State of Hp Vs Bimla Devi

The present appeal is directed against the judgment dated 21.03.2013 passed by the learned Judicial Magistrate First Class, Court No.1, Dehra, District Kangra, H.P. (learned Trial Court) vide which the respondents (accused before learned Trial Court) were acquitted of the commission of offences punishable under Sections 323 and 324 read with Section 149 of the Indian Penal Code (IPC) . (The parties shall hereinafter be referred to in the same manner as they were arrayed before the learned Trial Court for

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convenience)

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1 Whether reporters of Local Papers may be allowed to see the judgment? Yes.

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Briefly stated, the facts giving rise to the present appeal are that the police presented a challan before the learned Trial Court against the accused for the commission of offences punishable under Sections 323 and 324, read with Section 149 of the IPC. It was asserted that informant Suman Devi (PW1) had gone to her field to cut the grass on 26.11.2010 at about 4:30 p.m. Sukh Dev Singh, the accused, came and caught hold of her neck. The informant shouted for help. Accused Parveen Kumar, Bimla Devi, Poonam Kumari, Pooja Devi, and Arti also came to the spot. Poonam Kumari was armed with a sickle, and she inflicted an injury on the informant’s left hand. Bimla Devi, Pooja Devi, Arti and Praveen gave beatings to the informant with kicks and fist blows. Neeraj Kumar (PW2) reached the spot after hearing the noise and rescued the informant from the accused. The matter was reported to the police. An entry in the daily diary (Ext.PW1/A) was recorded in the Police Station. An application (Ext.PW3/A) was filed for the medical examination of the victim. Dr Anita Mahajan (PW3) conducted the medical examination and found that the informant had sustained multiple injuries which could have been caused by a blunt and sharp weapon. She issued the MLC (Ext.PW3/B). An entry (Ext.PW6/A) was recorded in the Police Station, and FIR

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(Ext.PW7/A) was registered. ASI Mohinder Singh (PW7) investigated the matter. He visited the spot and prepared the site plan (Ext.PW7/B). Poonam produced one sickle (Ext.P1), which was seized vide memo (Ext.PW1/B). Statements of witnesses were recorded as per their version, and after the completion of the investigation, the challan was prepared and presented before the learned Trial Court.

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The learned Trial Court found sufficient reasons to summon the accused. When the accused appeared, they were charged with the commission of offences punishable under Sections 323 and 324, read with Section 149 of the IPC, to which they pleaded not guilty and claimed to be tried.

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The prosecution examined seven witnesses to prove its case. Suman Devi (PW1) is the informant/injured. Neeraj (PW2) rescued the informant from the accused. Dr Anita Mahajan (PW3) medically examined the injured. Malkiat Singh (PW4) is an eyewitness. Deepak Kumar (PW5) witnessed the recovery. Constable Rachhpal (PW6) proved the entry in the daily diary. ASI Mohinder Singh (PW7) investigated the matter.

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The accused, in their statements recorded under Section

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313 of the Code of Criminal Procedure (Cr.P.C.), denied the prosecution’s case in its entirety. They claimed that they were innocent and were falsely implicated because of the boundary dispute with the informant. They did not produce any evidence in their defence.

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The learned Trial Court held that the prosecution’s version was full of contradictions. The presence of Malkiat Singh (PW4) on the spot was highly doubtful. The civil litigation was pending between the parties, and a careful assessment of the statements of prosecution witnesses was required. The prosecution had not proved its case beyond a reasonable doubt because of the various infirmities. Hence, the learned Trial Court acquitted the accused of the commission of offences punishable under Sections 323 and 324 read with Section 149 of the IPC.

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Being aggrieved by the judgment passed by the learned Trial Court, the State has filed the present appeal asserting that the learned Trial Court erred in acquitting the accused. Learned Trial Court appreciated the evidence in a slipshod and perfunctory manner. Suman Devi (PW1), Neeraj (PW2) and Malkiat Singh (PW4) had supported the prosecution’s case and asserted that

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Poonam Devi had inflicted a sickle below on the informant/victim. Their testimonies were duly corroborated by the medical evidence, and the learned Trial Court ignored this aspect. The testimony of Malkiat Singh (PW4) could not have been rejected because he knew the informant. Minor contradictions were bound to come in the statements with time and could not have been used to discard the prosecution’s case. Hence, it was prayed that the present appeal be allowed and the judgment passed by the learned Trial Court be set aside.

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I have heard Mr Ajit Sharma, learned Deputy Advocate General for the appellant/State and Mr N.K. Thakur learned Senior Counsel assisted by Mr Divya Raj Singh, learned counsel for the respondents/accused.

