Dismissed¶133

Arvinder Singh @ Billa v. State of Hp

Himachal Pradesh HC2 Mar 2026CRMPM/128/2026

Case brief

AI extract

What is this about?

HP High Court (Rakesh Kainthla, J.), Cr. MP (M) No. 128 of 2026, decided 02.03.2026 — regular bail denied under Sections 21 & 29 NDPS Act (FIR 120/2025, PS Dhalli); 29.840 g heroin intermediate, Section 37 NDPS inapplicable, yet bail refused as not a matter of right; conscious possession of all vehicle occupants per Madan Lal; parity rejected where roles/antecedents differ per Sagar v. State of U.P.; criminal antecedents disentitle bail per Champa (2025:HHC:28899); Pinki (2025) 7 SCC 314 bail parameters applied.

What did the court decide?

The present petition has to be decided as per the parameters for grant of bail laid down by the Hon'ble Supreme Court. ¶63

Arvinder Singh @ Billa Vs State of Hp — Narcotics (NDPS) | Himachal Pradesh HC (2026)

What the court decided

AI extract

Outcome

Dismissed

¶133

Issue for consideration

Whether the petitioner is entitled to regular bail in FIR No. 120 of 2025 (Sections 21 and 29, NDPS Act) notwithstanding that the recovered heroin (29.840 grams) is an intermediate quantity and the rigours of Section 37 of the NDPS Act do not apply. +2 more

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Court's answer

The present petition has to be decided as per the parameters for grant of bail laid down by the Hon'ble Supreme Court.

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Ratio / Principle

Applying Madan Lal, all occupants of a vehicle from which contraband is recovered, travelling together at night in a non-public vehicle without explanation, are in conscious possession; hence prima facie the petitioner was in possession of the contraband.

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Key takeaways

The quantity of heroin recovered (29.840 grams) is less than a commercial quantity; therefore the rigours of Section 37 of the NDPS Act do not apply to the present case.ratio¶85
Bail cannot be claimed as a matter of right merely because the rigours of Section 37 of the NDPS Act do not apply; following Khushi Ram Gupta and Bunty Yadav, the menace of drug addiction weighs against release and each case depends on its facts.ratio¶112
The 29.840 grams of heroin recovered is a huge quantity that could not have been meant for self-consumption and disentitles the petitioner from bail at this stage even though it is intermediate.ratio

Detailed headnote1 paragraphs

NDPS – Regular bail refused despite intermediate quantity. Petitioner Arvinder Singh @ Billa, arrested under FIR No. 120 of 2025 (PS Dhalli, Shimla; Sections 21 and 29, NDPS Act) after 29.840 grams of heroin were recovered from beneath the foot mat of the rear seat of car PB-01D-2378 on 19.08.2025, sought regular bail. Applying the Pinki bail parameters and the Madan Lal conscious-possession doctrine for occupants of a vehicle, the Court held the petitioner prima facie in possession of the contraband. Though the quantity is intermediate and the rigours of Section 37 NDPS do not apply (Khushi Ram Gupta; Bunty Yadav), bail is not a matter of right; 29.840 grams was deemed a huge quantity unfit for self-consumption, disentailing bail. The parity plea (co-accused Gurpreet Singh bailed on 24.11.2025 in Cr.MP(M) No. 2676 of 2025) was rejected per Sagar v. State of U.P.: parity turns on role/position, and the co-accused had no antecedents while the petitioner had a 2018 conviction and two pending FIRs (Champa followed; its challenge in SLP(Criminal) 19120 of 2025 dismissed on 27.11.2025). Petition dismissed; observations confined to the bail disposal.

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IN THE HIGH COURT OF HIMACHAL PRADESH, SHIMLA

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Cr. MP (M) No. 128 of 2026. Reserved on: 24.02.2026. Date of Decision:02_.03.2026

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Arvinder Singh @ Billa ...Petitioner Versus State of Himachal Pradesh ...Respondent

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Coram

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Hon’ble Mr Justice Rakesh Kainthla , Judge. Whether approved for reporting?¹ No.

