Sanjay Ranjta Vs Kirti Pal

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IN THE HIGH COURT OF HIMACHAL PRADESH, SHIMLA

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Cr. Revision No.510 of 2025

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Date of Decision: 07.04.2026

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Sanjay Ranjta ……...Petitioner Versus Kirti Pal …....Respondent

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Coram

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Hon’ble Mr. Justice Sandeep Sharma, Judge.

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Whether approved for reporting?

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_____________________________________________________________________________ For the Petitioner: Mr. Rajeev Sharma, Advocate. For the Respondent: Mr. Nishant Khidtta, Advocate. __________________________________________________________________________ Sandeep Sharma, J. (Oral)

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Instant criminal revision petition filed under Section 438 read with Section 442 of the Bharatiya Nagrik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023, lays challenge to judgment dated 09.04.2024, passed by the learned Additional Sessions Judge, Rohru, Himachal Pradesh, in Criminal Appeal No.143-R/10 of 2023, titled Sanjay Ranjta Vs. Kirti Pal, affirming judgment of conviction and order of sentence dated 30.09.2023, passed by the learned Additional Chief Judicial Magistrate, Rohru, District Shimla, Himachal Pradesh, in criminal case No.122-3 of 2019, whereby the learned trial Court while holding the petitioner-accused (hereinafter, “ accused” ) guilty of having committed offence punishable under Section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act (in short the “Act"), convicted and sentenced him to undergo simple imprisonment for a period of ten months and pay compensation to the tune of Rs.5,30,000/- to the respondent-complainant.

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Precisely, the facts of the case, as emerge from the record are that respondent-complainant (hereinafter, ‘complainant’) instituted a complaint under Section 138 of the Act, in the competent Court of law, alleging therein that in the month of August-September 2013, he sold apple boxes to accused on different dates for a sum of ₹4,53,849/-. Accused did not make any payment qua aforesaid purchase, but subsequently, issued seven Cheques, five Cheques being drawn on account No.05640510000274 of UCO Bank and two Cheques drawn on account No.0741002100005604 of PNB Branch, Kumarsain, in order to discharge their lawful liability towards the complainant and also paid sum of ₹20,000/- in cash to the complainant. However, aforesaid Cheques on their presentation to the Bank concerned, were dishonoured with the remarks “Account Frozen”. After receipt of aforesaid return memos, complainant served accused with a legal notice calling upon him to make the payment good well within stipulated time. However, since petitioner-accused failed to make the payment good within the time stipulated in the legal notice, respondent/complainant was compelled to initiate proceedings under Section 138 of the Act in the Court of learned Additional Chief Judicial Magistrate, Rohru, District Shimla, Himachal Pradesh.

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Learned trial Court on the basis of material adduced on record

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by the respective parties, vide judgment/order dated 30.09.2023, held the petitioner-accused guilty of having committed offence under Section 138 of

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the Act and accordingly, convicted and sentenced him, as per the description given hereinabove.

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Though, at the first instance, accused preferred an appeal in the Court of learned Additional Sessions Judge, Rohru, Himachal Pradesh, however, same was partly allowed, whereby learned Appellate Court reduced the amount of compensation awarded by learned Court below from ₹5,30,000/- to ₹4,00,000/-. In the afore background, one of the accused, namely Sanjay Ranjta, has approached this Court in the instant proceedings, praying therein for his acquittal after setting aside the judgment of conviction and order of sentence recorded by Courts below. Another co-accused namely Ajay @ Boby has been already declared proclaimed offender in the proceedings before the Court below.

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Vide order dated 30.08.2025, Coordinate Bench of this Court stayed the substantive sentence imposed by the learned Court below, subject to petitioner/accused depositing 50% of the compensation amount and furnishing personal bonds in the sum of Rs.50,000/-, however, fact remains that despite repeated opportunities, aforesaid order was never complied with, as a result thereof, petitioner is behind bars. Matter was lastly adjourned on 03.03.2026, on which date, on the vehement vehement request of learned counsel representing the petitioner and by way of indulgence, this Court granted last opportunity to petitioner to comply with the order dated 30.05.2025 and deposit the compensation amount, but

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nothing has been done till date and as such, this Court is compelled to decide the petition on its own merits.

