Amit Kumar Vs Maneesh Srivastava

2026:HHC:6522

IN THE HIGH COURT OF HIMACHAL PRADESH, SHIMLA

CrMMO Nos.64 and 65 of 2017 Date of Decision: 10.3.2026

_____________________________________________________________________ 1. CrMMO No. 64 of 2017 Amit Kumar ……...Petitioner Versus Maneesh Srivastava …....Respondent 2. CrMMO No. 65 of 2017 Amit Kumar ……...Petitioner Versus State of Himachal Pradesh …....Respondent Coram Hon’ble Mr. Justice Sandeep Sharma, Judge. Whether approved for reporting? Yes. For the Petitioner(s): Mr. Nitin Thakur, Advocate. For the Respondent(s): Respondent expired in CrMMO No. 64 of 2017 Mr. Rajan Kahol, Mr. Vishal Panwar and Mr. B.C. Verma, Additional Advocates General with Mr. Ravi Chauhan, Deputy Advocate General.

¶5

Sandeep Sharma, J. (Oral)

¶6

Since common questions of facts and law are involved in both the above captioned cases, same were heard together and are being disposed of vide common order.

¶7

2026:HHC:6522

¶8

2

¶9

2. Precisely, facts of the case, relevant for adjudication of the case at hand, are that petitioner after having passed degree of MBBS in September 1999 got himself registered with Himachal Pradesh State Medical Council vide registration certificate (Annexure P-2). After his being registered with the afore State Medical Council, petitioner started running Ultrasound Clinic in the name and style of Dev Bhumi Medical Centre at Kullu. One Sh. Maneesh Srivastava i.e. respondent/complainant (herein after referred to as “complainant”) in CrMMO No. 64 of 2017, lodged a complaint (Annexure P-3) under Section 28 of PC&PNDT Act, 1994 read with Section 200 of Cr.PC, against the petitioner for his having allegedly committed offence punishable under Sections 4, 5, 6, 23, 25 & 29, Rules 9 & 18 of the Pre-Conception and Pre-Natal Diagnostic Techniques (Prohibition Of Sex Selection) Act, 1994 & Rules framed thereunder read with Sections 166, 167, 204, 109 and 34 of IPC and the provisions of Prevention Of Corruption Act, in the court of learned Chief Judicial Magistrate Kullu, District Kullu, Himachal Pradesh, alleging therein that in the year 2014, he came to know from various reliable sources that petitioner-accused (in short “accused”) is not only acting in gross violation of provisions of PC & PNDT Act and rules framed thereunder, but he is also involved in determination of the sex of fetus. He alleged that in the first week of October 2014, he came in possession of one ultrasound report

¶10

2026:HHC:6522

¶11

3

¶12

dated 11.3.2014 of one pregnant woman namely Ms. Ranjeeta, aged 26 years, who was referred by Dr. Geeta, pertaining to Ultrasound Clinic of the accused i.e. Dev Bhumi Medical Centre. The Ultrasound report contained; (i) Original Thermal Print of USG image (with the text printed as -" Dev Bhumi Medical GE conducted on 11.03.2014 at 12:51:03 PM"; (ii) Original Report containing signatures/initials with remarks as 'Dr. Amit Kumar, MBBS, DMRD' and (iii) Original printed Envelope with text as Dev Bhumi Medical Centre.

¶13

3. After receipt of afore information, complainant applied for aforesaid information under RTI Act, whereby he sought certified copies of consolidated summary of records (Form-F) of Ultrasound Centers functioning in Kullu Town for the period starting from February 2014 to May 2014. In response to aforesaid RTI, complainant was provided certified records of monthly report of ultrasonography, registered centre wise of eight ultrasound centers of Kullu Town including Dev Bhumi Medical Centre, owned and possessed by the accused. Perusal of report of Dev Bhumi Medical Centre reveals that in the month of March 2014, afore clinic conducted/ performed as many as 68 ultrasounds, however, out of 68 ultrasound reports, there is not a single report, which finds mention of any serial number or date on it. Complainant further alleged that he could not

¶14

2026:HHC:6522

¶15

4

¶16

find mention / details of any patient in the name of Ms. Ranjeeta (referred by Dr. Geeta) in all of the 74 entries of ultrasounds conducted/performed in Dev Bhumi Medical Centre of accused in March 2014, however signatures appearing in the ultrasound report dated 11.3.2014 of Ms. Ranjeeta and monthly report on ultrasonogrpahy registered centre wise of march 2014 are one and the same.

