Dismissed¶61

Sanjay Sharma v. State of Hp and Another

Himachal Pradesh HC2 Mar 2026CRMPM/1085/2025

Case brief

AI extract

What is this about?

Condonation of delay; 204 days' delay; revision petition against notice of accusation; limitation; ignorance of law no excuse; blame on counsel not encouraged; merits irrelevant to condonation; discharge application dismissed 09.02.2024; Himachal Pradesh High Court, Shimla; Cr. MP(M) No. 1085 of 2025 with Cr. R/3339/ 2025; Rakesh Kainthla, J.; reserved 24.02.2026; decided 02.03.2026; not approved for reporting.

What did the court decide?

The plea that the applicant was not advised about the limitation by his counsel will not help him, because every person is presumed to know the law and ignorance of the law is no excuse. ¶31

Sanjay Sharma Vs State of Hp and Another — Himachal Pradesh HC (2026) — LawSathi Research

What the court decided

AI extract

Outcome

Dismissed

¶61

Issue for consideration

Whether the 204 days' delay in filing the revision petition challenging the order dated 03.10.2024 (notice of accusation) should be condoned.

¶10

Court's answer

The plea that the applicant was not advised about the limitation by his counsel will not help him, because every person is presumed to know the law and ignorance of the law is no excuse.

¶31

Ratio / Principle

The applicant cannot take advantage of the plea that his counsel had not advised him about the period of limitation.

¶43

Key takeaways

The claim of not being advised properly cannot be accepted because the counsel who represented the applicant in the discharge proceedings still represents him, and no action against the counsel is shown.ratio¶47
The submission that the applicant has a very good case on merits cannot be accepted; the delay cannot be condoned because of the merits of the claim, as held in H. Guruswamy v. A. Krishnaiah.ratio¶49
There is no sufficient cause for condonation of delay; hence the present application is dismissed.ratio

Detailed headnote1 paragraphs

Condonation of delay — 204 days' delay in filing revision petition against order dated 03.10.2024 putting notice of accusation — plea that counsel did not advise the applicant about the period of limitation rejected: every person is presumed to know the law and ignorance of law is no excuse; a litigant cannot throw the blame on his counsel to get over limitation (Rajneesh Kumar v. Ved Prakash, 2024 SCC OnLine SC 3380; quoting Salil Dutta v. T.M. & M.C. Private Ltd., (1993) 2 SCC 185 and Bharat Barrel & Drum MFG Co. v. The Employees State Insurance Corporation, (1971) 2 SCC 860) — the same counsel continued to represent the applicant and no action against the counsel was shown — merits of the case are not a ground for condonation of delay (H. Guruswamy v. A. Krishnaiah, 2025 SCC OnLine SC 54) — no sufficient cause made out — condonation application dismissed; revision petition (Cr. R/3339/ 2025) dismissed as barred by limitation.

¶1

IN THE HIGH COURT OF HIMACHAL PRADESH, SHIMLA

¶2

Cr. MP(M) No. 1085 of 2025. Reserved on: 24.02.2026. Date of Decision: 02.03.2026.

¶3

Sanjay Sharma		….applicant/Petitioner.
	Versus
State of H.P. & Anr.		…. Non-applicant/Respondent.

¶4

Coram

¶5

Hon’ble Mr Justice Rakesh Kainthla , Judge.

¶6

Whether approved for reporting?¹ No.

¶7

For the Petitioner	: Mr Sudhir Thakur, Sr. Advocate, with
	Mr Karun Negi, Advocate.
For the Respondent	: Mr Ajit Sharma, Dy. A.G.

¶8

Rakesh Kainthla, Judge

¶9

The applicant/petitioner has 昀椀led the present application

¶10

for condonation of 204 days’ delay in 昀椀ling the revision petition.

¶11

It has been asserted that the applicant has challenged

¶12

the order dated 03.10.2024, vide which the learned trial Court put

¶13

the notice of accusation to the applicant. The applicant applied for a

¶14

1 Whether reporters of Local Papers may be allowed to see the judgment? Yes.

¶15

¶16

copy of the order on 01.04.2025, which was prepared on 02.04.2025

¶17

and was supplied on 03.04.2025, and the instant petition was 昀椀led on 25.04.2025. There is a delay of 204 days in 昀椀ling the petition.