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For the Petitioner : Mr Vikram Thakur, Advocate. For the Respondent/State : Mr Prashant Sen, Dy. A.G.

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Rakesh Kainthla, Judge

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The petitioner has 昀椀 led the present petition for seeking regular bail in F.I.R. No. 120 of 2025, dated 19.08.2025, registered in Police Station Dhalli, Shimla, District Shimla, H. P., for the commission of o昀昀 ences punishable under Sections 21 and 29 of the Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances Act (NDPS).

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2 . It has been asserted that, as per the prosecution, the

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police were on patrolling duty on 19.08.2025 in the vicinity of the

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Whether reporters of Local Papers may be allowed to see the judgment? Yes.

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Dhalli area. They received a secret information at about 3.25 a.m. that Sunil Kumar, Arvinder Singh and Gurpreet Singh were present in a vehicle bearing registration No. PB-01D-2378, which was parked near the rear gate of Sacred Heart School. They were in possession of a contraband substance which could be recovered by their search. The police joined the independent witness and reached the spot, where the car was found parked. The person sitting in the driver’s seat identi昀椀 ed himself as Gurpreet Singh. The person sitting on the front seat identi昀ed himself as Arvinder Singh, 椀 and the person sitting on the rear seat identi昀椀 ed himself as Sunil Kumar. The police searched the vehicle and recovered 29.840 grams of heroin kept beneath the foot mat of the rear seat. The police seized the heroin and arrested the occupants of the vehicle. The quantity of heroin stated to have been recovered by the police is intermediate, and the rigours of Section 37 of the NDPS Act do not apply to the present case. The police have 昀椀 led the charge sheet. No fruitful purpose would be served by detaining the petitioner in custody. The recovery was e昀昀 ected from beneath the foot mat of the rear seat, and the petitioner was not in possession of the

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heroin. Gurpreet Singh has been enlarged on bail by the Court vide order dated 24.11.2025, passed in Cr.MP(M) No. 2676 of 2025, and the petitioner is entitled to bail on the principle of parity. The petitioner was convicted in FIR No. 35 of 2018. FIR No. 20 of 2025 and 29 of 2023 are pending against the petitioner. The petitioner belongs to a respectable family, and there is no chance of his absconding. He would abide by all the terms and conditions that the Court may impose upon him. Hence, it is prayed that the present petition be allowed and the petitioner be released on bail.

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3 . The petition is opposed by 昀ling a status report, 椀 asserting that the police were on patrolling duty on 19.08.2025. They received a secret information at about 3:25 am that a vehicle bearing registration No. PB-01D-2378 was transporting heroin, and a huge quantity of heroin could be recovered during its search. The information was credible. It was reduced to writing and was sent to the Supervisory O昀 케 cer. The police joined Gopal Sharma and went towards the place where the vehicle was parked. The police found three people present in the vehicle. The driver identi昀椀 ed himself as

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Gurpreet Singh, the person sitting on the front seat identi昀椀 ed

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himself as Arvinder Singh, and the person sitting on the rear seat identi昀椀 ed himself as Sunil Kumar. The police gave their search to the occupants of the vehicle and searched the vehicle. The police recovered a transparent polythene kept beneath the foot mat of the rear seat. The police checked the polythene packet and recovered 29.840 grams of heroin. The police seized the vehicle and the heroin and arrested the occupants. The heroin was sent to SFSL, Junga, and as per the result, it indicated the presence of Diacetylmorphine (heroin). The call detail records were obtained, and the occupants were found to be in touch with each other. The charge sheet has been 昀椀 led before the Court, and the matter is listed on 07.03.2026 for recording the statements of prosecution witnesses. The petitioner is a resident of a di昀昀 erent State, who is likely to abscond in case of his release on bail. The petitioner was convicted in FIR No. 35 of 2018. FIR Nos. 29 of 2023 and 20 of 2025 are pending against the petitioner before the Courts. The petitioner would indulge in the commission of a similar o昀昀 ence in case of his release on bail. Heroin harms society, and no leniency should be shown to the petitioner. Hence, the status report.