¶17

4. In nutshell, complainant alleged that accused had conducted ultrasound of Ms. Ranjita on 11.3.2014, and did not keep the record of the same. He further alleged that during March 2014, more particularly, on 11.3.2014, Dev Bhumi Medical Centre being run by accused was put under temporary suspension w.e.f. 4.3.2014 to 29.3.2014. If it is so, no ultrasounds, otherwise, could have been conducted in the afore clinic on 11.3.2014. Complainant alleged that petitioner not only conducted ultrasounds in Dev Bhumi Medical Centre during the period when registration of afore clinic had expired, but he also did not furnish particulars about the patients on Form-F which act of him is in violation of Section 4 (3) 5 (i) (b) and Section 29 of the Act.

¶18

5. After filing of the aforesaid private complaint at the behest of the complainant Manish Srivastava, respondent-State also filed complaint No. 106-1/2016 in the court of learned Chief Judicial Magistrate Kullu,

¶19

2026:HHC:6522

¶20

5

¶21

leveling therein similar allegations as contained in the complaint of Maneesh Srivastava. Learned Chief Judicial Magistrate, Kullu, took cognizance of allegations leveled in the complaint filed by complainant as well as respondent-State and issued process against the accused. In the afore background, petitioner accused has approached this Court in the instant proceedings for quashing of complaint filed by the complainant as well as respondent-State as also consequent proceedings pending in the competent court of law.

¶22

6. Precisely, the grouse of the petitioner, as has been highlighted in the petition and further canvassed by Mr. Nitin Thakur, Advocate, is that proceedings under relevant provision of law have been initiated against the accused on false grounds. While referring to notice of suspension of Ultrasound Clinic (Annexure P-4 in CrMMO No. 64 of 2017), Mr. Thakur states that vide aforesaid communication, registration of Ultrasound Clinic being owned and possessed by the petitioner was suspended temporarily till he submits the required registration with Himachal Pradesh State Medical Council. He states that accused submitted the registration of degree/diploma with State Medical Council to the Chief Medical Officer, Kullu, vide communication dated 7.3.2014 (Annexure P-5), on the basis of which, Chief Medical Officer Kullu, vide communication dated 29.3.2014

¶23

2026:HHC:6522

¶24

6

¶25

revoked the suspension of Ultrasound Clinic. He states that since petitioner had submitted the registration document on 7.3.2014, no illegality otherwise can be said to have been committed by the petitioner by conducting ultrasound of one patient namely Ranjeeta on 11.3.2014. To substantiate his aforesaid argument, Mr. Thakur, specifically referred to communication dated 4.3.2014, whereby notice of suspension and Ultrasound Clinic registration was issued. He submitted that as per aforesaid communication, registration of Ultrasound Clinic was suspended temporary till he submits the required registration with the State Medical Council. He stated that though suspension was revoked vide communication dated 29.3.2014 but since it stood specifically mentioned in order dated 4.3.2014 that registration of Ultrasound Clinic shall remain suspended till the submission of required registration with State Medical Council, which was submitted on 7.3.2014, no case much less case under afore provisions of law is made out against the accused and as such, prayer made by the accused for quashing of FIR deserves to be allowed. While referring to Form-F (Annexure P-7 in CrMMO No. 64 of 2017), Mr. Thakur, learned counsel for the petitioner stated that complete information with regard to patient namely Ranjeeta was submitted in Form-F well within time. He submitted that since afore document was made available much prior to filing of the complaint sought to be quashed, but yet authority

¶26

2026:HHC:6522

¶27

7

¶28

concerned ignored the same and proceeded to initiate the complaint against the petitioner. Mr. Thakur submitted that since for the submissions made herein above, case of the prosecution is likely to fail in all probabilities, there is no reason to put the accused to ordeal of protracted trial, which shall ultimately fail.

