Hritik Gupta Vs State of H.P.

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IN THE HIGH COURT OF HIMACHAL PRADESH, SHIMLA

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Cr. Revision No. 672 of 2025

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Reserved on: 2.4.2026 Date of Decision: 3.6.2026.

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Hritik Gupta	...Petitioner
Versus
State of H.P. & another	...Respondents
Coram
Hon’ble Mr Justice Rakesh Kainthla	,Judge.
Whether approved for reporting?¹	No.
For the Petitioner :	Petitioner present in person.
For the Respondent/State :	Mr. Prashant Sen, Deputy Advocate General for respondent No.1.
For Respondent No.2 :	None.

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Rakesh Kainthla, Judge

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The present petition has been filed against the order dated 14.8.2025, passed by the learned Chief Judicial Magistrate, Kangra, at Dharamshala (learned Trial Court) in Private Criminal Complaint No.25 of 2022, titled Hritik Gupta Vs. Amritanshu Gupta. (The parties shall hereinafter be referred to in

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1 Whether reporters of Local Papers may be allowed to see the judgment? Yes.

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the same manner as they were arrayed before the learned Trial Court for convenience) .

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Briefly stated, the facts giving rise to the present petition are that the complainant filed a complaint before the learned Trial Court against the accused for committing the offences punishable under sections 415, 417, 500 and 504 of the Indian Penal Code (IPC). It was asserted that the complainant is residing at Dharamshala and is working remotely from his home. The complainant and the accused had put up their matrimonial profiles on a matrimonial website. The accused accepted the complainant’s request to connect on the website on 4.8.2022. A mobile number xxx383 was shared with the complainant for further discussion. Complaint’s mother had a brief discussion with the father of the accused. Both parties found the alliance suitable, and the father of the accused shared the mobile number of the accused, xxx080, with the complainant’s mother. The accused and the complainant had phone calls, and they discussed a matrimonial alliance. They also exchanged messages on WhatsApp. Complainant and the accused made inquiries about each other’s past lives. The complainant’s aunt asked the complainant to visit Noida to meet

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the accused. The complainant asked the accused to meet at Jallandhar, Phagwara or Ludhiana, but she expressed her inability. The complaint also suggested meeting at Chandigarh, to which proposal the complainant initially agreed but subsequently rescinded. They also discussed their personal affairs, including the post-marital intimacy on the phone calls. The complainant also revealed to the accused on 15.8.2022 that he used to visit Spa Centres due to his desk job. The accused made fun of this and insinuated that the accused was going to the spa for pleasure. The accused also admitted on 19.8.2022 that she had shared the personal details of the complainant with her maternal aunt. The complainant objected to it and forbade her from revealing his personal details to anyone. The complaint went to Noida at the instance of the accused on 25.8.2022. They met on 26.8.2022 at around 5.00 p.m. and spent about four hours together. The accused had a shopping trip at the complainant’s expense. The accused advised the complainant to undergo various tests on 27.8.2022. She asked the complainant to meet her on 27.8.2022 to see each other's divorce papers. The complainant went to the appointed place and waited for more than one hour for the accused, but the accused did not bring her

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divorce papers. The accused took the complainant to her maternal aunt’s home, where he was made to wait outside the building. Subsequently, the accused told the complainant that her maternal aunt and her brother wanted to meet the complainant. The complainant objected by saying that he was not ready for this unplanned and unexpected meeting. She also handed over her mobile phone to her maternal aunt, who compelled the complainant to meet him. The aunt of the accused handed over the mobile phone to the brother of the accused, who made vague and imaginary allegations against the complainant. Subsequently, the accused called the complainant on 27.8.2022, at about 1.57 pm to 2.00 p.m. and alleged that the complainant had told her some weird, irritating and cheap stuff. The brother of the accused also talked to the complainant and said that he should not talk to anyone about the personal issues. The other family members also accused the complainant of discussing intimate things with the accused. The complainant's mother also called the father of the accused, and he also made defamatory remarks about the complainant. He alleged that the complainant had asked the accused about having a baby and other personal details. The accused had committed the offences

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punishable under Sections 415, 417, 500 and 504 of the IPC. Hence, the complaint was made to the Court for taking action against the accused.

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The learned Magistrate examined the witnesses of the complainant and called for the report from the SHO, Police Station, Dharamshala, under the provisions of Section 202 of Cr.PC. The learned Chief Judicial Magistrate held that meeting a prospective life partner is not uncommon in today’s society. The discussion amongst the prospective partners to assess their compatibility is also common. If the complainant had met the accused and spent money, it would not constitute the commission of any offence. Therefore, the learned Trial Court dismissed the complaint.

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Being aggrieved by the order passed by the learned Trial Court, the complainant has filed the present revision asserting that the learned Trial Court erred in law by directing an investigation under Section 202 of Cr.PC. The Investigating Officer conducted an enquiry in a biased manner. The complainant had filed an application for monitoring the police enquiry or conducting an independent enquiry through the

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Superintendent of Police, Kangra/Vigilance Department. The learned Trial Court acted in a biased manner in not ordering an investigation against the erring police official. The complainant had filed written objections, which were summarily dismissed. The learned Trial Court erred in focusing on expenses of travelling and refreshment and ignoring the specific allegation of a sustained campaign of inducement, pressure, defamation and cheating. The complainant could not array the father of the accused as a party because his address was not known. The complainant had prayed to the learned Trial Court to investigate whether the accused was still married, but this aspect was ignored by the learned Trial Court. Hence, the present petition.

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I have heard the petitioner in person through videoconferencing and Mr Prashant Sen, learned Deputy Advocate General, for the respondent No.1/ State.

