Akrant Thakur Vs State of Hp

The petitioner has filed the present petition for quashing of FIR No. 207 of 2022 dated 12.12.2022, registered at Police Station Rohru, District, Shimla, HP, for the commission of an offence punishable under Section 39 (1) (a) of the Himachal Pradesh Excise Act and the consequential proceedings arising out

¶14

of it.

¶15

1 Whether reporters of Local Papers may be allowed to see the judgment? Yes.

¶16

2

¶17

2026:HHC:29328

¶18

Briefly stated, the facts giving rise to the present petition are that the police were present at Jakhar Road on 12.12.2022 at about 09.00 p.m. A vehicle bearing registration No. HP-10B-9411 came from Rohru. The police signalled the driver to stop. The driver identified himself as Akrant Thakur (the present petitioner). The vehicle had many liquor boxes loaded on it. The police checked the boxes and found that 15 boxes contained 12 bottles of 650 ml. of beer bearing Mark-Tuborg Strong Beer, 6 boxes contained 12 bottles of IMFL bearing Mark Episode Whisky, one box contained 12 bottles of IMFL bearing Mark Royal Stag Whisky, and two boxes contained 12 bottles of country liquor bearing Mark Santra No.1 . In this manner, 84 bottles of IMFL, 24 bottles of country liquor and 180 bottles of beer were recovered. The police demanded the license/permit for transporting the liquor, but the accused could not produce any license/permit. The police seized the liquor and arrested the petitioner. The samples were sent to the FSL, and these were found to contain various degrees of proof alcohol strength in them. The bottles were subsequently released to Kushal Singh. The police recorded the statements of the witnesses as per their

¶19

3

¶20

2026:HHC:29328

¶21

version and filed a charge sheet before the Court after the completion of the investigation.

¶22

Being aggrieved by the registration of the FIR and filing of the charge sheet, the petitioner has filed the present petition asserting that Kushal Singh had a valid permit for the transportation of the liquor issued by the competent authority. The learned Judicial Magistrate had released the liquor in favour of Kushal Singh after perusing the documents. The petitioner was merely a driver engaged in the transportation of the liquor. The continuation of the proceedings would amount to an abuse of the process of the Court. Therefore, it was prayed that the present petition be allowed and the FIR and the consequential proceedings arising out of the FIR be quashed.

¶23

The petition is opposed by the State by filing a reply making preliminary submissions regarding the lack of maintainability and the petitioner having not come to the Court with clean hands. The contents of the petition were denied on the merits. It was asserted that an order of release of the case property is interim in nature and does not adjudicate the merits of the case. The petitioner failed to produce any permit for

¶24

4

¶25

2026:HHC:29328

¶26

transporting the liquor. Therefore, he was rightly arrested, and a charge sheet was rightly filed against him before the Court of law. Hence, it was prayed that the present petition be dismissed.

¶27

The State also filed a status report reproducing the contents of the FIR and the steps taken during the investigation. 6. Another status report was also filed, mentioning that the report issued by the Excise and Taxation Department, Rohru, stated that the seized quantity of liquor was less than the quantity authorised under the permit.

¶28

I have heard Mr Ajay Kumar, learned counsel for the petitioner and Mr Ajit Sharma, learned Deputy Advocate General, for the respondent-State.

¶29

Mr Ajay Kumar, learned counsel for the petitioner, submitted that the owner of the bottles had a valid permit and he had directed the petitioner to transport the liquor. The allegation made against the petitioner is false that the liquor was being transported without a valid permit. Therefore, he prayed that the present petition be allowed and the FIR and consequential proceedings arising out of it be quashed. He relied upon Manik Kumar Vs. State of H.P. 2026:HHC:15064 and Himachal Pradesh

¶30

5

¶31

2026:HHC:29328

¶32

Cricket Association & anr. Vs. State of Himachal Pradesh & ors. Crl. Appeal Nos. 1258-1259 of 2018, decided on 2.11.2018, in support of his submission.

