Shyam Sunder Aggarwal Vs State of Hp

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IN THE HIGH COURT OF HIMACHAL PRADESH, SHIMLA

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Cr.MMO No. 53 of 2019

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Date of Decision: 21.07.2026

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_____________________________________________________________ Shyam Sunder Aggarwal ……...Petitioner Versus State of Himachal Pradesh & another …....Respondents Coram Hon’ble Mr. Justice Sandeep Sharma, Judge. Whether approved for reporting? For the Petitioner: Mr. Anand Sharma, Senior Advocate with Mr. Karan Sharma, Advocate. For the Respondent(s): Mr. Rajan Kahol & Mr. Vishal Panwar, Additional Advocate Generals with Mr. Ravi Chauhan & Mr. Anish Banshtu, Deputy Advocates General, for the respondent-State. Mr. Balwant Singh Thakur and Ms. Anchal Sharma, Advocates, for respondent No.2. _________________________________________________________________________

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Sandeep Sharma, J. (Oral)

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By way of instant petition filed under Section 482 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, prayer has been made on behalf of the petitioner for quashing of FIR No. 24 of 2018, dated 04.04.2018, registered at Police Station, Kasauli, District Solan, Himachal Pradesh, under Sections 420 and 506 read with Section 34 of the Indian Penal Code alongwith all consequential proceedings pending in the competent Court of law.

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2. Precisely, the facts of the case, as emerge from the pleadings as well as other documents adduced on record by the respective parties, are

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that the FIR, sought to be quashed in the instant proceedings, came to be lodged at the behest of respondent No.2, Sh. Ajay Garg, alleging therein that in the month of September 2016, an agreement was executed with Sh. Shyam Sunder, resident of Kasauli, District Solan, Himachal Pradesh qua two properties comprising Khata/Khatauni No.92min/111, Khasra No.113/1/1, measuring 5 bighas and Khasra No.113/1/7, measuring 2-11 bigha, Kita-2, total area measuring 7-11 bighas situate at Mauja Sanawar, Pargana Bassal, Tehsil Kasauli, District Solan, Himachal Pradesh, whereafter earnest money to the tune of ₹29,00,000/- was paid with the understanding that sale deed in respect of the property in question would be executed in his favour. He alleged that at the time of execution of agreement, he was not aware that the real owner of the property was not Shyam Sunder, but Dalmeet Singh, who had executed a General Power Attorney in favour of Gopal Singh, who, at the relevant time, was working with the present petitioner, Shyam Sunder. He further alleged that accused, named in the FIR, i.e., petitioner herein, had also agreed to get the requisite permission under Section 118 of the H.P. Tenancy and Land Reforms Act within a period of 2-3 months, and in between, he also took an additional payment to the tune of ₹1, 39, 50,000 /- . However, fact remains that despite receipt of aforesaid amount, he did not obtain the requisite approval/permission under Section 118 H.P. Tenancy and Land Reforms Act, rather he started avoiding him. He further alleged that when he attempted to meet accused Shyam Sunder, he, alongwith his wife

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and son, extended threats and gave him beatings. In the aforesaid background, FIR, sought to be quashed, came to be instituted against the petitioner. Though, after completion of the investigation, police has already presented the challan in the competent Court of law, but before same could be taken to its logical end, petitioner has approached this Court in the instant proceedings for quashing of the FIR on the ground that no case, much less under Sections 420 and 506 read with Section 34 IPC, is made out against the petitioner.

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3. During the proceedings of the case, learned counsel representing respondent No. 2, fairly admitted that the land qua which earnest money of Rs. ₹29,000,000/- was paid in terms of the agreement dated 06.01.2017 i.e., land, as detailed in the FIR, already stand registered in the name of Respondent No. 2, Ajay Garg. He also admitted that respondent No. 2 has constructed and developed a resort on the land in question. He fairly stated that at the time of lodging of the FIR, there was some dispute with regard to money as well as the extent of land, but pursuant to judgment dated 26.07.2019, passed by Co-ordinate Bench of this Court in COMS No. 9/2018 titled Daljit Singh v. M/s Elegance Retreat Pvt. Ltd. & Ors . , possession qua 5 bighas of land was delivered to respondent No.2 and actual owner of the property in question, namely Dalmeet Singh, also got the sale deed executed.

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4. Mr. Anand Sharma, learned Senior counsel duly assisted by Mr. Karan Sharma, Advocate, learned counsel representing the petitioner submitted that since the dispute, otherwise sought to be decided through filing criminal case, was with regard to execution of the sale deed in respect of the property agreed to be sold by Sh. Dalmeet Singh through his General Power of Attorney, Sh. Gopal Singh, coupled with the fact that now, in terms of judgment passed by Co-ordinate Bench of this Court in COMS No. 9 of 2018, land in question already stands transferred in the name of respondent No.2, no fruitful purpose would be served by keeping the FIR, sought to be quashed, alive, rather continuation thereof would amount to a sheer abuse of the process of law.

