State of Hp Vs Sat Pal

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IN THE HIGH COURT OF HIMACHAL PRADESH, SHIMLA

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Cr. Appeal No. 308 of 2014 Reserved on: 17.06.2026 Date of Decision: 01.07.2026

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State of H.P. ...Appellant Versus Satpal ...Respondent ______________________________________ Coram_

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Hon’ble Mr Justice Rakesh Kainthla , Judge. Whether approved for reporting?¹ Yes For the Appellant : Mr Lokender Kutlehria, Additional Advocate General. For the Respondents : Mr Subhash Punshi, Advocate.

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Rakesh Kainthla, Judge

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The present appeal is directed against the judgment dated 01.05.2014 passed by Learned Additional Sessions Judge-II, Shimla, HP (learned Appellate Court) vide which the judgment of conviction dated 05.04.2012 and order of sentence dated 10.04.2012 passed by Learned Judicial Magistrate First Class, Court No.4, Shimla HP (learned Trial Court) were set aside. (The parties shall hereinafter be referred to in the same manner as they were arrayed before the Learned Trial Court for convenience).

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1 Whether reporters of Local Papers may be allowed to see the judgment? Yes.

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Briefly stated, the facts giving rise to the present appeal are that the complainant, Food Inspector, filed a complaint against the accused for the commission of an offence punishable under Section 16(1) (a) (i) of the Prevention of Food Adulteration Act (PFA) 1954. It was asserted that Mr L.D. Thakur (PW4) was appointed as a Food Inspector for all local areas of MC Shimla and District Shimla. He inspected the premises known as M/s Vijay Chand Arun Kumar, Meer Building, Bus Stand, Shimla on 26.02.2005 at about 12.30 p.m. He found Arun Kumar conducting the business of the shop as a salesman. He had 9 x 400-gram sealed packets of Kitty’s premium bread on the counter for sale to the general public. The food inspector revealed his identity and issued a notice (Ext.P1) declaring his intention to take the sample of bread for analysis. The food inspector purchased 3 x 400 grams of Kitty's premium bread on cash payment of ₹24/- as a sample for analysis. A receipt (Ext.P2) was issued to him. The food inspector separately labelled and wrapped the packets of Kitty’s premium bread. He affixed a paper slip bearing serial number and code number SII/2654 issued and signed by local health authority M. C. Shimla with gum from bottom to top of each packet. He obtained the signatures of Arun Kumar in such a manner that they appeared

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on the slip and the wrapper both. He fastened the packets with a strong thread and sealed each packet with sealing wax. He put at least 4 seal impressions on each packet and covered all the knots with a seal. Devender Singh (PW3) and Charan Dass (PW2) witnessed the proceedings. Food Inspector prepared a spot memo (Ex. P3). He sent one part of the sample to the Public Analyst along with a memo in Form VII (Ext.P4) through Charan Dass (PW2) in a sealed packet. He sent a copy of the memo, Form VII, along with the seal impression used to seal the sample separately to the Public Analyst in a sealed letter through the same person. He deposited the remaining two parts of the samples with two copies of Form VII with the Local Health Authority (LHA) MC Shimla, in a sealed packet for record. Public Analyst issued a report (Ext.P7) stating that the date, month and year in which the bread was manufactured had not been mentioned on the label. Alcoholic acidity was equivalent to 9.15 ml of Sodium Hydroxide (NaOH) per 100 grams of dried substance, and the sample of bread was misbranded and adulterated. This report was forwarded to the Food Inspector by LHA vide letter (Ext.P8). Food Inspector produced the document and the case file along with an application (Ext.PW1/B) for seeking a sanction before the Chief Medical Officer,

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Shimla, who was empowered to grant a prosecution sanction. Chief Medical Officer, Shimla, went through the case file and issued the sanction (Ext.PW1/A). The Food Inspector filed a complaint before the Court and gave an intimation (Ext.PW5/A) to the Local Health Authority. Local Health Authority forwarded the report of analysis to the accused vide letter (Ext.PW5/B).