¶29

7. To the contrary, Mr. Anish Banshtu, learned Deputy Advocate General, while justifying the issuance of summoning order on the basis of complaint lodged by the respondent/complainant as well as respondentState, submitted that once it is not in dispute that suspension was revoked vide communication dated 29.3.2014, there was otherwise no occasion, if any, for the petitioner to conduct ultrasound of any patient on 11.3.2014. He submitted that since registration of Ultrasound Clinic run by the petitioner was suspended vide communication dated 4.3.2014 and same came to be revoked on 4.3.2014, any ultrasound conducted throughout 4.3.2014 to 29.3.2014, shall be deemed to be in violation of afore provisions of law. If it is so, no illegality can be said to have been committed by the learned trial Court while issuing process and entertaining the complaint lodged at the behest of respondent/complainant and respondent-State.

¶30

8. Before ascertaining the genuineness and correctness of the submissions and counter submissions having been made by the learned

¶31

2026:HHC:6522

¶32

8

¶33

counsel for the parties vis-à-vis prayer made in the instant petition, this Court deems it necessary to discuss/elaborate the scope and competence of this Court to quash the criminal proceedings while exercising power under Section 482 of Cr.PC.

¶34

9. Hon’ble Apex Court in judgment titled State of Haryana and others vs. Bhajan Lal and others, 1992 Supp (1) SCC 335 has laid down several principles, which govern the exercise of jurisdiction of High Court under Section 482 Cr.P.C. Before pronouncement of aforesaid judgment rendered by the Hon’ble Apex Court, a three-Judge Bench of Hon’ble Court in State of Karnataka vs. L. Muniswamy and others, 1977 (2) SCC 699 , held that the High Court is entitled to quash a proceeding, if it comes to the conclusion that allowing the proceeding to continue would be an abuse of the process of the Court or that the ends of justice require that the proceeding ought to be quashed. Relevant para is being reproduced herein below:-

¶35

“7....In the exercise of this wholesome power, the High Court is entitled to quash a proceeding if it comes to the conclusion that allowing the proceeding to continue would be an abuse of the process of the Court or that the ends of justice require that the proceeding ought to be quashed. The saving of the High Court’s inherent powers, both in civil and criminal matters, is designed to achieve a salutary public purpose which is that a court proceeding ought not to be

¶36

2026:HHC:6522

¶37

9

¶38

permitted to degenerate into a weapon of harassment or persecution. In a criminal case, the veiled object behind a lame prosecution, the very nature of the material on which the structure of the prosecution rests and the like would justify the High Court in quashing the proceeding in the interest of justice. The ends of justice are higher than the ends of mere law though justice has got to be administered according to laws made by the legislature. The compelling necessity for making these observations is that without a proper realisation of the object and purpose of the provision which seeks to save the 59 inherent powers of the High Court to do justice, between the State and its subjects, it would be impossible to appreciate the width and contours of that salient jurisdiction.”

¶39

10. Subsequently, Hon’ble Apex Court in Bhajan Lal ( supra), has elaborately considered the scope and ambit of Section 482 Cr.P.C. Subsequently, Hon’ble Apex Court in Vineet Kumar and Ors. v. State of U.P. and Anr. , while considering the scope of interference under Sections 397 Cr.PC and 482 Cr.PC, by the High Courts, has held that High Court is entitled to quash a proceeding, if it comes to the conclusion that allowing the proceeding to continue would be an abuse of the process of the Court or that the ends of justice require that the proceedings ought to quashed. The Hon’ble Apex Court has further held that the saving of the High Court’s inherent powers, both in civil and criminal matters, is designed to achieve a salutary public purpose i.e. a court proceeding ought not to be permitted to degenerate into a weapon of harassment or persecution. In the aforesaid

¶40

2026:HHC:6522

¶41

10

¶42

case, the Hon’ble Apex Court taking note of seven categories, where power can be exercised under Section 482 Cr.PC, as enumerated in Bhajan Lal (supra), i.e. where a criminal proceeding is manifestly attended with malafides and/or where the proceeding is maliciously instituted with an ulterior motive for wreaking vengeance on the accused and with a view to spite him due to private and personal grudge, quashed the proceedings. 11. Hon’ble Apex Court in Prashant Bharti v. State (NCT of Delhi), (2013) 9 SCC 293 , while drawing strength from its earlier judgment titled as Rajiv Thapar and Ors v. Madan Lal Kapoor, (2013) 3 SCC 330 , has reiterated that High Court has inherent power under Section 482 Cr.PC., to quash the initiation of the prosecution against an accused, at the stage of issuing process, or at the stage of committal, or even at the stage of framing of charge, but such power must always be used with caution, care and circumspection. While invoking its inherent jurisdiction under Section 482 of the Cr.P.C., the High Court has to be fully satisfied that the material produced by the accused is such, that would lead to the conclusion, that his/their defence is based on sound, reasonable, and indubitable facts and the material adduced on record itself overrules the veracity of the allegations contained in the accusations levelled by the prosecution/complainant. The material relied upon by the accused should be such, as would persuade a reasonable person to dismiss and condemn

