Ishan Khan Vs Devi Ram and Others

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2026:HHC:12745

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IN THE HIGH COURT OF HIMACHAL PRADESH, SHIMLA

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Cr. Rev. No. 166 of 2026 Reserved on: 31.03.2026 Date of Decision: 22.4.2026.

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Ishan Khan ...Petitioner Versus Devi Singh and others ...Respondents

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Coram

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*Hon’ble Mr Justice Rakesh*	*Kainthl*	a,*Judge.*
*Whether approved for repo*	*rting?*¹	*Yes.*
For the Petitioner	:	Mr Bhupinder Singh Ahuja, Advocate.
For Respondents	:	Nemo

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Rakesh Kainthla, Judge

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The present revision is directed against the order dated 10^th November 2025 passed by the learned Chief Judicial Magistrate, Bilaspur (learned Trial Court) vide which a complaint filed by the petitioner (complainant before learned trial Court) was dismissed. (Parties shall hereinafter be referred to in the same manner as they were arrayed before the learned Trial Court for convenience.)

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1 Whether reporters of Local Papers may be allowed to see the judgment? Yes.

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Briefly stated, the facts giving rise to the present

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revision are that the complainant filed a complaint before the Station House OfÏcer (SHO), police Station Sadar, District Bilaspur, asserting that his grandmother had executed a Will bequeathing the first floor of her building to him. A mutation number 733 dated 2^nd April 2004 was attested based on the Will. Smt Zubeda filed a false application before Tehsildar Sadar, who directed Patwari to visit the spot and prepare a report depicting the spot position. Patwari prepared a false report in favour of Aneesh Mohammad and Zubeda to benefit them. Tehsildar Sadar attested mutation number 892 dated 22^nd June 2009 in favour of Aneesh Mohammad and Zubeda, without summoning the complainant. The complainant made enquiries and came to know about the forgery. The complainant was being threatened; hence, he made a complaint to take action against Aneesh Mohammad and Zubeda.

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The police did not take any action on the complaint, and the complainant filed a complaint before the learned Trial Court for the commission of an offence punishable under section 166A (b) of the Indian Penal Code (IPC).

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Learned trial Court held that the complainant had filed a complaint for cheating and forgery, which are not covered under section 166A of the IPC. An action can only be taken regarding the offences specified in section 166A of the IPC. No case for summoning any person was made out; hence, the complaint was dismissed.

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Being aggrieved by the order passed by the learned trial Court, the complainant has filed the present revision asserting that the learned trial Court erred in interpreting the judgment of Hon’ble Supreme Court in Lalita Kumari vs Govt of UP and others (2014) 2 SCC 1 , which provided for the mandatory registration of the FIR in case of disclosure of a cognizable offence. Hence, it was prayed that the present revision be allowed and the order passed by the learned trial Court be set aside.

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Mr. Bhupinder Singh Ahuja, learned counsel for the complainant, submitted that the Hon’ble Supreme Court has directed the police to register the FIR in Lalita Kumari (supra) if a cognizable offence is disclosed. The police violated the mandatory direction, and the learned trial Court erred in

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dismissing the complaint. Hence, he prayed that the present revision be allowed and the order passed by the learned trial Court be set aside.

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I have given a considerable thought to the submissions made at the bar and have gone through the records carefully.

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It was laid down by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Malkeet Singh Gill v. State of Chhattisgarh , (2022) 8 SCC 204: (2022) 3 SCC (Cri) 348: 2022 SCC OnLine SC 786 that a revisional court can only rectify the patent defect, errors of jurisdiction or the law. It was observed at page 207-

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“10. Before adverting to the merits of the contentions, at the outset, it is apt to mention that there are concurrent findings of conviction arrived at by two courts after a detailed appreciation of the material and evidence brought on record. The High Court in criminal revision against conviction is not supposed to exercise the jurisdiction like the appellate court, and the scope of interference in revision is extremely narrow. Section 397 of the Criminal Procedure Code (in short “CrPC”) vests jurisdiction to satisfy itself or himself as to the correctness, legality or propriety of any finding, sentence or order, recorded or passed, and as to the regularity of any proceedings of such inferior court. The object of the provision is to set right a patent defect or an error of jurisdiction or law. There has to be a well-founded error that is to be determined on the merits of individual cases. It is also well settled that while considering the same, the

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Revisional Court does not dwell at length upon the facts and evidence of the case to reverse those findings.