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The learned Trial Court found sufficient reasons to summon the accused. When the accused appeared, a notice of accusation was put to him for the commission of offences punishable under Section 16(1) (a) (i) of the PFA Act, to which the accused pleaded not guilty and claimed to be tried.

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4. The accused filed an application under Section 20A of the PFA Act for impleading Raghu Enterprises, from whom the bread was purchased. The learned Trial Court ordered the summoning of M/s. Raghu Enterprises as accused no. 3.

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A notice of accusation was put to the accused no. 3, to which he pleaded not guilty and claimed to be tried.

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Accused no. 3 also filed an application under Section 20A of the PFA Act for impleading M/s Kitty Industry's Private Limited through the Director and Nominee. Learned Trial Court allowed the

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application vide order dated 12.05.2009 and summoned Kitty Industry Private Limited as accused no. 4.

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A notice of accusation was put to the accused No. 4. vide order dated 01.08.2011, to which he pleaded not guilty and claimed to be tried.

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The complainant was called upon to produce the evidence, and the complainant examined Naresh Kumar (CW1), Charan Dass (PW2), Devinder Singh (PW3), L.D. Thakur (PW4) and R.D. Sharma (PW5).

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Accused Satpal, Production Manager of Kitty Industries, admitted that he was the manufacturer of Kitty bread and had supplied it to accused no. 3 who had supplied it to accused nos. 1 and 2. He admitted that the samples of bread were taken by the Food Inspector. He denied the rest of the complainant’s case. He stated that he did not want to produce any evidence in defence.

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Learned Trial Court held that the testimonies of the complainant and his witnesses corroborated each other. It was duly proved that the bread was manufactured by M/s Kitty Industries and remained in the same condition in which it was manufactured till its sale to the Food Inspector. The bread was sent to the Public Analyst, who found it to be misbranded and adulterated. Accused

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no. 4 also admitted that he had supplied the bread to the coaccused. Hence, the learned Trial Court convicted accused no. 4 of the commission of an offence punishable under Section 16(1) (a) (i) of PFA and sentenced him to undergo simple imprisonment for 6 months for the commission of the aforesaid offence, pay a fine of ₹1,000/- and in default of payment of fine, to undergo simple imprisonment for 15 days.

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Aggrieved by the judgment and order passed by the learned Trial Court, the accused filed an appeal, which was decided by the learned Additional Sessions Judge-II, Shimla (learned Appellate Court). Learned Appellate Court held that the Food Inspector had not mentioned in the spot memo (Ext.P3) that the sample did not have the manufacturing date, time and place, which made the complainant's case doubtful that the sample was misbranded. There was no evidence that the bread remained in the same condition in which it was manufactured, and the liability could not be fastened upon the accused. There was a marginal increase in the alcoholic acidity of Sodium Hydroxide, which could occur with the passage of time. There was a delay in the analysis of the sample, which could have contributed to the marginal increase. Hence, the learned Appellate Court acquitted the accused.

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Being aggrieved by the judgment passed by the learned Appellate Court, the State has filed the present appeal asserting that the learned Appellate Court failed to properly appreciate the prosecution evidence. The statements of prosecution witnesses corroborated each other, and there was no reason to disbelieve them. Learned Appellate Court wrongly held that the sample was not kept properly, which could have led to an increase in the alcoholic content. Therefore, it was prayed that the present appeal be allowed and the judgment passed by the learned Appellate Court be set aside.

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I have heard Mr Lokender Kutlehria, learned Additional Advocate General for the appellant/State and Mr Subhash Punshi, learned counsel for the respondent/accused.

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Mr Lokender Kutlehria, learned Additional Advocate General for the appellate/State, submitted that the prosecution had proved its case beyond a reasonable doubt and the learned Appellate Court erred in acquitting the accused. The integrity of the sample was duly proved by the testimonies of the complainant's witnesses. The mere fact that the Food Inspector had not mentioned that the manufacturing date was not mentioned on the sample was not sufficient to record the acquittal. The learned Trial

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Court had convicted the accused by a well-reasoned judgment, and the learned Appellate Court erred in setting aside this judgment. Hence, he prayed that the present appeal be allowed and the judgment passed by the learned Appellate Court be set aside.