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4 . I have heard Mr Vikram Thakur, Advocate, learned

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counsel for the petitioner and Mr Prashant Sen, learned Dy. Advocate General for the respondent/State.

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5 . Mr Vikram Thakur, learned counsel for the petitioner, submitted that the petitioner is innocent and that he was falsely implicated. As per the prosecution, the recovery was e昀昀 ected from the packet kept beneath the foot mat of the rear seat. The petitioner was not in possession of the heroin. The co-accused has been released on bail, and the petitioner is entitled to bail on the principle of parity. Therefore, he prayed that the present petition be allowed and the petitioner be released on bail.

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6 . Mr Prashant Sen, learned Dy. Advocate General for the respondent/State submitted that the petitioner was found in possession of heroin, which a昀昀 ects the young generation adversely. The petitioner was also involved in the commission of a similar o昀ence in the past, and he was convicted by the competent Court. 昀

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The petitioner would indulge in the commission of a similar o昀昀 ence

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in case of his release on bail. Therefore, he prayed that the present

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petition be dismissed.

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7 . I have given considerable thought to the submissions

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made at the bar and have gone through the records carefully.

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The parameters for granting bail were considered by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Pinki v. State of U.P., (2025) 7 SCC 314: 2025 SCC OnLine SC 781, wherein it was observed at page 380:

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( i ) Broad principles for the grant of bail

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56. In Gudikanti Narasimhulu v. High Court of A.P., (1978) 1 SCC 240: 1978 SCC (Cri) 115 , Krishna Iyer, J., while elaborating on the content of Article 21 of the Constitution of India in the context of personal liberty of a person under trial, has laid down the key factors that should be considered while granting bail, which are extracted as under: (SCC p. 244, paras 7-9)

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“ 7 . It is thus obvious that the nature of the charge is the vital factor, and the nature of the evidence is also pertinent. The punishment to which the party may be liable, if convicted or a conviction is con昀椀rmed, also bears upon the issue.

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8 . Another relevant factor is whether the course of justice would be thwarted by him who seeks the benignant jurisdiction of the Court to be freed for the time being . [ Patrick Devlin, “The Criminal Prosecution in England” (Oxford University Press, London 1960) p. 75 — Modern Law Review, Vol. 81, Jan. 1968, p. 54.]

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9 . Thus, the legal principles and practice validate the Court considering the likelihood of the applicant interfering with witnesses for the prosecution or otherwise polluting the process of justice. It is not only traditional but rational, in this context, to enquire into the antecedents of a man who is applying for bail to 昀椀nd whether he has a bad record, partic-

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ularly a record which suggests that he is likely to commit serious o昀昀ences while on bail. In regard to habituals, it is part of criminological history that a thoughtless bail order has enabled the bailee to exploit the opportunity to in昀氀ict further crimes on the members of society. Bail discretion, on the basis of evidence about the criminal record of a defendant, is therefore not an exercise in irrelevance .” (emphasis supplied)

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57. In Prahlad Singh Bhati v. State (NCT of Delhi), (2001) 4 SCC 280: 2001 SCC (Cri) 674 , this Court highlighted various aspects that the courts should keep in mind while dealing with an application seeking bail. The same may be extracted as follows: (SCC pp. 284-85, para 8)

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“ 8 . The jurisdiction to grant bail has to be exercised on the basis of well-settled principles, having regard to the circumstances of each case and not in an arbitrary manner. While granting the bail, the court has to keep in mind the nature of accusations, the nature of evidence in support thereof, the severity of the punishment which conviction will entail, the character, behaviour, means and standing of the accused, circumstances which are peculiar to the accused, reasonable possibility of securing the presence of the accused at the trial, reasonable apprehension of the witnesses being tampered with, the larger interests of the public or State and similar other considerations. It has also to be kept in mind that for the purposes of granting the bail the legislature has used the words “reasonable grounds for believing” instead of “the evidence” which means the court dealing with the grant of bail can only satisfy it (sic itself) as to whether there is a genuine case against the accused and that the prosecution will be able to produce prima facie evidence in support of the charge .” (emphasis supplied)