¶43

2026:HHC:6522

¶44

11

¶45

the actual basis of the accusations as false. In such a situation, the judicial conscience of the High Court would persuade it to exercise its power under Section 482 Cr.P.C. to quash such criminal proceedings, for that would prevent abuse of process of the court, and secure the ends of justice. In the aforesaid judgment titled Prashant Bharti v. State (NCT of Delhi), (2013) 9 SCC 293, the Hon’ble Apex Court has held as under:-

¶46

“22. The proposition of law, pertaining to quashing of criminal proceedings, initiated against an accused by a High Court under Section 482 of the Code of Criminal Procedure (hereinafter referred to as “the Cr.P.C.”) has been dealt with by this Court in Rajiv Thapar & Ors. vs. Madan Lal Kapoor wherein this Court inter alia held as under: (2013) 3 SCC 330, paras 29-30)

¶47

The issue being examined in the instant case is the jurisdiction of the High Court under Section 482 of the Cr.P.C., if it chooses to quash the initiation of the prosecution against an accused, at the stage of issuing process, or at the stage of committal, or even at the stage of framing of charges. These are all stages before the commencement of the actual trial. The same parameters would naturally be available for later stages as well. The power vested in the High Court under Section 482 of the Cr.P.C., at the stages referred to hereinabove, would have far reaching consequences, inasmuch as, it would negate the prosecution’s/complainant’s case without allowing the prosecution/complainant to lead evidence. Such a determination must always be rendered with caution, care and circumspection. To invoke its inherent jurisdiction under Section 482 of the Cr.P.C. the High Court has to be fully satisfied, that the material produced by the accused is such, that would lead to the conclusion, that his/their

¶48

2026:HHC:6522

¶49

12

¶50

defence is based on sound, reasonable, and indubitable facts; the material produced is such, as would rule out and displace the assertions contained in the charges levelled against the accused; and the material produced is such, as would clearly reject and overrule the veracity of the allegations contained in the accusations levelled by the prosecution/complainant. It should be sufficient to rule out, reject and discard the accusations levelled by the prosecution/complainant, without the necessity of recording any evidence. For this the material relied upon by the defence should not have been refuted, or alternatively, cannot be justifiably refuted, being material of sterling and impeccable quality. The material relied upon by the accused should be such, as would persuade a reasonable person to dismiss and condemn the actual basis of the accusations as false. In such a situation, the judicial conscience of the High Court would persuade it to exercise its power under Section 482 of the Cr.P.C. to quash such criminal proceedings, for that would prevent abuse of process of the court, and secure the ends of justice. 30. Based on the factors canvassed in the foregoing paragraphs, we would delineate the following steps to determine the veracity of a prayer for quashing, raised by an accused by invoking the power vested in the High Court under Section 482 of the Cr.P.C.:-

¶51

30.1 Step one, whether the material relied upon by the accused is sound, reasonable, and indubitable, i.e., the material is of sterling and impeccable quality?

¶52

30.2 Step two, whether the material relied upon by the accused, would rule out the assertions contained in the charges levelled against the accused, i.e., the material is sufficient to reject and overrule the factual assertions contained in the complaint, i.e., the material is such, as would persuade a reasonable person to dismiss and condemn the factual basis of the accusations as false.

¶53

2026:HHC:6522

¶54

13

¶55

30.3 Step three, whether the material relied upon by the accused, has not been refuted by the prosecution/complainant; and/or the material is such, that it cannot be justifiably refuted by the prosecution/complainant?

¶56

30.4 Step four, whether proceeding with the trial would result in an abuse of process of the court, and would not serve the ends of justice?