¶18

The applicant was not aware of the fact that the order was to be challenged within the stipulated period of time. Learned counsel representing him did not guide the applicant to challenge the order putting the notice of accusation to the applicant. Therefore, it was prayed that the present application be allowed and the delay in

¶19

昀椀ling the revision petition be condoned.

¶20

The application is opposed by 昀椀ling a reply. It has been asserted that the applicant had 昀椀led an application seeking his discharge, which was dismissed by the Court on 09.02.2024. Notice of accusation was put to the applicant, and the matter was listed for examination of prosecution witnesses. The party seeking the condonation of delay has to demonstrate su昀케cient cause for the delay, as mere assertion of the oversight of the counsel is not su昀케cient. The applicant had accepted the order passed by the Court, and he cannot challenge it. Hence, it was prayed that the present application be dismissed.

¶21

¶22

I have heard Mr Sudhir Thakur, learned Senior Advocate,

¶23

assisted by Mr Karun Negi, Advocate, for the applicant/petitioner and Mr Ajit Sharma, learned Deputy Advocate General for the respondent/State.

¶24

Mr Sudhir Thakur, learned Senior Advocate for the applicant, submitted that the applicant could not 昀椀le the revision petition within the stipulated period because he was not advised of the period of limitation by the counsel representing him before the learned Trial Court. He contacted the present counsel, who advised

¶25

him to 昀椀le the revision. The person cannot be penalised for the fault of his counsel. Therefore, he prayed that the present application be allowed and the delay in 昀椀ling the revision be condoned.

¶26

Mr Ajit Sharma, learned Deputy Advocate General for

¶27

the respondent/State, submitted that the applicant has failed to show any reasonable cause for not 昀椀ling the revision within the stipulated period of limitation. The ignorance of the law is no excuse, and the plea taken by the applicant that he was not advised by the learned counsel representing him about the limitation cannot

¶28

¶29

be accepted. Therefore, he prayed that the present application be dismissed.

¶30

I have given considerable thought to the submissions made at the bar and have gone through the records carefully.

¶31

Reply 昀椀led by the State shows that the applicant had 昀椀led an application seeking the discharge, which was dismissed by the learned Trial Court on 09.02.2024. Subsequently, notice of accusation was put to the applicant on 03.10.2024. The applicant claimed that he was not advised about the limitation by the counsel. This plea will not help the applicant/petitioner because every person is presumed to know the law, and ignorance of the law is no excuse.

¶32

It was laid down by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Rajneesh Kumar v. Ved Prakash, 2024 SCC OnLine SC 3380 , that the tendency of throwing the blame upon the counsel to get rid of the limitation cannot be encouraged. It was observed:

¶33

“10. It appears that the entire blame has been thrown on the head of the advocate who was appearing for the petitioners in the trial court. We have noticed over a period of time a tendency on the part of the litigants to blame their lawyers of negligence and carelessness in attending the proceedings before the court. Even if we assume for a moment that the

¶34

¶35

concerned lawyer was careless or negligent, this, by itself, cannot be a ground to condone long and inordinate delay, as the litigant owes a duty to be vigilant of his own rights and is expected to be equally vigilant about the judicial proceedings pending in the court initiated at his instance. The litigant, therefore, should not be permitted to throw the entire blame on the head of the advocate and thereby disown him at any time and seek relief.

¶36

11. In the aforesaid context, we may refer to a decision of this Court in the case of Salil Dutta v. T.M. & M.C. Private Ltd., (1993) 2 SCC 185 , wherein this Court observed as under: —

