Dismissed

Koullan Devi Deceased through Lrs Pushpa Devi and Ors. v. Gurdittu Deceased through Lrs Jamna Dass and Ors.

Himachal Pradesh HC20 Jul 2026CMPMO/289/2021

Case brief

AI extract

What is this about?

Restoration petition under Article 227 seeking to revive an application for setting aside abatement that was dismissed in default. The High Court found no sufficient cause shown, noted contradictory stands by the applicants, declined to disturb findings of fact, and dismissed the petition.

What the court decided

AI extract

Koullan Devi Deceased through Lrs Pushpa Devi… — Property and Title | Himachal Pradesh HC (2026)

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IN THE HIGH COURT OF HIMACHAL PRADESH, SHIMLA CMPMO No.289 of 2021 Reserved on: 01.07.2026 Decided on: 20.07.2026

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Koullan Devi (deceased) through her LRs ….Petitioners

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Versus

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Gurdittu (deceased) through his LRs & others ...Respondents

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Coram

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Hon’ble Mr. Justice Romesh Verma, Judge

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Whether approved for reporting?

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For the petitioners:	Mr. Sanjeev Kuthiala, Senior Advocate with Ms.Tamanna Sharma, Advocate.
For the respondents:	Mr. Umesh Kanwar, Advocate, for respondents No.1(a) to 1(c).

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Romesh Verma, Judge

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The instant petition arises out of judgment as passed by learned District Judge, Bilaspur, dated 02.09.2021, whereby the appeal preferred by the present petitioners was ordered to be dismissed and the order as passed by learned Civil Judge (Junior Division), Court No.3, Ghumarwin, dated 23.10.2018 was affirmed, whereby the application filed by the present petitioners under Order 9 Rule 9 read with Section 151 of CPC and application filed under Section 5 of the Limitation Act were ordered to be dismissed.

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The facts as emerge in the present case are that suit

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for declaration, permanent injunction and possession was instituted by Labhu and Longu. During the pendency of suit, plaintiff, Labhu, expired and an application under Order 22 Rule 3 CPC was filed for bringing on record his legal representatives and the same came to be allowed on 14.05.1992. Chaitru Ram and Bhangu were substituted as the legal representatives of deceased plaintiff vide order dated 14.05.1992. During the pendency of suit, one of the legal representatives of original plaintiff Labhu, namely, Bhangu, had expired on 28.01.1999 before the learned trial Court.

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The learned trial Court vide its judgment and decree dated 30.12.2000 dismissed the suit as filed by the plaintiffs. Thereafter, the legal representative of Labhu, namely, Chaitru Ram and Longu filed an application under Section 151 of CPC in the Court of learned Additional District Judge, Ghumarwin on 17.06.2005. In the said application, it was averred that since the judgment and decree has been passed against a dead person, therefore, the judgment as passed by learned trial Court dated 30.12.2000 needs to be quashed and set aside. During the pendency of the application before the learned first appellate Court it transpired that after the death of Labhu, his legal representatives were ordered to be brought on record as Chaitru

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and Bhangu. However, in the record of the learned trial Court Bhangu was mentioned as Mangu. In the said application, learned Additional District Judge, Ghumarwin came to the conclusion that admittedly said Bhangu, son of Labhu, had expired on 28.01.1999 during the pendency of suit and since the judgment and decree has been passed against a dead person, therefore, after allowing the application under Section 151 of CPC, the judgment and decree passed by learned Sub Judge 1^st Class, Ghumarwin, was set aside. The case was remanded to the Court of learned Civil Judge (Senior Division), Ghumarwin for disposal afresh in accordance with law, after deciding the question of abatement and/or question of substitution of the legal representatives of deceased plaintiff Bhangu, son of Labhu. Learned first appellate Court directed the parties to appear before the learned Civil Judge (Senior Division), Ghumarwin on 03.10.2005.

