State of Hp Vs Naval Kishore

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2026:HHC:17121

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IN THE HIGH COURT OF HIMACHAL PRADESH, SHIMLA

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Cr. Appeal No. 68 of 2014 Reserved on: 31.03.2026 Date of Decision: 15.05.2026

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State of H.P. ..Appellant

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Versus Naval Kishore ...Respondent

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Coram Hon’ble Mr Justice Rakesh Kainthla , Judge. Whether approved for reporting?¹ No. For the Appellant : Mr Jitender K. Sharma, Additional Advocate General. For the Respondents : Mr N.K. Thakur, Senior Advocate with Mr Divya Raj Singh, Advocate.

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Rakesh Kainthla, Judge

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The present appeal is directed against the Judgment dated 29.08. 2013 passed by, learned Additional Chief Judicial Magistrate, Dehra, District Kangra, H.P. (learned Trial Court) vide which, the respondent (accused before learned Trial Court) was acquitted of the commission of offences punishable under Sections 279, 337 and 338 of the Indian Penal Code (IPC). (The

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1 Whether reporters of Local Papers may be allowed to see the judgment? Yes.

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parties shall hereinafter be referred to as in the same manner as they were arrayed before the learned Trial Court for convenience).

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Briefly stated, the facts giving rise to the present appeal are that the police presented a challan against the accused before the learned Trial Court for the commission of offences punishable under Sections 279, 337, and 338 of the Indian Penal Code (IPC). It was asserted that the informant, Onkar Chand (PW-2), was standing outside his shop on 07.06.2009 at about 9:30 a.m. when an Indica car bearing registration No. HR-176774 came from Nehranpukhar side at high speed. A motorcycle A/F came from Dehra. The driver of the Indica car drove the car towards the wrong side of the road and hit the motorcycle. The motorcyclist sustained injuries. The motorcycle rider revealed his name as Virender Singh, and the pillion riders revealed their names as Sushma Devi and Rajat. The driver of the Indica car revealed his name as Naval Kishore (accused). The accident occurred due to the high speed of the car and the negligence of the accused. The injured were taken to the hospital. An intimation was given to the police. An entry (Ext. PW-5/A) was recorded in the Police Station. ASI Mohinder Singh (PW-5), Head Constable (HC) Karan Singh, Constable Vishambhar Singh and

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HHG Manjeet Singh were sent to the spot for verification in the vehicle bearing registration No. HP-68-1864 being driven by Constable Chaman Lal. ASI Mohinder Singh (PW-5) recorded the informant’s statement (Ext.PW-2/A) and sent it to the Police Station, where F.I.R. (Ext.PW-5/B) was registered. The photographs of the spot (Ext.P-1 to P-6), whose negatives are Ext.P-7 to P-12, were taken. ASI Mohinder Singh prepared the site plan (Ext.PW-5/D). The accused produced the car along with the documents, which were seized vide memo (Ext.PA). The motorcycle was seized vide memo (Ext. PB). An application (Ext.PW-5/E) was filed for obtaining the report of the medical examination, and MLCs (Ext. PC to Ext. PE) were obtained. The vehicles were mechanically examined, but no defect was found in them that could have led to the accident. The mechanical examination reports (Ext.PG and Ext.PH) were obtained. The registration certificate of the motorcycle was seized vide memo (Ext.PW-1/A). The statements of witnesses were recorded as per their version, and after completion of the investigation, the challan was prepared and presented before the Court.

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The learned Trial Court found sufficient reasons to summon the accused. When the accused appeared, a notice of

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accusation was put to him for the commission of offences punishable under Sections 279, 337 and 338 of the IPC, to which he pleaded not guilty and claimed to be tried.

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The prosecution examined five witnesses to prove its case. Virender Singh (PW-1) was riding the motorcycle. Onkar Chand (PW-2) and Bishan Dass (PW-4) did not support the prosecution's case. Dharam Pal (PW-3) took the photographs, and ASI Mohinder Singh (PW-5) investigated the matter.