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Mr. Subhash Punshi, learned Counsel for the accused, submitted that the Food Inspector failed to mention in the spot memo that the bread did not have the manufacturing date in the spot memo. Therefore, the report of the Public Analyst to this effect was not reliable. The sample was taken on the 26.02.2005 and was analysed on 24.03.2005. Bread is a perishable item and likely to degrade with the passage of time. The increase in the alcoholic acidity is attributable to the faulty storage conditions and the delay in analysing the sample. No opportunity to crossexamine the co-accused was afforded to the present accused, and there is no evidence that the bread remained in the same condition in which it was manufactured. Learned Appellate Court had taken a reasonable view while acquitting the accused, and this Court should not interfere with the reasonable view of the Court while exercising jurisdiction to decide an appeal against acquittal. He relied upon the judgment in P. Robert Immanuel and another vs. The State Represented by the Food Inspector 2010 FAJ 59, Ganga Ram vs.

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State of H.P., 2011 (2) FAC 76, Narender Kumar vs. State of H.P. 1993 (1) FAC 15, Nebh Raj vs. The State (Delhi Administration) and another 1980 (2) FAC 191-A and Mohinder Kumar vs. State of Haryana (2004) 1 SCC 778 in support of his submissions.

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I have given considerable thought to the submissions made at the bar and have gone through the records carefully.

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The present appeal has been filed against a judgment of acquittal. It was laid down by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Surendra Singh v. State of Uttarakhand, (2025) 5 SCC 433: 2025 SCC OnLine SC 176 that the Court can interfere with a judgment of acquittal if it is patently perverse, is based on misreading of evidence, omission to consider the material evidence and no reasonable person could have recorded the acquittal based on the evidence led before the learned Trial Court. It was observed at page 438:

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“24. It could thus be seen that it is a settled legal position that the interference with the finding of acquittal recorded by the learned trial Judge would be warranted by the High Court only if the judgment of acquittal suffers from patent perversity; that the same is based on a misreading/omission to consider material evidence on record; and that no two reasonable views are possible and only the view consistent with the guilt of the accused is possible from the evidence available on record.

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18. This position was reiterated in State of M.P. v. Ramveer

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Singh, 2025 SCC OnLine SC 1743 , wherein it was observed:

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We may note that the present appeal is one against acquittal. Law is well-settled by a plethora of judgments of this Court that, in an appeal against acquittal, unless the finding of acquittal is perverse on the face of the record and the only possible view based on the evidence is consistent with the guilt of the accused, only in such an event, should the appellate Court interfere with a judgment of acquittal. Where two views are possible, i.e., one consistent with the acquittal and the other holding the accused guilty, the appellate Court should refuse to interfere with the judgment of acquittal. Reference in this regard may be made to the judgments of this Court in the cases of Babu Sahebagouda Rudragoudar v. State of Karnataka (2024) 8 SCC 149 ; H.D. Sundara v. State of Karnataka (2023) 9 SCC 581 and Rajesh Prasad v. State of Bihar (2022) 3 SCC 471 .

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A similar view was taken in Tulasareddi v. State of

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Karnataka, 2026 SCC OnLine SC 89, wherein it was observed:

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“29. From the aforesaid decisions rendered by this Court, it can be said that if two reasonable conclusions are possible on the basis of the evidence on record, the Appellate Court should not disturb the findings of acquittal recorded by the Trial Court. Further, if the view taken is a possible view, the Appellate Court cannot overturn the order of acquittal on the ground that another view was also possible. The following principles have to be kept in mind by the Appellate Court while dealing with the appeals against an order of acquittal:

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(a) whether the judgment of acquittal suffers from patent perversity;

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(b) whether the judgment is based on misreading/omission to consider the material evidence on record;

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(c) an order of acquittal is to be interfered with only when there are “compelling and substantial reasons” for doing so. If the order is “clearly unreasonable”, it is a compelling reason for interference.’