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The petitioner in person submitted that the accused had cheated the complainant by inducing him to talk to her, travel to Noida and bear expenses for her shopping. The complainant had shared the intimate details with the accused, which she revealed to her family members, who made fun of the

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complainant by repeating those details. They also falsely accused the complainant of demanding the intimate details of the complainant. These allegations disclosed the commission of the offences punishable under Sections 415, 417, 500 and 504 of the IPC. Learned the Trial Court erred in seeking the report from the Investigating Officer. The complainant had filed the various applications for taking action against the biased enquiry, but no orders were passed on them. Hence, he prayed that the present petition be allowed and the order passed by the learned Trial Court be set aside.

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Mr Prashant Sen, learned Deputy Advocate General, for the respondent No.1/State submitted that the learned Magistrate had directed the police to conduct an enquiry in terms of Section 202 of the CrPC. The police conducted the enquiry and submitted the report to the Court. There was no bias in the enquiry, and false allegations were made against the police. Hence, he prayed that the present petition be dismissed.

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I have given considerable thought to the submissions made at the bar and have gone through the records carefully.

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It is undisputed that the accused is residing at Noida beyond the jurisdiction of the Court at Dharamshala. Section 202 of the Cr.PC, (as amended w.e.f. 23.6.2006 by the Act 25 of 2005) provides that any Magistrate shall in a case where the accused is residing at a place beyond the area in which he exercises his jurisdiction, postpone the issue of process against the accused had either enquire into the case himself or direct an investigation to be made by a Police Officer or by such other person as he thinks fit. It was laid down by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Abhijit Pawar v. Hemant Madhukar Nimbalkar , (2017) 3 SCC 528 , that where the accused is residing at a place beyond the territorial jurisdiction of the Magistrate, the Magistrate is bound to conduct an enquiry. It was observed:-

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“24. The essence and purpose of this amendment has been captured by this Court in Vijay Dhanuka v. Najima Mamtaj [ Vijay Dhanuka v. Najima Mamtaj, (2014) 14 SCC 638 : (2015) 1 SCC (Cri) 479 ] in the following words : (SCC p. 644, paras 11-12)

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“ 11. Section 202 of the Code, inter alia, contemplates postponement of the issue of the process in a case where the accused is residing at a place beyond the area in which he exercises his jurisdiction, and thereafter to either inquire into the case by himself or direct an investigation to be made by a police officer or by such other person as he thinks fit. In the face of it, what needs our determination is whether, in a case where the

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accused is residing at a place beyond the area in which the Magistrate exercises his jurisdiction, inquiry is mandatory or not.

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12. The words ‘and shall, in a case where the accused is residing at a place beyond the area in which he exercises his jurisdiction’ were inserted by Section 19 of the Code of Criminal Procedure (Amendment) Act (Central Act 25 of 2005) w.e.f. 23-6-2006. The aforesaid amendment, in the opinion of the legislature, was essential as false complaints are filed against persons residing at far-off places in order to harass them. The note for the amendment reads as follows:

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‘False complaints are filed against persons residing at far-off places simply to harass them. In order to see that innocent persons are not harassed by unscrupulous persons, this clause seeks to amend sub-section (1) of Section 202 to make it obligatory upon the Magistrate that before summoning the accused residing beyond his jurisdiction he shall enquire into the case himself or direct investigation to be made by a police officer or by such other person as he thinks fit, for finding out whether or not there was sufficient ground for proceeding against the accused.’

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The use of the expression “shall” prima facie makes the inquiry or the investigation, as the case may be, by the Magistrate mandatory. The word “shall” is ordinarily mandatory, but sometimes, taking into account the context or the intention, it can be held to be directory. The use of the word “shall” in all circumstances is not decisive. Bearing in mind the aforesaid principle, when we look to the intention of the legislature, we find that it is aimed to prevent innocent persons from harassment by unscrupulous persons from false complaints. Hence, in our opinion, the use of the expression “shall” and the background and the purpose for

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which the amendment has been brought, we have no doubt in our mind that inquiry or the investigation, as the case may be, is mandatory before summons are issued against the accused living beyond the territorial jurisdiction of the Magistrate.”

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25. For this reason, the amended provision casts an obligation on the Magistrate to apply his mind carefully and satisfy himself that the allegations in the complaint, when considered along with the statements recorded or the enquiry conducted thereon, would prima facie constitute the offence for which the complaint is filed. This requirement is emphasised by this Court in a recent judgment, Mehmood Ul Rehman v. Khazir Mohammad Tunda [Mehmood Ul Rehman v. Khazir Mohammad Tunda, (2015) 12 SCC 420 : (2016) 1 SCC (Cri) 124] in the following words : (SCC pp. 429-30, paras 20 & 22)

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“ 20. The extensive reference to the case law would clearly show that cognisance of an offence on complaint is taken for the purpose of issuing process to the accused. Since it is a process of taking judicial notice of certain facts which constitute an offence, there has to be an application of mind as to whether the allegations in the complaint, when considered along with the statements recorded or the inquiry conducted thereon, would constitute a violation of law so as to call a person to appear before the criminal court. It is not a mechanical process or a matter of course. As held by this Court in Pepsi Foods Ltd. v. Judicial Magistrate [Pepsi Foods Ltd. v. Judicial Magistrate, (1998) 5 SCC 749: 1998 SCC (Cri) 1400], to set in motion the process of criminal law against a person is a serious matter.