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The accused, in his statement recorded under Section 313 of the Code of Criminal Procedure (Cr.P.C), admitted that Virender Singh, his wife Sushma and son Rajat were riding the motorcycle on 07.06.2009, who had sustained injuries. He admitted that an Indica car and a motorcycle were taken into possession by the police. He stated that he was driving the Indica car towards his own side with all care and caution. Motorcyclist fumbled and hit the Indica car. He was not negligent. The local people and motorcycle riders gave him beatings and forced him to park the vehicle on the wrong side of the road. He did not produce any evidence in his defence.

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Learned Trial Court held that the accused did not dispute that he was driving the car on the date of the accident.

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Onkar Chand (PW-2) and Bishan Dass (PW-4) did not support the prosecution's case. Onkar Chand (PW-2) stated that the accident had occurred in the middle of the road, and the Indica car was driven towards the wrong side of the road before taking the photographs. A similar statement was made by Bishan Dass (PW-4). These statements made the site plan and the photographs doubtful and corroborated the statements of the accused recorded under Section 313 of Cr.P.C. Statement of Virender Singh (PW-1) was not corroborated by any witness and could not be relied upon. Therefore, the learned Trial Court acquitted the accused of the charged offences.

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Being aggrieved by the judgments passed by the learned Trial Court, the State has filed the present appeal asserting that the learned Trial Court erred in appreciating the evidence on record. The statements of Virender Singh (PW-1) and Bishan Dass (PW-4) were not appreciated in their proper perspective. They had spoken in one voice that Naval Kishore was driving the vehicle in a rash and negligent manner and hit the car against the motorcycle coming from Dehra on the wrong side of the road. Their testimonies were corroborated by the photographs and the site plan. These were rejected by the learned

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Trial Court without any reason. Therefore, it was prayed that the present appeal be allowed and the judgment of the learned Trial Court be set aside.

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I have heard Mr Jitender K. Sharma, learned Additional Advocate General, for the appellant/State and Mr N.K. Thakur, learned Senior Advocate, assisted by Mr Divya Raj Singh, learned counsel for the accused/respondent.

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Mr Jitender K. Sharma, learned Additional Advocate General, for the appellant/State, submitted that the learned Trial Court erred in appreciating the evidence on record. The statements of prosecution witnesses were discarded without any cogent reasons. The prosecution witnesses had consistently stated that the accused was driving the vehicles towards the wrong side of the road. These statements were corroborated by the site plan and the photographs. Hence, he prayed that the present appeal be allowed and the judgment of the learned Trial Court be set aside.

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Mr N.K. Thakur, learned Senior Advocate, for the respondent/accused, submitted that the learned Trial Court had rightly held that the prosecution version was made doubtful by the statement of Onkar Chand (PW-2) and Bishan Dass (PW-4),

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who had specifically stated that the accident had occurred in the middle of the road and the position of the vehicles was changed after the accident. This would make the site plan and photographs worthless, and the learned Trial Court was right in rejecting them. Learned Trial Court had taken a reasonable view that could have been taken based on the evidence led before the learned Trial Court, and no interference is required with the reasonable view of the learned Trial Court, while deciding an appeal against acquittal. Hence, he prayed that the appeal be dismissed.

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I have given considerable thought to the submissions made at the bar and have gone through the records carefully.

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The present appeal has been filed against a judgment of acquittal. It was laid down by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Surendra Singh v. State of Uttarakhand, 2025 SCC OnLine SC 176: (2025) 5 SCC 433 that the Court can interfere with a judgment of acquittal if it is patently perverse, is based on misreading/omission to consider the material evidence and reached at a conclusion which no reasonable person could have reached. It was observed at page 440:

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“12. It could thus be seen that it is a settled legal position that the interference with the finding of acquittal recorded by the learned trial judge would be warranted by the High Court only if the judgment of acquittal suffers from patent perversity; that the same is based on a misreading/omission to consider material evidence on record; and that no two reasonable views are possible and only the view consistent with the guilt of the accused is possible from the evidence available on record.”