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(d) the appellate court, while deciding an appeal against acquittal, after reappreciating the evidence, is required to consider whether the view taken by the trial court is a possible view which could have been taken on the basis of the evidence on record;

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(e) if the view taken is a possible view, the appellate court cannot overturn the order of acquittal on the ground that another view was also possible; and

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(f) the appellate court can interfere with the order of acquittal only if it comes to a finding that the only conclusion which can be recorded on the basis of the evidence on record was that the guilt of the accused was proved beyond a reasonable doubt and no other conclusion was possible.”

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The present appeal has to be decided as per the parameters laid down by the Hon’ble Supreme Court.

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The Food Inspector L.D. Thakur (PW4) did not mention in the spot memo (Ex. P3) that the date, month and year of manufacturing were not mentioned in the sample taken by him. It was held by Madras High Court in P. Robert Immanuel and another (supra) that when the Food Inspector had not mentioned anything about the misbranding or the non-compliance of the PFA Rules, the prosecution's case regarding the sample being misbranded cannot be accepted.

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“13. Admittedly, a 200ml beverage bottle of ginger was taken for a sample, and the respondent/Food Inspector has not mentioned anything about the label in his report. The misbranding of the label does not require any Public Analyst opinion. The Food Inspector who had occasion to deal with the impugned beverage bottle did not mention anything about the misbranding of the label or contravention of the Rules 24, 32 and 42.

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The said private complainant has only relied on the Public Analyst report for misbranding of the label. As stated earlier, misbranding of the label does not require Public Analyst opinion, and the Food Inspector, who had drawn samples, had not mentioned anything about the label of the beverage bottles. It is pertinent to note that the beverage is not adulterated but does not contain those particulars as stated earlier, which are contemplated under Rules 24, 32 and 42. The petitioner is a petty vendor who sells a beverage of local made. The manufacturer could not be found by the respondent, but the vendor has been prosecuted for offences of misbranding, as the label of the bottle did not contain so many particulars. In my considered view, the petitioner is not liable to be prosecuted as the respondent Food Inspector, who had the occasion to see the beverage bottles, did not mention anything about the misbranding, and it does not require the opinion of the Public Analyst.”

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A similar view was taken by this Court in Ganga Ram vs.

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State of H.P., 2011 (2) FAC 76, wherein it was observed :

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“7. On the second submission, which is based on the judgment in Kulbir Sharma’s case (supra), it is urged that in the panchnama which is prepared, there is no mention regarding any sample, etc, and there has been a violation of the provisions. In other words, his submission is that Panchnama Ext. P3 does not state that the packet of Sewian does not conform to the requirement of branding under the Act. All that I need to say is that at that particular point in time, the Food Inspector had inspected the business premises of the accused, where he associated one Inder Vir,

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son of Jeet Ram, PW4 and had seized only three samples of Sewian, which were then taken for analysis. In Kulbir Sharma’s case, this Court held:

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“The second point which makes the case of the prosecution doubtful is that the notice Exhibit P1 was given by the Food Inspector to pick up the sample of ‘Haldi Gulal’ (Haldi Powder) for which he paid Rs. 18/vide receipt Exhibit-P2. Whereas in the Panchnama Exhibit P3, the Food Inspector has mentioned that he had taken the sample of Haldi Powder (three packets). The sample of Haldi was found in conformity with the prescribed standard except that nothing was mentioned on the packet; thus, it was alleged to be ‘misbranded’. It is worth noting that the Food Inspector, while packing up the sample, did not mention in Panchnama that nothing was mentioned on the label of the packet, as opined by the Public Analyst, nor did he state so in the Court that the label on the package of Haldi was not in accordance with the Act and rules prescribed thereunder. Therefore, in these circumstances, in my opinion, the allegation of misbranding also stands not proved. As far as the next allegation with respect to selling of the food articles without a food license is concerned, the Food Inspector in his statement did not utter even a single sentence that the accused was selling the food articles without a license. In the absence of it, his admission in his statement under Section 313 Cr.P.C. carries no value, since the prosecution also failed to discharge its initial onus.”