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22. The steps taken by the Magistrate under Section 190(1)( a ) CrPC followed by Section 204 CrPC should reflect that the Magistrate has applied his mind to the

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facts and the statements and he is satisfied that there is ground for proceeding further in the matter by asking the person against whom the violation of law is alleged to appear before the court. The satisfaction on the ground for proceeding would mean that the facts alleged in the complaint would constitute an offence, and when considered along with the statements recorded, would, prima facie, make the accused answerable before the court. No doubt, no formal order or speaking order is required to be passed at that stage. The Code of Criminal Procedure requires a speaking order to be passed under Section 203 CrPC when the complaint is dismissed, and that too the reasons need to be stated only briefly. In other words, the Magistrate is not to act as a post office in taking cognisance of each and every complaint filed before him and issue process as a matter of course. There must be sufficient indication in the order passed by the Magistrate that he is satisfied that the allegations in the complaint constitute an offence and when considered along with the statements recorded and the result of inquiry or report of investigation under Section 202 CrPC, if any, the accused is answerable before the criminal court, there is ground for proceeding against the accused under Section 204 CrPC, by issuing process for appearance. The application of the mind is best demonstrated by the disclosure of mind on the satisfaction. If there is no such indication in a case where the Magistrate proceeds under Sections 190/204 CrPC, the High Court under Section 482 CrPC is bound to invoke its inherent power in order to prevent abuse of the power of the criminal court. To be called to appear before the criminal court as an accused is a serious matter affecting one's dignity, self-respect and image in society. Hence, the process of the criminal court shall not be made a weapon of harassment.”

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26. The requirement of conducting an enquiry or directing an investigation before issuing a process is, therefore, not an empty formality. What kind of “enquiry” is needed under this provision has also been explained in the Vijay Dhanuka case [ Vijay Dhanuka v. Najima Mamtaj, (2014) 14 SCC 638 : (2015) 1 SCC (Cri) 479 ], which is reproduced hereunder : (SCC p. 645, para 14)

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“ 14. In view of our answer to the aforesaid question, the next question that falls for our determination is whether the learned Magistrate, before issuing summons, has held the inquiry as mandated under Section 202 of the Code. The word “inquiry” has been defined under Section 2( g ) of the Code, which reads as follows:

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‘ 2. ( g ) “ inquiry ” means every inquiry, other than a trial, conducted under this Code by a Magistrate or court.’

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It is evident from the aforesaid provision, every inquiry other than a trial conducted by the Magistrate or the court is an inquiry. No specific mode or manner of inquiry is provided under Section 202 of the Code. In the inquiry envisaged under Section 202 of the Code, the witnesses are examined, whereas under Section 200 of the Code, examination of the complainant only is necessary, with the option of examining the witnesses present, if any. This exercise by the Magistrate, for the purpose of deciding whether or not there is sufficient ground for proceeding against the accused, is nothing but an inquiry envisaged under Section 202 of the Code.”

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Therefore, no fault can be found with the order

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passed by the learned Trial Court in ordering the enquiry in the present case.

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The allegations in the complaint show that the complainant and the accused had met each other with the intention to enter into matrimonial relationships, which somehow did not materialise. Both parties talked to each other and shared their details. The complainant alleges that by forcing him to spend money, the accused has committed an offence punishable under Section 417 of the IPC. (The complainant has mentioned Section 415 IPC, which is a defining Section and does not provide for punishment). In order to constitute cheating, it is necessary that the person should have a fraudulent or dishonest intention right from the beginning. The ingredients of cheating were explained by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in S.W. Palanitkar v. State of Bihar , (2002) 1 SCC 241, a s under:

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“10. The ingredients of an offence of cheating are: ( i ) there should be fraudulent or dishonest inducement of a person by deceiving him, ( ii )( a ) the person so deceived should be induced to deliver any property to any person or to consent that any person shall retain any property; or ( b ) the person so deceived should be intentionally induced to do or omit to do anything which he would not do or omit if he were not so deceived; and ( iii ) in cases covered by ( ii )( b ), the act of omission should cause or is likely to cause damage or harm to the person induced in body, mind, reputation or property.

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11. One of us (D.P. Mohapatra, J.), speaking for the Bench, in Hridaya Ranjan Prasad Verma v. State of Bihar [(2000) 4

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SCC 168: 2000 SCC (Cri) 786 ] on facts of that case, has expressed thus: (SCC p. 177, para 15)

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“ 15 . In determining the question, it has to be kept in mind that the distinction between mere breach of contract and the offence of cheating is a fine one. It depends upon the intention of the accused at the time of inducement, which may be judged by his subsequent conduct, but for this, subsequent conduct is not the sole test. Mere breach of contract cannot give rise to criminal prosecution for cheating unless fraudulent or dishonest intention is shown right at the beginning of the transaction, that is, the time when the offence is said to have been committed. Therefore, it is the intention that is the gist of the offence. To hold a person guilty of cheating, it is necessary to show that he had a fraudulent or dishonest intention at the time of making the promise. From his mere failure to keep up a promise, subsequently, such a culpable intention right at the beginning, that is, when he made the promise, cannot be presumed .” (emphasis supplied)

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12. Finding that the ingredients of the offence of cheating and its allied offences had not been made out, this Court interfered with the order of the High Court and quashed the criminal proceedings.