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58. This Court in Ram Govind Upadhyay v. Sudarshan Singh, (2002) 3 SCC 598: 2002 SCC (Cri) 688 , speaking through Banerjee, J., emphasised that a court exercising discretion in

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matters of bail has to undertake the same judiciously. In highlighting that bail should not be granted as a matter of course, bereft of cogent reasoning, this Court observed as follows: (SCC p. 602, para 3)

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“ 3 . Grant of bail, though being a discretionary order, but, however, calls for the exercise of such a discretion in a judicious manner and not as a matter of course. An order for bail bereft of any cogent reason cannot be sustained. Needless to record, however, that the grant of bail is dependent upon the contextual facts of the matter being dealt with by the court and facts do always vary from case to case. While the placement of the accused in society, though it may be considered by itself, cannot be a guiding factor in the matter of grant of bail, the same should always be coupled with other circumstances warranting the grant of bail. The nature of the o昀昀ence is one of the basic considerations for the grant of bail — the more heinous is the crime, the greater is the chance of rejection of the bail, though, however, dependent on the factual matrix of the matter .” (emphasis supplied)

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59. In Kalyan Chandra Sarkar v. Rajesh Ranjan, (2004) 7 SCC 528: 2004 SCC (Cri) 1977 , this Court held that although it is established that a court considering a bail application cannot undertake a detailed examination of evidence and an elaborate discussion on the merits of the case, yet the court is required to indicate the prima facie reasons justifying the grant of bail.

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60. In Prasanta Kumar Sarkar v. Ashis Chatterjee, (2010) 14 SCC 496: (2011) 3 SCC (Cri) 765 , this Court observed that where a High Court has granted bail mechanically, the said order would su昀昀er from the vice of non-application of mind, rendering it illegal. This Court held as under with regard to the circumstances under which an order granting bail may be set aside. In doing so, the factors which ought to have guided the Court's decision to grant bail have also been detailed as under: (SCC p. 499, para 9)

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“ 9 . … It is trite that this Court does not, normally, interfere with an order passed by the High Court granting or rejecting bail to the accused. However, it is equally incumbent upon the High Court to exercise its discretion judiciously, cautiously and strictly in compliance with the basic principles laid down in a plethora of decisions of this Court on the point. It is well settled that, among other circumstances, the factors to be borne in mind while considering an application for bail are :

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( i ) whether there is any prima facie or reasonable ground to believe that the accused had committed the o昀昀ence ;

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( ii ) nature and gravity of the accusation ;

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( iii ) severity of the punishment in the event of conviction ;

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( iv ) danger of the accused absconding or 昀氀eeing, if released on bail ;

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( v ) character, behaviour, means, position and standing of the accused ;

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( vi ) likelihood of the o昀昀ence being repeated ;

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( vii ) reasonable apprehension of the witnesses being in昀氀uenced; and

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( viii ) danger, of course, of justice being thwarted by grant of bail .” (emphasis supplied)

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xxxxxxx

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62. One of the judgments of this Court on the aspect of application of mind and requirement of judicious exercise of discretion in arriving at an order granting bail to the accused is Brijmani Devi v. Pappu Kumar, (2022) 4 SCC 497 : (2022) 2 SCC (Cri) 170 , wherein a three-Judge Bench of this Court, while setting aside an unreasoned and casual order ( Pappu Kumar v. State of Bihar, 2021 SCC OnLine Pat 2856 and Pappu Singh v. State of Bihar, 2021 SCC OnLine Pat 2857 ) of the High Court granting bail to the accused, observed as follows: ( Brijmani Devi v. Pappu Kumar, (2022) 4 SCC 497 : (2022) 2 SCC (Cri) 170] ), SCC p. 511, para 35)

