Ayush Jagota Vs State of Hp and Ors.

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2026:HHC:30104

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IN THE HIGH COURT OF HIMACHAL PRADESH, SHIMLA

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Cr. MMO No. 1153 of 2025 Reserved on: 16.07.2026 Date of Decision: 22.07.2026.

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Ayush Jagota ...Petitioner Versus State of H.P.& Ors ...Respondent

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Coram
*Hon’ble Mr Justice Rakesh Kainthl*	a,****Judge.
Whether approved for reporting?¹	No.
For the Petitioner :	Mr A.K. Sharma, Advocate.
For the Respondent/State :	Mr Ajit Sharma, Deputy Advocate General.

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Rakesh Kainthla, Judge

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The petitioner has fled the present petition for i quashing of FIR No. 35 of 2023 dated 29.10.2023 registered at Women Police Station, Bilaspur, District Bilaspur, for the commission of of f ences punishable under Sections 376, 376(2) (n) and 506 of the Indian Penal Code (IPC) and Section 6 of the Protection of Children from Sexual Of f ences Act (POCSO Act).

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2012.

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1 Whether reporters of Local Papers may be allowed to see the judgment? Yes.

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2 . Briefy stated, the facts giving rise to the present l petition are that the informant (named being withheld to protect her identity) was present in her home on 09.03.2023. The petitioner came to the informant's house, took her to a room and raped her. He threatened to kill her if the incident was narrated to any person. The informant/victim did not narrate the incident to any person. She had a stomachache, and she told her father about it, who took her to the hospital. The doctor advised the informant to go for a sonography. It was found after the sonography that the informant/victim was pregnant. The doctor called the police. The informant narrated the incident to the police. The police registered the FIR and investigated the matter. Subsequently, the victim delivered a child. The DNA of the victim, child and the petitioner were sent to the FSL. However, the petitioner’s DNA did not match the child’s DNA. The police also collected the DNA of various persons, and the victim's brother's DNA matched the child’s DNA. As per the report of the FSL, the victim's brother was found to be the biological father and the victim was found to be the biological mother of the child. As per the school certifcate, i the victim was born on 07.11.2008. She was a minor on the date of the incident. The police fled a charge sheet against the petitioner i

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before the regular Court and against the victim's brother before the Juvenile Justice Board. The victim's brother was sentenced to undertake training/ofce work in the Government Polytechnic fi College, Kalol, District Bilaspur.

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3 . Being aggrieved by the registration of the FIR and filing of the charge sheet, the petitioner has filed the present petition, asserting that the victim had made false allegations to save her brother from liability. However, the DNA analysis revealed the truth. The petitioner was not found to be the biological father of the child. The location of the mobile phone of the petitioner was also not found to be in the village on the date of the incident. The continuation of the proceedings against the petitioner amounts to an abuse of the process of the Court. Therefore, it was prayed that the present petition be allowed and the FIR and consequential proceedings arising out of it be quashed qua the petitioner.

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The petition is opposed by filing a status report reproducing the contents of the FIR and the various steps taken during the investigation.

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I have heard Mr A. K. Sharma, learned counsel for the petitioner and Mr Ajit Sharma, learned Deputy Advocate General for the respondent. 1/State.

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Mr A. K. Sharma, learned counsel for the petitioner, submitted that the allegations made against the petitioner are false. The victim made a supplementary statement before the police, naming her brother as the father of her child. The petitioner's DNA did not match the child’s DNA. The petitioner was not at home as per the call detail record. The victim appeared in the examination on the date of the incident. All these circumstances make the prosecution's version highly doubtful. No fruitful purpose would be served by continuing with the criminal proceedings, and the petitioner would face harassment. Therefore, he prayed that the present petition be allowed and the FIR and consequential proceedings arising out of the FIR be quashed.

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Mr Ajit Sharma, learned Deputy Advocate General for the respondent no. 1/State submitted that the mere fact that the petitioner was not found to be the biological father of the child cannot be a ground for quashing the FIR because it is possible for

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a person to rape a woman without making her pregnant. The allegations in the FIR disclose the commission of a cognisable

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offence. The Court exercising the inherent jurisdiction does not adjudicate upon the merits, and this is a matter for the trial. Hence, he prayed that the present petition be dismissed.

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I have given considerable thought to the submissions made at the bar and have gone through the records carefully.