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13. In G.V. Rao v. L.H.V. Prasad [(2000) 3 SCC 693: 2000 SCC (Cri) 733], this Court in para 7 has stated thus: (SCC pp. 696-97)

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“ 7 . As mentioned above, Section 415 has two parts. In the first part, the person must ‘dishonestly’ or ‘fraudulently’ induce the complainant to deliver any property; in the second part, the person should intentionally induce the complainant to do or omit to do a thing. That is to say, in the first part, inducement must be dishonest or fraudulent. In the second part, the inducement should be intentional. As observed by this Court in Jaswantrai Manilal

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Akhaney v. State of Bombay [AIR 1956 SC 575: 1956 Cri LJ 1116], a guilty intention is an essential ingredient of the offence of cheating. In order, therefore, to secure the conviction of a person for the offence of cheating, ‘ mens rea ’ on the part of that person must be established. It was also observed in Mahadeo Prasad v. State of W.B. [AIR 1954 SC 724: 1954 Cri LJ 1806] that in order to constitute the offence of cheating, the intention to deceive should be in existence at the time when the inducement was offered .”(emphasis supplied)

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14. In Trisuns Chemical Industry v. Rajesh Agarwal [(1999) 8 SCC 686: 2000 SCC (Cri) 47] dealing with the effect of existence of arbitration clause in the agreement on criminal prosecution on the ground that civil proceedings are also maintainable, this Court has held that quashing of FIR or a complaint exercising power under Section 482 CrPC should be limited to a very extreme exception; merely because an act has a civil profile is not enough to stop action on the criminal side. It is further held that a provision made in the agreement for referring the disputes to arbitration is not an effective substitute for a criminal prosecution when the disputed act constitutes a criminal offence.

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12. A similar view was taken in G.V. Rao v. L.H.V. Prasad ,

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(2000) 3 SCC 693, wherein it was observed as under:

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“7. As mentioned above, Section 415 has two parts. While in the first part, the person must “dishonestly” or “fraudulently” induce the complainant to deliver any property; in the second part, the person should intentionally induce the complainant to do or omit to do a thing. That is to say, in the first part, inducement must be dishonest or fraudulent. In the second part, the inducement should be intentional. As observed by this Court in Jaswantrai Manilal Akhaney v. State of Bombay

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[AIR 1956 SC 575: 1956 Cri LJ 1116: 1956 SCR 483], a guilty intention is an essential ingredient of the offence of cheating. In order, therefore, to secure the conviction of a person for the offence of cheating, “ mens rea ” on the part of that person must be established. It was also observed in Mahadeo Prasad v. State of W.B. [AIR 1954 SC 724: 1954 Cri LJ 1806] that in order to constitute the offence of cheating, the intention to deceive should be in existence at the time when the inducement was offered.

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8. Thus, so far as the second part of Section 415 is concerned, “property”, at no stage, is involved. Here, it is the doing of an act or omission to do an act by the complainant, as a result of intentional inducement by the accused, which is material. Such inducement should result in the doing of an act or omission to do an act as a result of which the person concerned should have suffered or was likely to suffer damage or harm in body, mind, reputation or property. In an old decision of the Allahabad High Court in Empress v. Sheoram [(1882) 2 AWN 237] , it was held by Mahmood, J.:

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“That to palm off a young woman as belonging to a caste different to the one to which she really belongs, with the object of obtaining money, amounts to the offence of cheating by personation as defined in Section 416 of the Penal Code, 1860, which must be read in the light of the preceding Section 415.”

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It was laid down by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in

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Ram Jas v. State of U.P., (1970) 2 SCC 740, that there should be a fraudulent or dishonest inducement before a person can be held guilty of cheating. It was observed:

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“3. In recording this finding and conviction, the High Court lost sight of the fact that no such charge was framed

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against the appellant in the trial court. As we have indicated above, the persons, who were cheated or attempted to be cheated, referred to in the charges framed against the appellant, were Madan Lal, Chunni Lal, or the office of the Relief and Rehabilitation-cum-Settlement Officer, Saharanpur. There was no charge at all relating to any cheating or attempting to cheat the Oath Commissioner. In fact, the case was never brought to Court with the intention of obtaining a conviction of the appellant for any offence of cheating in respect of the Oath Commissioner. Not only was there no charge in this respect, but, in addition, the appellant, when questioned under Section 342 of the Code of Criminal Procedure after the prosecution's evidence had been recorded, was not asked to explain evidence relating to such a charge of cheating the Oath Commissioner. No doubt, there was mention of the commission of forgery of affidavits; but the mention of the commission of that offence could not possibly lead the appellant to infer that he was liable to be convicted for abetting the offence of cheating the Oath Commissioner. Further, in recording this conviction, the High Court did not even cease to examine in detail whether all the ingredients of the offence had been established by the prosecution's evidence. The only finding of fact was that the appellant, who was known to the Oath Commissioner, wrongly identified some other person as Govind Ram and got the affidavit attested by the Oath Commissioner as if it was being sworn by Govind Ram. This act of wrong identification committed by the appellant cannot amount to the offence of cheating by personation. Cheating is defined in Section 415 IPC, which is as follows:

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“Whoever, by deceiving any person, fraudulently or dishonestly induces the person so deceived to deliver any property to any person, or to consent that any person shall retain any property, or intentionally induces the person so deceived to do or omit to do anything which he would not do or

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omit if he were not so deceived, and which act or omission causes or is likely to cause damage or harm to that person in body, mind, reputation or property, is said to ‘cheat’.”

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The ingredients required to constitute the offence of cheating are—

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( i ) there should be fraudulent or dishonest inducement of a person by deceiving him;

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( ii )( a ) the person so deceived should be induced to deliver any property to any person, or to consent that any person shall retain any property; or

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( b ) the person so deceived should be intentionally induced to do or omit to do anything which he would not do or omit if he were not so deceived; and

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( iii ) in cases covered by ( ii )( b ), the act or omission should cause or is likely to cause damage or harm to the person induced in body, mind, reputation or property.

