Allowed

Parmjit Singh v. State of Hp and Ors.

Himachal Pradesh HC11 Mar 2026CRMMO/1296/2024

Case brief

AI extract

What is this about?

Petitioner, a retired police officer, sought quashing of FIR alleging he conspired with a clerk to insert his name in an HRA order to draw allowance though ineligible. Disciplinary proceedings found no misuse or concealment. Finding no evidence of connivance or dishonest inducement, the court quashed the FIR and acquitted him.

What did the court decide?

FIR No.217 of 2023 and consequent proceedings quashed qua petitioner; petitioner acquitted; interim orders vacated; pending applications disposed.

Parmjit Singh Vs State of Hp and Ors. — Quashing and FIR | Himachal Pradesh HC (2026)

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2026:HHC:6730

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IN THE HIGH COURT OF HIMACHAL PRADESH, SHIMLA

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Cr.MMO No.1296 of 2024

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Date of Decision: 11.03.2026

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_____________________ Parmjit Singh	_______________ Versus	___________________ …….Petitioner
State of H.P. & others		… Respondents
_____________________ Coram:	_______________	___________________

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Hon’ble Mr. Justice Sandeep Sharma, Judge. Whether approved for reporting?¹ Yes.

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For the Petitioner: Mr. Rakesh Kumar Dogra, Advocate. For the Respondents : Mr. Rajan Kahol & Mr. Vishal Panwar, Additional Advocate Generals with Mr. Ravi Chauhan & Mr. Anish Banshtu, Deputy Advocates General, for the respondent/State.

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_______________________________________________________ Sandeep Sharma, Judge (oral):

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By way of instant petition filed under Section 528 of the Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, prayer has been made on behalf of the petitioner for quashing of FIR No.217 of 2023, dated 18.09.2023, under Sections 420, 468 and 120-B of IPC, registered at police Station, Sadar, District Bilaspur, Himachal Pradesh as well as consequent proceedings pending adjudication in the competent court of law.

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2. Precisely, the facts of the case, as emerge from the record are that FIR sought to be quashed came to be instituted against the petitioner, who at the relevant time was Sub-Inspector in

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1 Whether the reporters of the local papers may be allowed to see the judgment?

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the office of Superintendent of Police, Bilaspur, Himachal Pradesh, alleging therein that though petitioner was not entitled to House Rent Allowance, as he was living in his own house within the radius of 5 KM from the office of Superintendent of Police, Bilaspur, District Bilaspur, Himachal Pradesh, but yet in connivance with co-accused Manju Devi, who was also working as Clerk in the office of Superintendent of Police, Bilaspur, he fraudulently got his name inserted in the order dated 17.11.2018, issued under the signatures of Superintendent of Police, Bilaspur, District Bilaspur, Himachal Pradesh, thereby authorizing HRA to some of the police officials on account of non-availability of Government accommodation at Bilaspur. Contents of the FIR, if read in their entirety, reveal that petitioner filed an application for grant of HRA, but since he was residing in his personal house situate within the radius of 5 KM from the office of Superintendent of Police, Bilaspur, he was not entitled to HRA. However, he, misusing his official position, prevailed upon Ms. Manju Devi i.e. Clerk, who allegedly without there being any authority, inserted the name of the petitioner in order dated 17.11.2018, issued under the signatures of Superintendent of Police, Bilaspur, District Bilaspur, Himachal Pradesh. Though, above named Manju Devi claimed before the authorities that the then Superintendent of Police, Bilaspur had asked her to insert the name of the petitioner in order dated 17.11.2018, but such claim of her was seriously refuted by the

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then Superintendent of Police, Bilaspur. In the afore background, FIR came to be registered against the petitioner as well as co-accused Manju Devi. Besides the criminal proceedings, as detailed hereinabove, the Department of police also conducted disciplinary proceedings.

