State Vs Bobby Thakur

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2026:HHC:5561

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IN THE HIGH COURT OF HIMACHAL PRADESH, SHIMLA

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Cr. Appeal No.488 of 2011 Date of Decision: 03.03.2026

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State of Himachal Pradesh ….. Petitioner

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Versus

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Bobby Thakur .… Respondent Coram:

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The Hon’ble Mr. Justice Sandeep Sharma, Judge. Whether approved for reporting?¹ For the Appellant: Mr. Rajan Kahol & Mr. Vishal Panwar, Additional Advocate Generals with Mr. Anish Banshtu, Deputy Advocate General. For the Respondent :Mr. Virender Singh Chauhan,Advocate.

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Sandeep Sharma, Judge (oral)

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Instant Criminal appeal filed under Section

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378(3) of the Code of Criminal Procedure, is directed against the judgment of acquittal dated 16.06.2011, passed by learned Chief Judicial Magistrate, Sirmour, District at Nahan H.P., in Criminal case No.67/2 of 2007, whereby respondent (hereinafter referred to as the ‘accused’) has been acquitted of the offences under Sections 279 and 337 of Indian Penal Code.

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Whether reporters of the local papers may be allowed to see the judgment?

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2026:HHC:5561 2. In nutshell, the case of the prosecution is that on 26.03.2007, complainant Jagtar Singh (PW-1), alongwith his Uncle Roshan Lal (PW-2), aunts Kiran, Smt. Sukhvinder Kaur and grandmother Smt. Ishro Devi, had gone to Trilokpur temple to pay obeisance in a three-wheeler from Kolhapur bus stand. While they were returning from Trilokpur and had reached near Ruchira Paper Mills at around 8.30 PM, one Tata Sumo bearing registration No. CH-01(T)-1177 allegedly came from opposite direction in a high speed and hit the three-wheeler bearing registration No. HR-45-6929, as a result of which, uncle of the complainant, namely Roshan Lal sustained injuries. Above named Roshan Lal was taken to Nahan hospital for treatment. At around 8.40 PM, police received telephonic information with regard to the accident and accordingly reached the spot and recorded the statement of complainant Jagtar Singh under Section 154 Cr.P.C, on the basis of which, FIR Ex.PW11/A under Sections 279 and 337 of IPC came to be registered against the accused at police Station, Nahan. During investigation, Investigating Officer, HC Hari Chand (PW-11) visited the spot and prepared the site plan Ex. PW11/C. Investigating Officer after getting the

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2026:HHC:5561 photographs of the three-wheeler involved in the accident, took the same in possession vide memo Ex. PW6/A. He also took into possession Tata Sumo alongwith the documents on 27.03.2007 vide memo Ex.PW4/A. Vehicles involved in

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the accident were also got mechanically examined and the reports thereof are Ex.PW5/A and Ex.PW5/B. The Investigating Officer also moved an application Ex. PW11/D for medical examination of Roshan Lal and the Doctor concerned, vide MLC Ex.PW10/A, after obtaining the opinion of the Radiologist, opined that the injuries sustained by him are simple in nature. After completion of the investigation, police presented the challan in the competent court of law against the accused for his having committed offence punishable under Sections 279 and 337 of IPC.

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The learned trial Court being satisfied that a prima-facie case exists against the accused, put notice of accusation to the accused under Sections 279 and 337 of IPC, to which he pleaded not guilty and claimed trial.

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Prosecution with a view to prove its case examined as many as eleven witnesses. Accused in his statement recorded under Section 313 Cr.P.C, denied the

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2026:HHC:5561 case of the prosecution in toto and claimed himself to be innocent. He also led evidence in his defence by examining himself as DW-1.

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Learned trial Court, on the basis of the evidence adduced on record by the respective parties, vide judgment dated 16.06.2011, acquitted the respondent-accused from offences punishable under Sections 279 and 337 of IPC. In the aforesaid background, appellant-State has approached this court by way of instant proceedings, seeking therein conviction of the respondent-accused after setting aside the impugned judgment of acquittal recorded by the learned trial Court.

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In nutshell, the case of the prosecution, as has been projected in the grounds of appeal and further canvassed by Mr. Anish Banshtu, learned Deputy Advocate General, is that learned trial Court has failed to appreciate the prosecution evidence in its right perspective, as a result there of, findings to the detriment of the case of the prosecution have come to fore. He states that in the case at hand, bare perusal of statements made by the prosecution witnesses clearly reveals that prosecution has proved beyond reasonable doubt that on the date of alleged

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2026:HHC:5561 accident, accused, while driving the offending vehicle rashly and negligently, hit the three-wheeler, as result thereof, Roshan Lal suffered injuries.

