Preet Singh @ Preet Kumar Vs State of Hp

2026:HHC:27275

IN THE HIGH COURT OF HIMACHAL PRADESH, SHIMLA

Cr.M.P. No. 2693 of 2025 in Cr. Appeal No. 120 of 2025. Reserved on : 30.06.2026. Date of decision: 08.07.2026 Date of upload : 08.07.2026

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_____________________________________________________________________________ Preet Singh @ Preet Kumar ...Applicant.

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Versus

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State of Himachal Pradesh …Respondent.

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Coram

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Hon’ble Mr. Justice Vivek Singh Thakur, Judge. Hon’ble Mr. Justice Ranjan Sharma, Judge.

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Whether approved for reporting?¹ Yes

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____________________________________________________________________________ For the Applicant. Mr. Ajay Kochhar, Senior Advocate with Ms. Swati Sharma, Advocate. For the Respondent: Mr. Gautam Sood, Deputy Advocate General._

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Vivek Singh Thakur, Judge

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Applicant-appellant has preferred this application for suspension of sentence awarded to him, vide judgment and order dated 17.02.2025, by Additional Sessions Judge, Fast Tract Special Court (Rape/Pocso), Shimla, H.P. in case No. 134-S/7 of 21/2019, titled State of Himachal Pradesh vs. Preet Singh @ Preet Kumar, arising from FIR No. 1 Whether the reporters of the local papers may be allowed to see the judgment?

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68 of 2006, dated 23.03.2006, registered at Police Station Rohru, District Shimla, H.P., whereby he has been sentenced to undergo rigorous imprisonment for a period of ten years and to pay fine of Rs. 20,000/- and in default to pay fine, to further undergo simple imprisonment for three months for commission of offence punishable under Section 376 of IPC. Further, he has been sentenced to undergo simple imprisonment for a period of two years and to pay fine of Rs. 5,000/- and in default to pay fine, to further undergo simple imprisonment for one month for commission of offence punishable under Section 506 of IPC.

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Learned counsel for the applicant-appellant has submitted that there is a fair chance of acquittal, as the version of the prosecutrix is highly unbelievable. According to him, it is not possible for a person to commit rape upon a woman carrying a six months old infant child, particularly when the alleged incident is stated to have occurred near her residence, where her husband was also present.

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It has further been submitted that if the applicant-appellant was holding child in one hand and gagging the mouth of the prosecutrix with the other, it would not have been possible for him to remove her salwar and commit rape. Therefore, the allegations levelled against the applicant-appellant are highly unbelievable.

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It has also been submitted that there are material discrepancies and improvements in the statements of the prosecutrix recorded under Section 154/164 Cr.P.C. and her deposition before the Court, which indicate that the true version of the incident has not been brought on record.

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In response by respondent-State, the prayer for suspension of sentence has been opposed. It has been submitted that the incident occurred in March, 2006 and the applicant-appellant was arrested in connection with the said FIR. However, he absconded while in police custody and could be apprehended only after about twelve years. Therefore, there is every likelihood that, if enlarged on bail, he may again abscond.

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Learned Deputy Advocate General has submitted that the applicant-appellant was arrested on 24.03.2006, but when he was being taken to the Police Station/Hospital, he escaped from police custody and remained untraceable till 27.02.2018, when he was apprehended by the police and produced before the Court.

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It has further been submitted that the applicant-appellant could be traced only after great difficulty and the trial could be concluded after about twelve years. Therefore, if he is enlarged on bail, it may not be possible to secure his presence again.

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Learned counsel for the applicant-appellant has submitted that the applicant-appellant was not aware of the registration of FIR against him and that no one had come to his house to arrest him. Therefore, according to him, this circumstance goes against the prosecution and supports the case of the applicant-appellant.

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As per the custody certificate, the applicant-appellant has undergone imprisonment for approximate period of one year and seven months.

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Learned Deputy Advocate General has submitted that considering the conduct of the applicant-appellant, who remained absconding for about twelve years, there is every likelihood that, if applicant is enlarged on bail again, he would not be available.

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Although the applicant-appellant has been acquitted of the charge of escaping from police custody, a perusal of the judgment passed in the said case placed on record by appellant/applicant, indicates that in the said case the prosecution failed to lead sufficient and reliable evidence, and the acquittal was mainly on account of failure to prove the charge. Therefore, such acquittal cannot be made a ground for allowing the present application.

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As the applicant-appellant remained absconding during pendency of the trial and could be apprehended only after about twelve years, it is difficult to accept his plea that he was not absconding. It has also come on record that the prosecutrix had approached the Police Station immediately after the incident, named the applicant-appellant as the assailant, whereafter he was arrested and subsequently escaped while being taken by the police.

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If the applicant-appellant was innocent, he ought to have approached the police thereafter. It is difficult to believe that he remained unaware of the registration of the case against him for more than twelve years. Learned Deputy Advocate General has rightly submitted that, if enlarged on bail, there is every possibility of the applicant-appellant absconding again.

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The Supreme Court in Shivani Tyagi vs. State of U.P. & Anr. , reported in AIR 2024 SC 4594 : AIROnline 2024 SC 346 , has observed as under:-

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“4. We will briefly refer to some of the relevant decisions dealing with Section 389, Cr. PC. In the case of short-term imprisonment for conviction of an offence, suspension of sentence is the normal rule and its rejection is the exception. [See the decision in Bhagwan Rama Shinde Gosai & Ors. v. State of Gujarat, (1992) 4 SCC 421]. However, we are of the considered view that the position should be vice-versa in the case of conviction for serious offences when invocation of power under Section 389 is invited….”

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15. The Apex Court in Kishori Lal vs. Rupa & Ors. , reported in

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(2004) 7 SCC 638 , has observed as under:-

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“4. Section 389 of the Code deals with suspension of execution of sentence pending the appeal and release of the appellant on bail. There is a distinction between bail and suspension of sentence. One of the essential ingredients of Section 389 is the requirement for the appellate Court to record reasons in writing for ordering suspension of execution of the sentence or order appealed. If he is in confinement, the said court can direct that he be released on bail or on his own bond. The requirement of recording reasons in writing clearly indicates that there has to be careful consideration of the relevant aspects and the order directing suspension of sentence and grant of bail should not be passed as a matter of routine.

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The appellate Court is duty bound to objectively assess the matter and to record reasons for the conclusion that the case warrants suspension of execution of sentence and grant of bail. In the instant case, the only factor which seems to have weighed with the High Court for directing suspension of sentence and grant of bail is the absence of allegation of misuse of liberty during the earlier period when the accused-respondents were on bail.”

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16. Without going into the rival contentions of the parties

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regarding the chances of acquittal, the present application deserves to be dismissed, particularly keeping in view the nature of the offence, the period of detention undergone after conviction, and the fact that the applicant-appellant had remained absconding for about twelve years and had avoided the trial. The Trial Court has convicted the applicantappellant after due appreciation of the evidence on record and after affording him full opportunity to contest the case.

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