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23. This judgment is binding upon this Court. Therefore, it

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was essential for the Food Inspector to mention in the panchnama that the packet did not contain the date, month, and the manufacturing year before the accused could be held liable for

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selling the misbranded product, and the learned Appellate Court had rightly held that the sample was not proved to be misbranded.

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As per the complainant, the sample was taken on 26.02.2005. The sample was analysed in the laboratory, and the report dated 24.03.2005 was issued. The report mentions that the analysis was started on 26.02.2005 and was completed on 03.03.2005. There was an increase in alcoholic acidity, and it was found to be 9.15 ml of sodium hydroxide per 100 grams of dried substance, as compared to 7.5 ml of sodium hydroxide per 100 grams of dried substance. Learned Appellate Court held that the delay in analysis could have led to an increase in the alcoholic acidity and relied upon the judgment in Nebh Raj v. State (Delhi Admn.), (1980) 4 SCC 552: 1980 SCC OnLine SC 29 in support of its conclusion. However, in Nebh Raj (supra), the Hon’ble Supreme Court was concerned with the increase in the free fatty acid content of the edible fats. In the present case, the increase was in the alcoholic content. There is no evidence that the alcohol content increases with time. Further, in the present case, the analysis was started on 26.0.2005, the date of taking the sample, and it cannot be said that there was any delay in the analysis of the sample. It was laid down by the Gauhati High Court in Md. Najrul Islam v. State

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of Assam, 2012 SCC OnLine Gau 278, that when the sample of bread was analysed within forty days as per Rule 7 (3) of the PFA Rules, the plea of the accused that the bread was a perishable item and the delay led to an increase in the alcoholic content cannot be accepted. It was observed:

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“9. At the time of hearing of this revision, it has been submitted, on behalf of the accused-petitioner, that bread is a perishable article of food, and there was an inordinate delay in analysing the sample of bread, and thereby prejudice has been caused to the accused-petitioner.

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10. While considering the above submissions, made on behalf of the accused-petitioner, one may take note of Rule 7(3) of the Prevention of Food Adulteration Rules, 1955 (hereinafter referred to as the ‘PFA rules’), which provides that the Public Analyst shall send to the Local Health Authority a report of the result of analysis within a period of forty days from the date of receipt of sample for analysis. Thus, the outer limit for sending the report of analysis by the Public Analyst to the Local (Health) Authority is forty days.

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11. In the present case, the sample was taken on 07.06.1996, and it was dispatched to the Public Analyst on 08.06.1996. The sample was received by the Public Analyst on 13.06.1996 and, according to the evidence of the Public Analyst, he examined the sample on 17.06.1996. The Public Analyst signed the report on 22.07.1996, and on the same day, i.e., 22.07.1996, the report was forwarded to the Local (Health) Authority. Thus, the sample was analysed, and the report of the analysis was forwarded to the Local (Health) Authority within forty days. There was, therefore, no violation of Rule 7(3) of the PFA Rules.

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12. Coupled with the above, the standard of quality of bread, as provided by Appendix 18.14 of the PFA Rules, is as under:

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(a) Alcoholic acidity (with 90% alcohol) shall not be more than the equivalent of 7.5 ml. Sodium hydroxide per 100g of dried substances.

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(b) Ash insoluble in dilute hydrochloric acid on a dry weight basis -

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(i) bread except masala bread or fruit bread - not more than 0.1 per cent

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(ii) masala bread or fruit bread - not more than 0.2 per cent.

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Provided also that it shall be free from dirt, insect and insect fragments, larvae, rodent barirs and added colouring matter except any permitted food colours present as a carry over colour in accordance with the provision of Rule 64-C, in raw material used in the products.

