Om Prakash Vs Vidya Sagar and Another

The instant petition arises out of the judgment passed by the learned Additional District Judge, Ghumarwin, District Bilaspur, H.P., dated 21.02.2026 in Civil Miscellaneous Appeal No.15 of 2025, whereby the appeal preferred by the plaintiff-petitioner was dismissed, and the appeal preferred by the counter-claimant/defendant No.1 was allowed.

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The facts that emerge in the present case are that the plaintiff-petitioner, Om Prakash, filed a suit in the Court of the learned

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Whether reporters of Local Papers may be allowed to see the judgment?

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Civil Judge (Senior Division), Court No.1, Ghumarwin, for the cancellation of the sale deed dated 09.11.2020, seeking a declaration and consequential relief of injunction and possession to the effect that the sale deed executed by defendant No. 2 in favour of defendant No. 1 is null, void, and not binding on the rights of the plaintiff.

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Admittedly, the plaintiff is the son of defendant No.2. He has assailed and challenged the validity of the sale deed dated 09.11.2020, bearing registration No.390/2020, executed defendant No.2, his mother, in favour of defendant No. 1, Vidya Sagar. It is the case of the plaintiff that the suit land is joint Hindu family property and that the plaintiff is the Karta of the same. It is stated in the plaint that defendant No.2, being the mother of the plaintiff, is an illiterate, old, rustic lady, who is maintained by the plaintiff. It is alleged that defendant No. 1, being a clever person and a retired public servant, by false means and playing fraud on the old and ailing defendant No.2 procured a sale deed in his favour on 09.11.2020, registered in the office of the Sub-Registrar, Bharari, in connivance with the witnesses and the Sub-Registrar.

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It has been stated that the suit land was granted as Nautor land to late Shri Kanshi Ram, the father of the plaintiff, in the year 1977. Since there was a bar not to alienate the suit land as per the provisions of the Scheme, therefore, the said sale deed could not have been executed in favour of defendant No.1. Therefore, a decree

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for declaration was sought on the ground that the sale deed dated 09.11.2020, is illegal, null, inoperative, and it does not confer any right, title, or interest in favour of defendant No.1. In addition to seeking a decree for the cancellation of the sale deed dated 9th of November, 2020, a decree for a permanent prohibitory injunction was also sought from the learned trial court.

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The suit was contested by defendant No.1 by raising preliminary objections with respect to the maintainability, locus standi, estoppel, etc. A specific stand has been taken in the written statement that defendant No.1 falls under the definition of a person with disability under the Rights of Persons with Disabilities Act, 2016, having 100% disability. It has been averred in the written statement that the plaintiff executed one written agreement with him in the presence of UpPradhan along with the respected persons of the Gram Panchayat, Gahar, and peripherals for his easementary right on o7.06.2011 and the said fact was also admitted by the plaintiff in the writing before the learned SDM, Ghumarwin, on 06.06.2011. It has been stated that defendant No.1 purchased the land to regularize the easementary rights, and he is in continuous operation since the year 1994-95. Defendant No. 2 has sold land measuring 10 biswas comprised in Khata-Khatauni No.101/108, 10/90 shares out of Khasra No.354/286, land measuring 4-10 bighas, situated in village Jarora to defendant No.1 for a sale consideration of Rs.3,00,000/-. Defendant No. 2

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received a sum of Rs.64,000/-, part of the sale consideration, to clear her bank and other liabilities and also to clear the charges created on the share of defendant No.2. The rest of the sale consideration amount was received by defendant No.2 at home, and the possession of the suit land along with all the right, title, and interest was delivered to defendant No.1 on 09.11.2020, including the easementary rights since 1994-95. Further, Smt Geetan Devi had also obtained the loan from defendant No.1 to fulfill her daily needs and to sustain herself in order to discharge the loan liability of Rakesh Kumar, who is residing with her. All the averments as made in the plaint were specifically refuted and denied, and it was stated that being a disabled person, he is well within his right to utilize the suit land which has been purchased by execution of sale deed by defendant No. 2 in his favour. Therefore, it was prayed that the suit as instituted by the plaintiff against him deserves to be dismissed.