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Having heard learned counsel for the parties and perused material adduced on record, vis-a-vis reasoning assigned in the impugned judgments, this Court sees no reason to agree with Mr. Rajeev Sharma, learned counsel representing the petitioner, that Courts below have fallen in grave error while appreciating the evidence, rather this Court finds that both the Courts below have meticulously dealt with each and every aspect of the matter and there is no scope left for interference.

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Though, Mr. Sharma, learned counsel representing the petitioner, while making this Court peruse evidence adduced on record, attempted to argue that both the Courts below failed to appreciate the evidence in its right perspective, but such submission of his deserves outright rejection, being contrary to the record. In the case at hand, complainant, besides examining himself as CW1, also examined Surinder Bhardwaj as CW2, Prem Parkash as CW3, Anil Kumar as CW4 and J.K. Kashyap as CW5. After closure of complainant evidence, accused in his statement recorded under Section 313 Cr.P.C., admitted the liability. While admitting the liability, he stated that sum of the dues had been paid, and that the account had been frozen due to irregularity on their part. Though accused was provided adequate opportunity to led evidence in defence, but in vain. Since factum with regard to issuance of Cheques as well as his

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signature thereupon never came to be disputed at the behest of the accused, no illegality can be said to have been committed by the Courts below while invoking Sections 118 and 139 of the Act, which speak about presumption in favour of the holder of the Cheque that Cheque was issued towards discharge of a lawful liability. No doubt, aforesaid presumption is rebuttable, but to rebut such presumption, accused either can refer to the documents and evidence led on record by the complainant or presumption can be rebutted by leading positive evidence, if any. However, in the case at hand, accused was unable to point out from the documents as well as evidence adduced on record by the complainant that Cheque issued by him was not issued towards discharge of lawful liability.

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8 . The Hon’ble Apex Court in M/s Laxmi Dyechem V. State of Gujarat , 2013(1) RCR(Criminal), has categorically held that if the accused is able to establish a probable defence which creates doubt about the existence of a legally enforceable debt or liability, the prosecution can fail. To raise probable defence, accused can rely on the materials submitted by the complainant. Needless to say, if the accused/drawer of the Cheque in question neither raises a probable defence nor able to contest existence of a legally enforceable debt or liability, statutory presumption under Section 139 of the Negotiable Instruments Act, regarding commission of the ofence f comes into play. It would be proftable to reproduce relevant paras No.23 to i 25 of the judgment herein:-

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“23. Further, a three judge Bench of this Court in the matter of Rangappa vs. Sri Mohan [3] held that Section 139 is an example of a reverse onus clause that has been included in furtherance of the legislative objective of improving the credibility of negotiable instruments. While Section 138 of the Act specifies the strong criminal remedy in relation to the dishonour of the cheques, the rebuttable presumption under Section 139 is a device to prevent undue delay in the course of litigation. The Court however, further observed that it must be remembered that the offence made punishable by Section 138can be better described as a regulatory offence since the bouncing of a cheque is largely in the nature of a civil wrong whose money is usually confined to the private parties involved in commercial transactions. In such a scenario, the test of proportionality should guide the construction and interpretation of reverse onus clauses and the defendant accused cannot be expected to discharge an unduly high standard of proof”. The Court further observed that it is a settled position that when an accused has to rebut the presumption under Section 139, the standard of proof for doing so is all preponderance of probabilities.

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24. Therefore, if the accused is able to establish a probable defence which creates doubt about the existence of a legally enforceable debt or liability, the prosecution can fail. The accused can rely on the materials submitted by the complainant in order to raise such a defence and it is inconceivable that in some cases the accused may not need to adduce the evidence of his/her own. If however, the accused/drawer of a cheque in question neither raises

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a probable defence nor able to contest existence of a legally enforceable debt or liability, obviously statutory presumption under Section 139 of the NI Act regarding commission of the offence comes into play if the same is not rebutted with regard to the materials submitted by the complainant.

