 6-11)

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“6. A foray, albeit brief, into relevant precedents is warranted. This Court considered the factors to guide the grant of bail in Ram Govind Upadhyay v. Sudarshan Singh [(2002) 3 SCC 598: 2002 SCC (Cri) 688] and Kalyan Chandra Sarkar v. Rajesh Ranjan [(2004) 7 SCC 528: 2004 SCC (Cri) 1977] . In Prasanta Kumar Sarkar v. Ashis Chatterjee [(2010) 14 SCC 496 : (2011) 3 SCC (Cri) 765] , the relevant principles were restated thus: (SCC p. 499, para 9)

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‘9. … It is trite that this Court does not, normally, interfere with an order passed by the High Court granting or rejecting bail to the accused. However, it is equally incumbent upon the High Court to exercise its discretion judiciously, cautiously and strictly in compliance with the basic principles laid down in a plethora of decisions of this Court on the point. It is well settled that, among other circumstances, the factors to be borne in mind while considering an application for bail are:

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(i) whether there is any prima facie or reasonable ground to believe that the accused had committed the offence;

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(ii) nature and gravity of the accusation;

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(iii) severity of the punishment in the event of conviction;

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(iv) danger of the accused absconding or fleeing, if released on bail;

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(v) character, behaviour, means, position and standing of the accused;

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(vi) likelihood of the offence being repeated ;

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(vii) reasonable apprehension of the witnesses being influenced; and

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(viii) danger, of course, of justice being thwarted by the grant of bail.’

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In Mahipal v. Rajesh Kumar [(2020) 2 SCC 118 : (2020) 1 SCC (Cri) 558], this Court opined as under: (SCC p. 125, para 16)

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‘16. The considerations that guide the power of an appellate court in assessing the correctness of an order granting bail stand on a different footing from an assessment of an application for the cancellation of bail. The correctness of an order granting bail is tested on the anvil of whether there

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was an improper or arbitrary exercise of the discretion in the grant of bail. The test is whether the order granting bail is perverse, illegal or unjustified. On the other hand, an application for cancellation of bail is generally examined on the anvil of the existence of supervening circumstances or violations of the conditions of bail by a person to whom bail has been granted.’

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In Bhagwan Singh v. Dilip Kumar [(2023) 13 SCC 549: 2023 INSC 761] , this Court, in view of Dolat Ram v. State of Haryana [(1995) 1 SCC 349: 1995 SCC (Cri) 237]; Kashmira Singh v. Duman Singh [(1996) 4 SCC 693: 1996 SCC (Cri) 844] and X v. State of Telangana [(2018) 16 SCC 511 : (2020) 1 SCC (Cri) 902], held as follows: (Bhagwan Singh case, SCC p. 557, para 13)

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‘13. It is also required to be borne in mind that when a prayer is made for the cancellation of a grant of bail, cogent and overwhelming circumstances must be present, and bail once granted cannot be cancelled in a mechanical manner without considering whether any supervening circumstances have rendered it inadvisable to allow a fair trial. This proposition draws support from the judgment of this Court in Dolat Ram v. State of Haryana [(1995) 1 SCC 349: 1995 SCC (Cri) 237], Kashmira Singh v. Duman Singh [(1996) 4 SCC 693: 1996 SCC (Cri) 844] and X v. State of Telangana [(2018) 16 SCC 511 : (2020) 1 SCC (Cri) 902] .’

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In X3 v. State (UT of Andaman) [(2023) 14 SCC 280: 2023 INSC 767], this Court noted that the principles in Prasanta Kumar Sarkar v. Ashis Chatterjee, [(2010) 14 SCC 496 : (2011) 3 SCC (Cri) 765] stood reiterated in Jagjeet Singh v. Ashish Mishra [(2022) 9 SCC 321 : (2022) 3 SCC (Cri) 560].