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*** *** ***”

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13. In the present case, as per the Public Analyst's report, the quantity of alcoholic acidity (with 90% alcohol), contained in the bread (Kohinoor bread), was 9.05 ml per 100 gm., whereas the quantity of alcohol, as per the standard of the quantity of bread, as prescribed by Appendix 18.14 of the PFA Rules, shall not be more than 7.5 ml. Again, the quantity of total Ash found in the sample (bread Kohinoor) was 1.33%, whereas the quantity of Ash shall not exceed 0.2% as per the standard of quality prescribed. Thus, the sample of bread (Kohinoor bread) did not conform to the standard of quality as prescribed by the PFA Rules.”

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Thus, the learned Appellate Court erred in relying upon

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Nebh Raj (supra) and holding that the delay in the analysis led to an increase in the alcoholic content. There was no delay in the present case, and Nebh Raj (supra) did not apply to the present case.

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Learned Appellate Court also held that the accused did not have an opportunity to cross-examine the co-accused. Hence,

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the invoices relied upon by them could not be used against him. Reliance was placed upon Mohinder Kumar (supra) in support of this conclusion. This conclusion cannot be sustained. The accused admitted in his statement recorded under Section 313 of the Code of Criminal Procedure that the bread manufactured by Kitty Industries was sold to the co-accused vide bill (Ext.AW-2/A) dated 26.02.2005 who had supplied it to the accused nos. 1 & 2 from which the samples were taken by the Food Inspector. He also admitted that the Food Inspector had inspected the premises known as M/s Vijay Chand Arun Kumar, Meer Building, Bus Stand, Shimla, where co-accused Arun Kumar was conducting the business of the shop and had kept 9x 400-gram packets of Kitty’s Premium Bread on the counter for sale to the general public supplied by his firm. Thus, the supply of the Kitty’s Premium Bread to the co-accused and its sale to the Food Inspector were not disputed. It was laid down by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in State of Maharashtra v. Sukhdev Singh, (1992) 3 SCC 700: 1992 SCC (Cri) 705: 1992 SCC OnLine SC 421 that the Courts can rely upon the statement of the accused recorded under section 313 of the Cr.P.C. It was observed at page 742:

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“51. That brings us to the question of whether such a statement recorded under Section 313 of the Code can

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constitute the sole basis for conviction. Since no oath is administered to the accused, the statements made by the accused will not be evidence stricto sensu. That is why subsection (3) says that the accused shall not render himself liable to punishment if he gives false answers. Then comes sub-section (4), which reads:

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“313. (4) The answers given by the accused may be taken into consideration in such inquiry or trial, and put in evidence for or against him in any other inquiry into, or trial for, any other offence which such answers may tend to show he has committed.”

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Thus, the answers given by the accused in response to his examination under Section 313 can be taken into consideration in such an inquiry or trial. This much is clear on a plain reading of the above sub-section. Therefore, though not strictly evidence, sub-section (4) permits that it may be taken into consideration in the said inquiry or trial. See State of Maharashtra v. R.B. Chowdhari (1967) 3 SCR 708: AIR 1968 SC 110: 1968 Cri LJ 95 . This Court, in the case of Hate Singh Bhagat Singh v. State of M.B. 1951 SCC 1060: 1953 Cri LJ 1933: AIR 1953 SC 468, held that an answer given by an accused under Section 313 examination can be used for proving his guilt as much as the evidence given by a prosecution witness. In Narain Singh v. State of Punjab (1963) 3 SCR 678: (1964) 1 Cri LJ 730 , this Court held that if the accused confesses to the commission of the offence with which he is charged, the Court may, relying upon that confession, proceed to convict him. To state the exact language in which the three-Judge bench answered the question, it would be advantageous to reproduce the relevant observations at pages 684-685:

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“Under Section 342 of the Code of Criminal Procedure by the first sub-section, insofar as it is material, the Court may at any stage of the enquiry or trial and after the witnesses for the prosecution have been examined and before the accused is called upon for his defence shall put questions to the accused person for the purpose of enabling him to explain any circumstance appearing in the evidence against him. Examination