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The plaintiff/petitioner, along with the suit, filed an application under Order 39 Rules 1 and 2 CPC for seeking an ad interim injunction. In the civil suit, defendant No. 1 filed a counterclaim along with an application under Order 39 Rules 1 and 2 CPC.

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The learned trial Court, vide its order dated 08.08.2022, dismissed the application under Order 39 Rules 1 and 2 CPC filed by the plaintiff-petitioner, whereas the application filed by the defendant No.1, Vidya Sagar, was allowed by restraining the present petitioner

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from causing any sort of interference over the suit land/link road till the final disposal of the main suit.

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Thereafter, during the pendency of the suit and after the passing of the injunction order in favour of the defendant No.1, the present respondent-defendant No.1 filed an application under Section 151 of CPC for enforcement of the order passed by the learned trial Court on 08.08.2022, by providing police help. The learned trial Court, vide its order dated 01.02.2023, declined the said prayer made by defendant No.1.

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Against the dismissal of the application filed by the plaintiff under Order 39 Rules 1 and 2 CPC and allowing of the application filed by the counter-claimant-defendant No.1, admittedly, as fairly conceded by the learned counsel for the petitioner, he preferred only a single appeal before the first appellate Court bearing CMA No.6 of 2026. Against the dismissal of the application filed by defendant No.1, whereby police assistance was sought from the learned trial court, the present respondent/defendant No.1 preferred CMA No.15 of 2025.

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The learned First Appellate Court, while adjudicating both the Civil Miscellaneous Nos. 6 of 2026 and 15 of 2025, dismissed the appeal as preferred by the plaintiff-petitioner, and the appeal as preferred by respondent-defendant No. 1 came to be allowed, whereby

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the plaintiff, Om Prakash, was directed to remove the obstruction on the link road existing over the suit land so as to provide free ingress and egress to defendant No. 1, Vidya Sagar.

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Feeling dissatisfied, the plaintiff-petitioner has instituted the present revision petition, challenging the judgment as passed by the learned first appellate Court, whereby Civil Miscellaneous Appeal No.15 of 2025 as filed by defendant No.1 came to be allowed.

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It is contended by Mr. Neel Kamal Sharma, learned counsel for the plaintiff-petitioner, that the impugned judgment as passed by the learned first appellate Court is erroneous and liable to be set aside. He submits that the learned first appellate Court has gone astray in the matter, and granted the relief to the present respondent/defendant No.1, which is the subject matter of the trial and by passing of the impugned judgment, virtually, the main relief has been granted to the defendant No.1-respondent. He submits that after accepting the present petition, the impugned judgment as passed by the learned first appellate Court, deserves to be set aside.

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On the other hand, Mr. Neeraj Gupta, learned senior counsel, duly assisted by Mr.Harshit Sharma, learned counsel, has defended the impugned judgment as passed by the learned first appellate Court. He submits that the learned first appellate Court has rightly appreciated the point in controversy, and after relying upon the report of the Local Commissioner, the first appellate Court was well

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within its right to pass the impugned order and in order to preserve the suit property, the order impugned has rightly been passed.

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I have heard learned counsel for the parties and have gone through the case file carefully

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In the present case, the plaintiff-petitioner has approached the learned trial court seeking cancellation of the sale deed dated 09.11.2020, executed by his mother, Geetan Devi, in favour of defendant No. 1, Vidya Sagar, on the ground that the suit property is a joint Hindu family coparcenary property and he, being Karta of the family, defendant No. 2 could not have executed the sale deed in favour of defendant No.1, and the same is liable to be set aside. Further, it is the case of the plaintiff that since the sale deed was executed in the year 2020, and as per the Nautor Rules, the alienation could not have been effected within the time stipulated whereby there is bar to alienate the same; therefore, on that ground also, the sale deed deserves to be set aside.