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The case was listed before the learned Civil Judge (Senior Division), Ghumarwin on 04.10.2005 and he observed in his order that since plaintiff Bhangu had died on 07.08.1997, i.e. prior to the passing of judgment and decree dated 30.12.2000 and his legal representatives were not brought on record within a period of 90 days from the death, therefore, the said suit stands abated automatically on account of death of the plaintiff, when no

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application for impleading the legal representatives of deceased plaintiff was moved in time. Further, it was observed/held that the suit is one for declaration and in such cases, the suit cannot be continued in the absence of the LRs of the plaintiff as it would amount to passing of two decrees i.e. one against the deceased plaintiff and the other at the time of final decision of the suit. Therefore, it was ordered that the suit is abated as a whole. Learned Civil Judge (Senior Division), Ghumarwin had held that no LRs were brought on record in time, therefore the suit abates automatically and no separate order is required to be passed by the said Court and the file was consigned to the record room. It was ordered that the plaintiff is however, at liberty to move appropriate application under Order 22 Rule 9 of CPC for setting aside abatement, in accordance with law.

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The plaintiff Chaitru filed application under Order 22 Rule 3, Rule 9 of CPC for setting aside abatement and bringing on record the legal heirs of deceased Bhangu and in alternative for deleting his name from the array of the plaintiffs under Order 22 Rule 4(4) of CPC read with Section 151 of CPC. Along with the said application, an application under Section 5 of the Limitation Act was also filed for condonation of delay in filing the application under Order 22 Rule 3, Rule 9 of CPC.

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As admitted by both learned counsel for the parties

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before this Court that during the pendency of the said application, plaintiff Chaitru expired and application under Order 22 Rule 3 of CPC came to be filed by his sons, namely, Prem Singh and Sada Ram for bringing on record his legal representatives. It was stated in the application that by virtue of Will, the said applicants namely, Prem Singh and Sada Ram are the legal heirs of deceased Chaitru. However, in the application especially in para-5, the names of other legal heirs, including wife of Chaitru Smt. Koullan Devi were also mentioned. The said application was filed on 02.03.2006 and came to be dismissed in default on 16.06.2011 by the learned Senior Civil Judge, Court No.1, Ghumarwin.

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The application under Order 9 Rule 9 read with Section 151 of CPC and application under Section 5 of the Limitation Act came to be filed by Smt. Koullan Devi for setting aside the order dated 16.06.2011, whereby the application under Order 22 Rule 3, Rule 9 of CPC was dismissed in default. In the application filed under Order 9 Rule 9 of CPC read with Section 151 of CPC and the application under Section 5 of the Limitation Act, it was stated by Smt. Koullan Devi that her husband Chaitru had filed a suit before the learned Civil Judge and during the pendency of suit, he expired. The legal heirs of plaintiff Chaitru, namely Prem Singh and Sada Ram, filed an application under

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Order 22 Rule 3 of CPC for bringing on record the legal representatives of deceased plaintiff, Chaitru. Separately, an application under Section 5 of the Limitation Act was also filed before the learned Court. The applicants in the said application, namely, Prem Singh and Sada Ram did not take Koullan Devi into confidence to file the said application under Order 22 Rule 3 of CPC and she was made as legal heir of Chaitru. It is the case of applicant Koullan Devi that she was not aware about the proceedings of the case titled as Chetru vs. Gurdittu and about the application, which was filed by Sada Ram and Prem Singh under Order 22 Rule 3 of CPC till 25.04.2012.

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It was stated by Koullan Devi in the application that she asked her sons Prem Singh and Sada Ram about the proceedings of the case then both of them said that they have no knowledge of the date of the case and in case she is interested then she may call Mr. Narneder Sharma, Advocate, who was appointed by Shri Chaitru. After that, she inquired about the case tilted as Chetru vs. Gurditu from her husband’s counsel telephonically on 25.04.2012 and then Shri Narender Sharma, Advocate, disclosed to her that the case has been dismissed in default on 16.06.2011 by the Court. It came to the knowledge of

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the applicant for the first time that the application has been dismissed in default without her service in the application. The

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applicant is old lady and having no knowledge of law. Thereafter, she applied for the copy of order dated 16.06.2011 on 27.04.2012. The copy was obtained on 06.06.2012 from the copying agency at Bilaspur. An application under Section 5 of the Limitation Act came to be filed separately for condonation of delay in filing the application under Order 9 Rule 9 of CPC read with Section 151 CPC.

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Learned Civil Judge (Junior Division), Court No.3, Ghumarwin vide its impugned order darted 23.10.2018 dismissed the application filed under Order 9 Rule 9 read with Section 151 of CPC along with application under Section 5 of the Limitation Act.