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Mr Ajit Sharma, learned Deputy Advocate General for the appellant/State, submitted that the prosecution had proved its case beyond a reasonable doubt. The testimony of the informant/victim was duly corroborated by the testimonies of Neeraj (PW2) and Malkiat Singh (PW4). The medical evidence also proved that the informant had sustained multiple injuries which could have been caused by means of a sickle. The enmity is a double-edged weapon and could not have been used to acquit the

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accused. Therefore, he prayed that the present appeal be allowed and the judgment passed by the learned Trial Court be set aside.

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Mr N.K. Thakur, learned Senior Counsel for the respondent/accused, submitted that the relationship between the parties was strained. There was a civil litigation between the parties, and the learned Trial Court was justified in looking for the corroboration of the informant’s testimony. Malkiat Singh (PW4) was a chance witness, and his name was not mentioned in the FIR. The learned Trial Court had rightly doubted his presence on the spot. Learned Trial Court had taken a reasonable view, and this court should not interfere with the reasonable view of the learned Trial Court. Hence, he prayed that the present appeal be dismissed.

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I have given a considerable thought to the submissions made at the bar and have gone through the records carefully.

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The present appeal has been filed against a judgment of acquittal. It was laid down by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Surendra Singh v. State of Uttarakhand, (2025) 5 SCC 433: 2025 SCC OnLine SC 176 that the Court can interfere with a judgment of acquittal if it is patently perverse, is based on misreading of evidence, omission to consider the material evidence and no

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reasonable person could have recorded the acquittal based on the evidence led before the learned Trial Court. It was observed at page

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438:

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“24. It could thus be seen that it is a settled legal position that the interference with the finding of acquittal recorded by the learned trial Judge would be warranted by the High Court only if the judgment of acquittal suffers from patent perversity; that the same is based on a misreading/omission to consider material evidence on record; and that no two reasonable views are possible and only the view consistent with the guilt of the accused is possible from the evidence available on record.

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This position was reiterated in State of M.P. v. Ramveer

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Singh, 2025 SCC OnLine SC 1743 , wherein it was observed:

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We may note that the present appeal is one against acquittal. Law is well-settled by a plethora of judgments of this Court that, in an appeal against acquittal, unless the finding of acquittal is perverse on the face of the record and the only possible view based on the evidence is consistent with the guilt of the accused, only in such an event, should the appellate Court interfere with a judgment of acquittal. Where two views are possible, i.e., one consistent with the acquittal and the other holding the accused guilty, the appellate Court should refuse to interfere with the judgment of acquittal. Reference in this regard may be made to the judgments of this Court in the cases of Babu Sahebagouda Rudragoudar v. State of Karnataka (2024) 8 SCC 149 ; H.D. Sundara v. State of Karnataka (2023) 9 SCC 581 and Rajesh Prasad v. State of Bihar (2022) 3 SCC 471 .

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A similar view was taken in Tulasareddi v. State of

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Karnataka, 2026 SCC OnLine SC 89, wherein it was observed:

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“29. From the aforesaid decisions rendered by this Court, it can be said that if two reasonable conclusions are possible on the basis of the evidence on record, the Appellate Court should not disturb the findings of acquittal recorded by the Trial Court. Further, if the view taken is a possible view, the Appellate Court cannot overturn the order of acquittal on the ground that another view was also possible. The following principles have to be kept in mind by the Appellate Court while dealing with the appeals against an order of acquittal:

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(a) whether the judgment of acquittal suffers from patent perversity;

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(b) whether the judgment is based on misreading/omission to consider the material evidence on record;

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(c) an order of acquittal is to be interfered with only when there are “compelling and substantial reasons” for doing so. If the order is “clearly unreasonable”, it is a compelling reason for interference.’

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(d) the appellate court, while deciding an appeal against acquittal, after reappreciating the evidence, is required to consider whether the view taken by the trial court is a possible view which could have been taken on the basis of the evidence on record;

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(e) if the view taken is a possible view, the appellate court cannot overturn the order of acquittal on the ground that another view was also possible; and

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(f) the appellate court can interfere with the order of acquittal only if it comes to a finding that the only conclusion which can be recorded on the basis of the evidence on record was that the guilt of the accused was proved beyond a reasonable doubt and no other conclusion was possible.”

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The present appeal has to be decided as per the parameters laid down by the Hon’ble Supreme Court.

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The police filed an application (Ext.PW3/A) for the informant’s medical examination. It mentions that Suman Devi (PW1) had made a report in the Police Station that Sukh Dev Singh had given beatings to her with kicks and fist blows. He had tried to snatch the sickle held by Suman Devi (PW1), and she sustained injury on her hand. This version is contrary to the prosecution’s version recorded in the entry (Ext.PW1/A) and deposed on oath. No person deposed that the informant had a sickle in her hand, and she sustained injuries on her hand when the accused Sukh Dev Singh had tried to snatch it; rather, it was stated in the entry (Ext.PW1/A) and on oath by Suman Devi (PW1) that Poonam was armed with the sickle and she had inflicted an injury to the informant. Therefore, the initial version projected by the prosecution in the application for the medical examination and the subsequent version are contradictory to each other.