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25. It is no doubt true that the dishonour of cheques in order to qualify for prosecution under Section 138 of the NI Act precedes a statutory notice where the drawer is called upon by allowing him to avail the opportunity to arrange the payment of the amount covered by the cheque and it is only when the drawer despite the receipt of such a notice and despite the opportunity to make the payment within the time stipulated under the statute does not pay the amount, that the said default would be considered a dishonour constituting an ofence, hence punishable. But f even in such cases, the question whether or not there was lawfully recoverable debt or liability for discharge whereof the cheque was issued, would be a matter that the trial court will have to examine having regard to the evidence adduced before it keeping in view the statutory presumption that unless rebutted, the cheque is presumed to have been issued for a valid consideration. In view of this the responsibility of the trial judge while issuing summons to conduct the trial in matters where there has been instruction to stop payment despite suf fi ciency of funds and whether the same would be a suf fi cient ground to proceed in the matter, would be extremely heavy.”

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Complainant examined himself as CW1. He filed affidavit

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Ex.CW1/A, reiterating therein averments contained in the complaint. If

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cross-examination conducted upon this witness is perused in its entirety, it can be safely concluded that accused was unable to extract anything contrary to what this witness stated in his examination-in-chief. In his cross-examination, he denied that no apple boxes were sold to the accused and the Cheques were handed over as blank security Cheques and he has filled them on his own despite his having received payment. Surinder Bhardwaj, official of UCO Bank, Rohru, CW2, tendered statement of account of Kirti Pal, Ex.CW2/A, in evidence. J.K. Kashyap, CW5, an official of UCO Bank, Branch Dhalli, also deposed that aforesaid Cheques were dishonoured. In his cross-examination, he admitted that there is no account in the name of Sky Line Fruit Marketing Enterprises in his bank. Prem Prakash Mehta, Post Official, CW3, deposed that registered letters Ex.CW1/U and Ex.CW1/V were issued to the accused, vide postal receipts Ex.CW1/W and Ex.CW1/X. He deposed that Sanjay Rajta had been intimated, but he did not come to receive it, whereas co-accused Ajay had refused to take it and as such, they were returned to the sender. If the afore evidence led on record by the complainant is read in its entirety, it clearly established on record that accused had issued Cheques in question towards discharge of their lawful liability, but same were dishonoured with the remarks ‘Account Frozen’. Since despite his having received legal notice, accused failed to make the payment good well within the stipulated time, complainant had no option but to institute the proceedings under

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Section 138 of the Act in the competent Court of law. Though, in his statement recorded under Section 313 Cr.P.C., accused denied the case of the complainant in toto , but he admitted factum of his having purchased the apple boxes from the complainant. He also stated that some of the dues were paid and some could not be paid on account of freezing of his account. If the pattern of cross-examination conducted upon the complainant is perused in its entirety, it clearly reveals that no suggestion worth the name ever came to be put to the complainant with regard to non-issuance of Cheque, rather accused himself put a suggestion that Cheques issued as security were misused, meaning thereby that factum with regard to issuance of Cheques as well as his signatures thereupon was duly admitted by the accused and as such, no illegality can be said to have been committed by the Courts below while holding petitioner/accused guilty for the commission of offence punishable under Section 138 of the Act. Though, defence came to be taken at the behest of the petitioner/accused that Cheques in question was issued as security, but the same may not be of any help to the accused, for the reason that by now, it is well-settled that Cheque, even if issued as a ‘security’ can also be presented for encashment, if amount taken or promised to be repaid is not paid.

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Hon’ble Apex Court in case titled Sripati Singh v. State of Jharkhand, Criminal Appeal No. 1269-1270 of 2021, decided on 28.10.2021, has held as under:

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“16. A cheque issued as security pursuant to a fnancial i transaction cannot be considered as a worthless piece of paper under every circumstance. ‘Security’ in its true sense is the state of being safe and the security given for a loan is something given as a pledge of payment. It is given, deposited or pledged to make certain the fulflment of an obligation to i which the parties to the transaction are bound. If in a transaction, a loan is advanced and the borrower agrees to repay the amount in a specifed timeframe and issues a i cheque as security to secure such repayment; if the loan amount is not repaid in any other form before the due date or if there is no other understanding or agreement between the parties to defer the payment of amount, the cheque which is issued as security would mature for presentation and the drawee of the cheque would be entitled to present the same. On such presentation, if the same is dishonoured, the consequences contemplated under Section 138 and the other provisions of N.I. Act would f l ow.”