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The defence of defendant No.1 is very specific and categorical that being a handicapped person, he purchased the suit land from defendant No. 2 after paying the entire sale consideration amount of Rs.3,00,000/-

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Further, it is case of defendant No.1 that after execution of the sale deed on 09.11.2020, the suit land has been handed over to him, and he is enjoying the same after its purchase. It is admitted by

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the learned counsel for the parties that during the pendency of the suit and before the passing of the injunction order in favour of the counterclaimant, the learned trial Court had appointed a Local Commissioner, namely, Mr.Suresh Kumar, Advocate, to inspect the spot and to verify the allegations and the averments as made by the counter-claimant in his counter claim and application under Order 39 Rules 1 and 2 CPC. 18. The Local Commissioner filed his report on 01.10.2021, in the following manner:-

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“1. That on 01/10/2021 at 2:00 P.M. with prior notice to both the parties through their Id. Counsel, I visited the spot i.e. the suit land measuring 4-10 Bighas Comprised in Khasra No. 354/286/1, 354/286/2 Khata/Khatoni No. 101/108 situated in Village Jarora, Pargana Ajmerpur, Tehsil Ghumarwin Distt Bilaspur H.P. The applicant Sh. Vidya Sagar was present along with counsel Sh. Surinder Kumar Advocate and Sh. Om Prakash, Geetan Devi respondents were present on spot. Sh. Anmol Singh Patwari Cum Village Revenue Officer Gahar was also present. The suit land ie. land measuring 4-10 Bighas Comprised in Khasra No. 354/286/1, 354/286/2 Khata/ Khatoni No. 101/108 situated in Village Jarora, Pargana Ajmerpur, Tehsil Ghumarwin Distt Bilaspur H.P. was identified with the help of Patwari/ Village Revenue Officer Sh. Anmol Singh in presence of the applicant and respondents and there is no dispute with respect to the identification of the suit land and there was no dispute with respect to the boundaries of the suit land. As per my inspection the suit land is situated abutting the Govt. road Known as Dhadhol To Jarora. There is a passage which leads from Govt. road to the house of Sh. Vidya Sagar applicant and other houses in Vicinity. The dispute in entire passage is in the 30 meters length but the rest of the

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passage is open i.e. from starting point and after the disputed Length of 24 meters. After 24 meters length of passage the respondent No.1 Sh. Om Prakash has stored the Stones, Fuel woods, Iron rods(M.role) and Cow Dung. In addition to it the respondent No.1 has also put a Plastic Tank of water in the passage and by the side of Plastic Tank the respondent No.1 has also made a Kitchen Garden by Mud Stacking in the passage. After it in the remaining part of the passage, the respondent No.1 has also stored the Fuel woods.

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In the above all facts and circumstances there is no other alternative passage available on spot. The respondent No.1 has obstructed the passage on spot. I have also clicked the photographs of spot and has also prepared the rough/unscaled Sketch of spot, which is enclosed with the report.”

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It is contended by the learned senior counsel for respondent No.1 that before proceeding in the matter, this court has to take into consideration that defendant No.1 is a 100% disabled person. In order to have ingress and egress, he purchased the suit land in the year 2020 from the mother of the present plaintiff, i.e. defendant No. 2, Geetan Devi.

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The passing of the injunction order by the learned trial court in favour of the counter-claimant is a matter of record. The learned Senior Civil Judge, Ghumawin, District Bilaspur, HP, vide its order dated 08.08.2022, allowed the application filed by Vidya Sagar, defendant No.1, by restraining the plaintiff-petitioner from causing any

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sort of interference in the suit property/link road till the final disposal of the main suit.

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It is contended by the learned senior counsel that despite the passing of the injunction order by the learned trial Court, the petitioner continued to interfere in the property. Therefore, under such circumstances, an application came to be filed before the learned trial Court for the enforcement of injunction order with the help of the police. Though, the learned trial Court did not find favour with the defendant No. 1/counter-claimant, however, the first appellate Court has rightly taken into consideration the entire factual aspect of the matter and came to the conclusion that the obstruction, which has been raised by the plaintiff, deserves to be removed.

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In the present case, on the strength of the sale deed which has been executed by the mother of the plaintiff-petitioner, the defendant No.1/counter-claimant has been able to make out a prima facie case in his favour. It is also a matter of record that he is a 100% disabled person, and in order to have ingress and egress, he purchased the suit property from defendant No.2 after spending more than Rs.3,00,000/-.