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Though, prosecution has examined as many as eleven witnesses, but PW-1, Jagtar Singh, PW-2, Roshan Lal and PW-3, Deepi are the material witnesses. PW-1, Jagtar Singh deposed that on 26.03.2007, they had hired one three-wheeler to pay obeisance in Trilokpur temple and at around 8.30 PM, while they were returning back from Trilokpur and had reached near Ruchira Papers Mill, one Tata Sumo bearing No. CH-01-(T)-1177 came in a high speed and hit the tempo. He deposed that accused was driving the said vehicle and his uncle Roshan Lal sustained injuries in the accident. During his cross-examination, he admitted that six persons were travelling in the tempo and he was sitting on the back seat of the tempo and was not in a position to see the vehicle coming from front side. Since afore witness categorically stated that he was sitting on the back seat and was unable to see the vehicle coming from front side, version put forth by this witness rightly came to be ignored by learned trial Court for the reason that he had no occasion, if any, to see the accident with his own eyes.

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2026:HHC:5561 Though, this witness denied that tempo had hit the Tata Sumo, as result of which, tempo lost balance, but admitted that driver of three-wheeler, namely PW-3, Deepi was not holding any valid driving licence.

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PW-3, Deepi i.e. driver of three-wheeler bearing registration No. HR-45-6929 deposed that on 26.03.2007, 4- 5 persons had hired his tempo for Rs. 600/- and he took them to Trilokpur temple. He deposed that at around 9.30 PM, while they were coming back from the temple and reached on Trilokpur-Kala Amb road, he after having seen one Tata Sumo bearing No. CH-01-(T)-1177 coming in high speed, parked his three-wheeler on the right side of the road. He deposed that Tata Sumo hit his three-wheeler, as result of which, Roshan Lal sustained injuries. While stating that his driving licence has been lost and accident in question has taken place due to rash and negligent driving of the accused, he produced R.C of the vehicle and affidavit to the police, which were taken into possession vide memo Ex.PW3/A. In his cross-examination, he admitted that he was not having route permit and only three persons can travel in the tempo. He denied that he was overtaking the truck and due to lights of the vehicle coming from opposite

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2026:HHC:5561 side, he lost control and struck the three-wheeler against

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the Tata Sumo.

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PW-2, Roshan Lal deposed that on 26.03.2007, at around 8.30 PM, one Tata sumo bearing No. CH-01-(T)1177 came in a high speed and took pass from the truck and hit the three-wheeler. He deposed that he was sitting with the driver on the front seat and accused was driving Tata Sumo in a rash and negligent manner and on the wrong side. He deposed that he sustained injuries during the course of the accident. He deposed that there were 7 persons travelling in the tempo and the road on the spot is quite busy. As per the version put forth by this witness that tempo was moving at the speed of 5/10 Km per hour, whereas PW-3, Deepi deposed that he had stopped the tempo on the right side of the road.

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PW-1, Jagtar Singh also deposed that tempo was moving at the speed of 20 Km per hour. This witness nowhere deposed that Tata Sumo hit the three-wheeler while coming on wrong side, whereas PW-3 deposed that three-wheeler was parked on the side of the road and Tata Sumo hit the three-wheeler.

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2026:HHC:5561 11. If the statements made by PW-1 to PW-3 are

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read in conjunction, there are material contradictions and inconsistencies and as such, version put forth by them rightly came to be discarded by learned trial Court, while ascertaining the guilt, if any, of the respondent-accused. All the aforesaid witnesses gave altogether different versions with regard to timing as well as rash and negligent driving, if any, of the accused. Interestingly, one of the prosecution witnesses stated that at the time of the accident, threewheeler was being driven by PW-3, Deepi at the speed of 10/20 KM per hour, whereas PW-3 claimed that he had parked his three-wheeler on the side of the road.

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PW-9, Dr. D.D.Sharma examined MLC and X-ray films of Roshan Lal and deposed that he did not detect any fracture and issued his opinion Ex.PW9/A.

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PW-10, Dr. Parmesh Dogra after having examined injured Roshan Lal noticed four injuries on his person vide MLC Ex.PW10/A, which were found to be simple in nature.