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Needless to say, expression “Security cheque” is not a statutorily defined expression in the Negotiable Instruments Act, rather same is to be inferred from the pleadings as well as evidence, if any, led on record with regard to issuance of security cheque. The Negotiable Instruments Act does not per se carve out an exception in respect of a “security cheque” to say that a complaint in respect of such a cheque would not be maintainable as there is a debt existing in respect whereof the cheque in question is issued, same would attract provision of Section 138 of the Act in case of its dishonour.

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Having scanned the entire evidence adduced on record by the respective parties, this Court finds that all the basic ingredients of Section 138 of the Act are met in the case at hand. Since Cheques issued by accused towards discharge of his lawful liability were returned with the remarks ‘account frozen’ and he despite having received legal notice failed to make the payment good within the stipulated time, complainant had no option but to institute proceedings under Section 138 of the Act, which subsequently rightly came to be decided by both the Courts below on the basis of pleadings as well as evidence adduced on record by the respective parties.

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Moreover, this Court has a very limited jurisdiction under Section 397 of the Cr.P.C to re-appreciate the evidence, especially in view of the concurrent findings of fact and law relied upon by the Courts below. In this regard, reliance is placed upon the judgment passed by Hon’ble Apex Court in case “State of Kerala Vs. Puttumana Illath Jathavedan Namboodiri” ( 1999) 2 Supreme Court Cases 452, wherein it has been held as under:-

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“In its revisional jurisdiction, the High Court can call for and examine the record of any proceedings for the purpose of satisfying itself as to the correctness, legality or propriety of any finding, sentence or order. In other words, the jurisdiction is one of supervisory jurisdiction exercised by the High Court for correcting miscarriage of justice. But the said revisional power cannot be equated with the power of an appellate court

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nor can it be treated even as a second appellate jurisdiction. Ordinarily, therefore, it would not be appropriate for the High Court to re-appreciate the evidence and come to its own conclusion on the same when the evidence has already been appreciated by the Magistrate as well as Sessions Judge in appeal, unless any glaring feature is brought to the notice of the High Court which would otherwise tantamount to gross miscarriage of justice.”

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Since after having carefully examined the evidence in the present case, this Court is unable to find any error of law as well as fact, if any, committed by the Courts below, while passing impugned judgments, there is no occasion, whatsoever, to exercise the revisional power.

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True it is that the Hon’ble Apex Court in Krishnan and another Versus Krishnaveni and another, (1997) 4 Supreme Court Case 241; has held that in case Court notices that there is a failure of justice or misuse of judicial mechanism or procedure, sentence or order is not correct, it is salutary duty of the High Court to prevent the abuse of

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the process or miscarriage of justice or to correct irregularities/incorrectness committed by inferior criminal court in its judicial process or illegality of sentence or order, but learned counsel representing the accused has failed to point out any material irregularity committed by the Courts below while appreciating the evidence and as such, this Court sees no reason to interfere with the well reasoned judgments passed by the Courts below.

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Consequently, in view of the discussion made hereinabove as well as law laid down by the Hon’ble Apex Court, this Court sees no valid reason to interfere with the well reasoned judgments recorded by the Courts below, which otherwise, appear to be based upon proper appreciation of evidence available on record and as such, same are upheld. 17. Accordingly, the present criminal revision petition is dismissed being devoid of any merit. The petitioner is directed to surrender himself before the learned trial Court within a period of 15 days to serve the sentence as awarded by the learned trial Court, if not already served and if not already in custody. Bail bonds of the petitioner, if any, are cancelled. Interim order dated 30.08.2025 stands vacated. Pending applications, if any, also stand disposed of.

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(Sandeep Sharma), Judge

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April 07, 2026 (Rajeev Raturi)

Sanjay Ranjta v. Kirti Pal

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Sanjay Ranjta v. Kirti Pal

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