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This position was reiterated in State of Gujarat v.

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Dilipsinh Kishorsinh Rao, (2023) 17 SCC 688: 2023 SCC OnLine SC

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1294, wherein it was observed at page 695:

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“14. The power and jurisdiction of the Higher Court under Section 397 CrPC, which vests the court with the power to call for and examine records of an inferior court, is for the purposes of satisfying itself as to the legality and regularities of any proceeding or order made in a case. The object of this provision is to set right a patent defect or an error of jurisdiction or law or the perversity which has crept in such proceedings.

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15. It would be apposite to refer to the judgment of this Court in Amit Kapoor v. Ramesh Chander [Amit Kapoor v. Ramesh Chander, (2012) 9 SCC 460: (2012) 4 SCC (Civ) 687: (2013) 1 SCC (Cri) 986] , where scope of Section 397 has been considered and succinctly explained as under: (SCC p. 475, paras 12-13)

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“ 12 . Section 397 of the Code vests the court with the power to call for and examine the records of an inferior court for the purposes of satisfying itself as to the legality and regularity of any proceedings or order made in a case. The object of this provision is to set right a patent defect or an error of jurisdiction or law. There has to be a well-founded error, and it may not be appropriate for the court to scrutinise the orders, which, upon the face of it, bear a token of careful consideration and appear to be in accordance with law. If one looks into the various judgments of this Court, it emerges that the revisional jurisdiction can be invoked where the decisions under challenge are grossly erroneous, there is no compliance with the provisions of law, the finding recorded is based on no evidence,

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material evidence is ignored, or judicial discretion is exercised arbitrarily or perversely. These are not exhaustive classes, but are merely indicative. Each case would have to be determined on its own merits.

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13 . Another well-accepted norm is that the revisional jurisdiction of the higher court is a very limited one and cannot be exercised in a routine manner. One of the inbuilt restrictions is that it should not be against an interim or interlocutory order. The Court has to keep in mind that the exercise of revisional jurisdiction itself should not lead to injustice ex facie. Where the Court is dealing with the question as to whether the charge has been framed properly and in accordance with law in a given case, it may be reluctant to interfere in the exercise of its revisional jurisdiction unless the case substantially falls within the categories aforestated. Even the framing of the charge is a much-advanced stage in the proceedings under CrPC.”

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The present revision has to be decided as per the parameters laid down by the Hon’ble Supreme Court.

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The complainant had filed the complaint before the learned trial Court against the accused for the commission of an offence punishable under section 166A of the IPC, which reads as under:

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“166-A. Public servant disobeying direction under law . —Whoever, being a public servant, —

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( a ) knowingly disobeys any direction of the law which prohibits him from requiring the attendance at any place of any person for the purpose of

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investigation into an offence or any other matter, or

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( b ) knowingly disobeys, to the prejudice of any person, any other direction of the law regulating the manner in which he shall conduct such investigation, or

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( c ) fails to record any information given to him under sub-section (1) of Section 154 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), in relation to cognizable offence punishable under Section 326A, Section 326-B, Section 354, Section 354-B, Section 370, Section 370-A, Section 376, Section 376-A, [Section 376-AB, Section 376-B, Section 376-C, Section 376-D, Section 376-DA, Section 376-DB], Section 376-E or Section 509,

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shall be punished with rigorous imprisonment for a term which shall not be less than six months but which may extend to two years, and shall also be liable to fine.”