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3. The Disciplinary authority i.e. Superintendent of Police, Bilaspur vide order dated 19.01.2023, closed the departmental proceedings and directed the petitioner herein to be careful in future. Since in afore disciplinary proceedings, an amount of Rs.27,600/allegedly received by the petitioner as HRA, was ordered to be recovered from the petitioner, he accordingly deposited the sum of Rs. 27, 600/-, but if aforesaid order is perused in its entirety, it clearly suggest that disciplinary authority gave credence to the statement of Lady ASI Manju, the then dealing hand in the office of Superintendent of Police, Bilaspur, who had categorically stated that name of the petitioner was inserted in order dated 17.11.2018 at the instance of the then Superintendent of Police, Bilaspur. Though, as per final inquiry report, disciplinary authority found that Inspector Parmjit Singh i.e. petitioner neither concealed any facts from the department regarding his posting nor misused his official position for getting HRA/HMA, but yet recovery of sum of Rs. 27, 600/- was ordered for the reason that petitioner was not entitled to HRA for his having resided in his personal accommodation situate within the radius of 5

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KM from the Superintendent of Police Office Bilaspur. Now since the disciplinary proceedings stands closed against the petitioner, coupled with the fact that he had also deposited sum of Rs. 27, 600/unauthorizedly withdrawn by him, petitioner has approached this Court in the instant proceedings for quashing of FIR on the ground that no case muchless under Sections 420, 468 and 120-B of IPC is made out against the him.

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4. Mr. Rakesh Kumar Dogra, learned counsel representing the petitioner, vehemently argued that at no point of time petitioner, while working as Inspector in the office Superintendent of Police, Bilaspur, misused his position or attempted to induce co-accused Manju to confer upon him the undue benefit of HRA. Learned counsel for the petitioner submitted that, at first instance, petitioner filed an application for grant of HRA, but since such prayer of him was not accepted, he did not process the matter further. However, subsequently, he came to know with the issuance of order dated 17.11.2018, issued under the signatures of Superintendent of Police, Bilaspur that he has been also authorized HRA on account of his residing in private accommodation at Bilaspur, as a result thereof, he started drawing the said allowance. He submitted that there is no evidence, worth credence, adduced on record by the prosecution to prove that petitioner ever produced any fake and forged documents, rather precise case of the prosecution is that co-accused Manju, in

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connivance with the petitioner incorporated his name in order dated 17.11.2018 unauthorizedly without there being any authority or order passed by Superintendent of Police, Bilaspur. He submitted that since it has clearly emerged from the report of SFSL that name of the petitioner was inserted by Manju in order dated 17.11.2018, which fact otherwise stands admitted by co-accused Manju, no case under aforesaid provision of law can be said to be made out against the petitioner.

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5. While referring to Section 120-B of IPC, learned counsel for the petitioner submitted that there is no evidence suggestive of the fact that there existed any agreement interse petitioner and coaccused to commit an offence. He submitted that since co-accused Manju had categorically stated that she had inserted the name of the petitioner in order dated 17.11.2018 at the askance of the then Superintendent of Police, Bilaspur, coupled with the fact that there is no evidence that there was an agreement interse petitioner and coaccused Manju and as such, charge of criminal conspiracy sought to be levelled against the petitioner is not sustainable. He further submitted that since petitioner has already deposited the amount allegedly received by him unauthorizedly, coupled with the fact that he has retired from the service, criminal case registered against him deserves to be quashed.

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6. To the contrary, Mr. Rajan Kahol, learned Additional Advocate General, while refuting aforesaid submissions made by learned counsel for the petitioner, vehemently argued that mere factum of depositing of Rs. 27,600/- received by the petitioner as HRA, itself justifies criminal prosecution of the petitioner. He submitted that since petitioner was fully aware that he was not entitled to HRA on account of his residing in personal accommodation situate within the radius of 5 KM from the office of Superintendent of Police, Bilaspur, coupled with the fact that his application was rejected by the competent authority, there was no occasion, if any, for him to receive HRA. He submitted that bare perusal of order dated 17.11.2018 placed on record clearly reveals that name of the petitioner was inserted with a pen by co-accused Manju, who otherwise would not have benefited in any manner with the grant of HRA in favour of the petitioner. However, taking note of the fact that application made by the petitioner was rejected, coupled with the fact that he, in terms of rules, was not entitled to HRA, there is reason to believe and presume that petitioner, in connivance with co-accused Manju, who at the relevant time was working as Clerk, got his name inserted in order dated 17.11.2018 and thereafter, in terms of the same, kept on drawing HRA unauthorizedly. He submitted that agreement interse petitioner and co-accused, in terms of Section 120-B of IPC, can be easily inferred from the fact that rejection of the application filed by