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under Section 342 is primarily to be directed to those matters on which evidence has been led for the prosecution to ascertain from the accused his version or explanation, if any, of the incident which forms the subject-matter of the charge and his defence. By subsection (3), the answers given by the accused may ‘be taken into consideration’ at the enquiry or the trial. If the accused person in his examination under Section 342 confesses to the commission of the offence charged against him the court may, relying upon that confession, proceed to convict him , but if he does not confess and in explaining circumstance appearing in the evidence against him sets up his own version and seeks to explain his conduct pleading that he has committed no offence, the statement of the accused can only be taken into consideration in its entirety.” (emphasis supplied)

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Sub-section (1) of Section 313 corresponds to sub-section (1) of Section 342 of the old Code, except that it now stands bifurcated in two parts with the proviso added thereto clarifying that in summons cases where the presence of the accused is dispensed with, his examination under clause ( b ) may also be dispensed with. Sub-section (2) of Section 313 reproduces the old sub-section (4), asd the present subsection (3) corresponds to the old sub-section (2) except for the change necessitated on account of the abolition of the jury system. The present sub-section (4) with which we are concerned is a verbatim reproduction of the old sub-section (3). Therefore, the aforestated observations apply with equal force.”

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It was laid down by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Mohan Singh v. Prem Singh, (2002) 10 SCC 236: 2003 SCC (Cri) 1514:

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2002 SCC OnLine SC 933 , that the statement made by the accused under Section 313 Cr.P.C. can be used to lend credence to the evidence led by the prosecution, but such statement cannot form

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the sole basis for conviction. It was observed at page 244:

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27. The statement made in defence by the accused under Section 313 CrPC can certainly be taken aid of to lend credence to the evidence led by the prosecution, but only a part of such statement under Section 313 of the Code of Criminal Procedure cannot be made the sole basis of his conviction. The law on the subject is almost settled that the statement under Section 313 CrPC of the accused can either be relied on in whole or in part. It may also be possible to rely on the inculpatory part of his statement if the exculpatory part is found to be false on the basis of the evidence led by the prosecution. See Nishi Kant Jha v. State of Bihar (1969) 1 SCC 347: AIR 1969 SC 422 : (SCC pp. 357-58, para 23)

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“ 23 . In this case, the exculpatory part of the statement in Exhibit 6 is not only inherently improbable but is contradicted by the other evidence. According to this statement, the injury that the appellant received was caused by the appellant's attempt to catch hold of the hand of Lal Mohan Sharma to prevent the attack on the victim. This was contradicted by the statement of the accused himself under Section 342 CrPC to the effect that he had received the injury in a scuffle with a herdsman. The injury found on his body when he was examined by the doctor on 13-10-1961, negatives of both these versions. Neither of these versions accounts for the profuse bleeding which led to his washing his clothes and having a bath in River Patro, the amount of bleeding and the washing of the bloodstains being so considerable as to attract the attention of Ram Kishore Pandey, PW 17 and asking him about the cause thereof. The bleeding was not a simple one as his clothes all got stained with blood, as also his books, his exercise book, his belt and his shoes. More than that, the knife which was discovered on his person was found to have been stained with blood according to the report of the Chemical Examiner. According to the post-mortem report, this knife could have been the cause of the injuries on the victim. In circumstances like these, there

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being enough evidence to reject the exculpatory part of the statement of the appellant in Exhibit 6, the High Court had acted rightly in accepting the inculpatory part and piercing the same with the other evidence to come to the conclusion that the appellant was the person responsible for the crime .” (emphasis supplied)

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It was laid down in Ramnaresh v. State of Chhattisgarh,

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(2012) 4 SCC 257: (2012) 2 SCC (Cri) 382: 2012 SCC OnLine SC 213 , that the statement of the accused under Section 313 Cr.P.C., in so far as it supports the prosecution’s case, can be used against him for recording a conviction. It was observed at page 275: -

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“52. It is a settled principle of law that the obligation to put material evidence to the accused under Section 313 CrPC is upon the court. One of the main objects of recording a statement under this provision of the CrPC is to give an opportunity to the accused to explain the circumstances appearing against him as well as to put forward his defence, if the accused so desires. But once he does not avail this opportunity, then consequences in law must follow. Where the accused takes benefit of this opportunity, then his statement made under Section 313 CrPC, insofar as it supports the case of the prosecution, can be used against him for rendering a conviction. Even under the latter, he faces the consequences in law.”