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The contours of anticipatory bail have been elaborately dealt with by five-Judge Benches in

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Gurbaksh Singh Sibbia v. State of Punjab [(1980) 2 SCC 565: 1980 SCC (Cri) 465] and Sushila Aggarwal v. State (NCT of Delhi) [(2020) 5 SCC 1 : (2020) 2 SCC (Cri) 721]. Siddharam Satlingappa Mhetre v. State of Maharashtra [(2011) 1 SCC 694 : (2011) 1 SCC (Cri) 514] is worthy of mention in this context, despite its partial overruling in Sushila Aggarwal. We are cognizant that liberty is not to be interfered with easily. More so, when an order of pre-arrest bail already stands granted by the High Court.

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Yet, much like bail, the grant of anticipatory bail is to be exercised with judicial discretion. The factors illustrated by this Court through its pronouncements are illustrative and not exhaustive. Undoubtedly, the fate of each case turns on its own facts and merits.” (emphasis supplied)

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20. In Ajwar v. Waseem, [(2024) 10 SCC 768] , this Court also examined the considerations for setting aside bail orders in terms below: (SCC paras 28-29)

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“28. The considerations that weigh with the appellate court for setting aside the bail order on an application being moved by the aggrieved party include any supervening circumstances that may have occurred after granting relief to the accused, the conduct of the accused while on bail, any attempt on the part of the accused to procrastinate, resulting in delaying the trial, any instance of threats being extended to the witnesses while on bail, any attempt on the part of the accused to tamper with the evidence in any manner. We may add that this list is only illustrative and not exhaustive. However, the court must be cautious that at the stage of granting bail, only a prima facie case needs to be examined, and detailed reasons relating to the merits of the case that may cause prejudice to the accused ought to be avoided. It is sufficient to state that the bail order should reveal the factors that

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have been considered by the Court for granting relief to the accused.

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In Jagjeet Singh v. Ashish Mishra, [(2022) 9 SCC 321 : (2022) 3 SCC (Cri) 560], a three-Judge Bench of this Court, has observed that the power to grant bail under Section 439 CrPC is of wide amplitude and the High Court or a Sessions Court, as the case may be, is bestowed with considerable discretion while deciding an application for bail. But this discretion is not unfettered. The order passed must reflect the due application of the judicial mind following wellestablished principles of law. In the ordinary course, courts would be slow to interfere with the order where bail has been granted by the courts below. But if it is found that such an order is illegal or perverse or based upon utterly irrelevant material, the appellate court would be well within its power to set aside and cancel the bail. (Also refer: Puran v. Rambilas [(2001) 6 SCC 338: 2001 SCC (Cri) 1124]; Narendra K. Amin v. State of Gujarat [(2008) 13 SCC 584 : (2009) 3 SCC (Cri) 813] )” (Emphasis Supplied)

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16. Recently, in Salil Mahajan v. Avinash Kumar 2025 SCC OnLine SC 2732 , this Court once again crystallised the distinction between an appeal against the grant of bail and an application seeking cancellation of bail. It was reiterated that in an appeal against the grant of bail, the superior court is concerned with examining the legality, propriety, and correctness of the bail order itself, and not the subsequent conduct of the accused. Where the bail order suffers from perversity, illegality, or nonconsideration of relevant factors such as the gravity of the offence, impact on society, or criminal antecedents, interference is fully justified. The following observations are pertinent:

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“7. At the outset, it is well settled by this Court that an appeal against the grant of bail and an application seeking cancellation of bail are on a different footing. The

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grounds for testing the legality of an order granting bail are well settled . Recently, in Ashok Dhankad v. State (NCT of Delhi) [2025 SCC OnLine SC 1690] , this Court had summarised the position of law as follows:

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“19. The principles that emerge as a result of the above discussion are as follows:

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(i) An appeal against the grant of bail cannot be considered to be on the same footing as an application for cancellation of bail;

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(ii) The Court concerned must not venture into a threadbare analysis of the evidence adduced by the prosecution. The merits of such evidence must not be adjudicated at the stage of bail.”

