State of Hp Vs Chuni Lal

dated 27.11.2014 passed by the learned Judicial Magistrate First Class, Court No.5, Shimla, H.P. (learned Trial Court) vide which the respondent (accused before learned Trial Court) was acquitted of the commission of offences punishable under Sections 451 and 323

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of the Indian Penal Code (IPC). (The parties shall hereinafter be

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1 Whether reporters of Local Papers may be allowed to see the judgment? Yes.

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referred to in the same manner as they were arrayed before the learned Trial Court for convenience) .

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Briefly stated, the facts giving rise to the present appeal are that the police presented a challan before the learned Trial Court against the accused for the commission of offences punishable under Section 451 and 323 of the IPC. It was asserted that the informant, Jagdish Chand (PW1), was present in his home on 12.11.2012. Accused Chuni Lal came to his courtyard at about 9:20 a.m and asked him to get out. The informant came out of the room into the verandah. The accused Chuni Lal told the informant that he had made a complaint against Chuni Lal in the Forest Department. The informant denied that he had made any complaint. Chuni Lal came to the verandah and gave beatings to the informant. Geeta Devi (PW2) and Seema (PW3) came to the spot after hearing the noise, and the accused ran away from the spot. The matter was narrated to the police, and the police recorded an entry (Ext.PW4/A) in the daily diary. The police filed an application (Ext.PW5/B) for the medical examination of the informant Jagdish Chand (PW1). Dr Jiten Sharma (PW5) examined the informant and found that he (the informant) had sustained simple injuries that could have been caused within six hours of the

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examination. The police registered the FIR (Ext.PW6/A). ASI Kundan Lal (PW6) investigated the matter. He visited the spot and prepared the site plan (Ext.PW6/B). He recorded the statements of witnesses as per their version. After the completion of the investigation, the challan was prepared and presented before the learned Trial Court.

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Learned Trial Court found sufficient reasons to summon the accused. When the accused appeared, he was charged with the commission of offences punishable under Sections 451 and 323 of the IPC, to which he pleaded not guilty and claimed to be tried.

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The prosecution examined six witnesses to prove its case. Jagdish Chand (PW1) is the informant/victim. Geeta (PW2) and Seema (PW3) came to the spot after hearing the noise. LHC Mahinder (PW4) proved the entry in the daily diary. Dr Jiten Sharma (PW5) examined the informant. ASI Kundan Lal (PW6) investigated the matter.

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The accused, in his statement recorded under Section 313 of the Code of Criminal Procedure (Cr.P.C.), denied the prosecution's case in its entirety. He stated that the informant did not have a cordial relationship with him. He was falsely implicated. He did not produce any evidence in his defence.

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Learned Trial Court held that the prosecution had relied upon the statements of the related witnesses. The witnesses admitted that there are many houses in the vicinity, but no person was examined. Seema (PW3) specifically admitted that no scuffle had taken place in her presence. The accused was entitled to the benefit of the doubt in these circumstances. Hence, the learned Trial Court acquitted the accused.

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Being aggrieved by the judgment passed by the learned Trial Court, the State has filed the present appeal asserting that the learned Trial Court erred in acquitting the accused. No cogent reasons were assigned to discard the statements of prosecution witnesses. The medical evidence corroborated the prosecution's version, but it was ignored. The witnesses specifically stated that no other person was present on the spot, and the prosecution's case could not have been doubted because of the non-examination of independent witnesses. Therefore, it was prayed that the present appeal be allowed and the judgment passed by the learned Trial Court be set aside.

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I have heard Mr Lokender Kutlheria, learned Additional Advocate General for the appellant/State and Mr Jeevesh Sharma, learned counsel for the respondent/accused.

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Mr Lokender Kutlehria, learned Additional Advocate General for the appellant/State, submitted that the learned Trial Court erred in acquitting the accused. The prosecution witnesses consistently stated that the accused had trespassed into the informant’s house and given beatings to him. The prosecution witnesses stated in their cross-examination that no person from the vicinity was present on the spot, and the learned Trial Court erred in rejecting the prosecution's case because of the nonexamination of the independent witnesses. The medical evidence corroborated the informant’s version, but the learned Trial Court failed to look into the medical evidence. Hence, he prayed that the present appeal be allowed and the judgment passed by the learned Trial Court be set aside.

