State of Hp Vs Nisha Kumari

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IN THE HIGH COURT OF HIMACHAL PRADESH, SHIMLA

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Cr. Appeal No. 270 of 2014 Reserved on: 28.02.2026 Date of Decision: 18.03.2026

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State of H.P. ...Appellant

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Versus Nisha Kumari ...Respondent

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Coram

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Hon’ble Mr Justice Rakesh Kainthla , Judge. Whether approved for reporting?¹ No. For the Appellant : Mr Lokender Kutlehria, Additional Advocate General. For the Respondent : Ms Anjali Soni Verma, Advocate.

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Rakesh Kainthla, Judge

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The present appeal is directed against the judgment dated 22.03.2014, passed by learned Additional Chief Judicial Magistrate, Palampur, District Kangra, H.P. (learned Trial Court) vide which the respondent (accused before the learned Trial Court) was acquitted of the commission of an offence punishable under Section 325 of the Indian Penal Code (IPC). (Parties shall hereinafter be referred to in the same manner as they were arrayed

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before the learned Trial Court for convenience.)

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1 Whether reporters of Local Papers may be allowed to see the judgment? Yes.

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Briefly stated, the facts giving rise to the present appeal

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are that the police presented a challan before the learned Trial Court against the accused for the commission of offences punishable under Sections 323 and 325 of the IPC. It was asserted that the informant, Shakuntla Devi (PW-2), is the mother-in-law, and Prakash Chand (PW-3), is the father-in-law of the accused Nisha. They were residing together. Prakash Chand told the accused on 17.10.2010, at about 6:30 am, that the gas stove in the kitchen was left on. The accused replied that she had not left it on, and she was being blamed for everything. She pushed the informant, Shakutla Devi, who sustained injury on her already fractured right arm. Shakutla Devi went to the police station and reported the matter to the police. An entry No. 6(A) (Mark D) was recorded. Dr Ramesh Chand (PW-4) examined Shakuntla Devi and found blunt injury on the right shoulder and right forearm. He advised an X-ray. Dr Kalpana Mahajan (PW-1) conducted an X-ray and found a fracture of the head of humorous bone on the right side. She issued the report (Ext. PW1/A). Dr Ramesh Chand (PW-4) issued an MLC (Ext. PW4/A) stating that the nature of the injury was grievous, which could have been caused by pushing a person. An entry No. 24(A) was recorded after receiving the

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medical opinion, and FIR (Ext. PW5/E) was registered in the police station. ASI Gian Chand (PW-5) investigated the matter. He visited the spot and prepared the site plan (Ext. PW5/A). He recorded the statements of the witnesses as per their version. The challan was prepared and presented before the learned Trial Court after the completion of the investigation.

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Learned Trial Court found sufficient reasons to summon the accused. When the accused appeared, she was charged with the commission of an offence punishable under Section 325 of the IPC, to which she pleaded not guilty and claimed to be tried.

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The prosecution examined seven witnesses to prove its case. Dr Kalpana Mahajan (PW-1) is the Radiologist who went through the X-ray. Shakuntla Devi (PW2) is the informant. Prakash Chand (PW3) is an eyewitness. Dr Ramesh Chand (PW4) examined Shakuntla Devi. ASI Gian Chand (PW5) investigated the matter. Constable Manjeet Singh (PW-6) has not entered the report Nos. 24(A) and 6(A). Sumna Kumari (PW-7) was Pradhan to whom the matter was reported.

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The accused, in her statement recorded under Section 313 of Cr.P.C., denied the prosecution's case in its entirety. She

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stated that the witnesses were relatives of the complainant. She claimed that she was innocent and was falsely implicated. However, she did not produce any evidence in her defence.

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Learned Trial Court held that the relationship between the parties was strained and the testimonies of the informant and her husband were required to be seen with due care and caution. They contradicted each other on material aspects. They admitted that the informant had already sustained a fracture in her arm. Therefore, the learned Trial Court acquitted the accused.

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Being aggrieved by the judgment passed by the learned Trial Court, the State has filed the present appeal asserting that the learned Trial Court erred in appreciating the evidence on record. The statements of the informant and her husband were discarded without any reason. The probable duration of injuries corroborated the time mentioned by the informant. Learned Trial Court failed to point out any material contradictions. Enmity is a double-edged weapon: while it furnishes a motive for the false implication, it also furnishes a motive for the commission of a crime. The statements of the witnesses could not have been discarded because of the relationship alone. Therefore, it was

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prayed that the present appeal be allowed and the judgment passed by the learned Trial Court be set aside.

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I have heard Mr Lokender Kutlehria, learned Additional Advocate General for the appellant/State and Ms Anjali Soni Verma, learned counsel for the respondent.

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Mr Lokender Kutlheria, learned Additional Advocate General for the appellant/State, submitted that the learned Trial Court erred in appreciating the evidence on record. The testimonies of the informant and her husband were discarded without any cogent reason. The learned Trial Court failed to point out even a single contradiction. The learned Trial Court had taken a view which could not have been taken by any reasonable person. Therefore, he prayed that the present appeal be allowed and the judgment passed by the learned Trial Court be set aside.

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Ms Anjali Soni Verma, learned counsel for the respondent/accused, submitted that the relationship between the parties is strained and the learned Trial Court was right in seeking corroboration of the statements. The informant had already suffered a fracture, and there is no evidence of its healing. The learned Trial Court had taken a reasonable view while acquitting the accused, and this Court should not interfere with the

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reasonable view of the learned Trial Court, even if another view is possible. Hence, she prayed that the present appeal be dismissed.

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I have given considerable thought to the submissions made at the bar and have gone through the records carefully.