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the petitioner for grant of HRA by the competent authority was very much in the knowledge of both the petitioner as well as co-accused Manju, but yet both the aforesaid persons in connivance with each other, inserted the name of the petitioner in order dated 17.11.2018, as a result of which, petitioner rightly came to be booked under Section 120-B of IPC alongwith co-accused Manju. He further submitted that since petitioner in order to avail undue benefit of HRA induced co-accused Manju to get his name inserted in order dated 17.11.2018, as a result whereof, monetary loss was caused to the State exchequer, petitioner rightly came to be booked under Section 420 of IPC. He further submitted that factum with regard to preparation of forged or fake document by the petitioner in connivance with co-accused Manju is to be proved by the prosecution in totality of evidence in trial. He submitted that since prima facie case can be inferred against the petitioner from the contents of the FIR as well as final report filed under Section 173 Cr.P.C, prayer made on behalf of the petitioner for quashing of the FIR deserves outright rejection .

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I have heard learned counsel for the parties and have gone through the record carefully.

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Before ascertaining the correctness and genuineness of the aforesaid submissions and counter submissions made on behalf of learned counsel representing the parties, this Court deems it

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necessary to discuss /elaborate the scope and competence of this Court to quash the FIR as well as criminal proceedings, while exercising power under Section 528 of Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita.

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The law relating to quashing of criminal cases was explained by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in B.N. John v. State of

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U.P., 2025 SCC OnLine SC 7 as under:-

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“7. As far as the quashing of criminal cases is concerned, it is now more or less well settled as regards the principles to be applied by the court. In this regard, one may refer to the decision of this Court in State of Haryana v. Ch. Bhajan Lal, 1992 Supp (1) SCC 335, wherein this Court has summarised some of the principles under which FIR/complaints/criminal cases could be quashed in the following words:

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“102. In the backdrop of the interpretation of the various relevant provisions of the Code under Chapter XIV and of the principles of law enunciated by this Court in a series of decisions relating to the exercise of the extraordinary power under Article 226 or the inherent powers under Section 482 of the Code which we have extracted and reproduced above, we give the following categories of cases by way of illustration wherein such power could be exercised either to prevent abuse of the process of any court or otherwise to secure the ends of justice, though it may not be possible to lay down any precise, clearly defined and sufficiently channelised and inflexible guidelines or rigid formulae and to give an exhaustive list of myriad kinds of cases wherein such power should be exercised.

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(1) Where the allegations made in the first information report or the complaint, even if they are taken at their face value and accepted in their entirety, do not prima facie constitute any offence or make out a case against the accused.

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(2) Where the allegations in the first information report and other materials, if any, accompanying the FIR do not disclose a cognizable offence, justifying an investigation by police officers under Section 156(1) of the Code except under an order of a Magistrate within the purview of Section 155(2) of the Code.

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(3) Where the uncontroverted allegations made in the FIR or complaint and the evidence collected in support of the same do not disclose the commission of any offence and make out a case against the accused.

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(4) Where the allegations in the FIR do not constitute a cognizable offence but constitute only a non-cognizable offence, no investigation is permitted by a police officer without an order of a Magistrate as contemplated under Section 155(2) of the Code.

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(5) Where the allegations made in the FIR or complaint are so absurd and inherently improbable on the basis of which no prudent

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person can ever reach a just conclusion that there is sufficient ground for proceeding against the accused.

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(6) Where there is an express legal bar engrafted in any of the provisions of the Code or the concerned Act (under which a criminal proceeding is instituted) to the institution and continuance of the proceedings and/or where there is a specific provision in the Code or the concerned Act, providing efficacious redress for the grievance of the aggrieved party.

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(7) Where a criminal proceeding is manifestly attended with mala fide and/or where the proceeding is maliciously instituted with an ulterior motive for wreaking vengeance on the accused and with a view to spite him due to a private and personal grudge.” (emphasis added) 8. Of the aforesaid criteria, clause no. (1), (4) and (6) would be of relevance to us in this case.

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In clause (1) it has been mentioned that where the allegations made in the first information report or the complaint, even if they are taken at their face value and accepted in their entirety do not prima facie constitute any offence or make out a case against the accused, then the FIR or the complaint can be quashed.

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As per clause (4), where the allegations in the FIR do not constitute a cognizable offence but constitute only a noncognizable offence, no investigation is permitted by a police officer without an order dated by the Magistrate as contemplated under Section 155 (2) of the CrPC, and in such a situation, the FIR can be quashed.

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Similarly, as provided under clause (6), if there is an express legal bar engrafted in any of the provisions of the CrPC or the concerned Act under which the criminal proceedings are instituted, such proceedings can be quashed.”