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Mr Jeevesh Sharma, learned counsel for the respondent/accused, submitted that the learned Trial Court has assigned cogent reasons for discarding the prosecution's case. Learned Trial Court had taken a reasonable view while appreciating the evidence, and this Court should not interfere with the reasonable view of the learned Trial Court, even if another view is possible. Hence, he prayed that the present appeal be dismissed.

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I have given considerable thought to the submissions made at the bar and have gone through the records carefully.

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The present appeal has been filed against a judgment of acquittal. It was laid down by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Surendra Singh v. State of Uttarakhand, (2025) 5 SCC 433: 2025 SCC OnLine SC 176 that the Court can interfere with a judgment of acquittal if it is patently perverse, is based on misreading of evidence, omission to consider the material evidence and no reasonable person could have recorded the acquittal based on the evidence led before the learned Trial Court. It was observed at page 438:

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“24. It could thus be seen that it is a settled legal position that the interference with the finding of acquittal recorded by the learned trial Judge would be warranted by the High Court only if the judgment of acquittal suffers from patent perversity; that the same is based on a misreading/omission to consider material evidence on record; and that no two reasonable views are possible and only the view consistent with the guilt of the accused is possible from the evidence available on record.

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This position was reiterated in State of M.P. v. Ramveer

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Singh, 2025 SCC OnLine SC 1743 , wherein it was observed:

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We may note that the present appeal is one against acquittal. Law is well-settled by a plethora of judgments of this Court that, in an appeal against acquittal, unless the finding of acquittal is perverse on the face of the record and the only possible view based on the evidence is consistent

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with the guilt of the accused, only in such an event, should the appellate Court interfere with a judgment of acquittal. Where two views are possible, i.e., one consistent with the acquittal and the other holding the accused guilty, the appellate Court should refuse to interfere with the judgment of acquittal. Reference in this regard may be made to the judgments of this Court in the cases of Babu Sahebagouda Rudragoudar v. State of Karnataka (2024) 8 SCC 149 ; H.D. Sundara v. State of Karnataka (2023) 9 SCC 581 and Rajesh Prasad v. State of Bihar (2022) 3 SCC 471 .

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A similar view was taken in Tulasareddi v. State of

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Karnataka, 2026 SCC OnLine SC 89, wherein it was observed:

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“29. From the aforesaid decisions rendered by this Court, it can be said that if two reasonable conclusions are possible on the basis of the evidence on record, the Appellate Court should not disturb the findings of acquittal recorded by the Trial Court. Further, if the view taken is a possible view, the Appellate Court cannot overturn the order of acquittal on the ground that another view was also possible. The following principles have to be kept in mind by the Appellate Court while dealing with the appeals against an order of acquittal:

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(a) whether the judgment of acquittal suffers from patent perversity;

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(b) whether the judgment is based on misreading/omission to consider the material evidence on record;

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(c) an order of acquittal is to be interfered with only when there are “compelling and substantial reasons” for doing so. If the order is “clearly unreasonable”, it is a compelling reason for interference.’

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(d) the appellate court, while deciding an appeal against acquittal, after reappreciating the evidence, is required to consider whether the view taken by the trial court is a possible view which could have been taken on the basis of the evidence on record;

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(e) if the view taken is a possible view, the appellate court cannot overturn the order of acquittal on the ground that another view was also possible; and

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(f) the appellate court can interfere with the order of acquittal only if it comes to a finding that the only conclusion which can be recorded on the basis of the evidence on record was that the guilt of the accused was proved beyond a reasonable doubt and no other conclusion was possible.”

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The present appeal has to be decided as per the parameters laid down by the Hon’ble Supreme Court.