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5. I have heard learned counsel for the parties and have gone through the record carefully.

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6. Before ascertaining the correctness and genuineness of the aforesaid submissions and counter submissions made on behalf of learned counsel representing the parties, this Court deems it necessary to discuss /elaborate the scope and competence of this Court to quash the FIR as well as criminal proceedings, while exercising power under Section 528 of Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita.

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7. The law relating to quashing of criminal cases was explained by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in B.N. John v. State of U.P., 2025 SCC OnLine SC 7 as under:-

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“7. As far as the quashing of criminal cases is concerned, it is now more or less well settled as regards the principles to be applied by the court. In this regard, one may refer to the decision of this Court in State of Haryana v. Ch. Bhajan Lal, 1992 Supp (1) SCC 335, wherein this Court has summarised some of the principles under which FIR/complaints/criminal cases could be quashed in the following words:

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“102. In the backdrop of the interpretation of the various relevant provisions of the Code under Chapter XIV and of the principles of law enunciated by this Court in a series of decisions relating to the exercise of the extraordinary power under Article 226 or the inherent powers under Section 482 of the Code which we have extracted and reproduced above, we give the following categories of cases by way of illustration wherein such power could be exercised either to prevent abuse of the process of any court or otherwise to secure the ends of justice, though it may not be possible to lay down any precise, clearly defined and sufficiently channelised and inflexible guidelines or rigid formulae and to give an exhaustive list of myriad kinds of cases wherein such power should be exercised.

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(1) Where the allegations made in the first information report or the complaint, even if they are taken at their face value and accepted in their entirety, do not prima facie constitute any offence or make out a case against the accused. (2) Where the allegations in the first information report and other materials, if any, accompanying the FIR do not disclose a cognizable offence, justifying an investigation by police officers under Section 156(1) of the Code except under an order of a Magistrate within the purview of Section 155(2) of the Code. (3) Where the uncontroverted allegations made in the FIR or complaint and the evidence collected in support of the same do not disclose the commission of any offence and make out a case against the accused.

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(4) Where the allegations in the FIR do not constitute a cognizable offence but constitute only a non-cognizable offence, no investigation is permitted by a police officer without an order of a Magistrate as contemplated under Section 155(2) of the Code.

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(5) Where the allegations made in the FIR or complaint are so absurd and inherently improbable on the basis of which no prudent person can ever reach a just conclusion that there is sufficient ground for proceeding against the accused.

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(6) Where there is an express legal bar engrafted in any of the provisions of the Code or the concerned Act (under which a criminal proceeding is instituted) to the institution and continuance of the proceedings and/or where there is a specific provision in the Code or the concerned Act, providing efficacious redress for the grievance of the aggrieved party.

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(7) Where a criminal proceeding is manifestly attended with mala fide and/or where the proceeding is maliciously instituted with an ulterior motive for wreaking vengeance on the accused and with a view to spite him due to a private and personal grudge.” (emphasis added)

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Of the aforesaid criteria, clause no. (1), (4) and (6) would be of relevance to us in this case.

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In clause (1) it has been mentioned that where the allegations made in the first information report or the complaint, even if they are taken at their face value and accepted in their entirety do not prima facie constitute any offence or make out a case against the accused, then the FIR or the complaint can be quashed.

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As per clause (4), where the allegations in the FIR do not constitute a cognizable offence but constitute only a noncognizable offence, no investigation is permitted by a police officer without an order dated by the Magistrate as contemplated under Section 155 (2) of the CrPC, and in such a situation, the FIR can be quashed.

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Similarly, as provided under clause (6), if there is an express legal bar engrafted in any of the provisions of the CrPC or the concerned Act under which the criminal proceedings are instituted, such proceedings can be quashed.”

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This position was reiterated in Ajay Malik v. State of Uttarakhand, 2025 SCC

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OnLine SC 185, wherein it was observed:

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“8. It is well established that a High Court, in exercising its extraordinary powers under Section 482 of the CrPC, may issue orders to prevent the abuse of court processes or to secure the ends of justice. These inherent powers are neither controlled nor limited by any other statutory provision. However, given the broad and profound nature of this authority, the High Court must exercise it sparingly. The conditions for invoking such powers are embedded within Section 482 of the CrPC itself, allowing the High Court to act only in cases of clear abuse of process or where intervention is essential to uphold the ends of justice. 9. It is in this backdrop that this Court, over the course of several decades, has laid down the principles and guidelines that High Courts must follow before quashing criminal proceedings at the threshold, thereby pre-empting the Prosecution from building its case before the Trial Court. The grounds for quashing, inter alia, contemplate the following situations : (i) the criminal complaint has been filed with mala fides; (ii) the FIR represents an abuse of the legal process; (iii) no prima facie offence is made out; (iv) the dispute is civil in nature; (v.) the complaint contains vague and omnibus allegations; and (vi) the parties are willing to settle and compound the dispute amicably (State of Haryana v. Bhajan Lal, 1992 Supp (1) SCC 335).”