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The law relating to quashing of criminal cases was explained by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in B.N. John v. State of U.P., 2025 SCC OnLine SC 7 as under: -

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“7. As far as the quashing of criminal cases is concerned, it is now more or less well settled as regards the principles to be applied by the court. In this regard, one may refer to the decision of this Court in State of Haryana v. Ch. Bhajan Lal, 1992 Supp (1) SCC 335, wherein this Court has summarised some of the principles under which FIR/complaints/criminal cases could be quashed in the following words:

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“102. In the backdrop of the interpretation of the various relevant provisions of the Code under Chapter XIV and of the principles of law enunciated by this Court in a series of decisions relating to the exercise of the extraordinary power under Article 226 or the inherent powers under Section 482 of the Code which we have extracted and reproduced above, we give the following categories of cases by way of illustration wherein such power could be exercised either to prevent abuse of the process of any court or otherwise to secure the ends of justice, though it may not be

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possible to lay down any precise, clearly defined and sufficiently channelised and inflexible guidelines or rigid formulae and to give an exhaustive list of myriad kinds of cases wherein such power should be exercised.

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(1) Where the allegations made in the first information report or the complaint, even if they are taken at their face value and accepted in their entirety, do not prima facie constitute any offence or make out a case against the accused.

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(2) Where the allegations in the first information report and other materials, if any, accompanying the FIR do not disclose a cognizable offence, justifying an investigation by police officers under Section 156(1) of the Code except under an order of a Magistrate within the purview of Section 155(2) of the Code.

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(3) Where the uncontroverted allegations made in the FIR or complaint and the evidence collected in support of the same do not disclose the commission of any offence and make out a case against the accused.

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(4) Where the allegations in the FIR do not constitute a cognizable offence but constitute only a non-cognizable offence, no investigation is permitted by a police officer without an order of a Magistrate as contemplated under Section 155(2) of the Code.

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(5) Where the allegations made in the FIR or complaint are so absurd and inherently improbable based on which no prudent person can ever reach a just conclusion that there is sufficient ground for proceeding against the accused.

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(6) Where there is an express legal bar engrafted in any of the provisions of the Code or the concerned Act (under which a criminal proceeding is instituted) to the institution and continuance of the

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proceedings, and/or where there is a specific provision in the Code or the concerned Act, providing efficacious redress for the grievance of the aggrieved party.

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(7) Where a criminal proceeding is manifestly attended with mala fide and/or where the proceeding is maliciously instituted with an ulterior motive for wreaking vengeance on the accused and with a view to spite him due to a private and personal grudge.” (emphasis added)

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8. Of the aforesaid criteria, clause no. (1), (4) and (6) would be of relevance to us in this case.

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In clause (1), it has been mentioned that where the allegations made in the first information report or the complaint, even if they are taken at their face value and accepted in their entirety, do not prima facie constitute any offence or make out a case against the accused, then the FIR or the complaint can be quashed.

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As per clause (4), where the allegations in the FIR do not constitute a cognizable offence but constitute only a noncognizable offence, no investigation is permitted by a police officer without an order dated by the Magistrate as contemplated under Section 155 (2) of the CrPC, and in such a situation, the FIR can be quashed.

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Similarly, as provided under clause (6), if there is an express legal bar engrafted in any of the provisions of the CrPC or the concerned Act under which the criminal proceedings are instituted, such proceedings can be quashed.”

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This position was reiterated in Ajay Malik v. State of

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Uttarakhand, 2025 SCC OnLine SC 185, wherein it was observed:

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“8. It is well established that a High Court, in exercising its extraordinary powers under Section 482 of the CrPC, may issue orders to prevent the abuse of court processes or to secure the ends of justice. These inherent powers are

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neither controlled nor limited by any other statutory provision. However, given the broad and profound nature of this authority, the High Court must exercise it sparingly. The conditions for invoking such powers are embedded within Section 482 of the CrPC itself, allowing the High Court to act only in cases of clear abuse of process or where intervention is essential to uphold the ends of justice.

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9. It is in this backdrop that this Court, over the course of several decades, has laid down the principles and guidelines that High Courts must follow before quashing criminal proceedings at the threshold, thereby preempting the Prosecution from building its case before the Trial Court. The grounds for quashing, inter alia , contemplate the following situations : ( i ) the criminal complaint has been filed with mala fides ; ( ii ) the FIR represents an abuse of the legal process; ( iii ) no prima facie offence is made out; ( iv ) the dispute is civil in nature; ( v. ) the complaint contains vague and omnibus allegations; and ( vi ) the parties are willing to settle and compound the dispute amicably ( State of Haryana v. Bhajan Lal, 1992 Supp (1) SCC 335 ).