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This position was reiterated in Ashok Debbarma v. State

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of Tripura, (2014) 4 SCC 747: (2014) 2 SCC (Cri) 417: 2014 SCC OnLine SC 199 , and it was held that the statement of the accused recorded under Section 313 of the Cr.P.C. can be used to lend corroboration to the statements of prosecution witnesses. It was held at page 761: -

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24. We are of the view that, under Section 313 statement, if the accused admits that, from the evidence of various witnesses, four persons sustained severe bullet injuries by the firing by the accused and his associates, that admission of guilt in Section 313 statement cannot be brushed aside. This Court in State of Maharashtra v. Sukhdev Singh [(1992) 3 SCC 700: 1992 SCC (Cri) 705 held that since no oath is administered to the accused, the statement made by the accused under Section 313 CrPC will not be evidence stricto sensu and the accused, of course, shall not render himself liable to punishment merely on the basis of answers given while he was being examined under Section 313 CrPC. But, sub-section (4) says that the answers given by the accused in response to his examination under Section 313 CrPC can be taken into consideration in such an inquiry or trial. This Court in Hate Singh Bhagat Singh v. State of Madhya Bharat, 1951 SCC 1060: AIR 1953 SC 468: 1953 Cri LJ 1933 held that the answers given by the accused under Section 313 examination can be used for proving his guilt as much as the evidence given by the prosecution witness. In Narain Singh v. State of Punjab (1964) 1 Cri LJ 730: (1963) 3 SCR 678, this Court held that when the accused confesses to the commission of the offence with which he is charged, the court may rely upon the confession and proceed to convict him.

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25. This Court in Mohan Singh v. Prem Singh (2002) 10 SCC 236: 2003 SCC (Cri) 1514 held that: (SCC p. 244, para 27)

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“ 27 . The statement made in defence by the accused under Section 313 CrPC can certainly be taken aid of to lend credence to the evidence led by the prosecution, but only a part of such statement under Section 313 CrPC cannot be made the sole basis of his conviction.”

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In this connection, reference may also be made to the judgments of this Court in Devender Kumar Singla v. Baldev Krishan Singla (2005) 9 SCC 15: 2005 SCC (Cri) 1185 and Bishnu Prasad Sinha v. State of Assam (2007) 11 SCC 467: (2008) 1 SCC (Cri) 766 . The abovementioned decisions would indicate that the statement of the accused under Section 313 CrPC for the admission of his guilt or confession as such cannot be made

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the sole basis for finding the accused guilty, the reason being he is not making the statement on oath, but all the same the confession or admission of guilt can be taken as a piece of evidence since the same lends credence to the evidence led by the prosecution.

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26. We may, however, indicate that the answers given by the accused while examining him under Section 313, fully corroborate the evidence of PW 10 and PW 13 and hence the offences levelled against the appellant stand proved, and the trial court and the High Court have rightly found him guilty for the offences under Sections 326, 436 and 302 read with Section 34 IPC.”

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30 In the present case, the manufacture and sale of the bread by Kitty Industries was not in dispute, and the learned Appellate Court erred in holding that the accused was prejudiced by not allowing him to cross-examine the co-accused.

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Therefore, the learned Appellate Court had erred in relying upon the judgments and circumstances which were irrelevant in the present case, and the judgment passed by the learned Appellate Court cannot be sustained.

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No other point was urged.

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In view of the above, the present appeal is allowed, and the judgment passed by the learned Appellate Court is set aside, and the judgment and order passed by the learned Trial Court are restored. Pending miscellaneous application(s), if any, also stand disposed of.

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