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Feeling dissatisfied and aggrieved by the said order dated 23.10.2018, Koullan Devi instituted a Civil Miscellaneous Appeal before the Learned District Judge, Bilaspur on 22.12.2018. The learned District Judge vide its impugned judgment dated 02.09.2021 dismissed the appeal as filed by Koullan Devi through her Legal representatives and affirmed the findings as returned by learned trial Court.

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The petitioners have approached this Court by assailing the impugned judgment as passed by learned District Judge, Bilaspur and the order as passed by learned Civil Judge (Junior Division), Court No.3, Ghumarwin.

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It is contended by Mr. Sanjeev Kuthiala, learned

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senior counsel, duly assisted by Ms. Tamanna Sharma, Advocate, that the impugned judgment and order as passed by learned Courts below are erroneous and liable to be quashed and set aside. He submits that the application filed under Order 9 Rule 9 read with Section 151 of CPC by Koullan Devi for the restoration of the application under Order 22 Rule 3, Rule 9 of CPC and application under Section 5 of the Limitation Act ought to have been allowed after condoning the delay in filing the said application. He submits that the present petitioners have been able to make out a case for condonation of delay in filing the application for setting aside the order whereby the application filed by the legal heirs of Chaitru under Order 22 Rule 3, Rule 9 of CPC came to be dismissed in default. He would submit that after accepting the present petition, the applications as instituted by the present petitioners under Order 9 Rule 9 read with Section 151 of CPC and an application under Section 5 of the Limitation Act deserve to be allowed.

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On the other hand, Mr. Umesh Kanwar, learned counsel for the respondents, has defended the impugned judgment and order as passed by learned Courts below. He submits that the perusal of record shows that no case is made out for allowing the application under Order 9 Rule 9 read with

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Section 151 of CPC as well as the application under Section 5 of the Limitation Act. He submits that no sufficient grounds or reasons have been assigned for allowing the said application, and this Court, while exercising the powers under Article 227 of the Constitution of India will not interfere in the well reasoned judgment and order as passed by learned Courts below.

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I have heard learned counsel for the parties and have also gone through the record carefully.

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In the present case, plaintiff Labhu and Longu instituted a suit for declaration and permanent injunction and possession in the Court of learned Civil Judge first Class, Ghumarwin on 16.08.1990. During the pendency of suit, Labhu expired and his legal representatives, namely, Chaitru and Bhangu were ordered to be arrayed as party plaintiffs. Admittedly, the suit as instituted by the plaintiff Chaitru came to be dismissed on 30.12.2000. After the dismissal of the said suit filed by the plaintiffs, the plaintiffs Chaitru and Longu filed application under Section 151 of CPC before the learned Additional District Judge, Ghumarwin, on 17.06.2005 on the ground that since one of the legal representatives of Labhu, namely, Bhangu had expired during the pendency of the suit, the judgment and decree dated 30.12.2000 had been passed against a dead person. Since the legal representatives of said Shri Bhangu were not arrayed as

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parties, it was prayed that the judgment and decree as passed against a dead person be declared as nullity. Consequently, the application filed by Chaitru and Longu under Section 151 of CPC came to be allowed by learned first appellate Court on 14.09.2005

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and after setting aside the judgment and decree dated 30.12.2000, the parties were relegated to the Court of Learned Civil Judge (Senior Division), Ghumarwin, whereby the parties were directed to appear before the said Court on 03.10.2005. The case was listed before the learned Civil Judge(Senior Division), Ghumarwin, on 04.10.2005, who, vide its order, dismissed the suit as having been abated as a whole on account of the fact that since late Shri Bhangu had expired on 07.08.1997, prior to the passing of judgment and decree of the learned trial Court, therefore, the suit has abated automatically on account of death of said plaintiff when no application for impleading the Legal representatives of deceased plaintiff was filed well in time. Learned Civil Judge (Senior Division) had granted liberty to the plaintiff to file application under Order 22 Rule 9 of CPC for setting aside the abatement in accordance with law.