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4. In the present case, the finding of fact recorded only shows that the Oath Commissioner was induced to attest the affidavit by the deception practised by the appellant in wrongly identifying a person as Govind Ram when he was in fact not Govind Ram. That act done by the Oath Commissioner of attesting the affidavit could not, however, possibly cause any damage or harm to the Oath Commissioner in body, mind, reputation or property. The Oath Commissioner was obviously not induced to deliver any property to anybody by this wrong identification, nor was he induced to consent that any person should retain any property. Thus, the facts found did not constitute the offence of cheating at all. The conviction for an offence under Section 419, substantively or with the aid of Section 109 IPC, could only have been justified if the facts proved constituted all the ingredients of the offence of cheating. In recording the conviction, the High Court neglected to see whether all those ingredients were proved. On the face of it, though the Oath Commissioner was induced to attest

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the affidavit by wrong identification made by the appellant, there was no likelihood of any damage or harm to him in body, mind, reputation or property, so that the Oath Commissioner was never cheated. Clearly, therefore, the High Court fell into an error in recording the conviction of the appellant for the offence under Section 419, read with Section 109 IPC and substituting that conviction in place of the conviction for offences for which he had been punished by the trial court.

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14. Similar is the judgment in V.Y. Jose v. State of Gujarat ,

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(2009) 3 SCC 78, wherein it was observed: -

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“ 14. An offence of cheating cannot be said to have been made out unless the following ingredients are satisfied:

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( i ) deception of a person either by making a false or misleading representation or by other action or omission;

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( ii ) fraudulently or dishonestly inducing any person to deliver any property, or to consent that any person shall retain any property and finally intentionally inducing that person to do or omit to do anything which he would not do or omit.

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For the purpose of constituting an offence of cheating, the complainant is required to show that the accused had fraudulent or dishonest intentions at the time of making a promise or representation. Even in a case where allegations are made in regard to failure on the part of the accused to keep his promise, in the absence of a culpable intention at the time of making the initial promise being absent, no offence under Section 420 of the Penal Code can be said to have been made out.”

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This position was reiterated in Raju Krishna

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Shedbalkar v. State of Karnataka, 2024 SCC OnLine SC 200,

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wherein it was observed:

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“7. A perusal of the aforesaid provision shows that the offence of cheating is in two parts. The first is where a person fraudulently or dishonestly deceives another in inducing that person to deliver any property to any person, etc. The second part of the offence would be made out if somebody is deceived to do an act which causes damage or harm to that person, “in body, mind, or reputation or property, " and is said to have cheated. Time and again, this Court has reiterated that in order to make out an offence under cheating, the intention to cheat or deceive should be right from the beginning. By no stretch of the imagination, this is even reflected in the complaint made by the informant.

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8. In the case of Hridaya Ranjan Prasad Verma v. State of Bihar (2000) 4 SCC 168 , this Court held as under:

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“15. In determining the question, it has to be kept in mind that the distinction between mere breach of contract and the offence of cheating is a fine one. It depends upon the intention of the accused at the time of inducement, which may be judged by his subsequent conduct, but for this, subsequent conduct is not the sole test. Mere breach of contract cannot give rise to criminal prosecution for cheating unless fraudulent or dishonest intention is shown right at the beginning of the transaction, that is, the time when the offence is said to have been committed. Therefore, it is the intention that is the gist of the offence. To hold a person guilty of cheating, it is necessary to show that he had a fraudulent or dishonest intention at the time of making the promise. From his mere failure to keep up a promise, subsequently, such a culpable intention right at the beginning, that is, when he made the promise, cannot be presumed.” (Emphasis supplied)

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9. Further, in the case of Indian Oil Corporation v. NEPC India Ltd. (2006) 6 SCC 736, this position was reiterated in the following manner:

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The High Court has held that a mere breach of contractual terms would not amount to cheating unless the fraudulent or dishonest intention is shown right at the beginning of the transaction, and in the absence of an allegation that the accused had a fraudulent or dishonest intention while making a promise, there is no “cheating”. The High Court has relied on several decisions of this Court wherein this Court has held that dishonest intent at the time of making the promise/inducement is necessary, in addition to the subsequent failure to fulfil the promise. Illustrations (f) and (g) to Section 415 make this position clear:

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“(f) A intentionally deceives Z into a belief that A means to repay any money that Z may lend to him and thereby dishonestly induces Z to lend him money, A not intending to repay it. A cheats.

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(g) A intentionally deceives Z into a belief that A means to deliver to Z a certain quantity of indigo plant which he does not intend to deliver, and thereby dishonestly induces Z to advance money upon the faith of such delivery, A cheats; but if A, at the time of obtaining the money, intends to deliver the indigo plant, and afterwards breaks his contract and does not deliver it, he does not cheat, but is liable only to a civil action for breach of contract.”(emphasis supplied).

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The allegations in the complaint do not show any such intention. Both parties talked to each other, shared the details and met each other at a place mutually agreed upon by them. Therefore, the allegations in the complaint, even if accepted to be correct, do not constitute the commission of an offence punishable under Section 417 of the IPC.

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The complainant alleges that the accused had committed offences punishable under Sections 499 IPC and 500 IPC of the IPC. Again, Section 499 IPC is not a punishing Section but a defining Section. Section 500 IPC deals with the punishment. Subsection 409 IPC provides that an imputation should have been published or made with the intent to harm or with a knowing reason to believe that such an imputation will harm the reputation of the person. It is undisputed that the petitioner and the accused had shared the intimate details. The petitioner himself asserted this fact in his complaint. Therefore, the disclosure of these details by the accused to her relatives will not constitute defamation because it was made for the protection of the interest of the accused, since her relatives are also entitled to know what kind of person she proposed to marry. Therefore, the imputation would be covered under the ninth exception, and no action could be taken based on the statement volunteered by the complainant to her relatives.