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8. From the aforesaid exposition of law, it is clear that power under Section 482 Cr.P.C.( Now section 528 of BNSS) can be exercised in the following conditions:(i) the criminal complaint has been filed with mala fides; (ii) the FIR represents an abuse of the legal process; (iii) no prima facie offence is made out; (iv) the dispute is civil in nature; (v.) the complaint contains vague and omnibus allegations; and (vi) the parties are willing to settle and compound the dispute amicably.

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9. Now being guided by the aforesaid proposition of law laid down by the Hon’ble Apex Court, this Court would make an endeavor to examine and consider the prayer made in the instant petition vis-à-vis factual matrix of the case.

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10. Having heard learned counsel for the parties and perused material available on record, this Court finds that petitioner herein was not the owner of the property in question, rather, being a registered property dealer, he introduced respondent No.2 to the actual owner of the property in question namely, Dalmeet Singh, who had executed General Power of Attorney (GPA) in favour of Gopal Singh, who was an employee of the present petitioner. Initially, at the time of execution of agreement to sell dated 06.01.2017, 7 bighas of land was decided to be sold in favour of respondent No.2 for a total consideration of Rs. 1,84,000,000/-. A sum of Rs. 29,00,000/- was paid as earnest money and the remaining sum of Rs. 1,55,000,000/- was agreed to be paid at the time of registration of sale deed. There was some delay in execution of sale deed for want of certain NOCs and permission to be granted by Government of Himachal Pradesh under Section 118 of the H.P. Tenancy and Land Reforms Act. The real owner of the property, Sh. Dalmeet Singh, filed a suit for specific performance, bearing COMS No.9 of 2018 before this Court, titled as Dalmeet Singh vs. M/s Elegance Retreat Pvt. Limited and others, praying therein to issue direction to respondent No.2, who was the Director of M/s Elegance Retreat Pvt. Limited, to perform his

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part of the agreement to sell dated 06.01.2017. However, during the pendency of aforesaid suit, parties decided to settle their dispute amicably and as such, matter was referred to the learned Mediator. Before the learned Mediator, parties agreed that 5 bighas of land shall be sold to M/s Elegance Retreat Pvt. Limited and accordingly, vide judgment dated 26.07.2019, suit filed by Dalmeet Singh came to be decreed to the extent of 5 bighas of land, with a further direction to Dalmeet Singh to get the sale deed executed. Pursuant to the judgment and decree passed by Co-ordinate Bench of this Court, Dalmeet Singh has already executed the sale deed qua 5 bighas of land in favour of M/s Elegance Retreat Pvt. Limited and now afore M/s Elegance Retreat Pvt. Limited is in possession and it has further raised construction of a resort, which is presently in operation.

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11. It is quite apparent from the material adduced on record that present petitioner had no role whatsoever in execution of sale deed, if any, qua the land for which, he had introduced respondent No. 2 with Shri Dalmeet Singh, rather, steps, if any, for execution of the sale deed were to be taken by Shri Gopal Singh, being the General Power of Attorney (GPA) of Shri Dalmeet Singh. There is no allegation that the money, if any, paid to Shyam Sunder was misappropriated by him or he had not handed over the same to the original owner, Shri Dalmeet Sing, who, having acknowledged factum with regard to his having received sum of ₹29,000,000/- in advance,

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had agreed to get the sale deed executed qua 5 bighas of land after receipt of total sum of ₹1,55,000,000/-

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12. Having taken note of the role played by the petitioner herein, being a registered property dealer, coupled with the fact that land qua which the petitioner had introduced respondent No. 2 with original owner Shri Dalmeet Singh, already stands transferred in the name of respondent- M/s Elegance Retreat Private Limited, this Court is persuaded to conclude that no case much less under S ections 420 and 506 read with Section 34 of the Indian Penal Code is made out against the petitioner.

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13. There is nothing on record to suggest that the petitioner, being a property dealer, had any dishonest intention from day one to dishonestly induce respondent No. 2 to deliver any property or any part of a valuable security. Rather, he after having introduced Respondent No. 2 with the seller i.e., Dalmeet Singh got the agreement to sell executed, on the basis of which, ultimately 5 bighas of land came to be transferred in the name of Respondent No. 2, which fact which has been fairly acknowledged by Mr. Balwant Singh Thakur, learned counsel representing respondent No. 2.