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“ 35 . While we are conscious of the fact that liberty of an individual is an invaluable right, at the same time while considering an application for bail courts cannot lose sight of the serious nature of the accusations against an accused and the facts that have a bearing in the case, particularly, when the accusations may not be false, frivolous or vexatious in nature but are supported by adequate material brought on record so as to enable a court to arrive at a prima facie conclusion. While considering an application for the grant of bail, a prima facie conclusion must be supported by reasons and must be arrived at after having regard to the vital facts of the case brought on record. Due consideration must be given to facts suggestive of the nature of crime, the criminal antecedents of the accused, if any, and the nature of punishment that would follow a conviction vis-à-vis the o昀昀ence(s) alleged against an accused .” (emphasis supplied)

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The present petition has to be decided as per the

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parameters laid down by the Hon’ble Supreme Court.

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The status report mentions that the petitioner was found sitting in the driver’s seat of the vehicle bearing registration No. PB-01D-2378, from which the recovery of 29.84 grams of heroin was e昀昀ected. All the occupants were residents of Punjab and were found at Shimla in the vehicle during the night. The petitioner has not provided any explanation about his presence in the vehicle at

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Shimla. In Madan Lal versus State of H.P. (2003) 7 SCC 465: 2003 SCC (Cri) 1664: 2003 SCC OnLineSC 874 , the contraband was

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recovered from a vehicle, and it was held that all the occupants of

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the vehicle would be in conscious possession of the contraband. It

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was observed:

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“19. Whether there was conscious possession has to be determined with reference to the factual backdrop. The facts which can be culled out from the evidence on record are that all the accused persons were travelling in a vehicle, and as noted by the trial court, they were known to each other, and it has not been explained or shown as to how they travelled together from the same destination in a vehicle which was not a public vehicle.

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Section 20(b) makes possession of contraband articles an o昀昀ence. Section 20 appears in Chapter IV of the Act, which relates to o昀昀ences for possession of such articles. It is submitted that to make the possession illicit, there must be conscious possession.

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It is highlighted that unless the possession was coupled with the requisite mental element, i.e., conscious possession and not mere custody without awareness of the nature of such possession, Section 20 is not attracted.

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The expression “possession” is a polymorphous term which assumes di昀昀erent colours in di昀昀erent contexts. It may carry di昀昀erent meanings in contextually di昀昀erent backgrounds. It is impossible, as was observed in the Supdt. & Remembrancer of Legal A昀昀airs, W.B. v. Anil Kumar Bhunja [(1979) 4 SCC 274: 1979 SCC (Cri) 1038: AIR 1980 SC 52] to work out a completely logical and precise de昀椀nition of “possession” uniformly applicable to all situations in the context of all statutes.

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The word “conscious” means awareness of a particular fact. It is a state of mind which is deliberate or intended.

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As noted in Gunwantlal v. State of M.P. [(1972) 2 SCC 194: 1972 SCC (Cri) 678: AIR 1972 SC 1756], possession in a given case need not be physical possession but can be constructive, having power and control over the article in the case in question, while the person to whom physical possession is given holds it subject to that power or control.

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The word “possession” means the legal right to possession (see Heath v. Drown [(1972) 2 All ER 561: 1973 AC 498: (1972) 2 WLR 1306 (HL)] ). In an interesting case, it was observed that where a person keeps his 昀椀rearm in his mother's 昀氀at, which is safer than his own home, he must be considered to be in possession of the same. (See Sullivan v. Earl of Caithness [(1976) 1 All ER 844: 1976 QB 966: (1976) 2 WLR 361 (QBD)] .)

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Once possession is established, the person who claims that it was not a conscious possession has to establish it because how he came to be in possession is within his special knowledge. Section 35 of the Act gives a statutory recognition of this position because of the presumption available in law. Similar is the position in terms of Section 54, where a presumption is also available to be drawn from possession of illicit articles.