¶33

Mr Ajit Sharma, learned Deputy Advocate General, for the respondent-State, submitted that the petitioner was required to produce the permit at the time of interception of the vehicle, and any subsequent production of the permit would not take away the effect of the crime. Therefore, he prayed that the present petition be dismissed.

¶34

I have given considerable thought to the submissions made at the bar and have gone through the records carefully.

¶35

The law relating to quashing of criminal cases was explained by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in B.N. John v. State of U.P., 2025 SCC OnLine SC 7 as under: -

¶36

“7. As far as the quashing of criminal cases is concerned, it is now more or less well settled as regards the principles to be applied by the court. In this regard, one may refer to the decision of this Court in State of Haryana v. Ch. Bhajan Lal, 1992 Supp (1) SCC 335, wherein this Court has summarised some of the principles under which FIR/complaints/criminal cases could be quashed in the following words:

¶37

“102. In the backdrop of the interpretation of the various relevant provisions of the Code under Chapter XIV and of the principles of law enunciated by this

¶38

6

¶39

2026:HHC:29328

¶40

Court in a series of decisions relating to the exercise of the extraordinary power under Article 226 or the inherent powers under Section 482 of the Code which we have extracted and reproduced above, we give the following categories of cases by way of illustration wherein such power could be exercised either to prevent abuse of the process of any court or otherwise to secure the ends of justice, though it may not be possible to lay down any precise, clearly defined and sufficiently channelised and inflexible guidelines or rigid formulae and to give an exhaustive list of myriad kinds of cases wherein such power should be exercised.

¶41

(1) Where the allegations made in the first information report or the complaint, even if they are taken at their face value and accepted in their entirety, do not prima facie constitute any offence or make out a case against the accused.

¶42

(2) Where the allegations in the first information report and other materials, if any, accompanying the FIR do not disclose a cognizable offence, justifying an investigation by police officers under Section 156(1) of the Code except under an order of a Magistrate within the purview of Section 155(2) of the Code.

¶43

(3) Where the uncontroverted allegations made in the FIR or complaint and the evidence collected in support of the same do not disclose the commission of any offence and make out a case against the accused.

¶44

(4) Where the allegations in the FIR do not constitute a cognizable offence but constitute only a non-cognizable offence, no investigation is permitted by a police officer without an order of a Magistrate as contemplated under Section 155(2) of the Code.

¶45

(5) Where the allegations made in the FIR or complaint are so absurd and inherently

¶46

7

¶47

2026:HHC:29328

¶48

improbable based on which no prudent person can ever reach a just conclusion that there is sufficient ground for proceeding against the accused.

¶49

(6) Where there is an express legal bar engrafted in any of the provisions of the Code or the concerned Act (under which a criminal proceeding is instituted) to the institution and continuance of the proceedings, and/or where there is a specific provision in the Code or the concerned Act, providing efficacious redress for the grievance of the aggrieved party.

¶50

(7) Where a criminal proceeding is manifestly attended with mala fide and/or where the proceeding is maliciously instituted with an ulterior motive for wreaking vengeance on the accused and with a view to spite him due to a private and personal grudge.” (emphasis added)

¶51

8. Of the aforesaid criteria, clause no. (1), (4) and (6) would be of relevance to us in this case.

¶52

In clause (1), it has been mentioned that where the allegations made in the first information report or the complaint, even if they are taken at their face value and accepted in their entirety, do not prima facie constitute any offence or make out a case against the accused, then the FIR or the complaint can be quashed.

¶53

As per clause (4), where the allegations in the FIR do not constitute a cognizable offence but constitute only a noncognizable offence, no investigation is permitted by a police officer without an order dated by the Magistrate as contemplated under Section 155 (2) of the CrPC, and in such a situation, the FIR can be quashed.

¶54

Similarly, as provided under clause (6), if there is an express legal bar engrafted in any of the provisions of the CrPC or the concerned Act under which the criminal proceedings are instituted, such proceedings can be quashed.”