¶130

The complainant had also asserted that an offence punishable under Section 504 of the IPC is made out. This again is not acceptable. The ingredients of Section 504 of IPC were

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explained by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Mohd. Wajid v. State

¶134

of U.P., (2023) 20 SCC 219: 2023 SCC OnLine SC 951, as under: -

¶135

“29. Section 504 of the IPC contemplates intentionally insulting a person and thereby provoking such person insulted to breach the peace or intentionally insulting a person knowing it to be likely that the person insulted may be provoked so as to cause a breach of the public peace or to commit any other offence. Mere abuse may not come within the purview of the section. But, the words of abuse in a particular case might amount to an intentional insult provoking the person insulted to commit a breach of the public peace or to commit any other offence. If abusive language is used intentionally and is of such a nature as would in the ordinary course of events lead the person insulted to break the peace or to commit an offence under the law, the case is not taken away from the purview of the Section merely because the insulted person did not actually break the peace or commit any offence having exercised self-control or having been subjected to abject terror by the offender. In judging whether particular abusive language is attracted by Section 504, IPC, the court has to find out what, in ordinary circumstances, would be the effect of the abusive language used and not what the complainant actually did as a result of his peculiar idiosyncrasy, cool temperament or sense of discipline. It is the ordinary general nature of the abusive language that is the test for considering whether the abusive language is an intentional insult likely to provoke the person insulted to commit a breach of the peace, and not the particular conduct or temperament of the complainant.

¶136

Mere abuse, discourtesy, rudeness or insolence, may not amount to an intentional insult within the meaning of Section504, IPCif it does not have the necessary element of being likely to incite the person insulted to commit a breach of the peace of an offence and the other element of

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the accused intending to provoke the person insulted to commit a breach of the peace or knowing that the person insulted is likely to commit a breach of the peace. Each case of abusive language shall have to be decided in the light of the facts and circumstances of that case, and there cannot be a general proposition that no one commits an offence under Section 504, IPC if he merely uses abusive language against the complainant. In King Emperorv.Chunnibhai Dayabhai,(1902) 4 Bom LR 78 , a Division Bench of the Bombay High Court, pointed out that: —

¶140

“ To constitute an offence under Section 504, I.P.C., it is sufficient if the insult is of a kind calculated to cause the other party to lose his temper and say or do something violent. Public peace can be broken by angry words as well as deeds .” (emphasis supplied)

¶141

A bare perusal of Section 506 of the IPC makes it clear that a part of it relates to criminal intimidation. Before an offence of criminal intimidation is made out, it must be established that the accused had an intention to cause alarm to the complainant.

¶142

In the facts and circumstances of the case and more particularly, considering the nature of the allegations levelled in the FIR, a prima facie case to constitute the offence punishable under Section 506 of the IPC may probably be said to have been disclosed, but not under Section 504 of the IPC. The allegations with respect to the offence punishable under Section 504 of the IPC can also be looked at from a different perspective. In the FIR, all that the first informant has stated is that abusive language was used by the accused persons. What exactly was uttered in the form of abuses is not stated in the FIR. One of the essential elements, as discussed above, constituting an offence under Section504of theIPCis that there should have been an act or conduct amounting to intentional insult. Where that act is the use of abusive words, it is necessary to know what those words were in order to decide whether the use of those words amounted

¶143

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to an intentional insult. In the absence of these words, it is not possible to decide whether the ingredient of intentional insult is present.”

¶146

It was laid down by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in Vikram Johar v. State of U.P. , (2019) 14 SCC 207: (2019) 4 SCC (Cri) 795: 2019 SCC OnLine SC 609 that mere abuse is not sufficient to attract Section 504 of IPC. It was observed at page 217: -

¶147

21. Section 504 IPC came up for consideration before this Court in Fiona Shrikhande v. State of Maharashtra [ Fiona Shrikhande v. State of Maharashtra , (2013) 14 SCC 44: (2014) 1 SCC (Cri) 715] . In the said case, this Court had the occasion to examine the ingredients of Section 504 IPC, which need to be present before proceeding to try a case. The Court held that in the said case, the order issuing process was challenged by filing a criminal revision. This Court held that at the complaint stage, the Magistrate is merely concerned with the allegations made out in the complaint and has only to prima facie satisfy whether there are sufficient grounds to proceed against the accused. In para 11, the following principles have been laid down: (SCC pp. 48-49)

¶148

“ 11 . We are, in this case, concerned only with the question as to whether, on a reading of the complaint, a prima facie case has been made out or not to issue process by the Magistrate. The law as regards the issuance of process in criminal cases is well settled. At the complaint stage, the Magistrate is merely concerned with the allegations made out in the complaint and has only to prima facie satisfy whether there are sufficient grounds to proceed against the accused, and it is not the province of the Magistrate to enquire into a detailed discussion on the merits or demerits of the case. The scope of enquiry under Section 202 is extremely limited in the sense that the Magistrate, at this stage, is expected to examine prima

¶149

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facie the truth or falsehood of the allegations made in the complaint. The Magistrate is not expected to embark upon a detailed discussion of the merits or demerits of the case, but only to consider the inherent probabilities apparent on the statement made in the complaint. In Nagawwa v. Veeranna ShivalingappaKonjalgi [Nagawwa v. Veeranna ShivalingappaKonjalgi, (1976) 3 SCC 736: 1976 SCC (Cri) 507] , this Court held that once the Magistrate has exercised his discretion in forming an opinion that there is ground for proceeding, it is not for the Higher Courts to substitute their own discretion for that of the Magistrate. The Magistrate has to decide the question purely from the point of view of the complaint, without at all adverting to any defence that the accused may have.”