¶57

30.5 If the answer to all the steps is in the affirmative, judicial conscience of the High Court should persuade it to quash such criminal - proceedings, in exercise of power vested in it under Section 482 of the Cr.P.C. Such exercise of power, besides doing justice to the accused, would save precious court time, which would otherwise be wasted in holding such a trial (as well as, proceedings arising therefrom) specially when, it is clear that the same would not conclude in the conviction of the accused.”

¶58

12. Hon'ble Apex Court in Asmathunnisa v. State of A.P. (2011)

¶59

11 SCC 259 , has held as under:

¶60

“12. This Court, in a number of cases, has laid down the scope and ambit of the High Court's power under section 482 of the Code of Criminal Procedure. Inherent power under section 482 Cr.P.C. though wide have to be exercised sparingly, carefully and with great caution and only when such exercise is justified 9 by the tests specifically laid down in this section itself. Authority of the court exists for the advancement of justice. If any abuse of the process leading to injustice is brought to the notice of the court, then the Court would be justified in preventing injustice by invoking inherent powers in absence of specific provisions in the Statute.

¶61

2026:HHC:6522

¶62

14

¶63

The law has been crystallized more than half a century ago in the case of R.P. Kapur v. State of Punjab AIR 1960 SC 866 wherein this Court has summarized some categories of cases where inherent power can and should be exercised to quash the proceedings. This Court summarized the following three broad categories where the High Court would be justified in exercise of its powers under section 482:

¶64

(i) where it manifestly appears that there is a legal bar against the institution or continuance of the proceedings;

¶65

(ii) where the allegations in the first information report or complaint taken at their face value and accepted in their entirety do not constitute the offence alleged;

¶66

(iii) where the allegations constitute an offence but there is no legal evidence adduced or the evidence adduced clearly or manifestly fails to prove the charge."

¶67

14.In Smt. Nagawwa v. Veeranna Shivalingappa Konjalgi and Others (1976) 3 SCC 736, according to the court, the process against the accused can be quashed or set aside :

¶68

"(1) where the allegations made in the complaint or the statements of the witnesses recorded in support of the same taken at their face value make out absolutely no case against the accused or the complaint does not disclose the essential ingredients of an offence which is alleged against the accused;

¶69

(2) where the allegations made in the complaint are patently absurd and inherently improbable so that no 10 prudent person can ever reach a conclusion that there is sufficient ground for proceeding against the accused;

¶70

(3) where the discretion exercised by the Magistrate in issuing process is capricious and arbitrary having been based either on

¶71

2026:HHC:6522

¶72

15

¶73

no evidence or on materials which are wholly irrelevant or inadmissible; and

¶74

(4) where the complaint suffers from fundamental legal defects, such as, want of sanction, or absence of a complaint by legally competent authority and the like".

¶75

This court in State of Karnataka v. L. Muniswamy & Others (1977) 2 SCC 699, observed that the wholesome power under section 482 Cr.P.C. entitles the High Court to quash a proceeding when it comes to the conclusion that allowing the proceedings to continue would be an abuse of the process of the court or that the ends of justice requires that the proceedings ought to be quashed. The High Courts have been invested with inherent powers, both in civil and criminal matters, to achieve a salutary public purpose. A Court proceeding ought not to be permitted to degenerate into a weapon of harassment or persecution. In this case, the court observed that ends of justice are higher than the ends of mere law though justice must be administered according to laws made by the Legislature. This case has been followed in a large number of subsequent cases of this court and other courts.”

¶76

13. Hon'ble Apex Court in Asmathunnisa (supra) has categorically

¶77

held that where discretion exercised by the Magistrate in issuing process is capricious and arbitrary having been based either on no evidence or on materials which are wholly irrelevant or inadmissible; and where the complaint suffers from fundamental legal defects, such as, want of sanction, or absence of a complaint by legally competent authority and the

¶78

2026:HHC:6522

¶79

16

¶80

like, High Court would be justified in exercise of its powers under Section 482 CrPC.

¶81

14. From the bare perusal of aforesaid exposition of law, it is quite apparent that while exercising its inherent power under Section 482 Cr.PC., High Court can proceed to quash the proceedings, if it comes to the conclusion that allowing the proceedings to continue would be an abuse of process of the law. 15. Now being guided by the aforesaid law laid down by the Hon’ble Apex Court, this court would make an endeavour to find out “whether proceedings initiated at the behest of complainant as well as respondent/complainant can be quashed and set-aside or not?”