¶55

8

¶56

2026:HHC:29328

¶57

12. This position was reiterated in Ajay Malik v. State of

¶58

Uttarakhand, 2025 SCC OnLine SC 185, wherein it was observed:

¶59

“8. It is well established that a High Court, in exercising its extraordinary powers under Section 482 of the CrPC, may issue orders to prevent the abuse of court processes or to secure the ends of justice. These inherent powers are neither controlled nor limited by any other statutory provision. However, given the broad and profound nature of this authority, the High Court must exercise it sparingly. The conditions for invoking such powers are embedded within Section 482 of the CrPC itself, allowing the High Court to act only in cases of clear abuse of process or where intervention is essential to uphold the ends of justice.

¶60

9. It is in this backdrop that this Court, over the course of several decades, has laid down the principles and guidelines that High Courts must follow before quashing criminal proceedings at the threshold, thereby preempting the Prosecution from building its case before the Trial Court. The grounds for quashing, inter alia , contemplate the following situations : ( i ) the criminal complaint has been filed with mala fides ; ( ii ) the FIR represents an abuse of the legal process; ( iii ) no prima facie offence is made out; ( iv ) the dispute is civil in nature; ( v. ) the complaint contains vague and omnibus allegations; and ( vi ) the parties are willing to settle and compound the dispute amicably ( State of Haryana v. Bhajan Lal, 1992 Supp (1) SCC 335 ).

¶61

A similar view was taken in Rajendra Bihari Lal v. State

¶62

of U.P., 2025 SCC OnLine SC 2265, wherein it was observed:

¶63

“70. The aforesaid decisions of this Court make it clear that where the High Court is satisfed that the process of i any court is being abused or likely to be abused or that the ends of justice would not be secured, it is not only

¶64

9

¶65

2026:HHC:29328

¶66

empowered but also obligated under the law to exercise its inherent powers. The provision does not confer any new power on the High Court but rather saves the power which the High Court already possesses, from before the enactment of the legislation, by reason of its very existence. In exercise of its power, it would be legitimate for the High Court to quash any criminal proceedings if the High Court f i nds that the initiation or continuation of it may lead to abuse of process of court, and quashing of the proceedings would serve the ends of justice.”

¶67

The present petition is to be decided as per the parameters laid down by the Hon’ble Supreme Court.

¶68

It is undisputed that the permit for transportation of the liquor was produced by the owner, Kushal Singh. This permit was verified by the Assistant State Taxes and Excise Officer, Rohru Circle. The status report also clarifies that the quantity of liquor being transported by the petitioner was less than that mentioned in the permit. Therefore, it is undisputed that Kushal Singh had a valid permit for the transportation of the liquor.

¶69

In Manik Kumar (supra), the accused was found to be transporting 402 boxes of IMFL. He produced a permit regarding the transportation of 400 boxes of IMFL. The correctness of the permit was verified by the Deputy Commissioner, State Taxes and Excise, Una. A coordinate bench of this Court held that no offence was committed regarding 400 boxes. However, the

¶70

10

¶71

2026:HHC:29328

¶72

offence was committed regarding 2 boxes for which a composition could be made. This judgment is binding upon this Court.

¶73

In the present case, admittedly, the liquor being transported was less than what was mentioned in the permit. Therefore, no offence punishable under Section 39 (1) (a) of the Punjab Excise Act has been committed in the present case. The continuation of the proceedings in the present case would amount to an exercise in futility, which cannot be allowed.

¶74

In view of the above, the present petition is allowed, and FIR No. 207 of 2022 dated 12.12.2022, registered at Police Station Rohru, District, Shimla, HP, for the commission of an offence punishable under Section 39 (1) (a) of the Himachal Pradesh Excise Act and the consequential proceedings arising out of the FIR are ordered to be quashed qua the petitioner.

¶75

Petition stands disposed of in the above terms, so also pending miscellaneous applications, if any.

¶76

Parties are permitted to produce a copy of this judgment, downloaded from the webpage of the High Court of Himachal Pradesh, before the authorities concerned, and the said

¶77

11

¶78

2026:HHC:29328

¶79

authorities shall not insist on the production of a certified copy,

¶80

but if required, may verify passing of the order from the Website of the High Court.

¶81

(Rakesh Kainthla) Judge

¶82

17^th July, 2026