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No doubt, prosecution after examining PW-9 and PW-10 was able to prove factum with regard to injuries suffered by Roshan Lal, but once prosecution failed to prove

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2026:HHC:5561 factum of the accident, if any, caused by the accused,

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opinion rendered by PW-9 and PW-10 in the shape of MLC with regard to injuries suffered in the accident may not be of much relevance.

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Interestingly, PW-11, HC Hari Chand admitted in his cross-examination that insurance certificate of the three-wheeler as well as driving licence of the driver had not been taken into possession by him. He also admitted that he had not challaned the tempo for not holding driving licence. He admitted that no local witness had been associated by him and only PW-1, PW-2 and PW-3, who were travelling in the tempo, were made witnesses by him. He also admitted factum with regard to presence of number

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of persons on the spot of the accident.

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Accused, while examining himself as DW-1,

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deposed that on 26.03.2007, he was coming from Trilokpur to Kala Amb side in Tata Sumo bearing No. CH-01-(T)-1177 and at around 8.30 PM, near Ruchira Papers Mill, one three-wheeler bearing No. HR-45-6929 tried to overtake him and in the meantime, one truck came from opposite side and three-wheeler hit his Tata Sumo. He admitted that the passengers of the tempo had sustained minor injuries and

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2026:HHC:5561

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he took the injured to the hospital. He deposed that he had been called in the Police Post and no proceedings had been conducted by the police in his presence. He categorically denied in his cross-examination that accident in question had taken place due to his rash and negligent driving.

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Though, it clearly emerges from the evidence led on record by the prosecution and the accused that accident took place near Ruchira Papers Mill, but interestingly, no independent witnesses ever came to be associated by the Investigating Officer during the investigation and he only chose to examine interested witnesses, who otherwise failed to prove the case of the prosecution. Conjoint reading of statements made by the material prosecution witnesses creates serious doubt with regard to correctness of the story put forth by the prosecution. Since PW-3, Deepi was not holding any valid driving licence as such, Court below rightly concluded that possibility of accident due to his fault cannot be ruled out. None of the prosecution witnesses stated anything specific with regard to driving of the vehicles involved in the accident on the public way. None of the witnesses has stated that offending vehicle was being

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2026:HHC:5561

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driven rashly and negligent, rather they stated that vehicle

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was being driven in a high speed.

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Reliance is placed on judgment rendered by the

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Hon’ble Apex Court in Braham Dass v. State of Himachal

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Pradesh, (2009) 3 SCC (Cri) 406 , which reads as under:-

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“6. In support of the appeal, learned counsel for the appellant submitted that there was no evidence on record to show any negligence. It has not been brought on record as to how the accused- appellant was negligent in any way. On the contrary what has been stated is that one person had gone to the roof top and driver started the vehicle while he was there. There was no evidence to show that the driver had knowledge that any passenger was on the roof top of the bus. Learned counsel for the respondent on the other hand submitted that PW1 had stated that the conductor had told the driver that one passenger was still on the roof of the bus and the driver started the bus.

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8. Section 279 deals with rash driving or riding on a public way. A bare reading of the provision makes it clear that it must be established that the accused was driving any vehicle on a public way in a manner which endangered human life or was likely to cause hurt or injury to any other person. Obviously the foundation in accusations under Section 279 IPC is not negligence. Similarly in Section 304 A the stress is on causing death by negligence or rashness. Therefore, for bringing in application of either Section 279 or 304 A it must be established that there was an element of rashness or negligence. Even if the prosecution version is accepted in toto, there was no evidence led to show that any negligence was involved.”

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The Hon’ble Apex Court in case titled “ State of

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Karnataka v. Satish,”1998 (8) SCC 493 , has also observed as under:-

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2026:HHC:5561

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“1. Truck No. MYE-3236 being driven by the respondent turned turtle while crossing a "nalla" on 25-11-1982 at about 8.30 a.m. The accident resulted in the death of 15 persons and receipt of injuries by about 18 persons, who were travelling in the fully loaded truck. The respondent was charge-sheeted and tried. The learned trial court held that the respondent drove the vehicle at a high speed and it was on that account that the accident took place. The respondent was convicted for offences under Sections 279, 337, 338 and 304A IPC and sentenced to various terms of imprisonment. The respondent challenged his conviction and sentence before the Second Additional Sessions Judge, Belgaum. While the conviction and sentence imposed upon the respondent for the offence under Section 279 IPC was set aside, the appellate court confirmed the conviction and sentenced the respondent for offences under Sections 304A, 337 and 338 IPC. On a criminal revision petition being filed by the respondent before the High Court of Karnataka, the conviction and sentence of the respondent for all the offences were set aside and the respondent was acquitted. This appeal by special leave is directed against the said judgment of acquittal passed by the High Court of Karnataka.