¶37

“8. The advocate is the agent of the party. His acts and statements, made within the limits of authority given to him, are the acts and statements of the principal, i.e. the party who engages him. It is true that in certain situations, the court may, in the interest of justice, set aside a dismissal order or an ex parte decree notwithstanding the negligence and/or misdemeanour of the advocate where it 昀椀nds that the client was an innocent litigant, but there is no such absolute rule that a party can disown its advocate at any time and seek relief. No such absolute immunity can be recognised. Such an absolute rule would make the working of the system extremely di昀케cult. The observations made in Ra昀椀q [(1981) 2 SCC 788: AIR 1981 SC 1400] must not be understood as an absolute proposition. As we have mentioned hereinabove, this was an ongoing suit posted for 昀椀nal hearing after a lapse of seven years of its institution. It was not a second appeal 昀椀led by a villager residing away from the city, where the court is located. The defendant is also not a rustic, ignorant villager but a private limited company with its head o昀케ce at Calcutta itself and managed by educated businessmen who know where their interest lies. It is evident that when their applications were not disposed of before taking up the suit for 昀椀nal hearing, they felt piqued and refused to appear before the court. Maybe it

¶38

¶39

was part of their delaying tactics, as alleged by the plainti昀昀. Maybe not. But one thing is clear: they chose not to cooperate with the court. Having adopted such a stand towards the court, the defendant has no right to ask its indulgence. Putting the entire blame upon the advocate and trying to make it out as if they were totally unaware of the nature or signi昀椀cance of the proceedings is a theory which cannot be accepted and ought not to have been accepted.” (Emphasis supplied)

¶40

12. As regards the law of limitation, we may refer to the decision of this Court in Bharat Barrel & Drum MFG Co. v. The Employees State Insurance Corporation, (1971) 2 SCC 860 , wherein this Court held as under:—

¶41

“The necessity for enacting periods of limitation is to ensure that actions are commenced within a particular period, 昀椀rstly to assure the availability of evidence documentary as well as oral to enable the defendant to contest the claim against him; secondly to give e昀昀ect to the principle that law does not assist a person who is inactive and sleeps over his rights by allowing them when challenged or disputed to remain dormant without asserting them in a Court of law. The principle which forms the basis of this rule is expressed in the maximum vigilantibus non dermientibus, jura subveniunt (the laws give help to those who are watchful and not to those who sleep). Therefore, the object of the statutes of limitations is to compel a person to exercise his right of action within a reasonable time, as also to discourage and suppress stale, fake or fraudulent claims.” (Emphasis supplied)

¶42

Hence, the applicant cannot take advantage of the plea

¶43

that his counsel had not advised him about the period of limitation.

¶44

The applicant has not mentioned that he had taken any

¶45

action against the learned counsel for not advising him properly,

¶46

¶47

and the revision petition shows that the learned counsel who had represented the applicant during the proceedings seeking discharge is still representing the applicant; therefore, the applicant’s claim that he was not advised properly cannot be accepted.

¶48

There is no other reason for the condonation of the delay.

¶49

It was submitted that the applicant has a very good case on merits, and the delay should be condoned. This submission cannot be accepted. It was laid down by the Hon’ble Supreme Court

¶50

in H. Guruswamy v. A. Krishnaiah, 2025 SCC OnLine SC 54, that the

¶51

delay cannot be condoned because of the merits of the claim. It was

¶52

observed:

¶53

“15. The rules of limitation are not meant to destroy the rights of parties. They are meant to see that the parties do not resort to dilatory tactics but seek their remedy promptly. 16. The length of the delay is de昀椀nitely a relevant matter which the court must take into consideration while considering whether the delay should be condoned or not. From the tenor of the approach of the respondents herein, it appears that they want to 昀椀x their own period of limitation for the purpose of instituting the proceedings for which the law has prescribed a period of limitation. Once it is held that a party

¶54

¶55

has lost his right to have the matter considered on merits because of his own inaction for a long time, it cannot be presumed to be a non-deliberate delay and in such circumstances of the case, he cannot be heard to plead that the substantial justice deserves to be preferred as against the technical considerations. While considering the plea for condonation of delay, the court must not start with the merits of the main matter. The court owes a duty to 昀椀rst ascertain the bona 昀椀des of the explanation o昀昀ered by the party seeking condonation. It is only if the su昀케cient cause assigned by the litigant and the opposition of the other side is equally balanced that the court may bring into aid the merits of the matter for the purpose of condoning the delay.

¶56

17. We are of the view that the question of limitation is not merely a technical consideration. The rules of limitation are based on the principles of sound public policy and principles of equity. No court should keep the ‘Sword of Damocles’ hanging over the head of a litigant for an inde昀椀nite period of time.”

¶57