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This position was reiterated in P. Somaraju v. State of

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A.P., 2025 SCC OnLine SC 2291, wherein it was observed:

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“ 12. To summarise, an Appellate Court undoubtedly has full power to review and reappreciate evidence in an appeal against acquittal under Sections 378 and 386 of the Criminal Procedure Code, 1973. However, due to the reinforced or ‘double’ presumption of innocence after acquittal, interference must be limited. If two reasonable views are possible on the basis of the record, the acquittal should not be disturbed. Judicial intervention is only warranted where the Trial Court's view is perverse, based on misreading or ignoring material evidence, or results in a manifest miscarriage of justice. Moreover, the Appellate Court must address the reasons given by the Trial Court for acquittal before reversing it and assigning its own. A catena of the recent judgments of this Court has more firmly entrenched this position, including, inter alia , Mallappa v. State of Karnataka 2024 INSC 104 , Ballu @ Balram @ Balmukund v. The State of Madhya Pradesh 2024 INSC 258 , Babu Sahebagouda Rudragoudar v. State of Karnataka 2024 INSC 320 , and Constable 907 Surendra Singh v. State of Uttarakhand 2025 INSC 114 .”

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The present appeal has to be decided as per the

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parameters laid down by the Hon’ble Supreme Court.

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Onkar Chand (PW-2) stated that he was working in his shop. He heard some noise and saw that an accident had occurred. He was permitted to be cross-examined. He denied that an Indica car bearing registration No.HR-17-6774 came from Nehranpukhar at high speed towards the wrong side of the road and hit the motorcycle. He admitted that the photographs pertain to the spot and the place of the accident was shown inside the red circle of the photograph (Mark P-2). He denied that he had signed the statement (Ext.PW-2/A) after reading it. He stated in his cross-examination that police had moved the position of the Indica car before taking the photographs, and the motorcycle was lying on the roadside.

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The statement of this witness does not support the prosecution's version that the accident had occurred on the wrong side of the road. The emphasis was placed on the admission made by him that the place of the accident was shown inside the red circle. However, the red circle is not on the wrong side of the road but is in the middle of the road and corroborates the statement of Bishan Dass (PW-4) made in his crossexamination that the accident had occurred in the middle of the road.

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Bishan Dass stated that the Indica car came from Nehranpukhar at a normal speed. A motorcycle came from the opposite side, and both of them collided with each other. He could not say whose negligence had led to the accident. He was permitted to be cross-examined. He admitted that the Indica car had left its own side and had moved to the other side. He admitted that the accident had occurred inside the red circle of the photograph (Ext.P-2). He admitted that the accident had occurred due to the negligence of the accused. He stated in his cross-examination by the learned counsel for the defence that the accident had occurred in the middle of the road on a curve. He admitted that sufficient space was available for the motorcyclist. He admitted that the motorcycle had fallen after some distance from the place of the accident.

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He admitted in his cross-examination that the accident had occurred due to the negligence of the accused. It was submitted that his testimony proved the prosecution’s case. This submission will not help the prosecution. It was laid down by Goddard LJ in Hollington v. Hawthorn 1943 KB 507 that a witness cannot depose about negligence. It was observed at 595:

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“It frequently happens that a bystander has a full and complete view of an accident. It is beyond question that

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while he may inform the court of everything he saw, he may not express any opinion on whether either or both of the parties were negligent. The reason commonly assigned is that this is the precise question the court has to decide, but in truth, it is because his opinion is not relevant. Any fact that he can prove is relevant, but his opinion is not.” 19. Similar is the judgment in State of H.P. vs. Niti Raj 2009

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Cr.L.J. 1922 (HP) , wherein it was held:

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“It is not necessary for a witness to say that the driver of an offending vehicle was driving the vehicle rashly. The issue whether the vehicle was being driven in a rash and negligent manner is a conclusion to be drawn on the basis of evidence led before the Court.”

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Therefore, no advantage can be derived from the fact

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that this witness has attributed the negligence to the accused.

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The statements of these witnesses show that the position of the vehicles was changed after the accident, and the learned Trial Court had taken a reasonable view while holding that no reliance can be placed upon the photographs and the site plan.

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Virender Singh (PW-1) stated that an Indica car came from Sunehat at a high speed and towards the wrong side and hit the motorcycle. The accident occurred due to the high speed and negligence of the accused, who was driving the vehicle.