¶82

16. Though in the case at hand, number of allegations came to be leveled against the accused, but if complaints having been filed by respondent/complainant as well as respondent-State are perused in conjunction, precise allegation against the accused is that he conducted ultrasound of one patient namely Ranjeeta on 11.3.2014 on which date, Dev Bhumi Medical Centre was not having registration. Besides above, there is allegation that while conducting ultrasound of afore person, accused failed to fill up Form-F, which was mandatory as per Act and Rules.

¶83

2026:HHC:6522

¶84

17

¶85

17. Pleadings as well as documents adduced on record by the respective parties clearly reveal that till 4.3.2014, petitioner herein, who was actually handling the ultrasound machine in the afore clinic had registration with State Medical Council Himachal Pradesh, which is mandatory as per Chapter 3, Section 15(7) of State Medical Council Act, 2003 of Himachal Pradesh. Otherwise also, perusal of reply filed at the behest of respondent-State nowhere disputes factum with regard to registration of the petitioner prior to afore date. At this stage, it would be apt to take note of communication dated 4.3.2014 (Annexure P-4), which reads as under:

¶86

“With reference to this office letter number HFW/KLU/PC & PNDT/2012 1506-1527 dated 20/01/2014, it is submitted that after six weeks of that letter you had failed to submit the registration of doctor handling ultrasound machine, with State Medical Council Himachal Pradesh which is mandatory as per chapter 3 Section 15(7) of State Medical council Act, 2003 of Himachal Pradesh.

¶87

As this office has not received registration of Doctor in State Medical Council of HP you are hereby directed to stop doing the ultrasound from today immediately and your registration of ultrasound clinic is hereby suspended temporary till you submit the required registration with State Medical Council HP. Non compliance of these orders will invite the cancellation of registration of your ultrasound Clinic and legal action will be taken against you in accordance of law.

¶88

Till then you are further directed to deposit back the registration certificate to the undersigned in person immediately.”

¶89

2026:HHC:6522

¶90

18

¶91

18. Careful perusal of afore communication reveals that time was granted to the petitioner to submit registration of doctor handling ultrasound machine with State Medical Council, but since he failed to do the same within six weeks, District Appropriate Authority cum Chief Medical Officer, Kullu, vide communication dated 4.3.2014, served him notice of suspension of ultrasound clinic registration. As per aforesaid communication, registration of Ultrasound Clinic was suspended temporarily till the submission of required registration with the State Medical Council, Himachal Pradesh. Petitioner also came to be apprised with regard to aforesaid communication that non-compliance of order dated 4.3.2014, would invite cancellation of registration of ultrasound and clinic, meaning thereby on 4.3.2014, there was no dispute, if any, with regard to registration of Ultrasound clinic, rather dispute is with regard to registration of doctor handling the said Clinic. Otherwise also, reply filed by the respondents nowhere suggests that petitioner had not got registered its Clinic under Act and rules. In nutshell case of the private respondents as well as respondent-State is that after 4.3.2014 till revocation of suspension vide order dated 29.3.2014, petitioner herein had no authority, whatsoever, to conduct ultrasound in his clinic.

¶92

19. Allegedly on 11.3.2014, petitioner being handler of the Ultrasound Clinic namely Dev Bhumi Medical Centre, conducted

¶93

2026:HHC:6522

¶94

19

¶95

ultrasound of one patient namely Ranjeeta. Since on afore date, petitioneraccused was not authorized to conduct registration on account of his not being registered with State Medical Council, he is liable to be prosecuted under the afore provision of law. As per accused, he immediately after having received notice of suspension dated 4.3.2014 had submitted communication dated 7.3.2014 to CMO Kullu, thereby apprising him with regard to his registration with Himachal Pradesh Medical Council (Annexures P-2 and P-5 in CrMMO No. 64/2017).