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The plaintiff filed an application under Order 22 Rule 3, Rule 9 of CPC along with Section 5 of the Limitation Act for bringing on record and for setting aside the abatement on account of death of late Shri Bhangu. During the pendency of said

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application, plaintiff Chaitru expired. His two sons, namely, Prem Singh and Sada Ram filed application under Order 22 Rule 3 of CPC on 02.03.2006 to bring the legal heirs of deceased Chaitru on record. As per record, the said application came to be dismissed in default on 16.06.2011. After about one year, applications under Order 9 Rule 9 read with Section 151 of CPC and under Section 5 of the Limitation Act came to be filed by the wife of deceased Chaitru, namely, Smt. Koullan Devi. She filed the said application for the restoration of application under Order 22 Rule 3, Rule 9 of the CPC and application under Section 5 of the Limitation Act, which stood dismissed in default. In the application, it was averred that she was not aware about the proceedings of the case titled as Chaitru vs. Gurdittu . She levelled allegations against her sons, namely, Sada Ram and Prem Singh that they did not take her into confidence while filing the application under Order 22 Rule 3 of CPC. When she inquired about the status of the said case, she claimed that Sada Ram and Prem Singh told her that she can inquire about the case from counsel of her husband, namely, Shri Narender Sharma. It was only then on 25.04.2012, Shri Narender Sharma, Advocate, disclosed that the case had been dismissed in default on 16.06.2011 by the learned Court. Thereafter, steps were taken to obtain the certified copy of the order and application came to be

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filed. In the application which was filed under Section 5 of the Limitation Act, it was averred that she was not aware about the proceedings initiated by her husband Shri Chaitru. She came to know about the dismissal of application under Order 22 Rule 3, Rule 9 on 25.04.2012 telephonically, which was disclosed to her by the counsel Shri Narender Sharma, Advocate.

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In order to substantiate her case, the applicant examined Shri Bhupender, son of Shri Prem Singh and a copy of affidavit was placed on record as Ext. AW-1/A. In his affidavit, he stated that he is the legal heir of Koullan Devi. For the restoration of the case, an application was filed, which came to be dismissed on 16.06.2011. Chaitru had filed a civil suit and during the pendency of the same, Shri Chaitru had expired and only Sada Ram and Prem Singh were made as legal heirs and not Koullan Devi. Smt. Koullan Devi came to know on 25.04.2012 that she had not been arrayed as one of the applicants/legal heirs in the said application. When she inquired from Prem Singh and Sada Ram, they told her that she can inquire from their counsel, namely, Shri Narender Sharma, Advocate. After making inquiry, Shri Narender Sharma, Advocate, told her that the suit, which was instituted by her husband, had been dismissed on 16.06.2011. Prior to 25.04.2012, she was not aware about the said fact. She was also unaware that why she had not been

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made as one of the legal heirs in the application under Order 22 Rule 3 of CPC. His grandmother had interest in the suit property and intentionally and willfully Smt. Koullan Devi was not arrayed as one of the legal heirs. The suit may be restored to its original number and the delay in filing the application under Order 9 Rule 9 of CPC be condoned.

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In the cross-examination, AW-1 Bhupender Singh stated that Koullan Devi was his grandmother. Koullan Devi had two sons, namely, Prem Singh and Sada Ram, Prem Singh had expired, and Chaitru Ram was his grandfather. Chaitru Ram expired in 2006. He admitted that the suit has been dismissed. He denied that qua the pendency of the proceedings they were having full knowledge and intentionally and willfully had filed application under Section 5 of Limitation Act belatedly. He denied that they have no right, title or interest over the suit property.

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Smt. Ram Pyari, daughter of Chaitru entered into the witness box as AW-2. She filed her affidavit Ext. AW-2/A. In the affidavit, she reiterated the averments as made by AW-1. In the cross-examination, she stated that her father expired about 10 to 15 years ago. She stated that Koullan Devi was her mother. She stated that her parents had right, title and interest over the suit land.

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In order to rebut the case of the applicant, the respondents/non-applicants entered into the witness box. Jamna Dass appeared as RW-1 and stated that Chaitru had instituted a suit against him about 25-26 years ago. The said suit came to be dismissed in the year 2005. He stated that the suit came to be dismissed during the lifetime of Shri Chaitru in the year 2005. After the dismissal of the suit, no appeal was filed by Shri Chaitru. Thereafter, the sons of Chaitru had filed one suit against him, which also came to be dismissed. He stated that Ram Pyari has got no right, title or interest over the suit property and that Koullan Devi has expired.

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In his cross-examination, he stated that Chaitru was his uncle. The suit which was filed by Chaitru in which his father, Gurdittu, was the party defendant. Chaitru had two sons, namely, Prem Singh and Sada Ram. On 16.06.2011, wife of Chaitru Smt. Koullan Devi was alive. He denied the suggestion that Prem Singh and Sada Ram without informing Koullan Devi got the suit dismissed. He denied that Koullan Devi was not aware about the case as instituted by Chaitru against the defendants. He denied all the suggestions as made by learned counsel for the applicant.