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A similar view was taken in Rajendra Bihari Lal v. State

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of U.P., 2025 SCC OnLine SC 2265, wherein it was observed:

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“70. The aforesaid decisions of this Court make it clear that where the High Court is satisf i ed that the process of any court is being abused or likely to be abused or that the ends of justice would not be secured, it is not only empowered but also obligated under the law to exercise its inherent powers. The provision does not confer any new power on the High Court but rather saves the power which the High Court already possesses, from before the enactment of the legislation, by reason of its very existence. In exercise of its power, it would be legitimate for the High Court to quash any criminal proceedings if the High Court f i nds that the initiation or continuation of it

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may lead to abuse of process of court, and quashing of the proceedings would serve the ends of justice.”

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The present petition is to be decided as per the parameters laid down by the Hon’ble Supreme Court.

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The victim specifically stated in the FIR that the petitioner entered her room on 09.03.2023 and raped her. She became pregnant because of his act. However, subsequently she made a supplementary statement before the police that her brother had maintained a physical relationship with her in February, March and April. She identified the room where these incidents had taken place. This part of the supplementary statement is duly corroborated by the report of the FSL, which mentions that the victim's brother was the biological father, and the victim was the biological mother of the baby. Therefore, the result of the analysis shows that the baby was born because of the relationship between the victim and her brother. The report also mentions that the petitioner’s DNA did not match the child’s DNA. This report falsifies the victim’s statement that the child was born because the petitioner had raped her.

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There can be no dispute with the submission made on behalf of the State that the mere non-matching of the baby’s

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DNA would not show that the victim’s allegations are false because it is possible for a person to rape a woman without impregnating her. However, the victim had not asserted that her brother and the petitioner had raped her. She had initially named the petitioner as her rapist and the child’s father. Subsequently, DNA analysis falsified this version, and she named her brother as her rapist and the father of her child, which was duly corroborated by the report of the DNA analysis. Thus, these two statements revealed a mutually exclusive relationship and not an inclusive relationship. Hence, there is a force in the submission of Mr A.K. Sharma, learned counsel for the petitioner, that the subsequent statement of the informant/victim and the report of analysis would show that the allegations against the petitioner cannot be proved.

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The police wrote a letter to the principal of the school in which the victim was studying regarding her attendance, and it was reported by the school that the victim had attended the board examination on 09.03.2023 with effect from 12:45 a.m. to 04:00 p.m. The police also collected the call detail record and found the location of the mobile phone of the petitioner at Ladror between 08:19 and 10:33. The location was found to be in the

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village between 11:31 and 12:10, but the victim had attended her board examination with effect from 12:45 p.m. till 04:00 p.m. These two documents falsify the victim's version that the petitioner had raped her on 09.03.2023.

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The status report shows that the victim's brother has already been sentenced to carry out training/office work in Government Polytechnical College, Kalol, District Bilaspur, for the commission of the offence. All these circumstances show that the continuation of the proceedings against the petitioner in these circumstances would be a futile exercise because it would not result in the conviction of the petitioner. The petitioner is a young person who is also undergoing the studies. He cannot be asked to face the trauma of a criminal trial to be acquitted at the end.

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Therefore, the present petition is allowed and the FIR No 35 of 2023 dated 29.10.2023 registered at Women Police Station, Bilaspur, District Bilaspur for the commission of of f ences punishable under Sections 376, 376(2)(n) and 506 of Indian Penal Code (IPC) and Section 6 of Protection of Children from Sexual Of f ences Act (POCSO Act) 2012 and the consequential

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proceedings arising out of it are ordered to be quashed qua the petitioner.

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Petition stands disposed of in the above terms, so also pending miscellaneous applications, if any.

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Parties are permitted to produce a copy of this judgment, downloaded from the webpage of the High Court of Himachal Pradesh, before the authorities concerned, and the said authorities shall not insist on the production of a certified copy, but if required, may verify passing of the order from the Website of the High Court.

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(Rakesh Kainthla) Judge

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22^nd July, 2026 (Nikita)

Ayush Jagota v. State of Hp and Ors.

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Ayush Jagota v. State of Hp and Ors.

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