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In the factual scenario of the present case, not only possession but conscious possession has been established. It has not been shown by the accused-appellants that the possession was not conscious in the logical background of Sections 35 and 54 of the Act.”

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Therefore, prima facie , the petitioner was in possession

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of the charas.

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The quantity of heroin stated to have been recovered

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from the possession of the petitioner is less than a commercial

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quantity, and the rigours of Section 37 of the NDPS Act do not apply to the present case.

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It was submitted that, as per the prosecution, an intermediate quantity of heroin was found in the vehicle, and the petitioner is entitled to bail as a matter of right. This submission is not acceptable. It was laid down by this Court in Khushi Ram Gupta

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v. State of H.P., 2022 SCC OnLine HP 3779, that the menace of drug

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addiction has seriously eroded into the fabric of society, and the release of an accused on bail in NDPS Act cases will send a negative

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signal to society. It was observed:

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“8. The menace of drug addiction, especially in adolescents and students, has seriously eroded into the fabric of society, putting the future generation as well as the prospects of future nation-building into serious peril.

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9. It is not a case where the investigating agency is clueless in respect of evidence against the petitioner. Though allegations against the petitioner are yet to be proved in accordance with the law, it cannot be taken singly as a factor to grant bail to the petitioner. Nothing has been placed on record on behalf of the petitioner to divulge as to how and in what manner he came in contact with the persons who were residents of the State of Himachal Pradesh. Thus, there is su昀케cient prima facie material to infer the implication of the petitioner in the crime. In such circumstances, the release of the petitioner on bail will send a negative signal in society, which will de昀椀nitely be detrimental to its interests.

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10. The prima facie involvement of the petitioner in the dangerous trade of contraband cannot be ignored merely on account of the fact that he has no past criminal history. It cannot be guaranteed that there will be re-indulgence by the petitioner in similar activities, in case he is released on bail.”

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Similarly, it was held in Bunty Yadav v. State of H.P.,

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2022 SCC OnLine HP 4996, that the bail cannot be claimed as a

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matter of right even though the rigours of Section 37 of the NDPS

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Act do not apply to a case. Each case has to be adjudged on its own

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facts. It was observed:

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“6. The quantity involved in the case is 89.89 grams of heroin and 3.90 grams of MDMA. Such quantity may not technically fall under the category of commercial quantity; nevertheless, such quantity cannot be termed to be less by any stretch of the imagination. The evident nature of commercial transactions and dealing with the contraband aggravates the situation for the petitioner. In a case where Section 37 of the NDPS Act is not applicable, the bail cannot be claimed as a matter of right. The fate depends on the facts of each and every case.

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7. The menace of drug addiction, especially in adolescents and students, has seriously eroded into the fabric of society, putting the future generation as well as the prospects of future nation-building into serious peril.”

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It was laid down by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Union

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of India v Namdeo Ashruba Nakade SLP (Crl.) 9792/2025, decided

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on 07.11.2025, that there is a concerning increase in drug abuse

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amongst the youth. It was observed: -

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This Court is of the view that the issue of substance abuse has emerged as a global public health crisis in the twenty昀椀rst century, a昀昀ecting every country worldwide, as drug tra昀케cking and addiction have become pervasive. The United Nations O昀케ce on Drugs and Crime (UNODC) reported in its 2025 World Drug Report that “As at 2023, some 316 million people worldwide had used drugs in the past year, representing an increase over the past decade that outpaces population growth, which indicates a higher prevalence of drug use.”