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A perusal of the application when read in conjunction

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with the evidence as led by the parties, makes it clear that no sufficient grounds have been made out in the application for

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setting aside the order whereby the application under Order 22 Rule 3, Rule 9 of CPC and application under Section 5 of the Limitation Act came to be dismissed in default. The record shows that the application under Order 22 Rule 3, Rule 9 of CPC came to be filed by the sons of late Chaitru, namely, Prem Singh and Sada Ram. In the application, they have averred that, on the basis of Will, they are the legal heirs of late Shri Chaitru. Though, the application under Order 22 Rule 3, Rule 9 read with Section 5 of the Limitation Act came to be dismissed in default on 16.06.2011, however, application was filed by Smt. Koullan Devi for setting aside the said order on 10.06.2012 i.e. after about one year. No explanation has been assigned in the application or in the evidence as to why, after the dismissal of the application, which was filed by Sada Ram and Prem Singh, the original sons of Chaitru and Koullan Devi, no steps were taken by the legal representatives for setting aside the said order. The most interesting aspect that has emerged in the present case is that, though the application was filed under Order 22 Rule 3, Rule 9 of the CPC along with application under Section 5 of the Limitation Act on behalf of Prem Singh and Sada Ram, however, they have not come forward for the restoration of the said applications. Instead of filing restoration application on behalf of said

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applicants, Koullan Devi has come forward for the restoration of those applications.

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As rightly held by learned Courts below that in case the present applications are allowed, then the applications which were filed by Sada Ram and Prem Singh for which they have not come forward shall be restored. In support of the applications Bhupender Singh, son of Prem Singh has entered the witness box. In the application, it has been averred by Smt. Koullan Devi that when she inquired from Prem Singh and Sada Ram they told her that in case she wants to inquire about the case she can do so and ask the counsel of the husband of the applicant. She had levelled allegations against Sada Ram and Prem Singh by stating that the said persons did not take her into confidence while filing the application under Order 22 Rule 3, Rule 9 of CPC for bringing on record the legal representatives of deceased Chetru. On the one hand, allegations have been levelled against Prem Singh and Sada Ram and on the other hand, son of Prem Singh has been examined in order to restore the application under Order 22 Rule 3, Rule 9 read with Section 5 of the Limitation Act. The stand being adopted by the applicant is contradictory and does not inspire confidence.

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In support of the application Ram Pyari, daughter of Chetru has entered the witness box as AW-2. It seems that the

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applications have been filed at the behest of the daughter, as Sada Ram and Prem Singh in the application under Order 22 Rule 3, Rule 9 have setup a Will on behalf of their father. Both the Courts below have rightly come to the conclusion that no case is made out for setting aside the order, which was passed by learned trial Court on 16.06.2011, whereby the application under Order 22 Rule 3, Rule 9 read with Section 5 of the Limitation Act came to be dismissed in default. Even otherwise, the main suit came to be dismissed as having been abated on 04.10.2005. Thereafter, application under Order 22 Rule 3, Rule 9 of CPC and another application under Section 5 of the Limitation Act came to be filed for bringing on record the legal representatives of deceased Bhangu Ram. During the pendency of said applications, plaintiff Chetru Ram had expired and application for bringing on record his legal representatives was filed and the same came to be dismissed in default on 16.06.2011. Meaning thereby, as of today, the suit which was filed by the plaintiff has been ordered to be dismissed as having been abated on 04.10.2005.

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Learned counsel for the respondents in order to support his contention that no sufficient cause has been shown while filing the present application has relied upon the judgment of this Court as passed in CMPMO No.480 of 2023, titled Ram

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Swaroop(deceased) through LRs vs. Rajinder Singh , where in

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it was held as follows:

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“23…….. it must also be borne in mind that while construing the sufficient cause while dealing with the application under Section 5 of the Limitation Act, substantive right in favour of the decree holder accrues and this right ought not to be outrightly disturbed. The Court should maintain balance between the the decree holder and judgment debtor while dealing with application under Section 5 of the Limitation Act. It is well settled that the Courts despite establishment of sufficient cause for various reasons may refuse to condone the delay depending upon the bonafide of the party. It has been repeatedly held by the Hon’ble Supreme Court that when the mandatory provision is not complied with and delay is not properly and satisfactorily explained, it ought not to be condoned on sympathetic grounds alone. The Liberal approach in considering the sufficiency of cause for delay should not be allowed to override the substantial law of limitation. Concepts such as “liberal approach”, “Justice oriented approach”, “substantial justice” cannot be employed to the substantial law of limitation”, The expression “sufficient cause’ as occurring in Section 5 of the Limitation Act cannot be liberally interpreted if negligence, inaction or lack of bonafide is writ large. 24. The Hon’ble Apex Court in case titled as Pathapati Subba Reddy (died) by LRs and others vs. The Special Deputy Collector (LA), Special Leave Petition(Civil) No.31248 of 2018 , held as under:

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“26. On a harmonious consideration of the provisions of the law, as aforesaid, and the law laid down by this Court, it is evident that:

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(i) Law of limitation is based upon public policy that there should be an end to litigation by forfeiting the right to remedy rather than the right itself;

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(ii) A right or the remedy that has not been exercised or availed of for a long time must come to an end or cease to exist after a fixed period of time;

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(iii) The provisions of the Limitation Act have to be construed differently, such as Section 3 has to be construed in a strict sense whereas Section 5 has to be construed liberally;

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(iv) In order to advance substantial justice, though liberal approach, justice-oriented approach or cause of substantial justice may be kept in mind but the same cannot be used to defeat the substantial law of limitation contained in Section 3 of the Limitation Act;

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(v) Courts are empowered to exercise discretion to condone the delay if sufficient cause had been explained, but that exercise of power is discretionary in nature and may not be exercised even if sufficient cause is established for various factors such as, where there is inordinate delay, negligence and want of due diligence;

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(vi) Merely some persons obtained relief in similar matter, it does not mean that others are also entitled to the same benefit if the court is not satisfied with the cause shown for the delay in filing the appeal;

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(vii) Merits of the case are not required to be considered in condoning the delay; and

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(viii) Delay condonation application has to be decided on the parameters laid down for condoning the delay and 18 | 2 2 condoning the delay for the reason that the conditions have been imposed, tantamounts to disregarding the statutory provision.

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25. The above exposition of law clearly stipulates that liberal approach, justice-oriented approach or cause of substantial justice may be kept in mind, but, the same cannot be used to defeat the substantial law of limitation.”

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In the present case also, no sufficient cause has been pleaded and proved in order to restore the applications which came to be dismissed in default on 16.06.2011, therefore, the right which has accrued to the respondents cannot be taken away in a routine manner.

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The power under Article 227 is limited to see that the Courts below function within the limits of their authority or jurisdiction. The High Court cannot interfere with the findings of fact recorded by the subordinate Court or Tribunal while exercising its jurisdiction under Article 227. The Hon’ble Apex Court has held that, over the last 50 years, it has consistently been observed that the limited jurisdiction of the High Court under Article 227 cannot be exercised by interfering with findings of fact or by setting aside the judgments of the courts below on merits.

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Hon’ ble Apex Court in Civil Appeal No. 2226 of 2010 , titled State of Haryana & others vs. Manoj Kumar ,

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decided on 09.03.2010 has held as follow:-

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“23. More than half a century ago, the Constitution Bench of this court in Nagendra Nath Bora and Another v. Commissioner of Hills Division and Appeals, Assam & Others AIR 1958 SC 398 settled that power under Article 227 is limited to seeing that the courts below function within the limit of its authority or jurisdiction.

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24. This court placed reliance on Nagendra Nath's case in a subsequent judgment in Nibaran Chandra Bag v. Mahendra Nath Ghughu AIR 1963 SC 1895. The court observed that jurisdiction conferred under Article 227 is not by any means appellate in its nature for correcting errors in the decisions of subordinate courts or tribunals but is merely a power of superintendence to be used to keep them within the bounds of their authority.