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Despite the passing of the injunction order, when the present petitioner-plaintiff did not stop from interfering in the peaceful possession of the defendant No.1, he was constrained to file the application for the grant of police assistance. The first appellate Court,

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while placing reliance on the report of the local commissioner, has come to the conclusion that there is a passage which leads from government road to the house of Vidya Sagar, respondent No.1. It has been stated that the dispute in entire passage is in the 30 meters length, but the rest of the passage is open, i.e. from starting point and after the disputed length of 24 meters. After 24 meters length of the passage, the petitioner/plaintiff, Shri Om Prakash, has stored the stones, fuel woods, iron rod, cow dung. In addition to the same, the present plaintiff-petitioner has also put a plastic water tank in the passage, and by the side of the plastic water tank, the plaintiff has made a kitchen garden by stacking mud in the passage. While concluding his report, the local commissioner has observed that the road of defendant No.1 has been obstructed on the spot.

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As rightly submitted by the learned senior counsel that in order to uphold the majesty of the Court order which was passed by the learned trial court, whereby the plaintiff-petitioner was restrained from interfering in the peaceful possession of defendant No.1, the first appellate Court has exercised the jurisdiction, and the same does not suffer from any infirmity. Defendant No.1, being the owner of the suit property, was well within his right to file the application for the grant of police assistance, and once there is an injunction order passed by the learned trial Court, in that event, the said order has to be implemented in its letter and spirit on the spot.

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It is well settled principle of law that interim protection order as passed by the competent Court has to be implemented and no one can be permitted to violate the same. The majesty of the court orders has to be upheld. On account of the defiance as made by the present petitioner, respondent No.1 was compelled to approach the learned trial Court for grant of police assistance. Once, the interim protection was granted to present respondent No.1/counter claimant, then the same cannot be permitted to be violated to his detriment.

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This Court in CMPMO No. 146 of 2026 titled as Kiran vs. Rajesh Kumar @ Manga and others , decided on 07.05.2026, has held as follows:

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“20. A Co-ordinate Bench of this Court in CMPMO No. 166 of 2021 , titled Sanjay Kumar vs. Vijay Kumar & others, decided on 13.07.2023 , has held as under :-

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“7 . This Court in Jaishi Ram and others Vs. Salig Ram, 1981 Sim. L.C. 156 has held that if the circumstances of a case are such that assistance of police for the enforcement of an order is necessary, an order to this effect can be passed. The learned Single Judge has held as under:

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“3. I have perused the order passed by the SubJudge. He has based his judgment on a decision in Ravapati Audemma V. Pothineni Narasimham, AIR 1971 A.P. 53. This is a Division Bench judgment of that High Court. In the said judgment the point involved was the same as in the presence case. The learned Judges have discussed the case-law on the point. They have not agreed with certain prior decisions. The relevant observations may be reproduced:

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“The observations in the aforesaid decision no doubt support the contention of the

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learned counsel for the petitioner. The learned Judge Bhima Sankaram, J., referred to Section 151, C.P.C. but took the view that because an order of injunction is capable of enforcement by punishing its disobedience in the manner provided by Order 39 Rule 2(3), C.P.C., it is not open to the Civil Courts to enforce the same with the aid of the police. With great respect we are unable to agree with this reasoning. It has to be noticed that Order 30, Rule 2(3), CPC., provides only for punishment by attachment of the property or by detention in civil prison of the person who committed breach. But it does not further provide for implementation of the order of injunction itself. Order 39, Rule 2(3) cannot be said to be an express provision with respect to implementation of the order of injunction, but is only a provision which provides penalty for disobedience of the order. In such a case there being no other express provisions in the Code for enforcement of the order, it is not only proper but also necessary that the courts should render all aid to the aggrieved party to derive full benefits of the order. Though the order of injunction under Order 39, C.P.C. is only interim in nature, still it clothes the person who obtained the order with certain rights and he is entitled to enforce the aforesaid right against the party who is bound by the order. No doubt in such a case, the aggrieved party himself could approach the police authorities to prevent obstruction to the enforcement of the order or to the exercise of the right which he derives under the order or to the exercise of such right which he derives under the order of Court. But we do not see why when the same person brings to the notice of the Court that enforcement of the order is sought to be prevented or obstructed, the Court should not exercise its inherent power under Section 151, C.P.C. and direct the police authorities to render all aid to the aggrieved party in the implementation of the Court’s order. In our opinion the exercise of such power is necessary for the ends of justice or to prevent abuse of the process and the civil court has ample jurisdiction to pass such order under Section 151, C.P.C. The learned Judge’s observation “that the police are not bound to obey and directions

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of the court in the absence of any statutory obligation to do so and a civil court would be stultifying itself by giving directions which may not be complied with”, with great respect, cannot be said to be correct. Inasmuch as we are of the opinion that such a direction to be police authorities could be given under the inherent powers of the Court under Section 151, C.P.C. the police are bound to obey such directions.”