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This position was reiterated in Ajay Malik v. State of Uttarakhand,

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2025 SCC OnLine SC 185, wherein it was observed:

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“8. It is well established that a High Court, in exercising its extraordinary powers under Section 482 of the CrPC, may issue orders to prevent the abuse of court processes or to secure the ends of justice. These inherent powers are neither controlled nor limited by any other statutory provision. However, given the broad and profound nature of this authority, the High Court must exercise it sparingly. The conditions for invoking such powers are embedded within Section 482 of the CrPC itself, allowing the High Court to act only in cases of clear abuse of process or where intervention is essential to uphold the ends of justice.

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It is in this backdrop that this Court, over the course of several decades, has laid down the principles and guidelines that High Courts must follow before quashing criminal proceedings at the threshold, thereby pre-empting the Prosecution from building its case before the Trial Court. The grounds for quashing, inter alia, contemplate the following situations : (i) the criminal complaint has been filed with mala fides; (ii) the FIR represents an abuse of the legal process; (iii) no prima facie offence is made out; (iv) the dispute is civil in nature; (v.) the complaint contains vague and omnibus allegations; and (vi) the parties are willing to settle and

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compound the dispute amicably (State of Haryana v. Bhajan Lal, 1992 Supp (1) SCC 335).”

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From the aforesaid exposition of law, it is clear that power under Section 482 Cr.P.C.( Now section 528 of BNSS) can be exercised in the following conditions:(i) the criminal complaint has been filed with mala fides; (ii) the FIR represents an abuse of the legal process; (iii) no prima facie offence is made out; (iv) the dispute is civil in nature; (v.) the complaint contains vague and omnibus allegations; and (vi) the parties are willing to settle and compound the dispute amicably.

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Now being guided by the aforesaid proposition of law laid down by the Hon’ble Apex Court, this Court would make an endeavor to examine and consider the prayer made in the instant petition vis-à-vis factual matrix of the case.

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Admittedly, in the case at hand, name of the petitioner, who at the relevant time was working as Inspector, was inserted in the office order dated 17.11.2018 with a Pen. It is also not in dispute that name of the petitioner was inserted in afore order by co-accused Manju, who at the relevant time was working as a Clerk. Vide aforesaid order, some of the police officials, who were residing in private quarters, were granted HRA/HMA. Since petitioner was residing in his personal accommodation situate within radius of 5 KM from the office of Superintendent of Police, Bilaspur, he was not entitled to HRA as per rules, but allegedly he, in connivance with co-

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accused Manju, got his name inserted in order dated 17.11.2018. It is not in dispute that co-accused Manju categorically stated that name of SI Parmjit was inserted in office order dated 17.11.2018 on the direction of the then Superintendent of Police, Bilaspur.

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True it is that the then Superintendent of Police, Bilaspur refuted aforesaid claim of co-accused Manju, but admittedly no evidence, worth credence, ever came to be adduced on record by the prosecution to prove connivance, if any, interse petitioner and coaccused Manju. It is also not in dispute that disciplinary proceedings were initiated against the petitioner for his having unauthorizedly availed the benefit of HRA. It is also not in dispute that it came to be concluded in final inquiry report that Inspector Parmjit Singh i.e. petitioner herein, neither concealed any fact from the department regarding his posting nor misused his position to get HRA/HMA. As per final inquiry report, it was found that allegations levelled against the petitioner could not be proved, but he had availed HRA/HMA amounting to Rs. 27,600/-, which was not proper.

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Disciplinary authority i.e. the Superintendent of Police, Bilaspur, taking note of the report of inquiry officer, though ordered recovery of Rs. 27,600/ from the petitioner for his having unauthorizedly availed HRA, but at the same time gave credence to the statement of Lady ASI Manju, the then dealing hand in SP Office, Bilaspur, who categorically stated that name of the petitioner was

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incorporated in the office order dated 17.11.2018 at the askance of the then Superintendent of Police, Bilaspur.

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Though, in the disciplinary proceedings the petitioner was asked to be more careful in future, but that does not mean that he was indicted or held guilty, rather recovery was effected only for the reason that as per rules, he could not have availed the benefit of HRA. At no point of time allegation of misuse of office and connivance with co-accused Manju was ever proved. Though, this Court is persuaded to agree with learned Additional Advocate General that outcome of disciplinary proceedings may not be of much bearing on the criminal proceedings initiated against the petitioner, but this Court cannot lose sight of the fact that in disciplinary proceedings the charge of connivance interse petitioner and co-accused Manju was never proved.