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25. This court had an occasion to examine this aspect of the matter in the case of Mohd. Yunus v. Mohd. Mustaqim & Others (1983) 4 SCC 566. The court observed as under:-

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"The supervisory jurisdiction conferred on the High Courts under Article 227 of the Constitution is limited "to seeing that an inferior Court or Tribunal functions within the limits of its authority," and not to correct an error apparent on the face of the record, much less an error of law. for this case there was, in our opinion, no error of law much less an error apparent on the face of the record. There was no failure on the part of the learned Subordinate Judge to exercise jurisdiction nor

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did he act in disregard of principles of natural justice. Nor was the procedure adopted by him not in consonance with the procedure established by law. In exercising the supervisory power under Article 227, the High Court does not act as an Appellate Court or Tribunal. It will not review or reweigh the evidence upon which the determination of the inferior court or tribunal purports to be based or to correct errors of law in the decision."

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26. This court again clearly reiterated the legal position in Laxmikant Revchand Bhojwani & Another v. Pratapsing Mohansingh Pardeshi (1995) 6 SCC 576. The court again cautioned that the High Court under Article 227 of the Constitution cannot assume unlimited prerogative to correct all species of hardship or wrong decisions. It must be restricted to cases of grave dereliction of duty and flagrant abuse of fundamental principles of law or justice, where grave injustice would be done unless the High Court interferes.

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27. A three-Judge Bench of this court in Rena Drego (Mrs.) v. Lalchand Soni & Others (1998) 3 SCC 341 again abundantly made it clear that the High Court cannot interfere with the findings of fact recorded by the subordinate court or the tribunal while exercising its jurisdiction under Article 227. Its function is limited to seeing that the subordinate court or the tribunal functions within the limits of its authority. It cannot correct mere errors of fact by examining the evidence and reappreciating it.

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28. In Virendra Kashinath Ravat & Another v. Vinayak N. Joshi & Others (1999) 1 SCC 47 this court held that the limited power under Article 227 cannot be invoked

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except for ensuring that the subordinate courts function within its limits.

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29. This court over 50 years has been consistently observing that limited jurisdiction of the High Court under Article 227 cannot be exercised by interfering with the findings of fact and set aside the judgments of the courts below on merit.”

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29. To the similar extent, the Apex Court in Civil Appeal

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No. 3072 of 2022 , titled as Ibrat Faizan vs. Omaxe Buildhome

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Private Limited , decided on 13.05.2022 has held as follows: -

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“14. In view of the above, in the present case, the High Court has not committed any error in entertaining the writ petition under Article 227 of the Constitution of India against the order passed by the National Commission which has been passed in an appeal under Section 58 (1) (a) (iii) of the 2019 Act. We are in complete agreement with the view taken by the High Court. However, at the same time, it goes without saying that while exercising the powers under Article 227 of the Constitution of India, the High Court subjects itself to the rigour of Article 227 of the Constitution and the High Court has to exercise the jurisdiction under Article 227 within the parameters within which such jurisdiction is required to be exercised.

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14.1 The scope and ambit of jurisdiction of Article 227 of the Constitution has been explained by this Court in the case of Estralla Rubber v. Dass Estate (P) Ltd., (2001) 8 SCC 97, which has been consistently followed by this Court (see the recent decision of this Court in the case of Garment Craft v. Prakash Chand Goel, 2022 SCC Online SC 29). Therefore, while exercising the powers under Article 227 of the Constitution, the High

¶108

242026:HHC:29703

¶109

Court has to act within the parameters to exercise the powers under Article 227 of the Constitution. It goes without saying that even while considering the grant of interim stay/relief in a writ petition under Article 227 of the Constitution of India, the High Court has to bear in mind the limited jurisdiction of superintendence under Article 227 of the Constitution. Therefore, while granting any interim stay/relief in a writ petition under Article 227 of the Constitution against an order passed by the National Commission, the same shall always be subject to the rigor of the powers to be exercised under Article 227 of the Constitution of India.”

¶110

Therefore, in the considered opinion of this Court, there is no infirmity, illegality or perversity in the impugned judgment and order as passed by learned Courts below and they have rightly determined and adjudicated the point in controversy and the same does not call for any interference.

¶111

Consequently, the present petition, being devoid of any merit, deserves to be dismissed. Ordered accordingly. Pending miscellaneous application(s), if any, shall also stand disposed of.

¶112

( Romesh Verma ) Judge

¶113

20^th July 2026 (vt)

Koullan Devi Deceased through Lrs Pushpa Devi and Ors. v. Gurdittu Deceased through Lrs Jamna Dass and Ors.

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Koullan Devi Deceased through Lrs Pushpa Devi and Ors. v. Gurdittu Deceased through Lrs Jamna Dass and Ors.

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