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In India, there has been a concerning increase in drug abuse among the youth. Substance abuse not only a昀昀ects individuals, families, and communities but also undermines various aspects of health, including physical, social, political, and cultural foundations, and mental well-being. (See: “Bhattacharya S, Menon GS, Garg S, Grover A, Saleem SM, Kushwaha P. The lingering menace of drug abuse among the Indian youth–it’s time for action. Indian J Community Med 2025;50:S9-12, published on 17th April, 2025”)

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According to many news reports, India faces a clear dilemma between tackling the narcotics crisis systematically or sacri昀椀cing its most valuable resource, i.e. its young people. The extent of menace of drug abuse has also been highlighted by this Court in the case of Ankush Vipan Kapoor v. National Investigation Agency, (2025) 5 SCC 155 , wherein this Court has observed as under:

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“9.1 The ills of drug abuse seem to be shadowing the length and breadth of our country, with the Central and every State Government 昀椀ghting against the menace of substance abuse. The debilitating impact of the drug trade and drug abuse is an immediate and

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serious concern for India. As the globe grapples with the menace of escalating Substance Use Disorders (“SUD”) and an ever accessible drug market, the consequences leave a generational Page 75 of 84 imprint on public health and even national security. Article 47 of the Constitution makes it a duty of the State to regard the raising of the level of nutrition and the standard of living of its people and the improvement of public health as among its primary duties and in particular the State shall endeavour to bring about prohibition of the consumption except for medicinal purposes of intoxicating drinks and of drugs which are injurious to health. The State has a responsibility to address the root causes of this predicament and develop e昀昀ective intervention strategies to ensure that India’s younger population, which is particularly vulnerable to substance abuse, is protected and saved from such a menace. This is particularly because substance abuse is linked to social problems and can contribute to child maltreatment, spousal violence, and even property crime in a family.”

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Hence, the petitioner cannot be released on bail merely

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because the rigours of Section 37 of the NDPS Act do not apply to the present case.

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The status report mentions that the police had

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recovered 29.840 grams of heroin, which is a huge quantity and could not have been meant for self-consumption. The quantity of

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heroin stated to have been recovered from the possession of the

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petitioner would disentitle him from the bail at this stage, even though it is intermediate.

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It was submitted that the co-accused has been released

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on bail; therefore, the petitioner is entitled to bail on the principle of parity. This submission cannot be accepted. It was laid down by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Sagar v. State of U.P., 2025 SCC OnLine SC 2584 , that a person cannot be released on bail after applying the principle of parity without examining his role. It was observed:

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“14. What 昀氀 ows from the above judgments, which have been referred to, only to the limited extent indicated above, is that the High Courts speak in one voice that parity is not the sole ground on which bail can be granted. That, undoubtedly, is the correct position in law. The word ‘parity’ is de昀椀 ned by the Cambridge Dictionary as “ equality, especially of pay or position.” When weighing an application on parity, it is the ‘ positio n ’ that is the clincher. The requirement of ‘ position ’ is not met only by involvement in the same o昀ence. Position 昀 means what the person whose application is being weighed, his position in crime, i.e., his role, etc. There can be di昀erent 昀 roles played - someone part of a large group, intending to intimidate; an instigator of violence; someone who throws hands at the other side, instigated by such words spoken by another, someone who 昀椀 red a weapon or swung a machete - parity of these people will be with those who have performed similar acts, and not with someone who was part of the group to intimidate the other by the sheer size of the

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gathering, with another who attempted to hack away at the opposer's limbs with a weapon.”

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The status report shows that the petitioner has criminal

¶125

antecedents, and one FIR was lodged against him. The co-accused was not involved in the commission of any o昀昀ence, and the petitioner cannot claim parity with him.

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The petitioner has criminal antecedents. This Court

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dealt with the relevance of criminal antecedents while granting bail in Champa vs. State of H.P.: 2025:HHC:28899 and held that the criminal antecedents would disentitle an accused from the concession of bail, especially when an FIR was registered against

¶128

the accused related to the commission of a similar o昀昀ence. This judgment was unsuccessfully assailed before the Hon’ble Supreme

¶129

Court in SLP(Criminal) 19120 of 2025 titled Champa Devi vs State of H.P., decided on 27.11.2025. Therefore, the relevance of criminal

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antecedents cannot be ignored.

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