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2. We have examined the record and heard learned counsel for the parties.

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3. Both the trial court and the appellate court held the respondent guilty for offences under Sections 337, 338 and 304A IPC after recording a finding that the respondent was driving the truck at a "high speed". No specific finding has been recorded either by the trial court or by the first appellate court to the effect that the respondent was driving the truck either negligently or rashly. After holding that the respondent was driving the truck at a "high speed", both the courts pressed into aid the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur to hold the respondent guilty.

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4. Merely because the truck was being driven at a "high speed" does not bespeak of either "negligence" or "rashness" by itself. None of the witnesses examined by the prosecution could give any indication, even approximately, as to what they meant by "high speed". "High speed" is a relative term. It was for the prosecution to bring on record material to establish as to what it meant by "high speed" in the facts and

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2026:HHC:5561

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circumstances of the case. In a criminal trial, the burden of providing everything essential to the establishment of the charge against an accused always rests on the prosecution and there is a presumption of innocence in favour of the accused until the contrary is proved. Criminality is not to be presumed, subject of course to some statutory exceptions. There is no such statutory exception pleaded in the present case. In the absence of any material on the record, no presumption of "rashness" or "negligence" could be drawn by invoking the maxim "res ipsa loquitur". There is evidence to show that immediately before the truck turned turtle, there was a big jerk. It is not explained as to whether the jerk was because of the uneven road or mechanical failure. The Motor Vehicle Inspector who inspected the vehicle had submitted his report. That report is not forthcoming from the record and the Inspector was not examined for reasons best known to the prosecution. This is a serious infirmity and lacuna in the prosecution case.

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5. There being no evidence on the record to establish "negligence" or "rashness" in driving the truck on the part of the respondent, it cannot be said that the view taken by the High Court in acquitting the respondent is a perverse view. To us it appears that the view of the High Court, in the facts and circumstances of this case, is a reasonably possible view. We, therefore, do not find any reason to interfere with the order of acquittal. The appeal fails and is dismissed. The respondent is on bail. His bail bonds shall stand discharged. Appeal dismissed.”

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20. Careful perusal of aforesaid judgment clearly suggests that there cannot be any presumption of rashness or negligence, rather, onus is always upon the prosecution to prove beyond reasonable doubt that vehicle in question was being driven rashly and negligently. In the aforesaid judgment, it has been specifically held that in the absence

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2026:HHC:5561

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of any material on record, no presumption of rashness or negligence can be drawn by invoking maxim res ipsa loquitur .

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By now it is well settled that in a criminal trial evidence of the eye witness requires a careful assessment and needs to be evaluated for its creditability. Hon’ble Apex Court has repeatedly held that since the fundamental aspect of criminal jurisprudence rests upon the well established principle that “no man is guilty until proved so”, utmost caution is required to be exercised in dealing with the situation where there are multiple testimonies and equally large number of witnesses testifying before the Court. Most importantly, Hon’ble Apex Court has held that there must be a string that should join the evidence of all the witnesses and thereby satisfying the test of consistency in evidence amongst all the witnesses. In nutshell, it can be said that evidence in criminal cases needs to be evaluated on touchstone of consistency. In this regard, reliance is placed upon the judgment passed by Hon’ble Apex Court in

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C. Magesh and others versus State of Karnataka (2010)

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5 Supreme Court Cases 645, wherein it has been held as

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under:-

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2026:HHC:5561 “45. It may be mentioned herein that in criminal jurisprudence, evidence has to be evaluated on the touchstone of consistency. Needless to emphasis, consistency is the keyword for upholding the conviction of an accused. In this regard it is to be noted that this Court in the case titled Surja Singh v. State of U.P. (2008)16 SCC 686: 2008(11) SCR 286 has held:-( SCC p.704, para 14)

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“ 14. The evidence must be tested for its inherent consistency and the inherent probability of the story; consistency with the account of other witness is held to be creditworthy;..the probative value of such evidence becomes eligible to be put into the scales for a cumulative evaluation.”

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46. In a criminal trial, evidence of the eye witness requires a careful assessment and must be evaluated for its creditability. Since the fundamental aspect of criminal jurisprudence rests upon the stated principle that “ no man is guilty until proven so,” hence utmost caution is required to be exercised in dealing with situation where there are multiple testimonies and equally large number of witnesses testifying before the Court. There must be a string that should join the evidence of all the witnesses and thereby satisfying the test of consistence in evidence amongst all the witnesses.