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The statement of this witness shows that he has attributed the cause of the accident to the high speed and the

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negligence of the accused. His statement that the Indica car was travelling towards the wrong side of the road is not supported by other witnesses, who had specifically stated that the accident had occurred in the middle of the road. His statement that Indica car was being driven at a high speed will not assist the prosecution. It was laid down by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in Mohanta Lal vs. State of West Bengal 1968 ACJ 124 that the use of the term ‘high speed’ by a witness amounts to nothing unless it is elicited from the witness what is understood by the term 'high speed'. It was observed:

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“Further, no attempt was made to find out what this witness understood by high speed. To one man, the speed of even 10 or 20 miles per hour may appear to be high, while to another, even a speed of 25 or 30 miles per hour may appear to be a reasonable speed. On the evidence in this case, therefore, it could not be held that the appellant was driving the bus at a speed which would justify holding that he was driving the bus rashly and negligently. The evidence of the two conductors indicates that he tried to stop the bus by applying the brakes; yet, Gopinath Dey was struck by the bus, though not from the front side of the bus, as he did not fall in front of the bus but fell sideways near the corner of the two roads. It is quite possible that he carelessly tried to run across the road, dashed into the bus and was thrown back by the moving bus, with the result that he received the injuries that resulted in his death.”

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This position was reiterated in State of Karnataka vs.

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Satish 1998 (8) SCC 493, and it was held:

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“Merely because the truck was being driven at a "high speed" does not bespeak of either "negligence" or "rashness" by itself. None of the witnesses examined by the prosecution could give any indication, even approximately, as to what they meant by "high speed". "High speed" is a relative term. It was for the prosecution to bring on record material to establish as to what it meant by "high speed" in the facts and circumstances of the case. In a criminal trial, the burden of providing everything essential to the establishment of the charge against an accused always rests on the prosecution, and there is a presumption of innocence in favour of the accused until the contrary is proved. Criminality is not to be presumed, subject, of course, to some statutory exceptions. There is no such statutory exception pleaded in the present case. In the absence of any material on the record, no presumption of "rashness" or "negligence" could be drawn by invoking the maxim "res ipsa loquitur.”

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This Court also held in State of H.P. Vs. Madan Lal 2003

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Latest H.L.J. (2) 925 that speed alone is not a criterion for judging

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rashness or negligence. It was observed: -

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“It may be pointed out that speed alone is not a criterion to decide rashness or negligence on the part of a driver. The deciding factor, however, is the situation in which the accident occurs.”

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This position was reiterated in State of H.P. Vs.

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Parmodh Singh 2008 Latest HLJ (2) 1360 wherein it was held: -

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“Thus, negligent or rash driving of the vehicle has to be proved by the prosecution during the trial, which cannot be automatically presumed even on the basis of the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur. Mere driving of a vehicle at a high speed or slow speed does not lead to an inference that negligent or rash driving had caused the accident resulting in injuries to the complainant. In fact, speed is no criterion

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to establish the fact of rash and negligent driving of a vehicle. It is only a rash and negligent act as its ingredients, to which the prosecution has failed to prove in the instant case.”

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Therefore, the accused cannot be held liable for merely using the term high speed.

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There is no other evidence to show the negligence of the accused, and the learned Trial Court had taken a reasonable view while holding that the prosecution had failed to prove its case beyond a reasonable doubt. This Court will not interfere with the reasonable view of the learned Trial Court, even if another view is possible.

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No other point was urged.

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In view of the above, the present appeal fails and is dismissed. Pending applications, if any, also stand disposed of.

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In view of the provisions of Section 437-A of the Code of Criminal Procedure (Section 481 of Bhartiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023) the respondent is directed to furnish bail bonds in the sum of ₹50,000/- with one surety of the like amount to the satisfaction of the learned Registrar (Judicial) of this Court/learned Trial Court, which shall be effective for six months with a stipulation that in the event of a Special Leave Petition

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being filed against this judgment or on grant of the leave, the respondent on receipt of notice thereof shall appear before the Hon'ble Supreme Court.

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A copy of the judgment, along with the record of the

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learned Trial Court, be sent back forthwith.

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(Rakesh Kainthla) 15^th May 2026 Judge (ravinder)

State of Hp v. Naval Kishore

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State of Hp v. Naval Kishore

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