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A similar view was taken in Shobha Namdev Sonavane

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v. Samadhan Bajirao Sonvane, 2026 SCC OnLine SC 291, wherein it was observed:

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“20. We make it clear that there is a clear distinction between cancellation of bail on the considerations provided under Section 439(2) CrPC (corresponding Section 483(3) BNSS) and reversal of an order of bail by the superior Court. While cancellation should only be resorted to in cases where the accused misuses the liberty of bail granted to him or tamper with the evidence. On the other hand, the order granting bail can be interfered with by the superior Court considering the nature and gravity of the offences; if the order granting bail ignores the relevant material available on record or if the same is based on extraneous considerations. The present is a case in the second category.”

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This position was reiterated in Sarju Prasad v. State of

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U.P., 2026 SCC OnLine SC 334, wherein it was held:

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“14. Thus, the Appellate Court or the Higher forum that examines whether the order granting bail suffers from non-application of mind or is not borne out of a prima facie view on evidence on record, would be an essential feature. It is thus necessary for this Court to assess whether, on the basis of the evidence on record, there exists a prima facie case or reasonable ground that the accused has committed the crime, also taking into account the seriousness of the crime and the severity of the punishment. It is worth noting that in the instant case, what is being considered relates to whether the High Court had exercised the discretionary power under Section 439 in granting bail appropriately or not. Such an assessment is different from deciding whether circumstances after the grant of bail have made it necessary to cancel the same. If the twin factors are conspicuously present, then in such an event, this Court would be required to examine both the factors. The first situation requires analysing whether the granting of bail is illegal, perverse, unjustified or arbitrary. On the other hand, an application for cancellation of bail looks at whether supervening circumstances have occurred, warranting cancellation.”

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The learned Trial Court held that the custody of the

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respondents was not required for any purpose whatsoever, and no fruitful purpose would be served by their detention. There was no apprehension that respondents would influence any witnesses, and there was no reason to deny bail. Bail is the rule and jail is the exception, and a person cannot be kept behind bars indefinitely.

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These are relevant considerations, and it cannot be said that the learned Trial Court had not considered the relevant material while granting the bail. Learned Trial Court had rightly held that bail is the rule and jail is the exception, and no case was made out for invoking the exception. This was not a perverse order, and it is not possible to interfere with it.

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It was submitted that the learned Trial Court had not discussed the gravity of the offence. This submission cannot be accepted. Learned Trial Court noticed in para 10 that the allegations levelled against respondents were heinous and grievous in nature, but it was not a decisive factor to deny bail. The learned Trial Court was well advised not to appreciate the evidence collected by the prosecution to avoid any prejudice to either of the parties. Thus, the bail cannot be cancelled on the ground that the learned Trial Court had not considered the gravity of the offence.

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Even otherwise, the suicide note stated to have been recovered has not been connected to the deceased. It was sent to RFSL, but the handwriting expert could not give any definite opinion about its authorship and demanded the documents

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written in Hindi. The petitioner himself stated before the police that he had no document written by Pooja Devi in Hindi.

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The status report also mentions that no complaint was made by the petitioner or Pooja Devi during her lifetime regarding the harassment. The informant claimed that he had received a telephonic call about the harassment and threats, and he was advised to visit the home of Pooja with some persons. There is nothing on record that the informant had visited the matrimonial home of Pooja immediately after receiving the message or in the morning. He received a call at 12-12:30 from Manjeet Singh informing him about the consumption of insecticide by Pooja.

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Any father receiving the distress call of his daughter about the harassment would have taken steps to visit the spot or to ensure the safety of his daughter. The fact that nothing was done till 12:30 pm makes it difficult to rely upon the informant's version that the respondents were harassing Pooja.

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Therefore, the order passed by the learned Trial Court granting bail to the respondents cannot be faulted, and it is not possible to interfere with the order.

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No other point was urged.

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In view of the above, the present petitions fail, and are dismissed.

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The observation made herein before shall remain confined to the disposal of the instant petitions and will have no bearing, whatsoever, on the merits of the case.

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(Rakesh Kainthla)

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Judge

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13^th March, 2026

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(Nikita)

Chanchal Singh v. Manjeet Singh and Anr.

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Chanchal Singh v. Manjeet Singh and Anr.

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