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The learned Judges have also referred to some decisions on the point, including the observations in Padam Sen Vs. State of U.P. (AIR 1961 SC 218). It is desirable to reproduce the same:

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“The following observations in AIR 1961 also apposite in this context:

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“The inherent powers of the Court are in addition to the powers specifically conferred on the Court by the Code. They are complementary to those powers and therefore it must be held that the Court is free to exercise them for the purpose mentioned in Sec. 151 of the Code when the exercise of those powers is not in any way in conflict with what has been expressly provided in the Code or against the intentions of the Legislature.’ In view of these clear observations of their Lordships with regard to the scope and ambit of the inherent powers of the Court under Section 151, C.P.C., we are clearly of the opinion that in order to do justice between the parties or to prevent the abuse of process of the Court, the Civil courts have ample jurisdiction to give directions to the police authorities to render aid to the aggrieved parties with regard to the implementation of the orders of Court or the exercise of the rights created under orders of Court. That the police authorities owe a legal duty to the public to enforce the law is clear from a decision of the Court of Appeal, reported in R.V. Metropolitan Police Commr., (1968) 1 All DR 763, where Lord Denning, M.R. observed at page 769 as follows: “I hold it to be the duty of the Commissioner of Police, as it is of every chief constable to enforce the law of the land…..but in all these things he is not the servant of anyone, save of the law itself. The responsibility for law enforcement lies on him. He is answerable to the law and to the law alone.”

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The same view was expressed by the other learned Judges. We may also refer to the judgment of the Madras High Court, in Varadachariar V. Commr. Of Police (1969) 2 Mad. LJ 1, where the learned Judge, Kailasam, J., after referring to the English case cited above held that the Commissioner of Police should proceed and act in accordance with the directions indicated in the aforesaid judgment.”

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8. In P. Shanker Rao v. Smt. B. Susheela, AIR 2000 Andhra Pradesh 214, learned Single Judge of Andhra Pradesh has held that the court in its inherent powers under section 151 of the Code of Civil Procedure can grant police aid to ensure effective implementation of temporary injunction pending suit for perpetual injunction and procedure under order 39 rule 2-A of the Code of Civil Procedure need not be followed. Learned Single Judge has held as under:

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“[3] The observations, in my considered view should be confined to the facts of that particular case. In that case, the defendant sought police protection on the ground that the plaintiff was interfering with his possession despite the fact that the temporary injunction granted earlier in favour of the plaintiff was vacated. Thus, it is not a case where the order to extend police aid was granted in order to ensure compliance with an order of injunction in force pending the suit. The mere fact that the action could be taken against either party for flouting the injunction under Order XXXIX Rule 2-A or under the Contempt of Courts Act does not come in the way of the Court taking all necessary steps for ensuring obedience of the injunction order. The Court need not wait till the injunction is breached. In a fit case, the Court can undoubtedly direct police aid as a preventive measure. This power though not expressly conferred, is a power incidental or ancillary to the exercise of the power to grant injunction pending the suit. With great respect, I am not in a position to record my concurrence with the broad observations made by the learned Judge that the civil Court cannot direct police aid for execution of its order - interlocutory or final and that the party should only have recourse to the procedure laid down under Order XXI, Rule 32 or the Contempt of Courts Act. The observations are in the nature of obiter and therefore not binding on me. It is therefore unnecessary to refer the matter to the Division Bench, more so in view of the decision of this Court relied upon by the trial Court. I would however like to point out that the police aid should not be granted for mere asking. The Court has to be

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satisfied, prima facie, that there is an imminent threat of violation of interim order, if police does not intervene and that there is no other way of ensuring effective compliance. If however an alternative could be found such as, deploying an Officer of the Court to oversee the implementation of the order, the Court can avoid granting order for police aid.”