¶152

22. In para 13 of the judgment, this Court has noticed the ingredients of Section 504 IPC, which are to the following effect: (Fiona Shrikhande case[Fiona Shrikhandev. State of Maharashtra, (2013) 14 SCC 44: (2014) 1 SCC (Cri) 715] , SCC p. 49)

¶153

“ 13 . Section 504 IPC comprises the following ingredients, viz. ( a ) intentional insult, ( b ) the insult must be such as to give provocation to the person insulted, and ( c ) the accused must intend or know that such provocation would cause another to break the public peace or to commit any other offence. The intentional insult must be of such a degree that it should provoke a person to break the public peace or to commit any other offence. The person who intentionally insults, intending or knowing it to be likely that it will give provocation to any other person and such provocation will cause a breach of the public peace, or to commit any other offence, in such a situation, the ingredients of Section 504 are satisfied. One of the essential elements constituting the offence is that there should have been an act or conduct amounting to intentional insult, and the mere fact that the accused abused the complainant, as such, is not sufficient by itself to warrant a

¶154

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conviction under Section 504 IPC.”

¶157

23. In another judgment, i.e. Manik Tanejav.State of Karnataka[Manik Tanejav.State of Karnataka, (2015) 7 SCC 423: (2015) 3 SCC (Cri) 132] , this Court has again occasion to examine the ingredients of Sections 503 and 506. In the above case, a case was registered for the offence under Sections 353 and 506 IPC. After noticing Section 503, which defines criminal intimidation, this Court laid down the following in paras 11 and 12 : (SCC pp. 427-28)

¶158

“ 11 .***

¶159

A reading of the definition of “criminal intimidation” would indicate that there must be an act of threatening to another person, of causing an injury to the person, reputation, or property of the person threatened, or to the person in whom the threatened person is interested and the threat must be with the intent to cause alarm to the person threatened or it must be to do any act which he is not legally bound to do or omit to do an act which he is legally entitled to do.

¶160

12 . In the instant case, the allegation is that the appellants have abused the complainant and obstructed the second respondent from discharging his public duties and spoiled the integrity of the second respondent. It is the intention of the accused that has to be considered in deciding whether what he has stated comes within the meaning of “criminal intimidation”. The threat must be with the intention to cause alarm to the complainant to cause that person to do or omit to do any work. Mere expression of any words without any intention to cause alarm would not be sufficient to bring in the application of this section. But material has to be placed on record to show that the intention is to cause alarm to the complainant. From the facts and circumstances of the case, it appears that there was no intention on the part of

¶161

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the appellants to cause alarm in the mind of the second respondent, causing obstruction in the discharge of his duty. As far as the comments posted on Facebook are concerned, it appears that it is a public forum meant for helping the public, and the act of the appellants posting a comment on Facebook may not attract ingredients of criminal intimidation in Section 503 IPC.”

¶164

In the above case, the allegation was that the appellant had abused the complainant. The Court held that the mere fact that the allegation that the accused had abused the complainant does not satisfy the ingredients of Section 506 IPC.

¶165

24. Now, we revert back to the allegations in the complaint against the appellant. The allegation is that the appellant, with two or three other unknown persons, one of whom was holding a revolver, came to the complainant's house and abused him in filthy language and attempted to assault him, and when some neighbours arrived there, the appellant and the other persons accompanying him fled the spot. The above allegation, taking on its face value, does not satisfy the ingredients of Sections 504 and 506 as have been enumerated by this Court in the above two judgments. The intentional insult must be of such a degree that it should provoke a person to break the public peace or to commit any other offence. The mere allegation that the appellant came and abused the complainant does not satisfy the ingredients as laid down in para 13 of the judgment of this Court in Fiona Shrikhande [Fiona Shrikhandev. State of Maharashtra, (2013) 14 SCC 44: (2014) 1 SCC (Cri) 715] .

¶166

This position was reiterated in B.V. Ram Kumar v.

¶167

State of Telangana, 2025 SCC OnLine SC 275, wherein it was observed:

¶168

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“19. For appreciating the necessary ingredients required to substantiate a charge under Section 504, IPC, a reference in this regard may be made to the judgment of this Court in Fiona Shrikhandev. State of Maharashtra (2013) 14 SCC 44 , wherein the Court discussed the essential ingredients of Section 504, IPC. The Court held as follows: —

¶171

“13. Section 504 IPC comprises the following ingredients, viz. (a) intentional insult, (b) the insult must be such as to give provocation to the person insulted, and (c) the accused must intend or know that such provocation would cause another to break the public peace or to commit any other offence. The intentional insult must be of such a degree that it should provoke a person to break the public peace or to commit any other offence. The person who intentionally insults, intending or knowing it to be likely that it will give provocation to any other person and such provocation will cause a breach of the public peace, or to commit any other offence, in such a situation, the ingredients of Section 504 are satisfied. One of the essential elements constituting the offence is that there should have been an act or conduct amounting to intentional insult, and the mere fact that the accused abused the complainant, as such, is not sufficient by itself to warrant a conviction under Section504IPC.”