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Informant Jagdish Chand (PW1) stated that he was taking food in his home when Chuni Lal came to the house and told him that the informant had complained against the accused to the Forest Department. The informant denied that he had made any such complaint, and the accused inflicted a blow by means of a fist. The informant sustained injury. He specifically denied that the accused had not entered this house.

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This statement shows that the accused had entered the informant’s house. This is contrary to the initial version narrated to the Police, in which it was stated that the accused came to the courtyard of the house and asked the informant to come out. When the informant came out, the accused gave beatings to the informant. Thus, it is apparent that the informant has shifted the place of the incident from the courtyard to the house.

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Geeta Devi (PW2) stated that she was preparing food. The informant and his daughters were taking food in their kitchen. The accused came to the house and enquired whether he (the informant) had called the Forest Department. The informant replied in the negative. The accused gave the informant beatings with kicks and fist blows. The statement of this witness also shows that the informant had entered the house and given beatings to the informant while he was taking the food in his home.

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Seema (PW3) stated that the family was taking food in the kitchen on 12.11.2012 at about 9:20 a.m. The accused came to the verandah and called the informant. The informant stated that he was taking food. The accused told the informant that he had made a complaint to the Forest Department. When the informant went outside, the accused gave him beatings with kicks and fist blows. She rescued the informant, and the accused ran away.

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The sequence of the events narrated by this witness is quite different from that narrated by the informant and his wife. As per this witness, the incident had taken place in the verandah after the informant had finished his meals. This was not narrated by the informant or his wife. Seema admitted in her cross-examination that no scuffle had taken place in her presence. She volunteered to

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say that when she came out, the accused was beating and had left. The accused could not have given beatings and left at the same time. Thus, her testimony is not satisfactory and cannot be relied upon.

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Informant Jagdish admitted in his cross-examination that 250-300 people reside in his ward, and three to four houses are located in his immediate neighbourhood. He admitted that people are usually present in their homes at about 9-10 A.M. Geeta Devi (PW2) also admitted in her cross-examination that many houses are located around her house, and 30-40 people reside in those houses. She could not say that people are usually present in their homes in the morning. These admissions in the crossexamination show that many houses are located in the vicinity. The fact that no one came to the spot from the neighbourhood would make the prosecution's case suspect that the incident had taken place.

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Geeta Devi (PW2) admitted that her family is not on visiting terms with the family of the accused. This admission shows that the statements of the prosecution witnesses are required to be seen with due care and caution.

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Dr Jiten Sharma (PW5) found a contusion over the left lower eyelid, extending onto the cheek and the temple, with a superficial abrasion that could have been caused by a blunt weapon. He has not stated that the injury noticed by him could have been caused by a fist blow. He admitted in cross-examination that the injury can be caused by falling on a hard surface and may or may not be caused in a scuffle. Therefore, the medical evidence does not corroborate the informant’s version that the accused had inflicted a fist blow, causing injury to him.

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The learned Trial Court held that the accused was alone and three members of the informant party were present on the spot. Still, the informant party had not taken any steps to defend the informant, which is highly improbable. Further, the informant would not have gone outside when he was called by his enemy.

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Therefore, the learned Trial Court had taken a reasonable view while acquitting the accused, and this Court will not interfere with the reasonable view of the learned Trial Court, even if another view is possible.

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No other point was urged

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In view of the above, the present appeal fails, and it is dismissed. Pending miscellaneous application(s), if any, also stand disposed of.

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In view of the provisions of Section 437-A of the Code of Criminal Procedure (Section 481 of Bhartiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023) the respondent/accused is directed to furnish bail bonds in the sum of ₹25,000/- with one surety in the like amount to the satisfaction of the learned Trial Court within four weeks, which shall be effective for six months with stipulation that in the event of Special Leave Petition being filed against this judgment, or on grant of the leave, the respondent/accused on receipt of notice thereof, shall appear before the Hon’ble Supreme Court.

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Records be sent back to the learned Trial Court forthwith, along with a copy of the judgment.

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(Rakesh Kainthla) Judge 1^st June, 2026 (Nikita)

State of Hp v. Chuni Lal

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State of Hp v. Chuni Lal

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