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The present appeal has been filed against a judgment of acquittal. It was laid down by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Surendra Singh v. State of Uttarakhand, (2025) 5 SCC 433: 2025 SCC OnLine SC 176 that the Court can interfere with a judgment of acquittal if it is patently perverse, is based on misreading of evidence, omission to consider the material evidence and no reasonable person could have recorded the acquittal based on the evidence led before the learned Trial Court. It was observed at page

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438:

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“24. It could thus be seen that it is a settled legal position that the interference with the finding of acquittal recorded by the learned trial Judge would be warranted by the High Court only if the judgment of acquittal suffers from patent perversity; that the same is based on a misreading/omission to consider material evidence on record; and that no two reasonable views are possible and only the view consistent with the guilt of the accused is possible from the evidence available on record.”

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This position was reiterated in State of M.P. v. Ramveer

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Singh, 2025 SCC OnLine SC 1743, wherein it was observed:

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“21. We may note that the present appeal is one against acquittal. Law is well-settled by a plethora of judgments of this Court that, in an appeal against acquittal, unless the finding of acquittal is perverse on the face of the record and the only possible view based on the evidence is consistent with the guilt of the accused, only in such an event, should the appellate Court interfere with a judgment of acquittal. Where two views are possible, i.e., one consistent with the acquittal and the other holding the accused guilty, the appellate Court should refuse to interfere with the judgment of acquittal. Reference in this regard may be made to the judgments of this Court in the cases of Babu Sahebagouda Rudragoudar v. State of Karnataka (2024) 8 SCC 149 ; H.D. Sundara v. State of Karnataka (2023) 9 SCC 581 , and Rajesh Prasad v. State of Bihar (2022) 3 SCC 471 .”

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The present appeal has to be decided as per the

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parameters laid down by the Hon’ble Supreme Court.

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It was specifically mentioned in the FIR (Ext. PW5/E) that the victim had sustained a fracture on her right arm before the incident. Shakuntla Devi (PW-2) and Prakash Chand (PW-3) stated in their examination-in-chief that the informant had sustained a fracture, and she again sustained injury. Dr Ramesh Chand (PW-4) examined the informant. He stated in his crossexamination that the informant had not told him about the fracture sustained by her. The informant has not disclosed any reason as to why she should have concealed the earlier fracture sustained by her from the Medical Officer, who could have easily commented whether it was a case of a subsequent fracture or only

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one fracture. It was rightly submitted on behalf of the accused that there was no evidence that the fracture had healed, and the accused could not have been held liable for causing grievous hurt.

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The informant admitted in her cross-examination that the accused had filed a complaint under the Protection of Women from Domestic Violence Act against her husband and her son. She admitted that the accused had kept the almirah in the upper floor and she (informant) had locked it.

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Thus, the informant admitted the strained relationship between the accused and her, and the learned Trial Court was justified in holding that the relationship between the informant and the accused was strained and the prosecution’s case required corroboration from independent sources.

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The informant admitted that the accused had one room and one cow shed in which she cooked the food. Prakash Chand also admitted in his cross-examination that the accused had a separate kitchen adjacent to the cow shed. These admissions make the prosecution’s case suspect that Prakash Chand had asked the accused as to why she had left the gas on. The accused had a separate kitchen, and she had no justification to go to the

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common kitchen and leave the gas on. This makes the genesis of the prosecution's case suspect.

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The informant stated that Prakash Chand had told accused Nisha that she had left the gas on in the kitchen. The accused denied this fact. The informant told the accused not to keep the gas switched on, and Nisha pushed the informant, who had sustained a fracture.

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Significantly, she had not mentioned in the FIR about advising the accused not to leave the gas on, and this fact was a clear improvement. No reason was assigned in the FIR as to why the accused should have pushed the informant. The informant had not said anything to the accused, and only Prakash Chand had inquired about leaving the gas on. Thus, the version in the FIR was inherently improbable, and the informant changed this version in the Court by saying that she had also advised the accused not to leave the gas on.

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Prakash Chand (PW-3) stated that he went to the kitchen and saw that both burners were left on. He inquired from the accused as to why she had left the gas burners on. She replied that she had not left the gas on and that she was being blamed for everything. The informant inquired as to what had happened. He

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narrated the incident to the informant, and the informant also

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asked the accused not to leave the gas on. The accused pushed the informant, and she sustained injuries.

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Prakash Chand stated that the informant had inquired about the matter and told the accused as to why she had left the gas on, as somebody would get burned. These facts were not narrated by the informant in her testimony.

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He admitted in his cross-examination that he had not

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told the police about going to the kitchen and leaving the gas on. He had not told the police that he had asked the accused as to why the gas was left on. Thus, the material facts related to the incident were not narrated by him to the police.

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There is no other evidence to corroborate the statement of the informant and her husband, and the learned Trial Court was justified in doubting the prosecution's version. It was a reasonable view that could have been taken, based on the evidence produced before the learned Trial Court and no interference is required with it while deciding the appeal against acquittal if another view is possible.

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In view of the above, the present appeal fails, and it is dismissed, and so are the pending miscellaneous applications, if any.

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In view of the provisions of Section 437-A of the Code of Criminal Procedure (Section 481 of Bhartiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023) the respondent/accused is directed to furnish bail bonds in the sum of ₹25,000/- with one surety of the like amount to the satisfaction of the learned Trial Court which shall be effective for six months with a stipulation that in the event of a Special Leave Petition being filed against this judgment or on grant of the leave, the respondent/accused on receipt of notice thereof shall appear before the Hon'ble Supreme Court.

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A copy of the judgment, along with records of the learned Trial Court, be sent back forthwith.

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( Rakesh Kainthla) Judge

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18^th March, 2026 (Sushma)

State of Hp v. Nisha Kumari

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State of Hp v. Nisha Kumari

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