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Defendant No.1 has been able to make out the prima facie case in his favour, and the balance of convenience also lies in his favour. In case defendant No.1 is not provided the police assistance to enforce the injunction order, in that event, he shall suffer huge and irreparable loss.

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As far as the contention of the learned counsel for the petitioner that the alienation of the suit land could not have been made by defendant No.2 in favour of defendant No.1 against the spirit of the scheme has to be adjudged and adjudicated by the learned trial Court after affording an opportunity to the respective parties to lead their evidence.

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Presently, this court is dealing with the correctness of the judgment as passed by the learned first appellate Court. In the considered opinion of this Court, the first appellate Court has rightly exercised its jurisdiction in directing the petitioner to remove the obstructions raised on the suit land.

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The Hon’ble Supreme Court in Hammad Ahmed vs. Abdul Majeed and others, (2019) 14 SCC 1 , has held that a Court would grant such an interim relief only if it is satisfied that withholding

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of it would prick the conscience of the Court and do violence to the sense of the justice, resulting in injustice being perpetuated throughout the hearing, and at the end of the Court would not be able to vindicate the cause of justice. Therefore, in appropriate cases, ad-interim injunction in mandatory form can be granted. The relevant paras of aforesaid judgment read as follows:

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58. The ad interim mandatory injunction, is to be granted not at the asking but on strong circumstance so that to protect the rights and interest of the parties so as not to frustrate their rights regarding mandatory injunction. In Deoraj vs. State of Maharashtra and Others18, this Court held that Court would grant such an interim relief only if it is satisfied that withholding of it would prick the conscience of the Court and do violence to the sense of justice, resulting in injustice being perpetuated throughout the hearing, and at the end the Court would not be able to vindicate the cause of justice. Therefore, in appropriate case, ad-interim injunction in mandatory form can be granted. The Court held as under:-

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“12. Situations emerge where the granting of an interim relief would tantamount to granting the final relief itself. And then there may be converse cases where withholding of an interim relief would tantamount to dismissal of the main petition itself; for, by the time the main matter comes up for hearing there would be nothing left to be allowed as relief to the petitioner though all the findings may be in his favour. In such cases the availability of a very strong prima facie case — of a standard much higher than just prima facie case, the considerations of balance of convenience and irreparable injury forcefully tilting the balance of the case totally in favour of the applicant may

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persuade the court to grant an interim relief though it amounts to granting the final relief itself. Of course, such would be rare and exceptional cases. The court would grant such an interim relief only if satisfied that withholding of it would prick the conscience of the court and do violence to the sense of justice, resulting in injustice being 18 (2004) 4 SCC 697 perpetuated throughout the hearing, and at the end the court would not be able to vindicate the cause of justice. Obviously such would be rare cases accompanied by compelling circumstances, where the injury complained of is immediate and pressing and would cause extreme hardship. The conduct of the parties shall also have to be seen and the court may put the parties on such terms as may be prudent.”

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59. The argument that under Order XXXIX Rules 1 and 2 of the Code, the Court has the jurisdiction to maintain the status of the parties on the date of filing of the suit or on the date of passing of the order but cannot direct the parties to do something which was not in existence at the time of filing of the suit, is not a general rule of universal application. The nature of the orders claimed by the Appellant are not passed ordinarily in a routine manner as the Plaintiff is required to have a case which should be of higher standard than mere prima facie case. But in view of the agreement between the parties, as recorded by the Division Bench in an earlier round of litigation the primary question was agreed to be that who is to act as Chief Mutawalli. Both learned Single Judge and the Division Bench has examined such question only. Even, before this Court, the parties have argued primarily on the question as to who shall be Chief Mutawalli. Therefore, a prima-facie opinion would lead to consequential order in respect of management of the affairs of the Hamdard.

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The primary object of the revisional powers conferred on the High Courts is to prevent subordinate courts from acting arbitrarily, capriciously and illegally while they exercise their jurisdiction. The aspect related to the revisional powers given to the High Court has been extensively dealt with by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in a catena of judgments, whereby the Hon'ble Court discussed the meaning and scope of the said provision.