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14. This Court finds that there is no cogent and convincing evidence adduced on record with regard to alleged extension of threats and beatings, if any, given by the petitioner to respondent No. 2 or his family members, rather it appears that on account of the delay in execution of the sale deed,

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respondent No. 2, with a view to exert pressure upon the petitioner, lodged the FIR, sought to be quashed in the instant proceedings.

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15. Hon'ble Apex Court in case tilted Naresh Kumar and another vs. The State of Karnataka and another, passed in Criminal Appeal No.___ of 2024(arising out of SLP (CRL.) No.1570 of 2021, has held as under:-

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“6.In the case of Paramjeet Batra v. State of Uttarakhand (2013) 11 SCC 673, this Court recognized that although the inherent powers of a High Court under Section 482 of the Code of Criminal Procedure should be exercised sparingly, yet the High Court must not hesitate in quashing such criminal proceedings which are essentially of a civil nature. This is what was held:

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“12. While exercising its jurisdiction under Section 482 of the Code the High Court has to be cautious. This power is to be used sparingly and only for the purpose of preventing abuse of the process of any court or otherwise to secure ends of justice. Whether a complaint discloses a criminal offence or not depends upon the nature of facts alleged therein. Whether essential ingredients of criminal offence are present or not has to be judged by the High Court. A complaint disclosing civil transactions may also have a criminal texture. But the High Court must see whether a dispute which is essentially of a civil nature is given a cloak of criminal offence. In such a situation, if a civil remedy is available and is, in fact, adopted as has happened in this case, the High Court should not hesitate to quash the criminal proceedings to prevent abuse of process of the court.”

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(emphasis supplied)

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Relying upon the decision in Paramjeet Batra (supra), this Court in Randheer Singh v. State of U.P. (2021) 14 SCC 626, observed that criminal proceedings cannot be taken recourse to as a weapon of harassment. In Usha Chakraborty & Anr. v. State of West Bengal & Anr. 2023 SCC OnLine SC 90, relying upon Paramjeet Batra (supra) it was again held that where a dispute which is essentially of a civil nature, is given a cloak of a criminal offence, then such disputes can be quashed, by exercising the inherent powers under Section 482 of the Code of Criminal Procedure.

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Essentially, the present dispute between the parties relates to a breach of contract. A mere breach of contract, by one of the parties, would not attract prosecution for criminal offence in every case, as held by this Court in Sarabjit Kaur v. State of Punjab and

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Anr. (2023) 5 SCC 360. Similarly, dealing with the distinction between the offence of cheating and a mere breach of contractual obligations, this Court, in Vesa Holdings (P) Ltd. v. State of Kerala, (2015) 8 SCC 293, has held that every breach of contract would not give rise to the offence of cheating, and it is required to be shown that the accused had fraudulent or dishonest intention at the time of making the promise.

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In the case at hand, the dispute between the parties was not only essentially of a civil nature but in this case the dispute itself stood settled later as we have already discussed above. We see no criminal element here and consequently the case here is nothing but an abuse of the process. We therefore allow the appeal and set aside the order of the High Court dated 02.12.2020. The criminal proceedings arising out of FIR No.113 of 2017 will hereby stand quashed.

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16. Leaving everything aside, this Court finds that land, qua which the FIR came to be lodged, already stands transferred in the name of M/s Elegance Retreat Private Limited, through its Director-cum-Authorized Signatory, Shri Ajay Garg, and as such, grievance of respondent No. 2 stands redressed and as such, no fruitful purpose would be served in case the FIR, sought to be quashed, is permitted to sustain, rather continuation thereof would unnecessarily widen the rift interse petitioner and respondent No.2.

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17. During the proceedings of the case, this Court was also apprised that for the last 3 to 4 years, respondent No. 2 has not come forward to get his statement recorded in the trial initiated against the petitioner pursuant to the FIR, sought to be quashed, which conduct of him itself suggests that he is no more interested in prosecuting the case.

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18. Consequently, in view of the detailed discussion made hereinabove as well as law laid down by the Hon’ble Apex Court, present petition is

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allowed and FIR No. 24 of 2018, dated 04.04.2018, registered at Police Station, Kasauli, District Solan, Himachal Pradesh, under Sections 420 and 506 read with Section 34 of IPC alongwith all consequential proceedings pending in the competent Court of law, are quashed and set-aside qua the petitioner. Petitioner is acquitted of the charges framed against him in the aforesaid FIR.

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In the aforesaid terms, the present petition is disposed of, alongwith pending applications, if any.

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July 21, 2026 ( Sandeep Sharma), (shankar) Judge

Shyam Sunder Aggarwal v. State of Hp

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Shyam Sunder Aggarwal v. State of Hp

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