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It is apparent from the bare perusal of the section

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that it applies to the registration of the FIR for the commission of the offences specified in it. It is undisputed that the section is

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for which the FIR was sought to be registered by the complainant was not mentioned in section 166A of the IPC, and the learned trial Court was justified in holding so. It was laid down by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Mohd. Wajid v. State of U.P., (2023) 20 SCC 219: 2023 SCC OnLine SC 951, that a criminal statute is to be construed strictly. It was observed at page 241:

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21. The general rule governing the interpretation of penal statutes is that it must be strictly construed. Strict interpretation in the words of Crawford connotes:

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“If a statute is to be strictly construed, nothing should be included within its scope that does not come clearly within the meaning of the language used. Its language must be given exact and technical meaning with no extension on account of implications or equitable considerations; or, as has been aptly asserted, its operation must be confined to cases coming clearly within the letter of the statute as well as within its spirit and reason. Or stated perhaps more concisely, it is close and conservative adherence to the literal or textual interpretation.”

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22. According to Sutherland, by the rule of strict construction, it is not meant that the statute shall be stringently or narrowly construed, but it means that everything shall be excluded from its operation which does not clearly come within the scope of the language used .

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23. When it is said that all penal statutes are to be construed strictly, it only means that the court must see that the thing charged is an offence within the plain meaning of the words used and must not strain the words.

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Therefore, it is impermissible to add words to a criminal statute and say that the offence of forgery would also be covered under section 166A of the IPC.

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Hon’ble Supreme Court also held in Lalita Kumari v. Govt. of U.P. , (2014) 2 SCC 1 : (2014) 1 SCC (Cri) 524: 2013 SCC OnLine SC 999 that Section 166A of the IPC will apply to the Sections mentioned in it. It was observed at page 32:

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“41. Section 166-A( c ) lays down that if a public servant (police ofÏcer) fails to record any information given to him under Section 154(1) of the Code in relation to cognizable offences punishable under Sections 326-A, 326-B, 354, 354-B, 370, 370-A, 376, 376-A, 376-B, 376C, 376-D, 376-E or Section 509, he shall be punished with rigorous imprisonment for a term which shall not be less than six months but may extend to two years and shall also be liable to fine. Thus, it is the stand of the learned counsel that this provision clearly indicates that registration of FIR is imperative and a police ofÏcer has no discretion in the matter in respect of offences specified in the said section. Therefore, according to him, the legislature accepts that as far as other cognizable offences are concerned, the police have discretion to hold a preliminary inquiry if there is doubt about the correctness of the information.

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42. Although the argument is as persuasive as it appears, yet, we doubt whether such a presumption can be drawn in contravention of the unambiguous words employed in the said provision. Hence, insertion of Section 166-A in IPC vide Criminal Law (Amendment) Act, 2013, must be read in consonance with the provision and not contrary to it. The insertion of Section 166-A was in the light of recent unfortunate occurrences of offences against women. The intention of the legislature in putting forth this amendment was to tighten the already existing provisions to provide enhanced safeguards to women. Therefore, the legislature, after noticing the increasing crimes against women in our country, thought it appropriate to expressly punish the police ofÏcers for their failure to register FIRs in these cases. No other meaning than this can be assigned to the insertion of the same.”

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Therefore, no advantage can be derived from Lalita

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Kumari (supra).

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It was submitted that the police were bound to register the FIR as per the judgment of Lalita Kumari (supra), and there is a violation of the mandatory provision of law punishable under Section 166A (b) of the IPC. This submission will not help the petitioner. Section 166A (b) deals with the investigation. It was laid down in Rizwan Khan v. State of C.G., 2018 SCC OnLine Chh 691 that FIR is not a part of the investigation. It was observed:

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“11. Learned counsel for the appellants submits that ASI J.K. Sen is the complainant in the case, where he cannot be investigated. In view of this Court, ASI J.K. Sen is entitled to proceed on information, and he can record Dehati Nalsi on the spot and FIR in the police station. Dehati Nalsi or FIR is not part of the investigation. Investigation starts after registration of FIR. In the present case, Police Inspector Ashish Shukla (PW-5) has investigated the matter after registration of FIR and recorded statement of witnesses; therefore, it cannot be said that ASI J.K. Sen has investigated the matter. The argument on this count is not acceptable.”

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