¶172

We may also indicate that it is not the law that the actual words or language should figure in the complaint. One has to read the complaint as a whole and, by doing so, if the Magistrate comes to a conclusion, prima facie, that there has been an intentional insult to provoke any person to break the public peace or to commit any other offence, that is sufficient to bring the complaint within the ambit of Section504IPC. It is not the law that a complainant should verbatim reproduce each word or words capable of provoking the other person to commit any other offence. The background facts, circumstances, the occasion, the manner in which they are used, the person or persons to whom they are addressed, the time, the conduct of

¶173

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the person who has indulged in such actions are all relevant factors to be borne in mind while examining a complaint lodged for initiating proceedings under Section504IPC.” (emphasis supplied)

¶176

20. Thus, upon reading the complaint as a whole, if the Magistrate comes to a conclusion, prima facie , that there has been an intentional insult made by the accused to the complainant to provoke the latter to break the public peace or to commit any other offence, then only the act complained of would fall within the ambit of Section 504, IPC. The law does not mandate that the complainant should verbatim reproduce each word or words capable of provoking him/her to commit a breach of peace or any other offence. The background facts, circumstances, the occasion, the manner in which the offending words are used, the person to whom they are addressed, the time, and the conduct of the person who has indulged in such actions are all relevant factors to be borne in mind while examining a complaint lodged for initiating proceedings under Section 504, IPC.

¶177

21. Further, this Court in the case of Mohammad Wajidv.State of U.P. 2023 SCC Online SC 951 , while discussing Section 504, IPC, propounded the test for considering the circumstances wherein an abusive language takes the form and shape of an intentional insult and held thus: —

¶178

“28. Section 504 of the IPC contemplates intentionally insulting a person and thereby provoking such person to breach the peace or intentionally insulting a person knowing it to be likely that the person insulted may be provoked so as to cause a breach of the public peace or to commit any other offence. Mere abuse may not come within the purview of the section . But, the words of abuse in a particular case might amount to an intentional insult provoking the person insulted to commit a breach of the public peace or to commit any other offence. If abusive language is used intentionally and is of such a nature as would in the ordinary course of events lead the person insulted to break the peace or

¶179

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to commit an offence under the law, the case is not taken away from the purview of the Section merely because the insulted person did not actually break the peace or commit any offence having exercised self-control or having been subjected to abject terror by the offender . In judging whether particular abusive language is attracted by Section 504, IPC, the court has to find out what, in ordinary circumstances, would be the effect of the abusive language used and not what the complainant actually did as a result of his peculiar idiosyncrasy, cool temperament or sense of discipline. It is the ordinary general nature of the abusive language that is the test for considering whether the abusive language is an intentional insult likely to provoke the person insulted to commit a breach of the peace, and not the particular conduct or temperament of the complainant.

¶182

29. Mere abuse, discourtesy, rudeness or insolence, may not amount to an intentional insult within the meaning of Section504, IPCif it does not have the necessary element of being likely to incite the person insulted to commit a breach of the peace of an offence and the other element of the accused intending to provoke the person insulted to commit a breach of the peace or knowing that the person insulted is likely to commit a breach of the peace. Each case of abusive language shall have to be decided in the light of the facts and circumstances of that case, and there cannot be a general proposition that no one commits an offence under Section 504, IPC if he merely uses abusive language against the complainant.” (emphasis supplied)

¶183

22. Needless to say, mere abuse, discourtesy, rudeness or insolence does not amount to an intentional insult within the meaning of Section 504, IPC. Furthermore, it would be immaterial that the person who has been insulted and provoked did not actually break the peace or commit any offence.

¶184

23. Section 504, IPC, IPC consists of two parts. Firstly, the actus reus being the intentional insult that gives rise to the provocation. Secondly, mens rea , i.e. , the intention or

¶185

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knowledge on the part of the accused that such intentional provocation is likely to cause the person insulted to break public peace or commit any other offence. The animus nocendi in Section 504, IPC is that the accused should ‘intentionally insult’ the other person with the intention or knowledge that the provocation caused by such insult is likely to result in the commission of a breach of public peace or any other offence by the person who has been so insulted. The offence is said to be complete once the accused person makes an ‘intentional insult’ with the aforesaid mens rea . Hence, intention or knowledge on the part of the accused person that his actions of making an ‘intentional insult’ have the potential to provoke the person insulted is sine qua non for the commission of the offence under Section 504, IPC.

¶188

24. The natural corollary of the above discussion is that if the accused does not intend to give provocation, the offence is not made out. An insult without an ‘intention to insult’ is not punishable under Section 504, IPC. Further, ‘intentional insult’ must be of such a degree that it has the potential to provoke a reasonable person to break the public peace or to commit any other offence.

¶189

25. It is trite that whether the person provoked further commits an illegal act or not is immaterial to draw the conclusion of culpability under Section 504, IPC. The ‘intentional insult’ and provocation must be so proximate and close that the accused has either the intention or the knowledge that the intentional insult made by him is likely to cause the provoked person to break public peace or commit some other offence. However, what would be the nature of ‘intentional insult’ causing provocation, to draw culpability under Section 504, IPC, would depend upon the facts and circumstances of each case. The test to be applied to determine if the intentional insult made by the accused is sufficient to cause provocation is that of a reasonable person, i.e. , if the insult is sufficient to provoke any reasonable person to break the peace or commit any

¶190

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other offence, only then the accused will be liable for the offence under Section 504, IPC.”

¶193

In the present case, the complainant has not

¶194

disclosed that the words uttered by the relatives of the accused amounted to an insult and the insult was of such nature as to give provocation to the person insulted. Thus, the basic ingredient of Section 504 of the IPC is not satisfied.

¶195

Therefore, the learned Trial Court had rightly held that the allegations in the complaint, even if accepted to be correct, do not constitute the commission of any cognizable offence. No fault can be found with the order passed by the learned Trial Court.

¶196

In view of the above, the present petition fails, and it is dismissed.

¶197

A copy of this judgment, along with the records of the learned Trial Court, be sent back forthwith.

¶198

Pending applications, if any, also stand disposed of.

¶199

( Rakesh Kainthla) Judge

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3^rd June, 2026 (Chander)

Hritik Gupta v. State of H.P.

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