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The informant stated that she had gone to cut the grass. She stated in her cross-examination that she was collecting the grass after cutting it. Therefore, it is highly likely that she would have had the sickle. She has not explained as to what happened to the sickle held by her, and this non-explanation corroborates the initial version mentioned in the application to the Medical Officer

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that she had the sickle and she sustained injury when Sukhdev had tried to snatch it from her.

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The Medical Officer had found an incised wound with clear-cut margins on the medial side of the left hand. The informant stated that Poonam had inflicted a blow by means of a sickle on her. She has not explained how she would suffer injury on the medial side of the hand and not on the side of the hand that is likely to come in contact when a person tries to save himself.

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Neeraj (PW2) stated in his examination-in-chief that he shouted for help, and when the people arrived, the accused left the informant and went away. The informant had nowhere stated that Neeraj had shouted for help after which the people arrived, and the accused had left her.

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Neeraj (PW2) stated in his cross-examination that no injury was caused in his presence. Therefore, he is not a witness to the actual infliction of the injury, and his testimony does not support the prosecution’s version.

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Malkiat Singh (PW4) stated that he heard some noise and saw that the accused were quarrelling with the informant. He had seen injuries in the informant’s hand. Poonam was armed with

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the stick. The accused left after the incident. He stated in his crossexamination that his house was located at a distance of about 10 kilometres. He knew the informant because Subhash Chand was a guard, and he (Malkiat Singh) used to purchase the fuel wood.

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The learned Trial Court had rightly held that he was a chance witness. His name was not mentioned in the FIR, and his presence on the spot is doubtful. It was laid down by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Harbeer Singh v. Sheeshpal, (2016) 16 SCC 418: (2017) 4 SCC (Cri) 503: 2016 SCC OnLine SC 1164 that the chance witnesses have a habit of appearing suddenly at the place of the incident and thereafter disappearing. Their testimonies should be seen with due care and caution. It was observed at page 427:

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23. The defining attributes of a “chance witness” were explained by Mahajan, J., in Puran v. State of Punjab, (1952) 2 SCC 454: AIR 1953 SC 459: 1953 Cri LJ 1925 . It was held that such witnesses have the habit of appearing suddenly on the scene when something is happening and then disappearing after noticing the occurrence about which they are called later on to give evidence.

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24. In Mousam Singha Roy v. State of W.B., (2003) 12 SCC 377: 2004 SCC (Cri) Supp 429 , this Court discarded the evidence of chance witnesses while observing that certain glaring contradictions/omissions in the evidence of PW 2 and PW 3 and the absence of their names in the FIR have been very lightly discarded by the courts below. Similarly, Shankarlal v. State of Rajasthan, (2004) 10 SCC 632: 2005 SCC (Cri) 579 and Jarnail Singh v. State of Punjab, (2009) 9 SCC 719: (2010) 1 SCC (Cri) 107 are authorities for the proposition that deposition

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of a chance witness, whose presence at the place of the incident remains doubtful, ought to be discarded. Therefore, for the reasons recorded by the High Court, we hold that PW 5 and PW 6 were chance witnesses and their statements have been rightly discarded.

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It was laid down by the Hon’ble Supreme Court, Rajesh

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Yadav v. State of U.P., (2022) 12 SCC 200: 2022 SCC OnLine SC 150 that the testimony of a chance witness is to be seen with due care and caution and his presence on the spot should be satisfactorily established. It was observed:

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“Chance witness

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29. A chance witness is one who happens to be at the place of occurrence of an offence by chance, and therefore, not as a matter of course. In other words, he is not expected to be in the said place. A person walking on a street witnessing the commission of an offence can be a chance witness. Merely because a witness happens to see an occurrence by chance, his testimony cannot be eschewed, though a little more scrutiny may be required at times. This again is an aspect that is to be looked into in a given case by the court. We do not wish to reiterate the aforesaid position of law which has been clearly laid down by this Court in State of A.P. v. K. Srinivasulu Reddy [State of A.P. v. K. Srinivasulu Reddy, (2003) 12 SCC 660: 2005 SCC (Cri) 817] : (SCC pp. 665-66, paras 1213)

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“ 12 . Criticism was levelled against the evidence of PWs 4 and 9, who are independent witnesses, by labelling them as chance witnesses. The criticism about PWs 4 and 9 being chance witnesses is also without any foundation. They have clearly explained how they happened to be at the spot of occurrence, and the trial court and the High Court have accepted the same.