¶96

20. Question which needs determination in the case at hand, is “whether suspension order dated 4.3.2014, issued by the Chief Medical Officer Kullu, was in force till its revocation vide order dated 29.3.2014 or petitioner could have conducted the ultrasound immediately after his having submitted registration with the Himachal Pradesh State Medical Council. Careful perusal of notice of suspension dated 4.3.2014, clearly suggests that registration of Ultrasound Clinic of the petitioner was suspended temporary till submission of the required registration with the State Medical Council. Since petitioner despite various notices failed to make available certificate with regard to his registration with State Medical Council, notice dated 4.3.2014, came to be issued to him, however, careful perusal of afore notice clearly suggests that as and when, registration with the State Medical Council is submitted to the competent authority,

¶97

2026:HHC:6522

¶98

20

¶99

suspension ordered vide communication dated 4.3.2014, shall stand revoked. No doubt, in the case at hand, formal order of revocation of suspension came to be issued vide communication dated 29.3.2014 (Annexure P-6 in CrMMO No. 65 of 2017), but having carefully perused communication dated 4.3.2014 this court is persuaded to agree with Mr. Nitin Thakur, learned counsel for the petitioner that petitioner herein was directed to stop conducting ultrasound from the date of issuance of communication dated 4.3.2014, till submission of required registration with the State Medical Council. Since vide communication dated 7.3.2014 (Annexure P-5), petitioner apprised CMO Kullu, with regard to his registration with State Medical Council, no illegality can be said to have been committed by the petitioner for his having done ultrasound of the patient named herein above, on 11.3.2014. Once petitioner himself vide communication dated 4.3.2014 had apprised the authority concerned with regard to his registration with the State Medical Council and copy of registration was also made available, afore authority was otherwise under obligation to revoke the suspension order forthwith.

¶100

21. Though in the case at hand, order of revocation was issued on 29.3.2014 but at the cost of repetition, as observed herein above, suspension stood automatically revoked with the submission of required registration with the State Medical Council on 7.3.2014. Similarly, this

¶101

2026:HHC:6522

¶102

21

¶103

Court finds that Form-F though was not made available at the time of issuance of notice dated 4.3.2014, but same was made available much prior to filing of the complaint by private respondent or respondent-State. Otherwise also, communication dated 4.3.2014, nowhere specifically talks about non-submission of Form-F. Since prior to filing of the complaint, Form-F containing therein details of patient named herein above, was submitted by the petitioner, no complaint, if any, on afore count could have been filed against him. Since in view of the facts as well as discussion made herein above, this Court is persuaded to agree with Mr. Nitin Thakur, learned counsel for the petitioner that prosecution lodged against the petitioner will not succeed, rather for the reasons given herein above shall fail in all probabilities, prayer made on behalf of the petitioner for quashing of complaint deserves to be considered and allowed.

¶104

22. Having scanned the entire evidence, this Court has no hesitation to conclude that, no case much less under the aforesaid provisions of law can be said to have been made against the petitioner. Since for the facts as well as discussion made herein above, case of the prosecution is likely to fail in any eventuality, this Court finds the case at hand to be a fit case for exercising power under Section 482 CrPC to quash complaint as well as consequent proceedings. If prayer made in the instant petition is not accepted, petitioner would be unnecessarily subjected to

¶105

2026:HHC:6522

¶106

22

¶107

ordeal of the protracted trial, which is otherwise bound to culminate in acquittal of the accused.

¶108

23. Consequently, in view of the aforesaid discussion as well as law laid down by the Hon’ble Apex Court (supra), present petitions are allowed and complaint Nos. 106-1/2016 as well as 206-1/2016 pending adjudication before the Chief Judicial Magistrate Kullu, as well as consequent proceedings are quashed and set aside. Accused is acquitted of the charges framed against him. The petitions stand disposed of in the aforesaid terms, along with all pending applications.

Amit Kumar v. Maneesh Srivastava

Case brief

What is this about?

What did the court decide?

Amit Kumar v. Maneesh Srivastava

Case brief

What is this about?

What did the court decide?

Why is it important?

What the court decided

Issues for consideration

Cases cited

Statutes considered

Procedural history

Parties & counsel

Coram

Case details

Similar cases

Shiv Ram Vs Tara Dutt Nirmohi

State Vs Bias Dev

State Vs Bakshi Ram

Chander Mohan Sharma Vs State of Hp

Shamender Sood Vs Sanjay Dharmaik

Sahil Vs the State of Hp and Others