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Similarly, the disciplinary authority, while passing order dated 19.01.2023 gave credence to the statement of Lady ASI Manju, if it is so, statement made by co-accused Manju to the effect that name of the petitioner in office order dated 17.11.2018 was inserted at the instance of the then Superintendent of Police, Bilaspur, cannot be ignored. If aforesaid version of co-accused Manju is taken into consideration, no case muchless under Sections 420, 468 and 120-B of IPC can be said to be made out against the petitioner. Otherwise also, there is no evidence to prove that petitioner himself inserted his

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name in office order dated 17.11.2018, rather it has come on record in the disciplinary proceedings that he never concealed any fact from the department regarding his posting nor misused his office for getting HRA/HMA. Once it is not in dispute that petitioner had submitted an application for grant of HRA and thereafter, similar prayer of some official for grant of HRA was considered by the then Superintendent of Police, Bilaspur, version put forth by co-accused Manju that name of the petitioner was inserted in office order dated 17.11.2018 on the askance of Superintendent of Police cannot be brushed aside easily.

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Most importantly, order dated 17.11.2018, which is the subject matter of the case at hand, was signed by Superintendent of Police, Bilaspur. It is none of the case of the prosecution that name of the petitioner was inserted in aforesaid order subsequent to the signing of afore order by Superintendent of Police, Bilaspur. Moreover, there is no evidence adduced on record to suggest that petitioner dishonestly induced the person to deliver any property. In the case at hand, person, who was dishonestly induced to deliver any property can be said to be Superintendent of Police, Bilaspur, who actually signed the document. The case of the prosecution is that coaccused Manju, without there being any authority, inserted the name of the petitioner in office order dated 17.11.2018. Since there is nothing to prove that petitioner induced or prevailed upon the

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Superintendent of Police, Bilaspur to do something unlawful, as a result of which, petitioner availed the benefit of HRA, to which he was not entitled , no case muchless under Section 420 of IPC can be said to be made out against the petitioner. To prove the case, if any, under Section 420, there has to be dishonest intention from the very beginning, which is sine qua non to hold the guilty of the accused for commission of offence.

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Even if the allegations made in the complaint are accepted to be true and correct, petitioner cannot be said to have committed the offence of cheating. Since petitioner was not in the picture at all when co-accused allegedly inserted his name unauthorizedly in order dated 17.11.2018, neither any dishonest intention can be attributed to him nor can there be possible intention on his part to deceive the department. The offence of cheating is established only when the accused dishonestly induces a person to deliver any property or to do or omit to do something, which he would not otherwise have done or omitted. Similarly this Court finds that it is none of the case of the prosecution that petitioner forged any document or produced any fake document to avail benefit of HRA. The documents allegedly used to avail the benefit of HRA was allegedly prepared by co-accused Manju and signed by the Superintendent of Police, Bilaspur and as such, it is not understood how a case under Section 468 of IPC is made out against the

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petitioner, who subsequently on the basis of afore document reaped the benefit of HRA only with other similar situate persons.

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In view of the discussion made hereinabove as well as material adduced on record alongwith the challan filed under Section 173 Cr.P.C, this Court is persuaded to agree with learned counsel for the petitioner that no case much less under Sections 420, 468 and 120-B of IPC is made out against the petitioner and as such, no fruitful purpose would be served in continuation of trial against the petitioner under the aforesaid provisions of law, rather continuation of the same besides causing mental agony to the petitioner would amount to sheer abuse of process of law.

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Consequently, in view of the aforesaid discussion as well as law laid down by the Hon’ble Apex Court (supra), FIR No.217 of 2023, dated 18.09.2023, under Sections 420, 468 and 120-B of IPC, registered at police Station, Sadar, District Bilaspur, Himachal Pradesh as well as consequent proceedings, if any, pending adjudication in the competent court of law, are quashed and set aside qua the petitioner -accused and he is acquitted of the offences alleged in the FIR. Interim order, if any, is vacated. Pending applications, if any, also stand disposed of.

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(Sandeep Sharma), Judge

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March 11,2026 (shankar)

Parmjit Singh v. State of Hp and Ors.

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Parmjit Singh v. State of Hp and Ors.

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