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13 . Coming to the plea of the accused that PWs 4 and 9 were “chance witnesses” who have not explained how they happened to be at the alleged place of occurrence, it has to be noted that the said witnesses were independent witnesses. There was not even a suggestion to the witnesses that they had any animosity towards any of the accused. In a murder trial, by describing the independent witnesses as “chance witnesses”, it cannot be implied thereby that their evidence is suspicious and their presence at the scene doubtful. Murders are not committed with previous notice to witnesses; soliciting their presence. If murder is committed in a dwelling house, the inmates of the house are natural witnesses. If a murder is committed in a street, only passers-by will be witnesses. Their evidence cannot be brushed aside or viewed with suspicion on the ground that they are mere “chance witnesses”. The expression “chance witness” is borrowed from countries where every man's home is considered his castle, and everyone must have an explanation for his presence elsewhere or in another man's castle. It is quite an unsuitable expression in a country where people are less formal and more casual, at any rate in the matter of explaining their presence.”

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30. The principle was reiterated by this Court in Jarnail Singh v. State of Punjab, (2009) 9 SCC 719: (2010) 1 SCC (Cri) 107: (SCC p. 725, paras 21-23)

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“ 21 . In Sachchey Lal Tiwari v. State of U.P., (2004) 11 SCC 410: 2004 SCC (Cri) Supp 105, this Court, while considering the evidentiary value of the chance witness in a case of murder which had taken place in a street and a passer-by had deposed that he had witnessed the incident, observed as under:

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If the offence is committed in a street, only a passer-by will be the witness. His evidence cannot be brushed aside lightly or viewed with suspicion on the ground that he was a mere chance witness. However, there must be an explanation for his presence there.

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The Court further explained that the expression “chance witness” is borrowed from countries where every man's home is considered his castle, and everyone must have an explanation for his presence elsewhere or in another man's castle. It is quite an unsuitable expression in a country like India, where people are less formal and more casual, at any rate in the matter of explaining their presence.

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22 . The evidence of a chance witness requires very cautious and close scrutiny and a chance witness must adequately explain his presence at the place of occurrence ( Satbir v. Surat Singh, (1997) 4 SCC 192: 1997 SCC (Cri) 538, Harjinder Singh v. State of Punjab, (2004) 11 SCC 253: 2004 SCC (Cri) Supp 28, Acharaparambath Pradeepan v. State of Kerala, (2006) 13 SCC 643 : (2008) 1 SCC (Cri) 241 and Sarvesh Narain Shukla v. Daroga Singh, (2007) 13 SCC 360 : (2009) 1 SCC (Cri) 188 ) . Deposition of a chance witness whose presence at the place of the incident remains doubtful should be discarded (vide Shankarlal v. State of Rajasthan, (2004) 10 SCC 632: 2005 SCC (Cri) 579 ).

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23 . Conduct of the chance witness, subsequent to the incident, may also be taken into consideration, particularly as to whether he has informed anyone else in the village about the incident (vide Thangaiya v. State of T.N., (2005) 9 SCC 650: 2005 SCC (Cri) 1284 ). Gurcharan Singh (PW 18) met the informant Darshan Singh (PW 4) before lodging the FIR, and the fact of conspiracy was not disclosed by Gurcharan Singh (PW 18) or Darshan Singh (PW 4). The fact of a conspiracy has not been mentioned in the FIR. Hakam Singh, the other witness on this issue, has not been examined by the prosecution. Thus, the High Court was justified in discarding the part of the prosecution’s case relating to conspiracy. However, in the fact situation of the present case, the acquittal of the said two co-accused has no bearing, so far as the present appeal is concerned.”

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Thus, the learned Trial Court was justified in rejecting the testimony of this witness.

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Neeraj (PW2) stated that people had gathered on the spot. However, the prosecution did not examine any such witness and the learned Trial Court was justified in drawing an adverse inference against the prosecution.

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Therefore, the learned Trial Court had taken a reasonable view that could have been taken based on the evidence led before the learned Trial Court. This Court will not interfere with the reasonable view of the learned Trial Court, even if another view is possible.

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No other point was urged.

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In view of the above, the present appeal fails, and it is dismissed, and so are the pending miscellaneous applications, if any.

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In view of the provisions of Section 437-A of the Code of Criminal Procedure (Section 481 of Bhartiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023) the respondents/accused are directed to furnish bail bonds in the sum of ₹25,000/- each with one surety each in the like amount to the satisfaction of the learned Trial Court within four

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weeks, which shall be effective for six months with stipulation that in the event of Special Leave Petition being filed against this judgment, or on grant of the leave, the respondents/accused on receipt of notice thereof, shall appear before the Hon’ble Supreme Court.

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A copy of the judgment, along with records of the learned Trial Court, be sent back forthwith.

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(Rakesh Kainthla) Judge

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17^th June, 2026 (Nikita)

State of Hp v. Bimla Devi

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