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After perusing the statements of the prosecution witnesses as well exhibits placed on record, two views are possible in the present case and as such, the respondentaccused is entitled to the benefit of doubt. The learned counsel for the petitioner-accused has placed reliance on the judgment passed by Hon’ble Apex Court reported in

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2026:HHC:5561

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State of UP versus Ghambhir Singh & others , AIR 2005

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(92) Supreme Court 2439 , wherein the Hon’ble Apex Court has held that if on the same evidence, two views are reasonably possible, the one in favour of the accused must be preferred. The relevant paragraph is reproduced as

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under:-

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“6. So far as Hori Lal, PW-1 is concerned, he had been sent to fetch a basket from the village and it was only a matter of coincidence that while he was returning he witnessed the entire incident. The High Court did not consider it safe to rely on his testimony because he evidence clearly shows that he had an animus against the appellants. Moreover, his evidence was not corroborated by objective circumstances. Though it was his categorical case that all of them fired, no injury caused by rifle was found, and, only two wounds were found on the person of the deceased. Apart from this PW-3 did not mention the presence of either PW-1 or PW-2 at the time of occurrence. All these circumstances do create doubt about the truthfulness of the prosecution case. The presence of these three witnesses becomes doubtful if their evidence is critically scrutinized. May be it is also possible to take a view in favour of the prosecution, but since the High Court, on an appreciation of the evidence on record, has recorded a finding in favour of the accused, we do not feel persuaded to interfere with the order of the High Court in an appeal against acquittal. It is well settled that if on the same evidence two views are reasonably possible, the one in favour of the accused must be preferred.”

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Reliance is also placed on judgment rendered by

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the Hon’ble Apex Court in “ Harbeer Singh v. Sheeshpal

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and Ors. , (2016) 16 SCC 418, relevant para whereof is being reproduced herein below:-

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2026:HHC:5561

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“11. It is a cardinal principle of criminal jurisprudence that the guilt of the accused must be proved beyond all reasonable doubt. The burden of proving its case beyond all reasonable doubt lies on the prosecution and it never shifts. Another golden thread which runs through the web of the administration of justice in criminal cases is that if two views are possible on the evidence adduced in the case, one pointing to the guilt of the accused and the other to his innocence, the view which is favourable to the accused should be adopted. [Vide Kali Ram Vs. State of Himachal Pradesh, (1973) 2 SCC 808; State of Rajasthan Vs. Raja Ram, (2003) 8 SCC 180; Chandrappa & Ors. vs. State of Karnataka, (2007) 4 SCC 415; Upendra Pradhan Vs. State of Orissa, (2015) 11 SCC 124 and Golbar Hussain & Ors. Vs. State of Assam and Anr., (2015) 11 SCC 242].”

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The Hon’ble Division Bench of this Court vide

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judgment reported in Pawan Kumar and Kamal Bhardwaj versus State of H.P ., latest HLJ 2008 (HP) 1150 has also

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concluded here-in-below:-

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“25. Moreover, when the occurrence is admitted but there are two different versions of the incident, one put forth by the prosecution and the other by the defence and one of the two version is proved to be false, the second can safely be believed, unless the same is unnatural or inherently untrue.

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26. In the present case, as noticed hereinabove, the manner of occurrence, as pleaded by the defence, is not true. The manner of the occurrence testified by PW-11 Sandeep Rana is not unnatural nor is it intrinsically untrue, therefore, it has to be believed.

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27.Sandeep Rana could not be said to have been established, even if the prosecution version were taken on its face value. It was pleaded that no serious injury had been caused to PW-11 Sandeep Rana and that all the injuries, according to the testimony of PW-21 Dr. Raj Kumar, which he noticed on the person of Sandeep Rana, at the time of his medical examination, were simple in nature.

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2026:HHC:5561

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Consequently, in view of the discussion made hereinabove as well as law laid down by the Hon’ Apex Court, this court sees no illegality or infirmity in the impugned judgment passed by the learned trial Court, which appears to be based upon the correct appreciation of the evidence adduced on record and as such, same deserve to be upheld. Bailable warrants furnished by the respondent-accused are hereby discharged.

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Accordingly, the present appeal is dismissed alongwith pending application(s), if any.

(Sandeep Sharma)

March 03,2026

Judge

(shankar)

State v. Bobby Thakur

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State v. Bobby Thakur

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