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The Hon’ble Supreme Court in M/s D.L.F. Housing and Construction Company (P) Ltd., New Delhi vs. Sarup Singh and others, 1969(3) SCC 807 , has considered the provisions of Section 115 of CPC as follows:

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“5. The position thus seems to be firmly established that while exercising the jurisdiction u/s 115, it is not competent to the High Court to correct errors of fact however gross or even errors of law unless the said errors have relation to the jurisdiction of the Court to try the dispute itself. Clauses (a) and (b) of this section on their plain reading quite clearly do not cover the present case. It was not contended, as indeed it was not possible to contend, that the learned Additional District Judge had either exercised a jurisdiction not vested in him by law or had failed to exercise a jurisdiction so vested in him, in recording the order that the proceedings under reference be stayed till the decision of the appeal by the High Court in the proceedings for specific performance of the agreement in question. Clause (c) also does not seem to apply to the case in hand. The words "illegally" and "with material irregularity" as used in this Clause do not cover either errors of fact or of law; they do not refer to the decision arrived at but merely to the manner in which it is reached. The errors contemplated by this Clause may, in our

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view, relate either to breach of some provision of law or to material defects of procedure affecting the ultimate decision, and not to errors either of fact or of law, after the prescribed formalities have been complied with. The High Court does not seem to have adverted to the limitation imposed on its power u/s 115 of the Code. Merely because the High Court would have felt inclined, had it dealt with the matter initially, to come to a different conclusion on the question of continuing stay of the reference proceedings pending decision of the appeal, could hardly justify interference on revision u/s 115 of the Code when there was no illegality or material irregularity committed by the learned Additional District Judge in his manner of dealing with this question. It seems to us that in this matter the High Court treated the revision virtually as if it was an appeal.

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The Hon’ble Supreme Court in Civil Appeal No.5622 of 2025, titled as P. Kumarakurubaran vs, P. Narayanan & others , held as under:-

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“14. It is also to be noted that the appellant has categorically averred in the plaint that he executed the registered power of attorney in favour of his father solely for the limited purpose of constructing a house and carrying out related activities. There is no express clause authorizing his father to sell the suit property to any person without the appellant’s consent and knowledge. Yet, the appellant’s father executed a sale deed in favour of his granddaughter, going beyond the scope of the power of attorney, which raises serious doubt about misuse of authority and potential fraud. Such assertions cannot be rejected in the application under Order VII Rule 11 CPC. Accordingly, we are of the view that the plaint discloses a cause of action which cannot be shut out at the threshold. Thus, the trial Court acted within its jurisdiction in refusing to reject the plaint and in holding that

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the matter ought to proceed to trial. The High Court, while exercising its revisional jurisdiction under Section 115 CPC, ought not to have interfered in the absence of any jurisdictional error or perversity in the trial court’s order. Rejecting the plaint where substantial factual disputes exist concerning limitation and the scope of authority under the Power of Attorney, is legally unsustainable.”

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34. In Ajit Singh & others vs. Krishan Kumar , decided on

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18^th October, 2023, the Hon’ble Delhi High Court, held as under:

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“11. The same view is reiterated in a later decision of this Court in the case of Managing Director (Mig) Hindustan Aeronautics Ltd. v. Ajit Prasad Tarway [(1972) 3 SCC 195] wherein a three-Judge Bench of this Court speaking through Hegde, J. clearly stated that the High Court under Section 115 CPC had no jurisdiction to interfere with the order of the first appellate court based on facts or even involving any error of law. It was next observed that it was not the conclusion of the High Court that the first appellate court had no jurisdiction to make the order that it made. The order of the first appellate court may be right or wrong; may be in accordance with law or may not be in accordance with law; but one thing is clear, that it had jurisdiction to make that order. It was not the case that the first appellate court exercised its jurisdiction either illegally or with material irregularity. That being so, the High Court could not have invoked its jurisdiction under Section 115 of the Civil Procedure Code."

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The learned first appellate Court has rightly appreciated the point in controversy and was well within its right to direct the

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present petitioner to remove the obstruction as made by him over the suit land.

¶108

Consequently, the present petition being devoid of any merit deserves to be dismissed and the same is accordingly dismissed along with pending application(s), if any.

¶109

(Romesh Verma) Judge

¶110

16^th July, 2026. ( vt )

Om Prakash v. Vidya Sagar and Another

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Om Prakash v. Vidya Sagar and Another

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